Tax Compliance in Immigrant Communities: Bangladeshis in the UK by Akhand, Z
1 
 
 Tax Compliance in Immigrant Communities: 
Bangladeshis in the UK 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Md Zakir Hossain Akhand to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Accountancy  
In March 2018 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis employs Bourdieu’s theory of practice to explore small immigrant 
business owners’ adaptation to the host country’s income tax system. In doing 
this, the thesis applies a sociological perspective in the theorizing and study of 
their tax compliance behaviour. Drawing on a survey (N=101) and in-depth 
interviews (N=27) with Bangladeshi family business owners and their tax advisers 
in the UK, this thesis demonstrates that immigrant business owners’ engagement 
with the host country’s tax system is grounded in the sociocultural status they 
inherit from their country of origin, even though their social class positions in the 
new society unconsciously condition and impact on how they practise tax 
compliance. Findings suggest that the power relations inherent in the tax 
professional-taxpayer relationship act as a critical factor in the reproduction and 
transformation of immigrant business owners’ moral disposition towards 
compliance with tax laws. The thesis argues that the ways small Bangladeshi 
family business owners think, feel and act in their approach to tax compliance is 
likely to differ not only from those of native business communities but also from 
those of other immigrant communities in the UK.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and Statement of the Problem  
 
This thesis is about how small immigrant family businesses deal with the tax 
compliance challenges posed by the income tax system of the host country.  In 
particular, it employs Bourdieu’s theory of practice to examine the tax compliance 
perceptions and behaviours of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK. 
Understanding immigrants’ tax attitudes is an increasingly important area for tax 
research in immigrant-receiving countries, given the impact it may have on these 
countries’ income tax systems. The knowledge gained from this thesis should 
inform the operations of tax administrations and government agencies, so that 
they may better respond to the tax assistance needs of immigrant communities 
and encourage compliance from these communities.  
 
Paying taxes according to prescribed tax laws is a challenging task. For an 
immigrant taxpayer, paying taxes is far more challenging than for a local-born 
taxpayer, because of the differences between tax legislation and cultural values 
in the former’s homeland and that of the hostland (Yuan et al., 2013; Yong, 2011; 
de Vries, 2007; Fix and Pixel, 1994).  The Latino small business owner’s 
perception of the US tax system, “Here one needs a license for everything, and 
pays taxes for everything, which isn’t the situation in El Salvador,” signifies how 
strange the host country’s tax system may seem when compared with the one 
“back home” (Delgado, 2011:87). Similarly, an Indian family business owner’s 
comment on the New Zealand tax system, “I mean GST, PAYE, company tax and 
FBT, those are huge burdens on running a business,” reflects how frustrating tax 
14 
 
compliance can seem for an immigrant business (de Vries, 2007:79). Cullis et al. 
(2012) argue that differences in national fiscal identity is an important factor in 
explaining the differences in people’s willingness to pay income tax.  
 
Tax regulations and engagement with the tax system are not only a concern for 
immigrant communities to developed countries, but also for immigrants to 
developing countries.  In a comparative study among the African, Indian and 
European ethnic communities in South Africa, Mitchell (2012) finds that complex 
tax regulations are perceived as the most problematic policy areas for immigrant 
businesses in all communities, along with access to accounting and record-
keeping advice – a finding that also applies to ethnic businesses’ perceptions in 
New Zealand (Yong, 2011).  
 
In consideration of the significant contribution immigrant businesses make to 
public revenues, and the employment they create, it is worthwhile asking the 
question – How do immigrant businesses manage their compliance with tax laws? 
Tax compliance has been studied from different perspectives and viewpoints 
such as economics, sociology, psychology, and law (Onu and Oats,2015; 
discussed in detail in section 3.4) and different factors such as age, gender, 
religion, education, and culture (Milliron, 1985; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Morris and 
Lonsdale, 2004); but there has been little attempt to understand it from the 
viewpoint of immigrant communities in either developed or developing countries.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the Research  
 
This section identifies the factors that motivate the research undertaken in this 
study and discusses their importance as research topics. Three different yet 
interconnected factors motivate the research setting. First, family businesses are 
the most prevalent and pervasive form of business, representing 50-90% of GDP 
15 
 
in almost all economies (Rayney, 2013); but the research on them, particularly 
about their tax compliance attitude is very limited. Second, immigrants in 
developed and developing countries are mainly engaged in small businesses, 
most of which are owned and run by the family members. Third, immigration and 
its contribution, of which tax compliance and tax payment is one, is a major 
concern for many immigrant-receiving countries as reflected in the 2016 Brexit 
vote in the UK. To explore the tax compliance attitudes of the immigrant 
communities, Bangladeshis, who constitute an important segment of the growing 
immigrant population in the UK, can be used as a case study. 
 
These three factors are discussed in the following three sub-sections, where sub-
section 1.2.1 discusses the motivation for focusing on family business/small 
business, sub-section 1.2.2 highlights the importance of immigration and 
immigrant businesses in the host society and finally sub-section 1.2.3 discusses 
the reasons for choosing the Bangladeshi immigrant community as the case.   
 
1.2.1 Why Family Businesses?   
 
Family businesses dominate the economic landscape of almost all economies. In 
the UK, family businesses account for two-thirds of all businesses, which means 
they account for 71% of all SME businesses (BIS, 2014). Looking elsewhere, 
family businesses constitute 80% of all businesses in Canada and 90% of all 
companies in the United States (Feltham et al., 2005). In India, 16 family groups 
make up 65% of all private sector assets (Rouvinez and Ward, 2005). One 
defining characteristic of small businesses is their intricate connections to family 
and strong belief in the benefits of family business dynamics (de Vries, 2007). 
Ethnic minority small businesses are more likely to be owner-operated than 
businesses owned by the natives, with, for example, 21% of Bangladeshi 
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businesses and 33% of Pakistani businesses being owner-operated, compared 
to 13% of businesses owned by UK natives (IPPR, 2007). 
 
Research on family business is comparatively young (Nam and Herbert, 1999), 
and research on their tax compliance behaviour is even younger. Review of 
extant literature indicates that the tax research on family businesses has mainly 
focused on inheritance tax (Rouvinez and Ward, 2005; Tsoutsoura, 2015; 
Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999; Block, 2010). The dearth of taxation research in 
family businesses leads to Chrisman et al.’s (2003:31) question: “Do family firms 
do accounting differently? Would they tend to understate profit to lower tax 
payments?” Similarly, Shanker and Astrachan (1996:117) raise the question: “If 
family businesses represent 90% of all US businesses, how much in total taxes 
do they pay?”   
 
1.2.2 Importance of the Immigration Context 
 
In today’s world, where the number of international migrants continues to 
increase, reaching to 244 million in 2015 (United Nations, 2015), an appreciation 
of their tax compliance behaviour is crucial1. The UK is a common destination for 
immigrants from around the world, hosting 9 million of them and making it one of 
the most ethnically diverse countries in Europe. Non-native ethnic groups, 
including white Europeans, make up 14% of the UK population, with South Asians 
(Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) maintaining a high position on the list 
(Office of National Statistics, 2011).   
 
                                                          
1 In the literature, there is no distinction between immigrant and ethnic minority businesses 
(Panayiotopolous,2006). Rath (2000) comments that immigrants make up ethnic minority groups, 
and their activities, economic and social, are based on their ethnicity.   
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Immigrant communities own about 7% of the small and medium sized enterprises 
in the UK (Donut, 2014) and 62% of them are family owned. Immigrant 
businesses contribute £25 billion, including tax and other forms of contribution, 
annually to the UK economy, and most of these are owned by Indian, 
Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Black African immigrant families (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, UK, 2013).   
 
How immigrants adapt to the host country’s tax requirements, interact with the 
tax system, and use available social agencies on tax advice are concerns cited 
by a number of tax researchers (Yuan et al., 2013; Yong, 2011; Delgado, 2011). 
A unique feature of immigrant businesses is that they evolve with the experiences 
and solidarity of small groups of people within or beyond the family (Janjuha-
Jivraj, 2003; Mitchell, 2012). To understand the tax-paying mentality of 
immigrants in developed countries, some studies have looked at the contribution 
they make and the benefits they receive from public coffers (Dustmann et al., 
2010; Wang and Lo, 2000; Akbari, 1989; Simon, 1984; Fix and Passel, 1994). 
What these studies have not focused on is the way immigrants connect with, and 
maintain an interface with, the new tax system in their everyday business lives.  
 
The forms of assistance needed, and the challenges faced by the immigrant and 
native businesses are not the same (elaborated in section 2.4). Starting and 
managing businesses is far more difficult for immigrants than for natives. In 
recognition of the financing needs of disadvantaged communities in the UK, there 
are tax incentives schemes, for example Community Investment Tax Relief 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). Another UK tax aid, 
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the Office of Tax Simplification2, addresses tax complexity issues as a common 
problem for all businesses, starting with a focus on small businesses. However, 
there exists no such scheme specifically designed to orientate immigrant 
communities’ engagement with the UK’s tax system.3 It is likely that the common 
ethno-cultural and socio-economic backgrounds of immigrant businesses in 
many respects influence the perceptions4 of tax compliance of those who run 
them. 
1.2.3 Why Bangladeshis?  
 
Bangladeshi immigrants constitute 3% of the non-UK born population and 10% 
of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East (ONS, 2011). They are one of the 
fastest rising business communities in the UK, owning a significant share of 
restaurant and catering services (Wood et al., 2012). Out of the 8,500 Indian 
restaurants in the UK in 2012, 7,200 were owned by Bangladeshis, and their 
cuisine has become a staple part of the British national cuisine (Thaker and 
Barton, 2012).  It is believed that Bangladeshis and the other four largest ethnic 
minority groups in the UK (Indian, Pakistani, Black African and Black Caribbean) 
will double in size by 2050 (Donut, 2014).  
As an immigrant community, Bangladeshis have the lowest employment rate, 
with 44% being employed, 8% unemployed and 48% inactive, not part of the 
                                                          
2 The Office of Tax Simplification, established in the UK in 2010, and charged with addressing the 
problems of complexity in the tax system, has as one of its primary goals the simplification of tax 
for small and micro-businesses (HM Treasury, 2016). 
 
3 The UK has the longest tax code in the world. It overtook that of India in 2010, having trebled in 
size since 1997, and has more than 17,000 pages (Jelf, 2010; The Guardian, 2015). 
4 Perceptions of tax compliance means the way taxpayers capture and understand the social and 
economic realities of income tax payment (Sheffrin and Triest, 1992) Taxpayers may view income 
tax payment unfair in terms of the reward and punishment and administrative process of the tax 
system which is likely to discourage their compliance with tax obligations. Their perception of tax 
compliance can also be affected by the belief that the tax system is unfair and the benefits they 
receive against the contribution made are not equitable (Chau and Leung,2009).    
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labour force including pre-school children, students, pensioners and housewives 
(IPPR, 2007). Of the economically active Bangladeshis, 21% are self-employed, 
mainly because the jobs they have access to are underpaid.  Bangladeshis tend 
to have a larger family size than the UK national average which makes it easier 
to open a family business (IPPR, 2007). Research on the income tax payment 
behaviours of the Bangladeshi small family business community can be a good 
start to predict the tax compliance of the immigrant family businesses in general.  
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study  
 
As discussed in the previous section, and given the gap identified in the literature, 
the main objective of the study was to explore income tax compliance, and the 
management of tax risk, by small immigrant businesses in the context of a 
developed country.  The specific objectives were:  
1. To identify the aspects of tax compliance most problematic for 
Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK, and to understand these 
businesses’ perceptions of tax system complexity.  
2. To examine the extent of the dependence on tax advisers of Bangladeshi 
family businesses in the UK, and the nature of the relationship between 
the two parties in relation to the latter’s management and achievement of 
tax compliance.  
3. To explore the tax habitus of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses in the UK 
by examining the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors influencing 
attitudes to tax compliance in the host country.  
 
Keeping these objectives in mind, the study would review the extant literature on 
income tax compliance in general, and would focus on the taxation of small 
businesses, to which group most immigrant businesses belonged. The study was 
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intended to contribute to an understanding of the underlying stories of how small 
immigrant businesses managed tax compliance in the host society, looking 
particularly at the case of small Bangladeshi family-owned businesses in the UK.  
 
1.4 Research Question and Methodology  
 
The research would identify the problematic areas of tax compliance and look at 
how these were managed by the small immigrant family businesses. It would 
investigate the underlying reasons why some areas of tax compliance were more 
problematic than the others, the extent to which immigrant businesses depended 
on professional tax advisers to solve these problems, and the way the relationship 
between businesses and advisers evolved. It would also explore the nature of tax 
habitus of the Bangladeshi small business owners in the UK. So, this thesis 
effectively has three main research questions with five subsidiary questions 
under main research question one and two, the answer to which is believed to 
contribute to the answer of the related main research question.     
 
Main Research Question 1 
Is Bangladeshi small family businesses’ engagement to the UK tax system 
problematic?   
Subsidiary questions to main research question 1 
(I) What aspects of tax compliance are most problematic for small Bangladeshi 
family businesses in the UK? 
(II) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses perceive the UK tax system 
and its complexity?  
Main Research Question 2 
How is tax risk managed in the Bangladeshi small business community?  
Subsidiary questions to main research question 2 
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(III) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses manage tax risk? 
(IV) To what extent do small Bangladeshi family businesses rely on tax 
advisers?  
(V) What is the nature of the relationship between the small Bangladeshi family 
businesses and their tax advisers? 
Main Research Question 3 
What is the tax habitus of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK?  
 
The main and subsidiary research questions listed above were formulated after 
an appraisal of the extant literature on tax compliance. The socio-economic and 
ethno-cultural factors associated with these questions and the data analysis 
methods will be discussed in chapter 5. Then, in a set of empirical chapters – 6, 
7 and 8 – the questions will be answered. The first main research question having 
two subsidiary questions, of which the first one focuses on the most problematic 
areas of immigrant family business tax compliance, and the second subsidiary 
question, on their perception of tax system complexity, will be answered in 
Chapter 6. The second main research question having three subsidiary 
questions, 3 to 5, will be dealt with in Chapter 7.  And the third main research 
question that investigates the nature of tax habitus of Bangladeshi family 
businesses will be dealt with in Chapter 8.   
 
This study applied a mixed-method approach for data collection. First, a 
quantitative inquiry was undertaken in a questionnaire survey of sample small 
immigrant businesses, and this produced data that was analysed using statistical 
techniques.  Second, a qualitative approach, in the form of semi-structured 
interviews, was conducted, and the data collected was analysed by interpretation. 
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The study had the limitations common to all questionnaire surveys. A complete 
discussion on limitations will be given in Chapter 5, Section 14.       
 
Thus, the aim of the study was not only to determine the frequency of tax 
compliance problems for immigrant family businesses, but also to interpret the 
compliance practices taken by those interviewed using Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice as the theoretical lens.  The aim was to provide a rich picture of the 
Bangladeshi family business community, their economic and social 
circumstances, family links and educational attainments, and to find out how they 
perceived and managed their tax compliance activities. Bourdieu’s theory has 
been widely used for understanding the social and economic practices of ethnic 
communities, and the problems of relationships and conflicts that arise among 
them (discussed in detail in chapter 4).  
 
In taxation and accounting studies, Bourdieu is increasingly being used to 
illuminate these subjects (Oats and Morris, 2015; Gracia and Oats, 2012; Kraal, 
2013; Picciotto, 2007; Glover, 2010; Swedberg, 2011).  Bourdieu’s framework is 
a trio of interconnected constructs of habitus, capital and field.  Simply stated, 
habitus relates to the mental and cognitive structures that influence the way in 
which individuals perceive and react to the social world around them; capital 
relates to the intrinsic value of assets owned by individuals, exchangeable or non-
exchangeable; and field refers to the social space where individuals from all 
social, cultural and economic classes exist and interact with one another. Each 
of these concepts would be applied to the investigation into how Bangladeshi 
small businesses organized themselves to responded to their tax compliance 
obligations.  
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1.5 Scope of the Study 
 
The study looked at the income tax compliance (henceforth termed ‘tax 
compliance’) problems that immigrant businesses faced, and the way they 
managed these.  The focus of the study was small businesses owned by families 
in the Bangladeshi community in the UK, and particularly their attitudes to tax 
system complexity and tax risk, and the nature of the relationship they maintained 
with tax advisers. For an enhanced understanding of these problems, both the 
immigrant communities’ and the tax advisers’ viewpoints were investigated. 
Since the unit of study for this research was small businesses owned and 
managed by the immigrant families, the research did not investigate non-family-
owned small businesses; nor did it look at any medium sized businesses.  The 
study limited itself to consideration of the Bangladeshi community across the 
major cities of the UK, and consideration was not given to other ethnic 
communities.  Focus on one ethnic community may affect the generalizability of 
the study findings, yet the study conclusions are believed to be robust because 
of the similarities in difficulties immigrant communities encounter in the host 
society.  
Therefore, a review of the cultural, social and economic practices of, and the 
status of, the Bangladeshi community in the UK was needed in order to 
understand how Bangladeshi business people developed their perceptions of tax 
complexity and managed their tax compliance.  The study also briefly reviewed 
tax practice in these people’s homeland, i.e., in Bangladesh, so as to give an 
account of their pre-migration tax compliance experiences, since these might 
have affected their views on the complexity of tax systems in general, and that of 
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their newly adopted country in particular. The thesis will make a brief presentation 
on these two topics in Chapters 2.  
1.6 Significance of the Study  
 
Before my study, tax compliance had been studied from within a wide range of 
academic disciplines. Modern tax compliance scholarship began with Gary 
Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the economic behaviours of crime and 
punishment, which were later modelled by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). While 
economists (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 972; Andreoni et al., 1998) 
focused on the sanctions and punishments devised to enforce tax compliance, 
psychologists (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Grasmick and Scott, 1982) 
emphasised people’s sense of shame, guilt and stigma, they experienced from 
tax non-compliance; and sociologists (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993; Chau and 
Leung, 2009) looked at people’s perception of how others obeyed social norms 
and practices.  In addition to these scholars, political scientist, accountants, legal 
scholars and organizational scholars all had their own ideas as to what would 
promote higher tax compliance (Katz and Bommarito, 2014; James, 2007; Duff, 
2008; Picciotto, 2007).  
None of the above academic disciplines, however, had made a sufficiently 
convincing argument, despite the variety of evidence they had presented, about 
the problems of tax compliance within different tax-paying communities. Nor was 
there a ‘one size fits all’ approach that explained how tax compliance might be 
achieved for taxpayers from different cultures and beliefs. For example, civil 
penalty as an enforcement tool was found to have increased tax compliance in 
Guatemala when it was reduced, but to have decreased tax compliance in Costa 
Rica when it was increased (Maxwell, 1998).  There existed evidence that some 
25 
 
people would comply with tax obligations even if there was no probability of being 
caught attempting non-compliance (Andreoni et al., 1998).   
Against this background, the present study is important because tax compliance 
problems vary with respect to variations in taxpayers’ socio-economic and cultural 
identity. Torgler (2004) argues that many of the differences in their attitudes to 
tax systems between Costa Rican and Swiss taxpayers can be explained by the 
cultural differences between these two countries.  Similarly, the higher tax morale 
in the US, as compared to European countries, is attributable to a sturdy base of 
religious and social capital, along with strong democratic practices and trust in 
government (Alm and Torgler, 2006).  
The present study considered the impact of the cultural and social capital of 
Bangladeshi small businesses in their conceptualization of tax obligations and 
their networking with the wider community, especially with tax advisers. It was 
intended to give the reader a deeper understanding of the tax compliance 
practices observed in an ethnic community, which, it was believed, would make 
an original contribution to tax compliance scholarship.  
The study was intended not only to fill a gap in the literature in relation to how 
immigrant businesses adapted to the tax system in a new country, but also to 
show how immigrants running businesses integrated socially and economically 
into a host country. Alienation from the mainstream society, the stigma of being 
an outsider and the difficulties in accessing to information and capital are some 
of the common challenges for the immigrant communities (elaborated in section 
2.4). 
Investigating the tax compliance practice of immigrant communities is important 
in a world of mass migration. Research has suggested that immigrants pay more 
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in taxes than the value of the public services they receive, and they are not 
considered a drain on the public coffers in major immigrant-receiving countries 
like the UK and the USA (Dustmann et al., 2010; Fix and Passel, 1994; Wang 
and Lo, 2000). In the tax year 2003-4, all immigrants, business and individuals, 
paid £41.2 billion in UK tax and made a net fiscal contribution of approximately 
−£0.4 billion (Rowthorn, 2008). However, the net contribution from non-EEA 
immigrants became negative during 1995-2011(Dustmann and Frattini, 2013). It 
should be mentioned here that this study did not focus on the tax compliance 
issues of the immigrant communities for the 1995-2011 period. But it was hoped 
that, by looking at tax compliance of a specific year, might shed some lights on 
why contributions to the public exchequer from the immigrants had fallen.  
The findings of the study are likely to have a practical bearing on the achievement 
of both higher tax revenues and flexibility in the tax system for the UK. The UK 
hosts the fourth largest number of international migrants; and Bangladeshis are 
the fifth largest diaspora community in the world (United Nations, 2015). 
Historically, the UK and Bangladesh have maintained strong ties in the fields of 
trade and commerce and cultural exchange. In the fiscal year 2012-13, 
Bangladesh received export proceeds of USD 2.764 billion from the UK, which 
was 10. 23% of the total export receipts of the country.   Bangladesh also received 
nearly USD 1 billion in remittances and USD 45 million of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from the UK (UKBCCI, 2015). To resolve tax compliance 
problems on both sides, UK-Bangladesh double-taxation treaties have been in 
force since 1980.  The UK has also provided significant technical and economic 
assistance for the introduction of tax administration reforms in Bangladesh 
(Akhand and Hubbard, 2012). It was hoped that studying the compliance habits 
of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK might open new dimensions in tax policy 
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management and treaty-making at both domestic and international levels.  
Moreover, the study may help make the policy action necessary to support their 
integration into the tax system. Finally, the study’s concentration on family 
businesses – an important segment of the small business community – would 
provide an insight into the unique features of small business taxation. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each of which touches on different 
aspects of the study to answer the research questions.  
Chapter 1 gives an outline of the research problem, its aims and objectives.  It 
sets out the research question, the methodology and theoretical framework 
adopted; and it discusses the scope and significance of the study.  
Chapter 2 provides the background of the study. It also offers a brief overview of 
Bangladeshi culture, and of tax compliance in Bangladesh.  
Chapter 3 reviews previous knowledge of immigrant businesses’ tax compliance 
and identifies the gap in this knowledge that the research study sought to fill. The 
chapter has mainly four sections. The first section reviews immigrant family 
businesses as a business community, their significance, and their contribution to 
society. The second section discusses tax system complexity, its nature and 
types with a focus on the UK tax system. The third section looks at general 
theories of tax compliance and the complexity of tax requirements. And section 
four deals with approaches to tax risk and its management and the role that tax 
advisers play in managing such risk.     
28 
 
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework of the study.  It summarizes and 
evaluates the theory of practice of Pierre Bourdieu, and justifies the relevance 
and contribution of this theory to the understanding of the research problem.  
Chapter 5 describes the methodology of the study, the data that was collected, 
and the analytical techniques applied to it. It sets out the research questionnaire 
and presents an analytical framework to show how the main and subsidiary 
research questions were answered.  
Chapter 6 identifies the aspects of the tax system that are most problematic for 
immigrant businesses’ tax compliance. This chapter also provides an overview of 
immigrant businesses’ perception of tax system complexity and of how those 
perceptions problematize their engagement with the tax system. A wide range of 
socio-economic and cultural issues are analysed to explore how such perception-
building is associated with business families’ status in the host country.  
Chapter 7 addresses the tax risk management practices of immigrant businesses 
and the extent to which these businesses depend on tax advisers to mitigate the 
problems they encounter.  It explores the nature of the relationship between 
immigrant businesses and tax advisers as they seek to resolve tax risk issues.    
Chapter 8 explores the tax habitus of small Bangladeshi family business owners 
in the UK and the ways they produce tax compliance in their everyday lives. It 
examines the social fields, the volumes and forms of capitals possessed by small 
Bangladeshi businesses owners and their impact on developing tax compliance 
practice.   
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Chapter 9 spells out the conclusion of the thesis and highlights the contribution it 
makes to the field of knowledge. It discusses the policy implications of the study 
and indicates its limitations and the scope for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of immigrant businesses in the 
UK. It is divided into four sections mainly. The first section discusses the 
characteristics of the UK immigrant businesses, the contributions they make and 
the challenges they face in doing business. The second section reviews 
Bangladeshi family businesses and their significance in UK society. The third 
section presents a brief overview of the challenges of immigrant businesses. The 
fourth section discusses small business tax compliance practice in Bangladesh 
and the major hurdles for successful small business taxation in that country. 
Teasing out the nature and characteristics of immigrant businesses will point up 
the gap in the relevant body of knowledge that led to the generation of the 
research question for this study. 
2.2 Immigrant Businesses in the UK 
 
The entrepreneurial activity rate among immigrants is very high: 16% among first-
generation immigrants in comparison with 9% among UK-born entrepreneurs 
(GEM, 2015). This picture is similar to that painted by Chang et al. (2009:289): 
“Hispanic immigrants are more likely to start businesses than Hispanics who are 
already American citizens”. Immigrant entrepreneurs have founded or co-
founded nearly half a million, i.e., one in seven, of all companies in the UK (CEF 
and Deudil, 2014), and in 2014 they owned 7% of UK SME businesses. Immigrant 
businesses not only create employment for themselves, they also employ English 
natives.  
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2.2.1 Characteristics of UK Immigrant Businesses  
 
Immigrant businesses in the UK, and elsewhere, can be identified with the 
following business, managerial and ownership characteristics:  
The initial customer base of immigrant businesses is confined to their own 
community. Immigrants tend to start businesses with ethnic goods, for example, 
rice, fish, and newspapers in their native language (Kloosterman et al., 1999).  
However, as a business grows, its customer base can be diversified, reaching 
beyond the community to others with similar religious or historical backgrounds. 
With a common historical background in the Indian Subcontinent, Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani and Indian communities in the UK are engaged in family, social and 
business relationship (Dale, 2008).   
Among UK Asian communities, family participation in businesses is common 
practice for several reasons. First, appointing an outside employee is expensive. 
Second, finding a job is difficult. Third, for social and religious reasons, husbands 
want their wife to be employed within the family boundary in a light clerical job.  
Inability to speak good English is another barrier to many spouses working 
outside family firms (Basu and Altinay, 2002).    
Immigrants in the UK are driven to working in businesses by both economic (the 
desire to earn money) and non-economic (independence, status) motives, as well 
as by labour market discrimination (Watson et al., 2000; Basu and Altinay, 2002). 
The following poem, by Sook Ryul Ryu (cited in Park, 1997:36), illustrates the 
ethnic dilemma and the gravitation to small businesses of Korean Immigrants in 
the US.  
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“My brother who has master’s degree in English literature 
thinks about Norman Mailer’s American Dream 
while selling fishes and vegetables to his white neighbours 
                                    24 hours a day. 
My sister, who liked the paintings of Pablo Picasso’s Blue 
         Period, is working on a sewing machine, with dyed blue 
Hair.” 
 
Immigrants find it difficult to adjust to the institutional and regulatory framework 
of the host country. Distressing experiences within the formal structures may 
push them to seek business support and advice from the informal sector and 
largely depend on ‘cash-flow and turnover rather than margin’ (Halkias and 
Adendorff, 2014: 85). Sepulveda et el. (2008) find that immigrant businesses in 
the UK depend on informal sector advisers5 to help them avoid the difficulties of 
the regulatory and financial systems. Similarly, Kloosterman et al. (1999) find that 
the difficult tax, accounting and financial systems in the Netherlands lead many 
immigrant businesses to depend on informal sector advice.  
Immigrant businesses are found to be unique in deriving social capital from 
diverse international networking, which gives them an edge over non-immigrant 
businesses.  For suppliers, clients, workers and investors of capital, immigrant 
businesses exist in an embedded relationship with community people and firms 
(Rath, 2000; Halkias and Adendorff, 2014).  
2.2.2 The Mix of Immigrants and Immigrant Businesses in the UK 
 
The UK is a settler society with a long history of immigration. The latest surge of 
immigrants in the UK began slowly after the Second World War and increased to 
an unprecedented scale in the late 1990s (Migration Watch, UK, 2016).  Even if 
                                                          
5 Seeking advice or support on business start-up, finance, and taxes “through the entrepreneur’s 
personal network, notably by friends, relatives, acquaintances and community members who 
have greater business experience” rather than institutional advisers like local authorities, advice 
bureaus, and banks (Sepulveda et al.,2008:16). 
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the UK comes out of the European Union, there is some doubt about how much 
control of immigration will be possible in a post-Brexit Britain, if the free movement 
of British goods and services in the EU market remains the choice of the UK 
government (Oxford Migration Observatory, 2016).  
In terms of ethnic background, the UK population can be classified into four 
groups: white, mixed, Asian and African (ONS, 2011).  The white group includes 
the Irish, gypsy or Irish travellers, and all other whites, and it makes up 86% of 
the UK population, as represented in Figure 1.1.  Asian immigrants constitute 
7.5% of the UK population, and this group is dominated by Indians, Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis, while African and Caribbean peoples together form the third 
largest UK migrant community, which constitutes 3.3%. Besides these groups, 
there is a small community of Arab and Chinese immigrants, and other marginal 
immigrant communities from across the world.   
Figure 1. 1 Ethnic groups in Britain in 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics, 2011  
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The term ‘immigrant businesses’ in the UK refers to those businesses having at 
least half of their management team made up of people from immigrant 
communities (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). The 
entrepreneurial ability and the aspirations of immigrants in starting businesses is 
higher than that of UK-born entrepreneurs: for example, the business start-up 
rate is 35% for Black African and 28% for Black Caribbean groups, compared 
with 10% for white British counterparts (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, UK, 2013).   
Immigrant entrepreneurs start their businesses at a younger age than UK born 
entrepreneurs, and immigrant women have a higher level of business start-ups 
than the UK population. In some immigrant communities – Thai, Filipino and 
Vietnamese – female entrepreneurs outnumber male entrepreneurs (CEF and 
Deudil, 2014). The Oxford Migration Observatory report for 2014 suggests that 
the percentage of highly educated recent immigrant workers, which includes 
employees, the self-employed and workers in family businesses, increased from 
50% in 2007 to 60% in 2013. 
Self-employment rates are high among UK immigrants because of their genuine 
entrepreneurial ability (IPPR, 2007) and, to some extent, because of the social 
discrimination they face (Ram and Jones, 2008). Kloosterman et al. (1999) 
comment that first-generation immigrants are largely pulled, and the second 
generation is pushed, into being self-employed in all countries, due to the lack of 
employment opportunities and ‘discrimination’ in the mainstream labour market 
(Rath, 2000).  Others, however, have suggested that the self-employment rate of 
immigrants depends on their country of origin. Yuengert (1995) finds that United 
States immigrants from countries with a high self-employment rate are more likely 
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to be self-employed. Self-employed immigrants are also more concentrated in 
high-tax states, where self-employment gives them greater opportunities for tax 
avoidance.  
Closely related to this phenomenon is the finding that migrants don’t just build up 
their own businesses; they also build up others’ businesses, in both the skilled 
and the unskilled sectors.  Significant innovations made by immigrant business 
in the UK, for example in biotech firms, have created employment and business 
opportunities for all business communities. Sayad (1999) comments that what the 
immigrants bring in is more important to immigrant-receiving countries than what 
they cost.  Knowledge transfer from immigrants and immigrants’ businesses have 
played a key role in developing a wide range of businesses opportunities for 
mainstream business (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, UK, 2015). 
Also, the immigrant self-employed sector is a significant source of business and 
employment for new immigrants (Yuengert, 1995).   
2.2.3 Geographical Spread of the UK’s Immigrant Businesses 
  
Immigrant businesses are represented in almost all the great cities of the UK. As 
stated in the 2016 report from the Oxford Migration Observatory, 13% of Britain’s 
immigrants live in the City of London alone. When these are added to those in 
South East, East and North-West London, the percentage of the immigrant 
population found in London reaches 47%. The Midlands, both West and East, 
host 16% of the immigrant population and take second position. The South West, 
York and Scotland each have an equal percentage, 8% of the immigrant 
population, while Wales and Northern Ireland are populated by the fewest 
immigrants. The report reveals that in all cities, except in London and the West 
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Midlands, the percentage of immigrants from the EU is more than, or equal to, 
that from non-EU countries.   
Table 2. 1 Distribution of the immigrant population across the regions of the UK, 
by place of birth, 2015 
 
  EU Non-EU All 
London 30% 41% 13% 
South East 13% 12% 14% 
Eastern 10% 8% 9% 
North West 8% 8% 11% 
West Midlands 7% 8% 9% 
East Midlands 7% 5% 7% 
South West 6% 5% 8% 
York 6% 6% 8% 
Scotland 6% 4% 8% 
Wales 3% 2% 5% 
Northern Ireland 3% 1% 3% 
North East 1% 2% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
  Source: Oxford Migration Observatory, 2016  
 
London has always been the most ethnically diverse area of the UK, with the 
highest proportion of immigrant businesses, as shown in Table 2.1. Minority 
ethnic groups comprise nearly half of London’s population (ONS, 2011), with 
around 66,000 Black African and minority-ethnic businesses generating a total 
turnover of £90 billion in 2004 (Sepulveda et al., 2008). In 2002, nearly 19% of all 
small businesses in the UK were based in London (Basu and Altinay, 2002). In 
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greater London, a total of 220,637 businesses, almost half of the immigrant 
businesses in the UK, were founded by immigrants (CEF and Deudil, 2014).  
Ethnic and linguistic diversity have brought London huge foreign investment, 
adding £52 billion to its economy, and creating half a million jobs (Kitching et al., 
2007). About London’s booming flow of FDI, Kitching et al. (2007:11) comment, 
“While the crucial importance of access to resources, infrastructure and markets, 
a favourable taxation and regulatory framework, … should not be under-
estimated as major influences on FDI… ethnic and linguistic diversity might be a 
contributory factor in firms’ location decisions.”   
In terms of the geographical distribution of immigrant business, Birmingham, 
Harrow and Manchester are next to London, followed by Reading, Ilford and 
Cardiff (CEF and Deudil, 2014).  The construction and real estate sectors are the 
main focus of immigrant businesses, with nearly 50,000 such companies being 
owned by immigrant businesses. Other business sectors dominated by 
immigrants are information technology, manufacturing and heavy industry, and 
management consultancy.  
For Asian businesses like those run by Indians and Pakistanis, wholesale and 
international trading is the main business, while Bangladeshis and Turkish 
Cypriots are involved in the restaurant and catering businesses (Basu and 
Altinay, 2002; Thaker and Barton, 2012). Ram and Jones (2008) note that ethnic 
minority communities are prominently engaged in labour-intensive sectors like 
retailing and catering: for example, two in five men in Bangladeshi communities 
in the UK are cooks or waiters (Panayiotopoulos, 2006). This, to some extent, is 
connected with the availability of family and co-ethnic workers. Ethnic businesses 
comprise sole-proprietor businesses, family businesses, home-based activities 
38 
 
and community activities located around established shopping and market areas 
(Carney, 2007).  
2.3 Bangladeshi Immigrants and Their Businesses  
 
Bangladeshis and other South Asian immigrants are one of the fastest rising 
business communities in the UK, owning a significant share of restaurant and 
catering services (Ram and Jones, 2008; Wood et al., 2012). Out of the 8,500 
Indian restaurants in the UK in 2012, 7,200 were owned by Bangladeshis, and 
their cuisine has become a staple part of the British national cuisine (Thaker and 
Barton, 2012).  The reason for ethnic businesses being concentrated in some 
specific sectors is that they have access to specific ethnic resources, such as 
cheap and unpaid family labour and trusted supply networks (Wood et al., 2012). 
Moreover, minorities specialize in trade and commerce in which they have 
historical experience (Light, 2005). Bangladeshis have been present in the UK 
catering industry since they first arrived in the country.  
In terms of age, Bangladeshi business owners in the UK are young, with an 
average age of 35.3 compared to 52.1 for British entrepreneurs; and they occupy 
sixth position in the UK’s age distribution profile of immigrant businesses (CEF 
and Deudil, 2014).  
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Figure 2. 1 Population of the UK by country of birth (Bangladeshi born) 
 
Source: Migration Watch UK, 2016  
According to the Migration Watch report, the number of Bangladeshi-born people 
in the UK in 2015 was over 200,000, as reported in Figure 2.1. In 2006, there 
were more than 250,000, but this number has fluctuated during the last ten years. 
The Bangladeshi community in the UK mainly comprises Sylheties, who came 
from the Sylhet District of Bangladesh as lascars (cooks) in British ships after the 
Second World War (Basu and Altinay, 2002). Almost half of Bangladeshi 
immigrants (47%) arrived in between 1981 and 2000, during the perilous political 
and economic turmoil following the Bangladeshi war of independence in 1971 
and the military coups in 1975 and 1981 (ONS, 2011).  
Bangladeshi immigrants constitute 3% of the non-UK born population and 10% 
of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East (ONS, 2011).  Naturally, 
Bangladeshi immigrants had culinary and hospitality skills from serving as cooks 
in British ships, and they sought to exploit these when considering setting up a 
business.  Bangladeshi curries are among the most popular dishes in the UK, 
and until recently 65% of the Tandoori restaurants in the UK were Bangladeshi 
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(Thaker and Barton, 2012), which makes curries a niche market for Bangladeshi 
businesses (Wood et al., 2012). Most Bangladeshi immigrants arrived in the UK 
from the Commonwealth as work permit holders, student migrants, family 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (IPPR, 2007).          
Bangladeshi immigrants have strong cultural ties with the Indian and Pakistani 
communities (Barret et al., 2003). Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, as South 
Asian neighbours, have a deep cultural and ethnic relationship developed over 
their thousand years of common territorial borders, before the partition in 1947 
(Dale, 2008). Culturally, Bangladeshi immigrants are more akin to Indian 
immigrants, while in their religious life they have more in common with Pakistani 
immigrants. One similarity between ethnic Bangladeshi and Pakistani businesses 
is that both emerge from a situation of disadvantage, having no successful 
business role models (Wood et al., 2012). Due to their religious beliefs, 
Bangladeshis and most Muslim communities in the UK depend mainly on their 
own community for supplies, sales, and financing for their businesses (ONS, 
2011). Their scriptures strictly prohibit charging interest on loans, although they 
take a positive view towards business ownership because prominent figures in 
Islam were successful entrepreneurs (Wood et al., 2012). Thus, one of the 
barriers to Bangladeshi entrepreneurs taking finance from banks is interest (Basu 
and Altinay, 2002). Second, the participation in business of women from the 
Bangladeshi community is very limited, at only 20%, (Migration Watch UK, 2014), 
perhaps because of the community’s conservative beliefs.  
 
As an immigrant community, Bangladeshis have the lowest employment rate, 
with 44% being employed, 8% unemployed and 48% inactive, not part of the 
labour force including pre-school children, students, pensioners and housewives 
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(IPPR, 2007). Of the economically active Bangladeshis, 21% are self-employed, 
mainly because the salaried jobs they have access to are underpaid, offering less 
than the national average wage (IPPR, 2007). Barret et al. (2003:106) comment 
that “the Bangladeshis … have a higher involvement in businesses with 
employees (13.6 percent) than do the less-disadvantaged Indians (8.7 per cent).” 
Bangladeshis tend to have a larger family size than the UK national average and 
are the second largest claimants of child benefit, which makes it easier to open a 
family business (IPPR, 2007). They have very low incomes compared to UK-born 
people – nearly 80% below the UK-born median – and this is also the case for 
most Asian and Middle Eastern communities (Migration Watch UK, 2014).  
2.4 Challenges and Prospects of Immigrant Businesses in the UK  
 
Each business has its unique situation and special needs (Greenhalgh and 
Lowry, 2011). Unfamiliarity with mainstream cultural traditions makes it difficult 
for immigrants to set business strategies and gain acceptance in the wider 
community. One problem for immigrant businesses is getting access to quality 
information on business and financial record-keeping. Sepulveda et al.’s 
(2008:14) comment that, “lack of information on critical aspects for new 
businesses (i.e. registration procedures and requirements, taxes, regulations and 
red tape in general) and access to relevant business advice”.  The bureaucratic 
and formal approach of support agencies, compliance costs, and the stigma of 
being an immigrant cause them to avoid formal advice centres (de Vries, 2007; 
North and Trlin, 2004).  
The legal status of immigrants in the UK (IPPR, 2007; Basu and Altinay, 2002) 
causes them much insecurity in their business and economic activities. Many 
immigrants are on a temporary visa, which creates problems in running a 
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business legally and paying proper taxes. Further, their business motives, 
business experience, educational attainment, religion, and family links create 
challenges for immigrant businesses (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2013).   
To survive in a world of cut-throat competition, cutting costs through “evading 
payment of taxes, or social contributions or ducking the minimum wage or 
working- hour regulation” is an often-followed strategy for immigrant businesses 
(Kloosterman et al.,1999:9). Non-immigrant business owners in Australia equate 
tax-cheating with Asian and Eastern European immigrants, and they also believe 
the latter keep shoddy records and invoices and pay wages in cash. The truth, 
however, is that the Inland Revenue in New Zealand (2014) reports finding a 
higher proportion of Australian and UK immigrant businesses tax non-compliant 
than of their Asian counterparts, i.e., Chinese and Indian immigrants.  
To reduce taxes in the UK, several independent or semi-independent immigrant 
businesses may do business under one roof; or a business may sub-contract its 
activities to nominally self-employed workers, but the name of the principal 
leaseholder/contractor appears in the documents (Barret et al., 2003).  
However, dependence on informal arrangements may not be a cheating, but 
rather it may be ignorance, inefficiency or simply the response to a tax system 
that doesn’t cater for them. The following comments from a UK immigrant 
business are worth noting, “I was never afraid of regulations or taxes, but you 
have to deal with taxes and regulations step by step. [Then] when the business 
grows, when you get to the point that you can pay for [being formal], lawyers and 
accountants can help you with these things [taxes and regulations], but you have 
to go step by step,” Sepulveda et al. (2008: 27). To orientate the tax system 
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towards the needs of its customers, and to improve learning about tax, De Vries 
(2007) asserts there is a need for applied education and the availability of 
management support to help immigrant businesses with payment of their taxes 
and the maintenance of books of accounts.  
The challenges may be increased if the regulatory cost of compliance with 
employment, taxation and financial reporting requirements is high. Immigrant 
businesses are often very carefully monitored “to ensure compliance with 
regulations, such as VAT, corporate tax, employment related taxes, health and 
safety and so on” (Watson et al., 2000:86). Significant amounts of tax and other 
compliance costs may lead immigrant businesses to move into the informal 
economy to evade tax payment fully (Watson et al., 2000; Light and Bonachich, 
1988). Pang (2003) finds that immigrant businesses carry the negative image of 
tax-evaders because of doing business within the own social and cultural 
networks. This creates a distance from the native community and generates an 
“enclave economy6”(Panayiotopoulos, 2006:74), or a street economy, as 
Wacquant (1999) calls it.  
The above discussions show that immigrant businesses make a significant 
contribution to the UK’s economy. However, their owners’ interests and voices 
are not well reflected in the UK’s financial and regulatory system. Thus, these 
businesses represent some intentional or unintentional challenges for UK 
government departments, notably for the tax and revenue bodies. In support of 
immigrant businesses, UK government departments have undertaken many 
programmes, from easy access finance to immigrant investment visas. Another 
                                                          
6 It is argued that an enclave economy is a vehicle for the upward mobility of ethnic minorities, 
especially for first-generation immigrants. Employers in the enclave are under pressure to recruit 
workers and business associates from their own community (Panayiotopoulos, 2006).  
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welcome item of support would be help in understanding and engaging with the 
UK’s complex tax system. To achieve that objective, HMRC would need to gain 
more insight into the ways of its migrant business customers, their compliance 
attitudes, and their interface with tax laws; and it would need to identify issues 
that would facilitate their tax compliance.   
2.5 Taxation in the Homeland: SME Tax Compliance in Bangladesh  
 
2.5.1 Tax System of Bangladesh: A Brief Overview   
 
Homeland culture and ethics strongly influence the collective identity of 
immigrants in the host country (Shams, 2016). This thesis takes Bangladeshi 
immigrants in the UK as a case study and explores their tax compliance practices.  
The historic and ongoing tax compliance practices of Bangladeshis back home 
may shape their tax perception in the UK. Habits and values acquired in the 
country of origin do not disappear, or necessarily diminish, as immigrants enter a 
new society. To better understand the relational and reconstruction process of 
forming perceptions of tax compliance and risk management, a brief overview of 
the historical and cultural contexts of the tax ethos in Bangladesh, and of small 
business tax compliance in particular, is presented in this section.  
 
Modern taxation in Bangladesh was introduced during the era of British 
colonialism by the Income Tax Act, 1860. When independence from Pakistan 
came, in 1971, Bangladesh inherited the Income Tax Act, 1922, of India, an 
amended version of the 1860 Act. After 13 years, in 1984, Bangladesh had a 
major reform of tax laws and came up with the Income Tax Ordinance, 1984 (ITO-
1984), which continues to be the principal statute to govern its direct tax system. 
 
The National Board of Revenue (NBR), an administrative department of the 
Internal Resources Division (IRD) of the Ministry of Finance, is the highest 
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revenue authority of Bangladesh, responsible for income tax, VAT and customs 
operations and policies. The secretary of the IRD is the head of the NBR, known 
as the Chairman, and is aided by several members of the Board, and field level 
officers who include commissioners of different ranks and jurisdictions. The field 
administration is divided into territorial, appellate and specialized units/zones, all 
staffed by civil servants.   
 
The Bangladeshi income tax structure has a progressive design, starting with a 
minimum tax rate of 10%, with a threshold of BDT 2,50,000, followed by 15%, 
20%, 25% and 30% on the next segments of income for the tax year 2016-2017 
(NBR, 2016). There are many exemptions and exclusions of income from tax, 
and this is believed to affect the progressivity of the tax structure (CPD, 2014). 
Corporate tax rates are common to all companies, large, small or medium, 
starting from a minimum of 25% and going to a maximum of 45%, with rate 
reductions for companies that make initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Stock 
Exchange and declare dividends. Taxes are mainly collected by the self-
assessment system, although administrative assessment is practised and can be 
used if a taxpayer or the tax administration requires this. Bangladesh has a tax-
type administration, and tax office locations are based on geographical 
distribution. VAT, customs and income taxes are each administered separately, 
and there is barely any collaboration between these three. Computerization and 
automation programmes are under way, and both the income tax and VAT 
departments are being reformed through the Finance Acts and SROs (Mansur at 
el., 2011).   
 
The tax-to-GDP ratio in Bangladesh in 2001 was 6.6%, and this had increased to 
9 percent by 2013, an increase of 2.4 percent in 12 years (World Bank, 2016). 
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VAT is the major source of tax revenues, followed by income tax and customs 
and excise, contributing 36.19%, 35.76% and 25.52%, respectively to NBR 
revenues in the fiscal year 2013-14 (NBR, 2016).  Despite tax revenues having 
increased in recent years, it is still a major concern that the country is far from 
achieving its revenue potential (Mansur at el., 2011). Bangladesh is one of the 
world’s top recipients of humanitarian assistance, of which the UK alone donated 
a commendable £157.5m in 2015 (ICAS, 2016). Social security insurance is 
absent from Bangladesh tax system, and thus no employers have any 
requirement to pay it (PWC, 2016).   
 
2.5.2 Tax Ethos in Bangladesh  
 
Bangladesh is one of the high-tax-gap countries of South Asia, with its tax gap 
estimated to be 36% in 2004 (Phua, 2015); and it has a weak tax administration 
and policy (Hassan and Prichard, 2016). Fewer than 1%, to be exact 0.73%, i.e., 
1.1 million, out of its 150 million population submitted tax returns in 2013 (ICAS, 
2016). The number of people who paid tax would be less than this, since 
submission of a tax return does not necessarily entail tax payment. Of the 
registered taxpayers, 4% pay nearly 40% of the total tax revenue, and 50% pay 
less than 1% of the tax revenue (Phillips, 2009).  Bangladesh is also a country 
with low tax effort (Daude et al., 2012) and a regressive tax structure (CPD, 
2014), and these indicate the inefficiency of the tax system. Moreover, 
Bangladesh has a large informal sector (Torgler, 2004; CPD, 2014), and many 
people work in agriculture, which contributes 18.70 % of GDP (BBS, 2015) and 
is a sector relatively untaxed and tax exempt (Reva, 2015).  
 
However, research has shown that Bangladeshis have good ethical attitudes to 
tax evasion compared to people in other Asian countries. Ethical attitudes to tax 
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evasion refers to whether taxpayers view evasion as never acceptable, sometime 
acceptable or always acceptable (McGee, 2008). Views on tax evasion by age, 
income, gender or nationality are an indication of moral positions on tax 
compliance in general. In focusing on the tax compliance practice of Bangladeshi 
immigrants in the UK, it is important to understand the views on tax evasion of 
Bangladeshis in their homeland, the centre from which the Bangladeshi diaspora 
has spread out. As Shams (2016) has noted, some dimensions of immigrant 
identity are influenced by post-migration experience, others by ongoing and pre-
migration experience in the homeland.  
 
In his study, McGee (2008) finds that the people of Bangladesh are the most 
opposed to tax evasion among the inhabitants of 13 Asian countries, including 
China, India, and Indonesia, while people in the Philippines are the most in favour 
of it.  His findings also suggest that Bangladeshi women are more opposed to tax 
evasion than Bangladeshi men. Likewise, Li (2010) asserts that ethnically and 
linguistically Bangladesh is a homogeneous country, which makes it a country of 
high tax morale. She shows that the average incidence of tax cheating in 
Bangladesh is lower than the global average calculated using survey data from 
67 countries. It may be pertinent to mention here that the UK is one of the OECD 
countries with comparatively low tax evasion, having an average score of 1.1 
during 1999 to 2010, in a range of 0.1 to 3.9, measured as a percentage of GDP. 
The tax morale7 of the UK taxpayers is also on the higher side (Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012). 
                                                          
7 The term ‘tax morale’ was first coined by Schmölders (1960) and Strümpel (1966), who argued 
that economic phenomena were not sufficient to explain tax (non-) compliance behaviour, given 
that many taxpayers behaved honestly despite the existence of opportunities to evade tax 
(Yücedoğru and Hasseldine, 2016).  Tax morale in the literature universally refers to “the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes” (Torgler, 2003: 5), or taxpayers’ inherent tendency towards tax 
compliance (Kirchler, 2007). Luttmer and Singhal (2014:150) define tax morale broadly as “an 
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Rethi (2010), in studying the relationship between cultural dimensions and tax 
evasion using Hofstede’s dimension of culture among 57 countries, finds that 
Bangladesh lies in the middle. He shows that Bangladesh has a tax evasion score 
of 25.6 in an index with a minimum score of 3, obtained by Canada, and a 
maximum of 59.9, obtained by Peru, as reported in Table 2.2.  Rethi however 
points out that, culturally, Bangladesh8 is a country with high power distance, 
which creates inequality of wealth and power in the society, and with medium 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, indicating a medium level of tolerance of 
uncertainty, and the placing of medium importance on material success and 
achievement. But there is low individualism in Bangladesh, which means high 
collectivism and an emphasis on ties between people. Each of these traits have 
an influence on how people behave regarding their tax obligations. Yong’s (2011) 
exploratory study has told us that in a low power distance society, taxpayers feel 
obligated to perform compliance activities correctly and are expected to calculate 
their tax liability independently. Also, in a culture of high uncertainty avoidance, 
taxpayers are more concerned about paper records and accounting systems, and 
                                                          
umbrella term capturing nonpecuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall 
outside the standard, expected utility framework.”  
 
 
8 According to Rethi, Bangladesh has a power distance score of 80, individualism of 20, 
masculinity of 55 and uncertainty avoidance of 60 in an index where the highest scores for each 
of these are 104, 91, 110 and 112 respectively. Tsakumis et al. (2007) explain that in a country 
with a high power distance, the income gap between the upper and the lower classes is high, 
which is likely to create greater opportunities for tax evasion than in a low power distance country. 
In Hofstede’s theory, the four dimensions of culture are uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, power 
distance and individualism (Tsakumis et al., 2007; Brink and Porcano, 2017).  A cultural group’s 
uncertainty avoidance score indicates how vulnerable its members feel in a society, and the extent 
to which they feel threatened or uncertain because of their cultural identity. Masculinity relates to 
the extent to which male roles and values are emphasised over those of females. In a masculine 
society, performance and success are considered more important than care and nurture of others, 
which are denigrated as feminine characteristics.  Power distance indicates the extent to which 
less powerful people in a society accept the unequal distribution of power and social hierarchy. 
Finally, individualism refers to the power of ties and interdependence over individuals in the 
society.  
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in a culture of low individualism, they tend to divulge or share their tax problems 
with their peers. Furthermore, high masculinity correlates with taxpayers using 
accounting and business information for purposes beyond tax compliance.    
Table 2. 2 Tax evasion by country for the year 2008  
 
 
Source: Rethi, 2010  
However, there is research evidence that questions the above findings.  Siddiki 
(2014) argues that Bangladesh is a country with low tax morale and an inefficient 
tax structure, and he identifies these two factors as the key drivers of an 
expanding shadow economy in Bangladesh, estimated to be 37% in 2010. 
Support for this assertion is found in Torgler’s (2004) research on the 
determinants of tax morale. He finds a contradictory case of tax morale in 
Bangladesh: in a descriptive analysis, he finds that Bangladesh has a relatively 
high level of tax morale among 13 Asian countries; but at the same time, 
Bangladesh has a high shadow economy, 35.6% of GNP in the year 1999-2000. 
For this reason, he did not consider the case of Bangladesh in creating his 
estimation model of the possible determinants of tax morale.  
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Again, the National Household Survey on Corruption in Bangladesh, run by 
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) in 2010, shows that 51.3% of 
respondents who had had any interaction with the tax department had been the 
victims of bribery and other forms of power abuse (Pan-Suk et al., 2013). Similar 
evidence was produced by Lee and Gordon (2005), in their study of the effect of 
tax policy on economic growth. They found that Bangladesh was one of the 
countries with high corruption and a low-quality bureaucracy. Picur and Riahi-
Belkaoui (2006) empirically demonstrate that bureaucracy levels and corruption 
control are important determinants of tax compliance in a country.  Furthermore, 
using data from the Global Economic Review of 30 countries, Riahi-Belkaoui 
(2004: 135) claims that tax compliance in a country is positively related to its level 
of “economic freedom, the level of importance of the equity market and the 
effectiveness of competition laws and high moral norms.”  Bangladesh ranks 
poorly in most of these determinants in a list of 140 countries drawn up in 2015-
16 (World Economic Forum, 2015), which, to some extent, indicates the level of 
tax compliance in Bangladesh.   
 
Religion is a defining factor in the social, political and economic life of Bangladesh 
(Shams, 2016), a country that first came into being on religious grounds, as East 
Pakistan, on the partition of India in 1947.  Eventually, East Pakistan became 
independent in 1971, based on the ideals of secularism, socialism and 
democracy. The majority of Bangladeshis, 86.6%, adhere to the Islamic faith and, 
according to the Islamic faith, a taxpayer, if a Muslim, needs to pay zakat9, in 
                                                          
9 Zakat is legal alms in Islam, levied at a fixed rate of 2.5% on accumulated wealth or the net stock 
of assets. It is one of the five fundamental pillars of the Islamic faith. It differs from taxation in the 
sense that it is levied on selected wealth increments, or income, and applies both to individuals 
and businesses (Mohdali and Pope, 2014).  
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addition to paying taxes. To accommodate this, the income tax system of 
Bangladesh allows a rebate on any money donated to the Zakat Board, which is 
run under the Zakat Fund Ordinance, 1982 (NBR, 2016). However, many people 
are not attracted to paying zakat even to get a tax rebate. In the last three 
decades, the Zakat Board has collected only BDT 11.5 crore (approx. 1.1 million 
pounds sterling) (New Age, 2014). McGee (2012) and Jalili (2012) argue that in 
Islamic states it is often believed that the traditional tax system is immoral, and 
income tax should be replaced with zakat, which may make the Muslim 
community believe that tax evasion is sometimes acceptable or even ethical.   
2.6 Small Business Tax Compliance in Bangladesh  
 
Small businesses are estimated to constitute 10.99% of all businesses in 
Bangladesh, and they contributed 22.5% of GDP in 2015 (ADB, 2015). There is 
no record of how much tax revenue is being contributed by small businesses, or 
by small and medium businesses together, in Bangladesh.  
 
The Industrial Policy, 2016, of Bangladesh defines small businesses and 
industries as enterprises having fixed assets of BDT 7.5 million to BDT 150 million 
(excluding the value of land and factory buildings), and employees totalling 
between 31 and 120. For enterprises in the service industries, the fixed assets 
are set at BDT 1 million to BDT 20 million and the number of employees at 
between 16 and 50 (Ministry of Industry, Bangladesh, 2016). Apart from these, 
as well as small and micro businesses, there is a vast cottage industry sector, 
which constitutes 87.52% of all businesses in Bangladesh (BBS, 2015). In terms 
of business ownership, there are 39.01 million family businesses, accounting for 
86.42% of all business ownerships in Bangladesh in 2015 (BBS, 2015).  The 
Industrial Policy does not define a family business, but the features of a cottage 
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industry, as defined there, involve having a total investment below BDT 1 million 
and fewer than 15 workers, indicate a family business.  
 
Similarly, the Income Tax Ordinance of Bangladesh (ITO, 1984) does not have 
any reference to, or definition of, family or small businesses. However, the 
characteristics and conditions used to define a cottage industry largely resemble 
those of a family business – the owner is the investor, worker and entrepreneur, 
and none of the family members or the owner has any other commercial 
enterprise in their names. The ITO also sets BDT 3 lacs (3,000 pounds sterling) 
as the limit of investment in plant and machinery by such industries, and defines 
family relationships as ones that include parents, spouses or children working full 
time or part time, whether for remuneration or not (section 47(a), ITO-1984).  
 
The informality of the way small businesses conduct their affairs is a major 
problem in Bangladesh, and tax compliance issues are a major factor behind this.  
The 2010 census shows that of 55,000 small and medium sized businesses in 19 
district towns in Bangladesh, 70% prefer to remain informal about their business 
status and tax office registration. Giorgi and Rahman (2013) explain that being 
registered with the tax authority in Bangladesh represents a substantial cost for 
small businesses, due to having to keep records for monitoring by the tax 
authority. These undocumented small businesses are not eligible for any tax or 
non-tax government incentives (CPD, 2014).  
 
On a similar note, Hassan and Prichard (2016) comment that any effort to enforce 
SME tax compliance in Bangladesh is confronted with collusion, corruption and 
politicisation. Nearly 50% of the firms in Bangladesh claim that they must give 
gifts when dealing with tax officials (IFC, 2014). Thus, taxpayers use initial returns 
as bait to start negotiations with the tax officials, and in the negotiation process, 
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the tax adviser, auditors and tax officials – all have their share of informal 
payments (Akhand, 2012; Hassan and Prichard,2016). The IMF (2005:35), in its 
Bangladesh country profile, maintains that, “the tax system in Bangladesh … is 
prone to corruption and tax evasions and gives rise to economic distortions”. 
According to the Global Competitiveness Index, the ethical behaviour of 
Bangladeshi firms ranks 135th in a study of 144 countries (World Economic 
Forum, 2015). Based on survey findings, Amin and Banerjee (2007) comment 
that income tax evasion is a common practice in India and Bangladesh, although 
the extent of such practice is higher in Indian small businesses than in 
Bangladeshi ones.  
 
Rahman et al. (2015) comment that tax issues remain the major hurdles for 
inclusive and sustainable development of small business in Bangladesh. The 
findings of their survey of 223 SMEs and 39 large businesses suggest that 80% 
of them are dissatisfied with the tax structure and efficiency of the tax 
administration, and with the high tax compliance and ‘unrelated’ costs (estimated 
to be 40% of tax liability). Survey responses indicate that reduction of tax rates 
and tax simplification are major areas for reform. There are however incentives 
for small businesses as well. For example, income derived from small and 
medium sized businesses engaged in production of any goods and having an 
annual turnover of less than 3 million Bangladeshi Taka (approx. 30,000 pounds 
sterling) is excluded from total income (ITO,1984).  
 
Tax regulations are frequently changed in Bangladesh. Taxpayers and tax 
administrations interpret the tax codes differently, and this creates opportunities 
for corruption and revenue leakage (Reva, 2015).  The IFC (2014) suggests that 
simplifying the tax regime in South Asia, including Bangladesh, would be a key 
54 
 
driver for small enterprise development. Referring to the case of Bangladesh, 
India and Sri Lanka, Gangl et al. (2015), however, comment that the services 
taxpayers receive in those countries, only reduce the time cost of compliance, not 
the monetary cost. 
 
A high tax rate is another major constraint on small business tax compliance in 
Bangladesh (Amin and Banerjee,2007). The IMF (2005:35) notes that, “the tax 
system in Bangladesh entails relatively high tax rates and numerous 
exemptions”. A survey undertaken by the World Bank Group suggests that tax 
compliance costs in the developing countries, including Bangladesh, is highly 
regressive and costs small businesses up to 15% of their turnover (Coolidge, 
2012). Taxpayers in Bangladesh, on an average, take 302 hours to comply with 
their tax obligations and need to make 21 tax payments, against the global 
average of 261 hours and 25.6 tax payments (PWC, 2016). In response to this 
finding, Bangladesh made tax payment less costly by reducing tax rates for 
manufacturing companies, from 37.5% to 35%, in 2014 (PWC, 2016). Tough tax 
requirements, however, have not been a strong reason for the emigration of 
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, in the form of a ‘brain drain’, as has been the case in 
other countries (CPD, 2014).  
 
Jacobs and Kemp (2002) state that small businesses in Bangladesh rarely 
prepare books of accounts and argue that the motivation for this comes from 
within the tax system. They (ibid: 152) observe, “With the existing taxation 
arrangements in Bangladesh it could be in the interest of small traders not to keep 
full accounting records because then it would be possible for taxation authorities 
to determine a tax liability.” Thus, with the current structure of taxation, and in the 
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absence of accounting, it has been difficult for the tax administration to collect 
taxes from small businesses in Bangladesh.  
 
In consideration of all these problems, Bangladesh has undertaken social 
incentives and recognition programmes to encourage tax compliance from all 
classes of taxpayer (Ahmed, 2011).  To expand the net tax take, and dispel fears 
of harassment among small businesses and individual taxpayers, three initiatives 
– a regularly held income tax fair, a development fair, and spot assessment – 
have been tried. Other programmes to attract SME compliance include issuing 
taxpayer identification numbers online, observing 15th September as National Tax 
Day, and raising awareness by street rallies, seminars, workshops and tax clinics. 
The main targets of these programmes are small business taxpayers. It is 
believed that the awareness and tax education programmes of recent years might 
have contributed positively to instilling a culture of tax payment and increasing 
the number of taxpayers in Bangladesh (OECD, 2013).   
 
The next chapter delves into the nature of small business tax compliance in 
particular and tax compliance theories in general.  
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CHAPTER III 
TAX COMPLIANCE IN IMMIGRANT FAMILY 
BUSINESSES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the socio-cultural and economic context of 
immigrant family businesses and their attitudes to tax compliance which will 
enable us to identify a gap in the existing literature and raise the research 
question. This chapter is divided into four major sections. Section 3.2 starts with 
defining family businesses and their essential features and then discusses their 
tax compliance behaviour. This section is sub-divided into six sub-sections.  
Section 3.3, divided into five sub-sections, touches upon the sources and nature 
of tax system complexity and the way these influence tax compliance actions. 
Section 3.4 explains different theoretical approaches to tax compliance and tax 
complexity, with a special focus on immigrant business tax compliance. Section 
3.5, containing six sub-sections, describes the tax risk management and planning 
practices of those running small immigrant businesses, and their relationship with 
tax professionals, from a cultural perspective.  Finally, Section 3. 6 presents the 
chapter summary.  
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3.2 Family Businesses: Importance, Scope and Definition    
 
Family businesses are the most prevalent and pervasive form of business 
(Chrisman et al., 2003), representing 50-90% of GDP in almost all economies 
(Feltham et al., 2005; Rayney, 2013). In the UK, the proportion of family 
businesses is highest among micro businesses (75%) followed by small (57%) 
and medium-sized businesses (43%), as shown in Table 3.1. The percentage of 
family businesses given for a country, however, may vary widely, because of the 
different definitions of a family business (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; Klein, 
2000). For example, the percentage of family businesses in the UK in 2000 varies 
from 15% to 78.5 %, depending on the criteria used (Klein, 2000). 
 
Table 3. 1 Distribution of family businesses in the UK by employee size 
Number of 
employees* 
Number of 
businesses 
Percentage that 
are family 
businesses 
Estimated family 
businesses 
1-9 989,900 75 739,200 
10-49 186,700 57 106,500 
50-249 30,700 43 13,200 
Source: Department for Business and Innovation Skills, 2014. *The business 
classification is made in accordance with the European Union definition.  
 
 
The objectives, governance and management of family businesses are full of 
‘familiness’ (BIS, 2014). A PwC (2014) survey suggests that improving long term 
wealth is the main priority of family firms, followed by business profitability. Family 
ownership, governance and control of a business affect its finance and tax 
compliance behaviours (BIS, 2014; Annuar et al., 2014; Carney et al., 2015). 
Shailer (1993:231) notes that, “The organisational structures adopted by owner-
managers often are likely to be products of taxation planning.”   
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There remains disagreement over the definition of ‘a family business’ (Chrisman 
et al., 2003; Gracia and Andújar,2007; Klein, 2000; Shanker and Astrachan, 
1996). This is a combination of two sub-definitions, family and business (Sharma 
et al., 1997), which implies that the concept of a family business is rooted in the 
concept of family (Cano and Austin, 2010). The family, as a socio-economic unit, 
has taken different arrangements and meanings over time – from non-marital 
cohabitation to marital cohabitation of same - or different-sex partners. In a British 
attitude survey in 2000, 67% of respondents agreed that it was “all right for a 
couple to live together without intending to get married” (Loutzenhiser, 2009:78). 
This prompts Bourdieu (1998:55) to define a family as “a set of related individuals 
linked either by alliance (marriage) or filiation or less commonly by adoption (legal 
relationship)”.  And to Backer (1974), a family is the smallest unit of production 
engaged in the exchange of goods and services, organized through the marriage 
market – a constituent of the domestic economy. Harris (2009:294) comments 
that, “Connection between family and business makes these businesses different 
from nonfamily businesses.” 
 
Seen from this perspective, family businesses aim to find work for family 
members. Swedberg (2011:69) notes that, “As members of an extended family, 
and as part of their responsibility to that family, work is conceived in a very 
different way… that brings in money.” This is supported by North and Trlin 
(2004:21) in their studies of family businesses among New Zealander 
immigrants, where one person observed, “We wanted something suitable we 
could all get involved in”, which reflects the significance of family business for the 
survival of immigrant families. A study by Inland Revenue New Zealand (2014) 
demonstrates that 42% of immigrant businesses have family members as 
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employees. Danes et al. (2008) comment that a family is a rational economic and 
social unit engaged in the exchange of resources within their own boundaries.  
 
Broadly, to be considered a family business, a business must make sure that the 
persons engaged in it have a family bond, with spouse, parents, child or child’s 
direct heirs holding major decision-making rights in the business (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006; James, 1999; BIS, 2014). Since they are managed by a nucleus 
of related individuals, family businesses offer limited access to human, social and 
networking capital, compared to non-family businesses (Laforet, 2012; PwC, 
2014).  Sharma et al. (1997:2) define family businesses as “a business governed 
and/or managed on a sustainable, potentially cross-generational, basis to shape 
and perhaps pursue the formal or implicit vision of the business held by members 
of the same family or small number of families.”   
 
Shanker & Astrachan (1996) propose three categories of family business: a broad 
category, in which the owning family exercises effective control over strategic 
goals and intends that the business shall remain within the family; a middle 
category, in which the founder runs the company, and at least one member of the 
family is involved in the day-to-day operation of the business; and a narrow 
category, in which multiple generations and family members are involved in the 
day-to-day operation and management of the business (Hamilton, 2013). 
According to Chrisman et al. (2003), a family may involve itself only with the day-
to-day management of the business or only with the strategic goal setting, and 
this choice makes the business a narrow or a broad family business. Rouvinez 
and Ward (2005) suggest that a business must fulfil at least one of the following 
conditions to qualify as a family business: three or more family members are 
60 
 
active in the business; two or more generations of the family control the business; 
there is an intention to pass the business to the next generation.  
 
Table 3. 2 Types of family business model 
Model  Characteristics  
Captain  SMEs managed by the founder 
Emperor  Businesses and families united by a leader 
Family Team  Extended family working in a small business 
Professional Family  A few family members engaged in professional 
management of a complex business 
Corporation  Complex family governing a complex business 
Family Investment 
Group  
Family with varying complexities investing together 
Source: Gimeno et al. (2010)  
 
Gimeno et al. (2010) suggest that, along with ownership, we need to consider the 
managerial structure to define a business as family or non-family, and they 
propose six different types of family business model, as shown in Table 3.2. 
Gimeno et al. (2010:69) also comment that the FIG (Family Investment Group) 
model is the one offering a wide range of services to the owners, such as “filing 
tax returns, making tax payments, book-keeping for particular activities, 
insurance and so on”. The family complexity and the business complexity of each 
of the family business models are different, and here tax consultants play a 
significant role alongside other team members like finance managers and 
business lawyers.  
 
Family businesses can be called by various names, for example, owner-managed 
businesses, closely-held companies, private equity firms and so on (Klein, 2000; 
Chrisman et al., 2003). Owner-managed businesses represent a much wider 
class of private company, and they differ from family businesses in the sense that 
owners in a family business may not need to own 100% of the business 
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(Chrisman et al., 2003; Carlock and Ward, 2010). A business in which the owning 
family have a minimum of 5% of places on the board of directors can be termed 
a family business (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Klein,2000). Likewise, in a family 
company, a single family holds more than 50% of the voting shares, and 
effectively controls the business by occupying this key position (Rayney, 2013).  
Even if the family business is publicly listed, the representation of family members 
on the board of directors creates a family hegemony, and the company tends to 
be owner managed. Therefore, it is disingenuous to adhere to a rigid definition of 
a family business without considering the complete spectrum of family ownership 
and management of the business.  
 
3.2.1 Essential Characteristics of Family Businesses    
 
The most important feature of a family business is control of the business by a 
single or a few individuals from the same family for their common benefit. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) comment that the benefits from family-control of a 
family business are expected to be large.  To reap the benefits, most family 
businesses have a family constitution (Gimeno et al., 2010) which covers 
ownership, protocol and managerial issues. If a family member joins the business 
as an employee, s/he needs to sign an employee contract which transforms the 
family relationship into an employment relationship.  
Family businesses may have single or multiple owners (Lipman, 2010; Gimeno 
et al., 2010). They may have owners who are in complete control, with ownership 
consolidated in the hands of a single individual or a couple (e.g., husband and 
wife co-entrepreneurs). They may be a sibling partnership, usually a second-
generation business with two or more siblings. Or they may be a consortium of 
cousins, with many cousins being shareholders, and such businesses are 
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typically multi-generation family businesses.  The diversity and variation of family 
business ownership can be understood as having three dimensions: a business 
dimension, a family dimension, and an ownership dimension.  
Glover (2010) comments that a family business is a symbolic business in the 
sense that, with its economic and cultural capital, it has a symbolic capital, which 
works as a force to continue the business through generations. In a family 
business, one generation passes down assets and money (economic capital), 
skills and tastes (cultural capital), goodwill and brand (symbolic capital) and family 
tradition (both cultural and social capital) to the succeeding generations (Glover, 
2010). The impulse to retain the family name and its ethnic history is one issue 
that influences the growth and potential of businesses (McGoldrick and Troast, 
1999). In Carney’s (2007:289) view, “Family businesses perform both wealth-
creation and wealth-preservation tasks.” This resonates with Bourdieu’s 
proposition that capital is accumulated over time and across generations (Berg, 
2015). Thus, a family business is more than a financial and production 
undertaking: it is a place “loaded with profound social, cultural and symbolic 
significance”, Swedberg (2011:77).   
 
Decision-making in family businesses is informal, flexible and quick (Morris et al., 
1997; Carlock and Ward, 2010), because in most cases, unless there are third-
party shareholders, they are dependent on a single decision-maker, i.e. the owner 
(Feltham et al., 2005). Decision-making, however, may take longer as a business 
ages and becomes larger.  Information is a private resource in a family business; 
whereas in a non- family business, information is a shared resource. One 
advantage of family business owners is that they have first-hand information on 
business problems and their potential solutions (Gimeno et al., 2010). 
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One aspect of family businesses is a lack of sufficient care in governance issues, 
with governance often being influenced by the wishes of family members rather 
than by ideal management practices (Block, 2010). Emotion plays a significant 
role in these businesses’ performance appraisal, although this may have a good 
side: greater emphasis on family wishes may make the owners more concerned 
about the business (Bloack,2010). Family businesses are more concerned about 
generational issues, whereas non-family businesses are concerned about current 
issues (Tsoutsoura, 2015; Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999).  Family businesses 
raise capital mainly from within the family and friends, or from reinvestment of 
retained earnings, which has significant tax and business implications 
(Poutziouris, 2011).  
3.2.2 Immigrant Communities and Family Businesses  
 
Most immigrant businesses are owned and managed by family members (Nam 
and Herbert, 1999; Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014), which makes 
immigrant family businesses a sub-set of family businesses. Faccio and Lang 
(2002) find that non-financial and small firms in the UK and in continental Europe 
are more likely to be family controlled. Immigrants turn to family businesses for 
two reasons – to earn a living and to be their own boss (Halkias and Adendorff, 
2014; Mitchell, 2012; Basu and Altinay, 2003). Having a business also converges 
with a desire to make a socio-economic contribution to one’s own community by 
creating jobs and income (Bjuggren and Sund,2001; Feltham et al., 2005).  
 
Immigrant communities have an established tradition of engaging in family 
businesses (Mitchell, 2012; Janjuha-Jajvir, 2003; Basu and Altinay, 2002). Strong 
family dynamics and business involvement are essential features of immigrant 
family business, together with a strong work ethic and ethnic connections (de 
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Vries, 2007). While financial independence is an important motive, a family 
business is also a stepping stone to finding work for all family members in a 
foreign land. Dissociating family from the business will not only impose costs on 
the business, but it will also impact on family ties adversely (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2006).   
 
Chang et al.’s (2009) study of the Hispanic community in the US suggests that, 
in business start-ups, family members provide ample support. They contend that 
family support in immigrant businesses is multifaceted, and more important than 
other sources of support. Research in other communities, for example among the 
Chinese communities of the US (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006), the European and 
Asian communities of New Zealand (Yong, 2011 and Yuan,2013), the South 
Asian communities of the UK (Janjuha-Jajvir, 2003), and the Afro-Asian and 
European communities in South Africa (Mitchell, 2012) has come up with similar 
findings.  
 
The main business activities of immigrant family businesses involve retailing, 
running restaurants and garment-manufacturing (Mitchell,2012; Ram and 
Jones,2008). These family businesses also play a significant role in bringing 
foreign capital and an expansion of international trade to the hostland and to 
homeland businesses (Carney, 2007; Halkias and Adendorff, 2014). Immigrant 
businesses not only strengthen their own community ties, they also bring vibrancy 
to other community businesses (BIS, 2015).  In some countries, immigrant family 
businesses hold a substantial share of private-sector assets. For example, the 
ethnic Chinese constitute 3% of the Indonesian population, but they own 70% of 
Indonesia’s private sector assets (Carney, 2007).    
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However, immigrant family businesses are not solely concerned with bringing 
capital and expanding international business: they also transmit money and 
capital to their country of origin, to support families back home (Delgado, 2011; 
Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014). Carney (2007:289) notes that family 
business units are not just a value-creation device; they may also work as a 
“wealth-protection and intergenerational and/or geographical transmission device 
used to preserve and transfer wealth through various informal and often 
nontransparent means”.  This reality makes them more dependent on cash 
transactions, as Andrejuk (2016:381) puts it in his statement: “Immigrants 
possess bank accounts because they are a necessity in Western countries, but 
they prefer to conduct business transactions in cash.” 
 
3.2.3 Role of Social and Cultural Capital in Immigrant Businesses  
 
It is practically impossible to understand the behaviour of immigrant family 
businesses without understanding the cultural context in which they operate 
(Danes et al., 2008). Bjursell (2011) indicates that cultural context and family 
business culture are strongly connected. McGoldrick and Troast (1999:283) 
assert that ethnic identity influences the “communication, values, relationships, 
and preferences in business practices”. However, they add that ethnicity is not 
the only determinant that influences behaviour: a person’s socio-economic 
status, age, gender, education, and mastery of the host country’s language also 
influence his perception of practices. The reason for Vietnamese immigrants in 
Poland seeking advice from a Vietnamese accountant is because “his fluency in 
Polish helps him with the business and he serves as an intermediary between 
the diaspora and the host society”, as Andrejuk (2016:394) finds.  
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In cultural matters, immigrant family businesses are strongly influenced by 
personal and social factors,as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3. 1 Personal, social and cultural factors affecting immigrant family 
businesses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate’s own figure 
 
As Figure 3.1 shows how social, cultural and socio-economic status influence the 
immigrant family businesses. To start with, their social capital can be derived from 
formal or informal, internal or external sources. Formal means institutional 
supports, like government agencies whereas informal implies connections with 
friends, families and community organizations. The figure describes that  
gender, age and education play an important role in forming cultural and socio-
economic capital.  The interplay of these three forms of capital decides the daily-
life operations of the business community.  Erick et al. (2009, quoted in Delgado, 
2011) in their study of Latino immigrant family businesses in the US, find that 
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business start-ups and venture capital are mainly mobilized through social 
connections.  A PwC (2014) report reveals that family businesses maintain 
powerful networks of relationships for buying and selling goods. Patronizing an 
immigrant family business, for its customers and suppliers, is seen as 
empowering the community and creating solidarity among ethnic members 
(Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Danes et al., 2008; Andrejuk,2016). Harris 
(2009:292) comments that, “Family businesses that have an ethnic background 
in common with customers, employees, and suppliers may receive preferential 
treatment… simply because of an associated group identity.” Even in a low trust 
society, “subgroups within the larger population may enjoy elevated levels of 
social solidarity”, as Carney points out (2007:290).  
 
The social or informal structure does not limit a business to drawing on its own 
community network but allows it to use the resources available in the wider 
community (Kloosterman et al.,1999; Rothengatter,2005). Janjuha-Jivraj (2003) 
finds that first-generation South Asian family businesses in the UK limit 
themselves to their own ethnic community for informal support, while second-
generation immigrants have access to the wider community.  In explaining the 
need for social networks among Hispanic Immigrants in the US, Chang et al. 
(2009) assert that these immigrants depend more on family members than on 
external sources, either from preference or necessity (McGoldrick and Troast, 
1999; Halkias and Adendorff, 2014).  
 
Ram and Jones (2008) find that for the African-Caribbean communities in the UK, 
it is particularly difficult to obtain capital from formal financial institutions.  Bertrand 
and Schoar (2006)  make the argument that if formal institutions are weak or non-
existent, solid family ties become the second-best solution for any business 
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support. The other reason for dependence on family may be a business owner’s 
relocation background and home-country experience of trust and legal protection.  
 
Another reason for dependence on social networks is that they may reduce 
business risk, improve business capabilities and offer new opportunities (Peredo 
and Chrisman,2006). The interrelationship between family firms and their 
communities enables the former to take more risk than their capacity suggests, 
because the risk is being borne and shared by community members, due to their 
sense of solidarity. Drori et al. (2010:15) state that, “Social capital enhances 
economic opportunities by leveraging resources towards the establishment of 
migrant-friendly businesses.” This resonates with Bourdieu’s idea of social capital 
enabling the exploitation of resources through contacts (Bourdieu, cited in Danes 
et al., 2008). Bertrand and Schoar (2006), however Small Chinese family firms 
dominate business in Taiwan and Hong Kong (Dobbins, 2005), suggest that 
dependence on narrow “familism” and kinship networks may impede the growth 
potential of immigrant businesses. Similarly, Bjursell (2011) cautions that kinship 
may bring hazard for family businesses.  
 
Model (2008, cited in Delgado, 2011) asserts that cultural and ethnic capital 
creates opportunities for immigrant family businesses. Cultural networks provide 
both employees and markets, economic capital, and emotional and psychological 
support (North and Trlin, 2004). These are the raison d’etre of ethnic family 
businesses.  Danes et al. (2008:231) explain that, “Because family is a conduit of 
culture and core cultural values, family structure and relationships are even more 
integral to understanding the management processes of ethnic-family businesses 
than mainstream businesses.”   
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3.2.4 Taxation in Family Businesses and Immigrant Communities   
 
The relatively little research done on family businesses and on immigrant family 
businesses suggests that the characteristics of the owning families critically affect 
business and tax policies (North and Trlin, 2004; de Vries, 2007: Yong, 2011; 
Yuan et al., 2013; Carney, 2007). 
 
Nam and Herbert (1999), in their study of Korean immigrant businesses in the 
US, find that immigrant businesses encounter major problems with respect to 
culture, tax and money.  Similar findings have emerged from research into 
communities in other societies with a significant proportion of immigrants.  North 
and Trlin’s (2004) study of immigrant businesses in New Zealand describes a 
semi-retired Chinese immigrant who, on the advice of his accounts adviser, also 
an immigrant, invested all his pension monies in a family investment firm to take 
advantage of goods and services tax (GST). One Indian immigrant in these 
researchers’ study commented, “New Zealand GST is too high, compared with 
other countries… business tax 33%”, ibid (2004:36).  The researchers argue that 
tax compliance plays a significant role in building perceptions of a country’s 
regulatory institutions among immigrant businesses.  De Vries (2007), on this 
point, adds that immigrants’ perception is not only influenced by the host country’s 
tax system but also by their experiences with their homeland tax system. Chang 
et al. (2009:289) support this observation by saying that, “We speculate that the 
behaviour of minority immigrants may also be a by-product of their prior home 
country experiences”.  
 
Contrary to this, however, there is evidence that businesses in New Zealand run 
by immigrants from a similar culture and tax system (for example, from the UK or 
Australia) may be less tax compliant than those from larger and dissimilar tax 
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systems (for example, Chinese and Indians) (Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 
2014).    
 
3.2.5 Tax Advice for Immigrant Family Businesses  
 
Accountants are the first choice for tax advice in immigrant businesses, along 
with family, friends and trade associations (Lewis et al., 2005). It is reported that, 
for seeking tax information, accountants are the first contacts for immigrant 
businesses (77%), followed by the tax authority (59%) and friends and family 
(31%) (Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014). De Vries (2007) and North and 
Trlin (2004) also draw similar conclusions about the heavy dependence on 
accountants by self-employed immigrant businesses in New Zealand, although 
some of these avoid accountants, either because of a lack of networking support 
or because of suspicion about an accountant’s role and value. An interesting point 
to note is that tax consultancy itself is a family business in immigrant 
communities. Andrejuk (2016), in his study of Vietnamese immigrants in Poland, 
finds that families running tax consultancies had trading backgrounds before they 
emigrated.  
 
Another study by the Department of Labour of the New Zealand Government 
(2012), however, shows that accountants are ranked fifth by immigrant 
businesses as a source of tax advice, after consultants, trade bodies, business 
planners and family members. Few businesses rely on unpaid social 
connections, and even fewer on government support. Government support on tax 
is less often sought, perhaps because of conflicts between societies and tax 
authorities about the quality and optimal level of taxpayer services, as Tsai and 
Yang (2015) contend. While a society’s expectations of the quality of service is 
high, the service preferred by the tax authority is of medium or low quality.  
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Figure 3. 2 Sources of business and tax advice for immigrant family businesses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Chang et al. 2009 
 
Figure 3.2 summarizes the sources of tax and business advice for immigrant 
businesses. Entrepreneurs’ own knowledge base and family support, along with 
external sources, are used for advice on topics from business start-ups to venture 
capital and tax planning.  For example, immigrant family businesses of Asian 
origin in New Zealand maintain business records for themselves, because they 
have better tax knowledge than Maori and European businesses, who mainly 
depend on tax advisers or family members (Yong, 2011). In South Africa, where 
tax regulations emerge as one of the major obstacles to doing business, 
immigrant businesses draw “heavily upon their social resource base” (Mitchell, 
2012:51). This finding is supported by Godsell (1991, cited in Mitchell, 2012) that 
Indian entrepreneurs in South Africa have more opportunity to utilize family and 
community resources than other ethnic groups.  
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In the UK, slightly differently, Janjuha-Jivraj (2003:39) finds that Asian family 
businesses predominantly rely on accountants and lawyers, and reports that they 
do not “feel the need to develop other relationships”. Likewise, Sian and Roberts 
(2009) provide evidence that most owner-managers in the UK depend on 
accountants to prepare accounting records and to provide tax information. This 
is the basis of the comment by Yuan et al. (2013) that there is a consistent 
difference between ethnic groups regarding the use of accountants, family friends 
or government offices as a source of tax advice.  
 
Furthermore, advisory services on business and tax are not only sought from 
within the immigrant businesses’ own community but from beyond the community 
(Harris, 2009). For example, Indian and Chinese business immigrants in New 
Zealand rely more on accountants with the same ethnic background as them 
(Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014), while the Hispanic community in the US 
depends more on the non-Hispanic community (Harris, 2009). In explaining this, 
Danes et al. (2008; 231) suggest that the operating and financial pattern of 
immigrant businesses varies with “whether the group is composed of immigrants 
or natives to the US, how long they have been in the country, and whether they 
have had business experience and opportunities prior to entry… the social 
networks … and how residentially segregated the group is or has been”.  
 
3.2.6 Income Tax Compliance by Family Businesses: What Do We Know?   
 
In relation to the law, the word “compliance” refers to obeying and acting within 
legal provisions. In income tax literature, tax compliance means fulfilling tax 
obligations following the tax laws and procedures in force in a tax system 
(Christian and Alm, 2014; Chau and Leung,2009). With legal issues, methods of 
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accounting and record-keeping play a key role in the tax compliance process. 
Tax compliance thus can be defined as paying the right amount of taxes to the 
government (the treasury) at the right time, with accompanying statements and 
documents. This can be achieved in four different stages (Freedman, 2010): the 
first is to register with the income tax department; the second is to file the tax 
return in good time; the third involves reporting all income earned during a tax 
year, whether taxable or non-taxable; and the fourth requires the paying of taxes 
due on the income.  The various functions and responsibilities involved in tax 
compliance make it a complex and multi-focus area for academic study (Andreoni 
et al. 1998; Lamb et al., 2005).   
Complying with income tax rules is a critical factor for making business decisions 
(Lanis and Richardson, 2011), and this is the tax about which family businesses 
are most worried.  Morris et al. (1997) state that one of the most important issues 
for family businesses’ attention is tax avoidance,10 and to find solutions to this 
problem they spend proportionately more time with tax advisors. Corbetta and 
Montemerlo (1999) provide empirical evidence that 74% of family businesses in 
Italy, and 38% in the United States, are very concerned about income tax11 – 
more than are concerned over estate tax, gift tax or inheritance tax. Gracia and 
Andújar (2007) find that the average tax rate for Spanish family businesses is 
                                                          
10 Tax avoidance refers to legally acceptable actions to reduce tax liability, whereas tax evasion 
refers to intentional or unlawful tax cheating by taxpayers (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010; Alm, 2012). 
Tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion, thus, is illegal. Sometimes, however, it is very difficult to 
differentiate between tax evasion and tax avoidance, particularly when an action by the taxpayer, 
committed willingly or unwillingly, causes a loss of tax revenue. For example, a taxpayer investing 
a huge amount of money in an employee provident fund, only to end up in a zero-effective tax 
rate, tends to be a case of tax evasion, although such an action is seemingly legal.    
 
11 It is more difficult to deal with the income tax matters than estate or gift tax. In both the countries, 
Italy and the US, taxpayers are more worried about the high tax rates which in turn increases 
complexities in managing businesses. One such complexity is the forced appointment of 
entrepreneur’s spouses in the business just for tax reasons.    
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higher, at 46.6%, than for non-family firms, at 40.7%. The reason Corbetta and 
Montemerlo (1999) offer for this is the lack of knowledge and awareness on the 
part of family businesses about income tax compared to other taxes.  
 
The little research that has been conducted on family business taxation shows 
that the link between family businesses and tax compliance is empirically unclear. 
There is evidence that family ownership of businesses and tax compliance are 
positively related – the more a business is owned by members of the same family, 
the more likely it is that they will be tax compliant (Chen at el., 2010; Fama and 
Jensen; 1983; Badertscher et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2001).  
 
Badertscher et al. (2013) compare the tax avoidance behaviour of firms with 
greater concentrations of ownership and control with that of firms with less 
ownership and control and find that the former avoid significantly less income tax 
than the latter. They maintain that owner managers are risk averse and less 
willing to invest in aggressive and blatant tax avoidance schemes.  Kotlar et el. 
(2014:597) maintain that, “Family firms are classically seen as risk averse 
organizations”, which is apparent in their low investment in research and 
development. Their findings support Fama and Jensen (1983), who assert that if 
equity and decision-making lie in the hands of a small number of owners, which 
is the case in family businesses, they are less likely to invest in risky projects.  
 
Ang et al. (2000) comment that, as a business community, family businesses 
have greater reputational concerns and tend to behave unselfishly. In a similar 
tone, Christensen and Murphy (2004) comment that tax aggressiveness12 
                                                          
12 Tax aggressiveness refers to the risk preference of a taxpayer or a tax adviser, conservative or 
aggressive, in making tax planning strategy (Schisler, 2004). Some taxpayers or their advisers 
may be aggressive in underreporting true income, giving rise to reporting aggressiveness. Some 
others may be aggressive in underpaying or delaying tax payment, called payment 
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generates cash flow benefits for the business, but such actions have severe non-
tax costs – loss of business reputation. Block (2010) argues that the stronger 
sense of identification that family owners and employees have makes them more 
sensitive about business reputation and avoiding risky business plans. Chen et 
al. (2010) argue that family–controlled firms are less tax aggressive than non-
family firms, because the former want to remain faithful to their minority 
shareholders. Thus, for family businesses, reduction in share value from 
reputational damage is an indirect cost (Young et al., 2008).  This is even more 
the case for family businesses, where half of the importance of the company is 
the link with the name of the family (McGoldrick and Troast, 1999). Zhu et al. 
(2013) add that owner mangers have a psychological ownership of the business 
which makes them more the caretaker of the business than a mere manager.  
 
Steijvers and Niskanen (2011) provide empirical evidence that private family firms 
are less tax aggressive than private non-family firms, because of the potential 
loss of reputation and socio-economic wealth. Kubota and Takehara’s (2013) 
exploratory study adds to our knowledge the fact that family businesses in Japan 
are more conservative in accounting practices than non-family businesses. 
Similarly, Poutziouris (2011) finds that family firms in the UK are more 
conservative than non-family firms in strategic business planning.  For many 
family firms, managing the business is like managing one’s second home, which 
makes financial gain a minor issue compared to the business’s emotional value 
(Sharma et al., 1997; Björnberg and Nicholson, 2012).  Gracia and Andújar 
(2007:270) point out that, due to the link between family and business capital, 
                                                          
aggressiveness.  The sole or dominant purpose of tax aggressiveness is to avoid taxes in a way 
not considered to be in the spirit of the law (Lanis and Richardson, 2011).  
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family businesses use resources efficiently, “particularly when they are aimed at 
reducing the tax burden”.  
 
On the other hand, there is evidence that privately-held family firms underreport 
income (Annuar et al, 2014; Schulze et al., 2001; Daily and Dollinger 1992).  
Haynes et al. (1999:238) find that family business owners “effectively reduce a 
tax bill by transferring cash income from the business to the family, thereby 
reducing the net profits of the business”. In a transitional period, such 
underreporting is higher than in a post-transition period (Morris et al., 1997; 
Bjuggren and Sund, 2001). Rouvinez and Ward (2005:28) state that, “Ownership 
transfers can trigger inheritance taxes, which in turn can cause a sudden increase 
in the demand for liquidity.”  Martinez and Ramalho (2014) find that in Brazil family 
businesses are more tax aggressiveness than non-family businesses, measured 
in terms of effective tax rates and book tax difference. In East Asia, family firms 
are found to have low transparency and to ignore the interests of minority 
shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001).  
 
Xiao et al. (2001), using survey data, conclude that family business owners are 
more risk tolerant than non-family businesses in financial planning. They provide 
two rationales for arriving at such a conclusion: first, the success rate in family 
businesses is historically low, which tempts them to take above-average financial 
risk to maximize potential success. Second, families with a business usually have 
more financial assets than families with no business, and this enables them to 
take high risks. Factors that may affect risk-taking attitude include age, race, and 
education, among others. The high risk taking and greater tax avoidance attitude 
of the self-employed (Yuengert, 1995), who represent a kind of family business, 
support these researchers’ theory. Also, it is pertinent to mention Kotlar et al. 
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(2014), who note that family businesses are usually risk averse, but they can 
embrace higher risk when their strategic goal is under threat.  
 
A common tax practice in family businesses is for owners involve their spouses 
in business shareholding only for tax reasons (Loutzenhiser, 2009; BIS, UK 
2014). As Corbetta and Montemerlo (1999:367) put it, “Some of these ‘pure’ 
shareholders are entrepreneurs’ spouses, who are often involved in ownership 
just for tax reasons.” Family members of non-publicly traded companies are more 
interested in receiving cash bonuses to reduce the tax burden (Berk et al. 1988; 
Shulze et al., 2001). This tendency is higher for incorporated family businesses 
located in rural areas or in small towns (Haynes et al., 1999). 
 
 North and Trlin (2004) find that dividend or profit distribution is one of the most 
frequently used methods of remuneration in immigrant family businesses.  
Sometimes, compensation for family managers is set unreasonably high, so that 
there is no cash available to declare a dividend for the minority shareholders 
(Lipman, 2010).  Haynes et al. (1999:238) however inform us that mixing 
business and family expenses may push up tax liability, “if business expenses 
are incurred by the family and never reported as business expenses.” 
 
Income splitting in the context of family businesses, that is, shifting income from 
higher-bracket-tax-paying family members to lower-bracket-tax-paying members 
is a unique problem in all taxing jurisdictions, and it raises concerns for horizontal 
and vertical equity as well as for economic neutrality (Loutzenhiser, 2009).  In the 
UK, this has raised major concern in the recent years. The HM Treasury Budget 
Report (2008:73) states, “The Government firmly believes it is unfair that some 
individuals can arrange their affairs to gain a tax advantage by shifting part of 
their income to another person who is subject to a lower rate of tax.”  Income 
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splitting by family businesses also creates complexities for the progressive 
income tax structure (Loutzenhiser, 2009).  
 
Another practice in family businesses is to over compensate family members by 
offering disguised gifts that are tax deductible. With respect to UK family 
businesses, Freedman (2003:27) notes, “There may be more scope for the 
Revenue to seek to disallow salary and benefits paid to an owner/manager that 
seem excessive.”  She further adds (ibid:28) that, “There may be a strong 
incentive in the case of small companies to pay out profits by way of dividend… 
paying lower rates of tax.”  Shailer (1993) argues that for taxation reasons, family 
firms falsify their disclosure behaviour. Some common items of misreporting are 
personal consumption buried in business expenditure, overpayments in related 
party transactions, and debt servicing for loans used mainly for personal 
consumption.  
 
The degree of tax aggressiveness, however, depends on owner managers and 
the composition of ownership or boards of directors. Lanis and Richardson (2011) 
find that a corporate board of directors comprised of more independent members 
is less tax aggressive than a board of directors comprised mainly of directors from 
within the family. Tsai et al. (2009) provide evidence that in an agency-managed 
family business, family members on the board of directors are supportive of risk 
reduction strategies taken by CFOs.  
 
Similarly, a CEO drawn from within the family will be more worried about business 
reputation and less eager to take a risk of tarnishing the business image.  If the 
CEO is from outside the family, the risk-taking behaviour may be different (Kubota 
and Takehara, 2013). Fan and Mawani (2015) examine the impact of ownership 
and voting rights on tax reporting aggressiveness. They find that firms with more 
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family ownership face lower financial reporting pressure and thus become more 
aggressive in tax reporting. They also find that firms with insider and family 
ownership pay 44% less tax than the non-closely-held firms. Sharma et al. (1997) 
argue that family businesses may differ from non-family businesses in business 
strategies and control, but in financial control, they are the same: the guiding 
principle is tax minimization.         
 
In summary, the above review suggests that family businesses are different from 
non-family businesses in terms of ethics, perceptions of business opportunities 
and risk, and business networking and strategies (Chrisman et al., 2003; Chen at 
el., 2010; Fama and Jensen; 1983; Badertscher et al., 2013). It further shows that 
there are differences in the perceptions and performance characteristics of a 
family business, depending on whether it is run by an immigrant or by a native 
(Nam and Herbert, 1999; Harris, 2009; North and Trlin, 2004; de Vries, 2007: 
Yong, 2011; Yuan et al., 2013; Carney, 2007; Kloosterman et al., 1999; 
Greenhalgh and Lowry, 2011). These differences indicate a clear need for a 
theory of tax compliance to understand how immigrant family businesses build 
their perceptions of tax compliance and tax complexity, how they manage tax 
risk, and to what extent they depend on the tax advisers to resolve tax compliance 
problems. This will help tax administrations to resolve whether immigrant 
businesses are in need of targeted support or preferential treatment to deal with 
their tax obligations.  
 
3.3 Tax Complexity and Immigrant Businesses  
 
Tax system complexity is a problem common to taxpayers of all types. How 
complexities arise as a problem in the achievement of tax compliance may differ 
with respect to taxpayers’ socio-economic positions and cultural identities. With 
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that phenomenon in mind, this section reviews the sources and nature of 
complexities in the tax system and the ways it may affect tax compliance 
behaviours. It discusses the major perspective that explains why complexities 
arise in the tax system and complicate tax management13, with a focus on how 
complexities are linked to the generation of tax risk and tax compliance. The 
section presents a brief account of UK tax system complexities to demonstrate 
how easy or difficult it can be to manage compliance, especially for immigrant 
taxpayers coming from another tax jurisdiction and culture. It shows how ethnicity 
and cultural identities contribute to the perception of tax complexity in small 
immigrant family businesses and how compliance difficulties may be resolved by 
community networking and external support.  
   
3.3.1 Tax Complexity – a Ubiquitous Problem of Tax Compliance 
 
Taxpayer’s engagement with the tax system is complex in almost all societies 
with a tax function. Even if some economic activities are tax exempt, as for 
example in tax holidays, taxpayers must submit a return and be accountable to 
the tax authority. There is a public perception that an attempt at tax simplification 
may mean more complexity in the tax system (Karlinsky and Burton, 2011).  Tax 
complexity encompasses a kaleidoscopic range of topics (Milliron, 1985; Gratez, 
1997; Snape, 2015). Generally, tax complexity refers to difficulties in reading and 
understanding tax legislation (Schenk,2011), uncertainty and lack of 
transparency in tax requirements (Krause, 2000), multiplicity and ambiguity in tax 
guidance notes (Deloitte, 2014) and unpredictability, unenforceability and 
manipulability of regulations (Slemrod, 2009; Kaplow, 1996). Schenk (2011:261), 
                                                          
13 Tax management refers to the planning and legal avoidance of tax, not the fraudulent or evasive 
activities done against the spirit of the law (Frecknall-Hughes, 2014). Individuals and firms engage 
in tax management to reduce tax cost and maximize after tax income in a socially responsible 
manner.   
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in talking of tax complexity, refers to taxpayer's “ability to understand and comply 
with a statutory provision or regulation”, and suggests this should not be confused 
with “lack of transparency”, which mainly refers to the straightforwardness of the 
law-making process. Tax complexities are recursive in nature (Rothengatter, 
2005); they create uncertainties in the tax system and destroy tax planning 
(Karlinsky and Burton, 2011; Speer et al. 2014; Hall, 1994).  
 
Measuring tax complexity is a difficult task, not only because of the differences in 
the cultural and social position of the taxpayer (Dobbins, 2005), but also because 
of the varied perspectives from which tax complexity is viewed. Decades ago, 
Bittker (1974) commented, “Neither tax ‘simplification’ nor its mirror image, 
complexity, is a concept that can be easily defined or measured. I know of no 
comprehensive analytic framework … that supplies a ‘simplicity index’ in 
particular areas of tax law practice.” Although there has not been any simplicity 
index constructed so far, there have been complexity indexes, for example, the 
Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) Index (Jones et al., 2014) or Galli and Porteba’s 
(2007) Gini-income inequality index. Baron (2012) notes that complexity indexes 
are subjective, full of overlapping ideas, and may misplace valuable information 
in the scoring process. A common approach to measuring tax complexity is thus 
to estimate the noticeable (e.g., money, time) and hidden (e.g., psychological) 
costs taxpayers bear in producing compliant tax returns (Slemrod, 1985). But 
there are other measurements in operation: for example, looking at the number 
of pages and length of the tax legislation (Picciotto,2007), and rating countries for 
tax system complexity (Richardson, 2006).    
 
As a concept, ‘tax complexity’ is used interchangeably with ‘tax system 
complexity’. Slemrod (1996) uses these terms interchangeably when he 
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estimates the compliance cost of the US tax system. In Carnes and Cuccia’s 
(1996:42) analysis of the complexity-equity relationship, the authors comment 
that in their own and other surveys tax complexity is measured as “taxpayers' 
general perceptions of the complexity of either the tax system as a whole or a 
few selected tax items.” Ulph (2014) clarifies that when people complain about 
tax complexity, they mean tax system complexity, and he defines tax system as 
a set of laws and rules that outline tax agents, the types of transactions to be 
taxed or not, rates and duties, and administrative procedures to complete and 
pay taxes or challenge the taxes imposed. In practical tax research, there is 
evidence for Ulph’s comment. For example, to measure the complexity of a tax 
system, Torgler (2003:273) asked the following question on tax law and rule 
complexity: “How complicated do you think our federal income tax laws and rules 
are for your particular income situation?” Chau and Leung (2009:37) also use tax 
complexity and tax system complexity interchangeably when they make the 
comment, “Complexity of tax system should increase as the number of criteria 
specified by tax laws increase.” 
 
Similarly, in studying perceptions of tax complexity for small businesses among 
tax professionals in the US and Australian tax systems, the five dimensions 
Ingraham et al. (2005) include are: ambiguity, computations, change, detail, 
record-keeping and forms, which are all features of tax law. They find that lack of 
detail is the leading cause of tax complexity, followed by ambiguity (Fogarty and 
Jones, 2014) and frequent changes in the law. Frequent tax law change is also 
found as a major cause of tax complexity in Australia, New Zealand and the US 
(Freudenberg et al., 2012).   This indicates that tax law complexity and tax system 
complexity can be treated as equivalents. 
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For immigrant taxpayers, their experience in their country of origin plays a 
significant role in building perceptions about the tax system of the country of 
settlement.  For example, Indian and Chinese immigrant businesses are more 
trusting of the New Zealand tax department than of the tax departments of their 
country of origin; but Australian and UK immigrants do not see it as much different 
(Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014). It is argued that immigrants coming from 
a dissimilar or less established tax system are likely to be more non-compliant, 
due to differing beliefs around tax. According to Rothengatter (2005), the 
competing personal values and norms operational in the tax system are one of 
the main factors in the achievement of tax compliance.  
 
3.3.2 Nature and Sources of Tax Complexity 
 
Complexity in the tax system may arise from three sources: technical, structural 
and compliance (Adam et al., 2010), based on which it can be broadly classified 
into legislative complexity, policy complexity and operational complexity (Jones 
et al., 2014; Kaplow,2009). Evans and Tran-Nam (2014) identify four major 
sources of tax complexity: policy complexity, statutory complexity, administrative 
complexity, and compliance complexity. Jones et al. (2014) argue that policy 
complexity mainly stems from reliefs and special cases. Snape (2015) views them 
as rule complexity, i.e., indeterminacy in legal language; compliance complexity, 
i.e., indeterminacy in completing returns; and, following Schenk (2011), 
transactional complexity i.e. the costs taxpayers bear to change their behaviours 
to reduce tax liabilities.    
 
According to James (2007), the two biggest reasons for complexity are the desire 
to limit tax avoidance and to address fairness. Once the loopholes in the law are 
plugged, taxpayers and their advisers find ways to break them, and this process 
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goes on in a vicious circle. To Donaldson (2003), the purposes that the tax system 
aims to achieve – influencing compliance behaviours, changing social and 
economic behaviours, and balancing certainty – generate tax complexity. Tax 
policies are designed to achieve multiple objectives, from correcting market 
failures to perfecting social and economic justice (Sheffrin, 2013). In achieving 
policy goals, tax codes encompass a web of deductions, exemptions, and special 
treatments. Leguizamon (1991:29) observes that the tax exemption benefits 
given to small firms in Honduras and Guatemala in the early 1980s did not reach 
them because “Big firms split legally into smaller entities, so that each part 
constitutes a small business and has access to the benefits granted to S&MSBs.”   
And to overcome this problem, the technical assistance given to small businesses 
was mostly related to tax laws and accounting. The difficulties in small business 
accounting and taxes reverberate even today – “That’s what I pay my accountant 
to do” or “That’s just paperwork for taxes”, as observed by an immigrant business 
owner (Greenhalgh and Lowry, 2011:24).  
 
Katz and Bommarito (2014) comment that tax laws reflect the present and the 
future realities of social and economic life, which is changing over time. Thus, 
there is a form of scaling relationship between laws and socio-economic realities. 
Tax laws become complex as a result of an endless number of amendments, 
appeals in the tax courts and variations in taxpayers’ class and social structure 
(Ingraham et al., 2005).  The tax structure of a country, progressive, regressive 
or digressive, has much to do with tax complexity. According to Slemrod (2009), 
progressivity is one of the leading reasons that connects the tax burden with the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay. Slemrod says that tax progressivity adds a great deal of 
complexity in the measurement of income by requiring taxpayers’ income and 
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expenditure documents. The difference between tax and transfer is another 
reason for complexity in some countries, as Slemrod maintains.  
 
Tax complexity arises not from the act of a single person, but from the interplay 
of a wide range of individuals, agencies and institutions. Based on a survey of 37 
complex areas of US tax law, Ingraham et al. (2005) find that partnerships are 
the most complex area of US income tax law, followed by estate and gift tax, 
mostly in family businesses. In assessing the complexity of the UK tax law, the 
first point, Jelfs and Lymer (2009) note is the increasing length of tax codes. The 
language of tax codes is difficult to penetrate, not only for taxpayers but also for 
tax professionals. This argument is consistent with that of Sherwood (2012), who 
contends that the problem in putting new words into the tax law is that they are 
subject to interpretation.  
 
It is important to note that not these complexities apply to taxpayers and 
businesses of all types. A wide range of tax laws have become complex due to 
the development of intricate types of business transaction (Adam et al., 2010) 
and to the choice of trading vehicle, whether owned and managed by unrelated 
investors or by closely-connected individuals (Rayney, 2013).  Badertscher et al. 
(2013) document how variations in ownership patterns influence the patterns of 
tax practice and the perceptions of tax planning. Likewise, Bjuggren and Sund 
(2001) note that a tax system that requires tax payments from a family business 
during the lifetime of the owner and later requires them from a new generation of 
owners causes uncertainty and wasteful rent-seeking behaviours in the business. 
It is also argued that complexity and obfuscation in the tax system is used to mask 
tax avoidance and rent-seeking activities by both family and some non-family 
firms, although the former are less interested in such activities than the latter 
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(Chen et al., 2010).  For Speer et al. (2014), the most prominent reasons for tax 
complexity are the existence of multiple marginal tax rates and different tax 
treatment for different income groups, for example income adjustment on a tax 
filer’s family status.  
 
3.3.3 The Link Between Tax Complexity and Tax Compliance 
 
Tax complexity is a non-economic determinant of tax compliance; but it has great 
economic and social implications (Richardson, 2006; Tsakumis et al., 2007). It 
was Jackson and Milliron (1986) who undertook the first major research on tax 
evasion and came up with 14 key determinants, grouped into economic and 
behavioural, tax complexity being placed in the latter category. Fisher et al. (1992 
cited in Chau and Leung, 2009), in their tax compliance model, show that one of 
the important factors in forming taxpayers’ attitudes to and perceptions of the tax 
system is the availability of non-compliance opportunities influenced by income 
level and occupation. Closely related to this, as a dominant factor in their model, 
is the complexity of the tax system or tax structure as shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3. 3 Tax complexity and tax compliance  
 
 
 
Source: Fischer et al. (1992) tax compliance model (cited in Chau and Leung, 
2009) 
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Employing data from 45 countries, Richardson (2006) provides evidence that tax 
complexity is the most significant determinant of tax evasion. He (ibid:150) argues 
that, “The lower the level of complexity and the higher the level of education, 
services, income source, fairness and tax morale, the lower is the level of tax 
evasion.”  
 
Tax complexity affects the cognition of taxpayers and leads to the possibility of 
making a suboptimal decision (Katz and Bommarito, 2014). Tax complexity is one 
of the reasons for reduced technical accuracy and increased tax compliance cost. 
Torgler (2007), based on US experience, argues that tax complexity reduces the 
morale cost of tax non-compliance and induces intentional and unintentional non-
compliance. However, the extent to which complexity affects tax risk attitudes 
depends on the type of taxpayers. A committed taxpayer, when faced with 
complexity, may over comply to reduce tax risk, while an uncommitted one will 
attempt to deceive the tax authorities even by risking his/her tax position (Morris 
and Lonsdale, 2004). Laffer et al. (2011:8) identify four major consequences of 
tax complexity: “decreased levels of voluntary compliance, increased cost for 
taxpayers, reduced perception of fairness, and increased difficulties in tax 
administration.”   
 
Tax complexity may affect the reporting and disclosure behaviours of taxpayers 
(Hasseldine, 2015). Complexity not only creates difficulty in identifying true 
income and exemptions, it also creates problems for tax administrations seeking 
to give correct advice on income and exemption eligibility (Tsai and Yang, 2015).  
A survey by GAO (1990) shows that the IRS could only answer 63.6% of 
taxpayer’s questions on exemption correctly, and 65.3% on filing and tax 
computation, due to complicated tax laws. Besides the impact on revenue 
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collection, tax complexity leads to the development of tax software and increased 
use of tax professionals, entailing cost to businesses.  
 
The vast amount of data required and obligatory supplying of information with 
respect to return filing are often claimed as one of the reasons for tax 
aggressiveness (Ingraham et al., 2005). Complexity, along with high tax rates, 
undermines the effectiveness of the tax compliance instruments. The 
effectiveness of tax audit as an instrument, as Hanlon et al. (2005) argue, 
depends on two provisions: first, easy tax laws; and second, efficient and honest 
tax administration. Krause (2000) emphatically submits that the enforcement 
strategy of tax authorities is directly affected by tax complexity. Complexity affects 
vertical and horizontal equity between and among taxpayers and creates 
distance between taxpayers and their tax administration (Freedman, 2003; 
Hasseldine, 2015). Tax complexity takes away taxpayers’ privacy of information 
(Slemrod, 2009) and thus transparency between the government and taxpayers 
may become eroded. 
 
3.3.4 Tax Complexity in the UK 
 
Complexity has long been a feature of the UK tax system (James and 
Wallschutzky, 1997; Jelfs and Lymer, 2009). There have been many reforms and 
drives for simplification between the introduction of the original act, in 1799, and 
the formation of the OTS in 2010 (James, 2016).  In recent history, the system 
first went through a simplification in 1965, when it was re-written in monosyllabic 
language to support users’ understanding of it. But it became harder, and the tax 
codes began to grow in length and complexity, for instance, adding 1,300 pages 
over a period of five years (James and Wallschutzky, 1997). The tax law re-writing 
project announced in 1995 is claimed to have improved the quality of the 
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legislation but not the length of the documentation (Picciotto, 2007; Sawyer, 
2012).  Since its implementation in 2007, there have been enormous and 
uncontrollable additions to the legislation through yearly finance acts. McKerchar 
et al. (2009:381) comment, “The tax law rewrite project is misdirected in that it is 
not making the law simpler or easier (or cheaper) to comply with, and that the 
current system is lacking in integration and contains economic distortions.”  
 
A more recent simplification drive is the Mirrlees Review (2011), which came up 
with priority areas of tax complexity that needed reform. Comparing the features 
of a good tax system and that of the UK, as in Table 3.3, Mirrlees et al. (2011:338) 
argue that, “There are many aspects of the UK tax system that fail to live up to 
this ideal.” 
Table 3. 3  A good tax system and the current UK tax system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Mirrlees et al. (2011)   
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As reported in the review, there is an opaque jumble of tax rates, due to tapered 
allowances and a complex array of benefits. The tax rate structure reduces 
employment and earnings, which is a major concern for immigrant communities 
highly dependent on self-employment (Yuengert, 1995), although there is 
preferential tax treatment available. Mirrlees et al. (2011) raise concern that the 
current system affects the choice of organizational form, between employment 
and self-employment, as well as the form of remuneration, between salary and 
dividends, one of the most frequently used methods of tax evasion by family 
businesses (Freedman, 2003; North and Trlin, 2004; Haynes et al.,1999). 
Aligning income from employment and self-employment is also important to 
increase the amount of national insurance contributions (NICs) paid by them, as 
they comment. Boissevain (2009) rightly points out that one of the reasons for a 
tendency to small business entrepreneurships and self-employment among 
ethnic businesses in the UK is to avoid heavy taxation and contributions to social 
welfare. One of the obvious costs of immigrants in all countries is the transfer of 
funds, e.g., family allowances, payments of social security, and so on (Sayad, 
1999). This complexity-led tax avoidance opportunity has “stimulated larger 
enterprises to split up and people to start up their own”, as Boissevain (2009:29) 
claims.  
 
A study by KPMG (2006) shows that a feature of tax rules in the UK is that many 
small businesses spend a huge amount of time and money learning this huge 
volume of laws only to be sure that these don’t apply to them, and the ultimate 
gain from investments is little. The following table shows the vast number of tax 
rules businesses must consult to decide their tax matters.  
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Table 3. 4 Number of regulations, HMRC forms, information obligations and 
data requirements by tax area 
 
 
 
Source: KMPG (2006) 
 
Table 3.4 shows the number of sources of legislation, forms, information and data 
requirement for tax filing. For business taxes, for example, there are 34 sources, 
12 forms, 194 information obligations and 531 data requirements, according to 
the tax law in operation in 2006.  This is just one area of the law. For corporation 
tax, the number of information obligations and data requirements is higher. There 
are more areas that small businesses need to focus on, for example, employment 
tax, capital gain tax, and so on. This prompts the question, which area of law 
should be the object of most attention for a small ethnic business owner with little 
or no formal or informal education or training in tax law or accounting? A survey 
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in 2005 shows that 77% of SME directors in the UK claim that the tax system is 
too complicated (Tenon Group, 2005, cited in Jelfs and Lymer, 2009). KPMG 
(2006: 5) suggests that, “HMRC needs to examine not only the main planks of 
the tax system that cause most of the burden, but also the long tail of minor 
obligations if it is to reduce the perception of complexity.” 
 
3.3.5 Tax Professionals and Tax Complexities 
 
Tax system complexity is one of the main reasons for taxpayers to appoint a tax 
adviser (Young, 2011; KPMG, 2006). Reliance on tax agents is very high among 
immigrant businesses. The Inland Revenue, New Zealand (2014) found that 
nearly three-quarters (72%) of immigrant businesses had a tax agent to manage 
their tax return. Cuccia (1994:43) remarks that the tax preparer’s task can be 
described as “resolving any uncertainty that may exist as to the tax consequences 
of ambiguous items” and maintaining the integrity of the tax system. But at the 
same time, to many tax advisers, tax law is a set of rules for playing the game 
(Morris and Lonsdale, 2004). It is argued that tax practitioners bend the law when 
there is ambiguity in the law. Ingraham et al. (2005) state that tax agents create 
a good metric of complexity in the tax system and influence taxpayer’s 
perceptions of tax risk and its management. 
 
Dependence on tax professionals is more common among immigrant businesses 
because of the complex and new tax environment of the host country and the 
differences in accounting, financial and taxation practices (Wang et al., 2014). 
Even state-backed community support teams encourage taxpayers to depend on 
tax advisers. A comment from TLC (2015: 36), a community law clinic in 
Massachusetts, USA, is worth noting: “Because of the complexity and evolving 
nature of the federal and state tax statutes … you should consult an accountant 
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or tax lawyer to confirm the specific forms that need to be filed.” In most cases, 
however, small immigrant businesses find their accountants and tax advisers 
through ethnic networks (Kloosterman et al., 1999; Janjuha-Jivraj,2003).  
Rothengatter (2005:303) notes that, “One of the most significant categories of 
advisors, and directly involved with tax-compliance, are commercial taxpayer 
services and tax-agents who work closely with ethnic entrepreneurs in the small-
business sectors.” This tendency to dependence on an ethnic network is less 
among high-skilled immigrants than low-skilled ones, because of their greater 
ability to accumulate information (Liebig and Poza, 2005).   
 
Greenhalgh and Lowry (2011) observe that the value ethnic businesses create is 
directly influenced by how they prepare their tax returns. Thus, taxpayers not 
comfortable with their return preparation have to depend on experts to interpret 
the latest tax regulations and submit their returns. But small businesses cannot 
afford expensive legal and accounting support, and thus face difficulty in 
understanding tax laws and regulations (James, 2007; Loutzenhiser, 2009). In 
cases of disagreement with the tax authorities, they cannot present their case 
effectively to the courts. However, there are special provisions for small 
businesses as well. For example, small businesses in the UK enjoy the privilege 
of submitting simplified tax returns – mentioning turnover figures, expenses and 
net profit only (James, 2007).   
 
3.4 Theories and Perspectives on Tax Compliance and Complexity 
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, tax compliance behaviours can be explained from 
different perspectives and viewpoints. For an in-depth understanding of how the 
immigrant business taxpayers perceive tax compliance and engage with the tax 
system, these perspectives need to be explored. Although this study applies 
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Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the theoretical framework, the other theoretical 
perspectives, especially the sociological one, from where Bourdieu’s thoughts 
originates, will help integrate his ideas more widely in the broad policy literature 
of tax compliance.  
It should be mentioned that approaches to understanding tax complexity are like 
approaches to understanding tax compliance, because many of the problems of 
uncertainty, unpredictability and difficulty in tax requirements arise from 
taxpayers’ inability to define tax compliance as a problem.  Milliron (1985:794) 
argues that, “Complexity …has been singled out as a factor affecting compliance 
and … viewed as one step in an ongoing program of study of noncompliance.” 
Graetz’s (1997) thoughtful comment that tax simplification is the most significant 
route to tax compliance pushes this proposition further, suggesting that what 
explains tax complexity may, to a considerable extent, explain tax compliance.  
There are four major perspectives, as shown in Figure 3.4, from which tax 
complexity and tax compliance can be understood.  
 
3.4.1 Sociological Perspective  
 
From a sociological perspective, or more precisely, from the perspective of fiscal 
sociology, beginning with the seminal work of Goldscheid and Schumpeter 
(1918), social norms and practices have occupied a significant role in tax 
compliance behaviour (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). Social norms refer to 
behaviours acceptable to a society (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993), where 
taxpayers’ culture, attitude, habits (Chau and Leung, 2009), age, education, and 
ownership patterns (in the cases of businesses) (Fischer et al., 1992, cited in 
Chau and Leung, 2009) play a significant role.  Even though a variety of views as 
to its aims exists in fiscal sociology, the main purpose is to investigate the 
relationship between taxation, state and society from “a wide range of cultural, 
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economic, institutional and historical factors” and to unpack “the complex social 
interactions involved” (James, 2012:112). The following remarks from Grasmick 
and Scott (1982:213) illustrate the role of social perspectives in taxation: 
“Deterrence theory posits three mechanisms of social control: legal sanctions 
(state-imposed punishment), social stigma (peer-imposed punishment), and guilt 
feelings (self-imposed punishment).” 
Based on the Bourdieusian theory of practice, Oats and Morris (2015) argue that 
tax complexity will remain unresolved and breed further complexities if it is viewed 
only as an economic problem. In a study of tax compliance attitudes among 
Indian, Chinese, UK, and Australian immigrant businesses in New Zealand, it was 
concluded that, “Believing that others were not necessarily honest with their tax 
obligations was one of the strongest predictors of hidden economy participation”, 
(Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014). 
Figure 3. 4 Perspectives from which to view tax compliance and complexity  
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate’s own figure  
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3.4.2 Political Perspective   
 
A tax system is the outcome of a political process, and this process can provide 
an important insight into the causes and origins of tax complexity (Katz and 
Bommarito, 2014). Political regimes amend tax laws in a way that consolidates 
their re-election chances and improves their short-term popularity (James, 2007) 
without considering the impact this rent-seeking behaviour may have on legal 
complexities (Katz and Bommarito, 2014; Snape, 2011). Galli and Profeta 
(2007:5) claim that, “In a democracy political competition requires complexity, i.e. 
many tax rates”, which allows careful discrimination among heterogeneous 
voters.   
 
Wagner (1976) remarks that the way tax features are chosen by political regimes 
has implications for the enactment process, the excess burden, and perhaps for 
the complexity of the system.  In a democracy, taxes are imposed through the 
participation of the people, which establishes an ownership of the tax system. In 
most countries, immigrants are the “alien trader”, as Max Weber called them 
(Light, 2005), and not part of the mainstream community. For tax compliance to 
flourish to its expected level, Rothengatter (2005) suggests that it is essential that 
culturally diverse ethnic communities are not politically alienated. Nor should their 
mixed national identities and loyalties be ignored and divided. It is vital that the 
dichotomous forces in a multicultural society are recognized in the application 
and enforcement of tax laws.  
 
Drori et al. (2010) argue that legal and regulatory systems differ substantially 
between countries, which may pose challenges for immigrant businesses. To 
mitigate this problem, immigrants may lobby for tax exemptions through social 
and political connections. Rath (2000) reminds us that, for small immigrant 
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businesses to survive, they are dependent not only on dealing with tax laws and 
regulations, and on their residency status, but also on the way the laws are 
enforced and the political conflicts related to these.   
 
3.4.3 Legal Perspective  
 
Legal clarity and certainty are essential to the application of the law (Duff, 2008). 
In practice, however, the clarity of the law is limited. Some noteworthy research 
studies have been conducted to measure tax complexity from the legal 
perspective (McCaffery, 2000; Paul, 1997; Donaldson 2003; Slemrod 2005) but 
have failed to produce a result. In Picciotto’s (2007:14) view, “Legal complexity 
comes from the attempt to draw up rules that are precise and that anticipate every 
contingency, resulting in a highly complex tax code”. 
 
According to Bourcier and Mazzega (2007), the three primary features 
responsible for the complexity of a law are structure, language, and 
interdependence. Legal codes, in the area of taxation or elsewhere, are 
documented in a structured, hierarchical network or tree that starts with a title at 
the top and has hundreds of thousands of provisions below, with words, language 
and finally citations to establish inter-provision links and dependencies.  
Legislative complexity is not attained overnight. Little amendments, annotations, 
and additions each contribute slightly to the overall complexity, and in the long 
run the complexity becomes extremely unwieldy. Non-legislative14 drafting, 
mostly done by HMRC, who don’t have the stylistic expertise to create legal 
                                                          
14  Non-legislative rule-making refers to the rules made by HMRC and HM treasury based on 
powers given to them under secondary or tertiary legislation. The inherent complexity of some 
rules can require making a non-legislative rule to further clarify a complex rule.  Manuals, 
explanatory statements, and special regulatory notes are typical examples of non-legislative 
drafting (Bowler, 2009).  
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documents, makes many rules imprecise and increases legal complexity (Bowler, 
2009). To reduce complexity, and to achieve the desired social objectives, 
detailed descriptions and exact specifications to apply to individuals in similar and 
dissimilar circumstances are needed. The law must demonstrate treatment 
common for all, and then distinguish the cases needing differential treatment.  
 
3.4.4 Economic Perspective  
 
Tax complexity first became a topic of prime importance in the canons of Adam 
Smith, the father of modern economics; although in today’s economics, it is a 
neglected or less interesting area of research (Tran- Nam, 2015). The underlying 
argument of this approach is that taxpayers decide between risky or uncertain 
situations by comparing their expected utility values (Becker, 1968). Accordingly, 
in public finance theories, tax complexity is viewed as a serious problem, as it 
uses up scare resources (Slemrod, 2009). An often-used rule of thumb for 
measuring tax complexity is tax compliance cost – what quantity of resources 
must be sacrificed to collect the revenue. A commonly used equation, as Tran-
Nam (2014) puts it, is: Tax compliance costs = Tax computation costs + Tax 
planning costs.   
 
Conceptually, computational and planning costs are understandable. Costs are 
inevitable when taxpayers have made a basic investment in a technology to 
achieve some level of compliance; whereas any cost arising over the basic may 
be due to poor record keeping, and thus be a preventable cost. Costs are not 
always measurable monetarily. Some part of them may be difficult or beyond 
measurement, and psychic tension or pressure may be felt in the tax compliance 
game.  In an economic approach to tax, compliance costs are divided into direct 
and indirect costs. The direct costs of complex tax systems include administrative 
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and tax compliance costs (Tran-Nam, 2014). The administrative cost is the cost 
the tax authorities bear in collecting a certain amount of revenue; whereas 
compliance costs are born by the taxpayers or other third parties in satisfying 
government conditions.   
 
Critics of the economic perspective argue that optimal tax theories trigger 
complexity through a multiple-rate structure and exemptions (Freedman, 2003; 
Jones et al., 2014). Freedman (2003:14) notes that, “Targeting relief is a major 
problem” for small business support and “can give rise to complexity if poorly 
designed – the phenomenon of complex deregulation.” 
 
3.4.5 Immigrant Businesses: How Does Tax Complexity Affect Them?  
 
For immigrant businesses, government policies relating to taxes play a significant 
role (Kwok-bun, 2005).  North and Trlin (2004) remark that complex tax regulation 
may create more dangers for immigrant-run businesses than for native ones, 
because paying taxes properly is an essential condition for their existence in the 
host country. According to Rothengatter (2005), it is important that, where there 
is a conflict of norms and practices between the new and the old cultures of 
immigrant communities, these are recognised in the inherently complex structure 
of the tax system.  Difficulties in dealing with tax laws may push members of these 
communities to the edge of legality in areas such as tax evasion and non-
registration of business (Ojo et al., 2013). Commenting on an unhelpful regulatory 
environment and heavy compliance costs, a Chinese family business owner said 
of the New Zealand tax system, “We have so much paper work the Government 
requires us to follow - our ACC system, our income structure, GST - all these to 
put together and you go ‘why would I want to do that?’ And then you still have to 
pay high tax on top of that!” (de Vries, 2007:26).  
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In making a comparison between tax compliance costs and tax complexity as a 
problem of tax compliance in New Zealand, Yuan et al. (2013) argue that 
immigrant businesses suffer more from the latter than the former, particularly 
immigrants coming from low-income countries. In the US, it is claimed that 
immigrant businesses and the resurgence of small businesses are 
contemporaneous: “The either might have caused the other”, and tax policy is 
one of the interventions intended to support small immigrant businesses (Light 
and Bonachich, 1988:13). In order to support small immigrant businesses, the US 
IRS thinks it may even be acceptable to tolerate some degree of tax evasion, so 
that these businesses do not go underground and remain competitive.  
 
High tax rates and tax complexity are considered as two significant factors that 
may affect the perception of tax system fairness and lead to manipulation of the 
tax system. An immigrant business owner comments, “We have two books, the 
good book we give to IRD, we fully fill our obligations just there’s so many small 
tricks we can do. Also, maybe sometimes you won’t get that much, but try to 
legally as possible avoid, you can always find a way” (Inland Revenue, New 
Zealand, 2014:37). Panayiotopoulos’s (2006) study of immigrant businesses in 
Los Angeles reports that underpayment and non-payment of taxes are a major 
concern when the tax authorities consider immigrant entrepreneurs. Likewise, 
Light and Bhachu (2004) suggest that huge cash operations and informal 
activities by Haitians in Miami are due to their lack of clear knowledge about the 
tax system and tax collectors. Putting this a bit differently, Delgado (2011) makes 
an interesting observation that small ethnic businesses live in a complex 
community economic system and prefer to remain in the informal economy, which 
makes their engagement with the tax system more complicated.  
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Referring to economic theories of entrepreneurship, Watson et al. (2000) suggest 
that high-tax rates are a barrier to financing and starting up ethnic minority 
businesses, which leads these businesses to establish entrepreneurial activities 
in the unregulated and untaxed sectors. The large concentrations of ethnic 
businesses in the low-profit sector, in their view, is an outcome of high and 
complex tax rate structure. Yuengert (1995) argues that immigrants are in general 
subject to higher tax rates than the native businesses.  In a study of the usual 
challenges SME immigrant businesses face in New Zealand, a complex tax 
system and high tax rates were rated to be the second barrier after linguistic and 
cultural differences. Moon et al.’s study (2014) of ethnic businesses in Arkansas, 
USA, shows that, among 21 communities, understanding government regulations 
and taxes were rated the second biggest barrier to business formation after start-
up capital. And this was an even greater obstacle for ethnic businesses in rural 
settings than for those in urban ones.  Among other immigrant businesses, those 
in the investment category cited accounting practices as a major problem that 
made smooth audit trails difficult (Department of Labour, New Zealand, 2002).  
 
Shanker and Astrachan (1996) are of the view that the controversies concerning 
family businesses, which make up a major section of immigrant businesses, 
particularly controversies relating to their definition, and the contribution they 
make to the economy in terms of employment creation and tax payment, are 
linked to the tax policy of the country.  Unclear tax laws allow the family business 
owners and their CEOs to hide their rent-extraction activities, for example, 
income, perquisites and compensation, and become more tax aggressive 
(Steijvers and Niskanen, 2011). In this regard, Loutzenhiser (2009) is of the view 
that income-splitting, a standard practice for many family businesses, is an 
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outcome of the substitution effect created by the feature of progressivity in the 
tax system. The more a tax system aims at considering individual circumstances, 
the more information and details will be needed, and the more complex the tax 
system becomes.  Thus, certainty and complexity are negatively related. 
Loutzenhiser (2009 :50) observes, “certainty can often come at the expense of 
complexity and cost.” 
 
It is not just for tax compliance issues that a complex array of taxes weighs heavily 
in immigrant business owners’ response to paying for social welfare benefits. 
Freeman and Ogelman (2000:120) observe, “The cost of social benefits 
contributions encourages employers (indigenous and immigrant) to push their 
activities underground … to escape paying social security and other welfare 
related taxes.” On this point, Light (2000) adds that the wages of immigrant 
workers are not reported to tax officials, which makes their jobs insecure. 
Wahlbeck (2007) argues that immigrant employers employ clandestine workers 
who are often illegal and do not know the language of the host country. Thus, 
immigrant business owners “exploit, they pay less salary, they avoid paying 
taxes” and they avoid social security payments for their employees, as Wahlbak 
(2007:556) contends.  
 
In support of immigrant businesses in their engagement with tax complexity, Li 
(2010) argues that how ethnic minorities are recognized in a society is an 
important factor in their tax compliance attitude. A continuous influx of immigrants 
into a country changes the homogeneity of its demographic structure and erodes 
its national identity, which in turn may affect its tax morale. One way of reducing 
tax complexity in such a heterogenous society is to increase inclusiveness in the 
tax system, as Li points out. For example, the State of California introduced a 
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Spanish version of online return filing for sales tax, and this increased return filing 
by the Latino community. In this connection, North and Trlin (2004) recommend 
that government agencies should provide legal and advisory resources in an 
appropriate language for immigrants not familiar with English, in addition to 
providing them with GST and other tax reliefs.  In their study across 50 countries, 
Tsakumis et al. (2007) find that national tax culture influences tax compliance 
levels and suggest investigating the role of legal and tax systems in conjunction 
with national cultures to develop a framework for an all-inclusive tax compliance 
model.  
 
In consideration of complex tax and other legal and fiscal legislation, the German 
Government have been running a semi-public organisation, Unternehmer ohne 
Grenzen (Entrepreneurs without borders) programme since 2000 (OECD, 2011).  
The UK Government’s Ethnic Minority Business Service (EMBS) is another 
example which provides start-up businesses services to immigrant 
entrepreneurs, including tax and employment legislation, book-keeping, business 
planning and finance. Technical assistance in the legal and tax areas is also 
provided to help immigrants across the US operate businesses, even if they are 
undocumented (TLC, 2015). Ojo et al. (2013) rightly point out that complexities in 
tax regulations not only deter immigrants from becoming legal but also from 
remaining legal. It is by tax compliance, as by the implementation of health and 
safety regulations, that immigrant communities can renew the legality of their 
businesses and remain in a foreign land.    
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3.5 Perception of Tax Risk and its Management  
 
The section begins with a conceptual review of tax risk and its components, 
followed by a discussion of small business taxpayers and their risk behaviour. It 
then touches upon the cultural and ethnic aspects of risk-taking behaviours in the 
context of immigrant businesses. The section attempts to find out how tax system 
complexity contributes to the generation of tax risk in immigrant business 
communities. Finally, it looks at the risk management practices of immigrant 
communities, the problems they face, and the ways they resolve them.  
 
3.5.1 Tax Risk: A Conceptual and Theoretical Review     
 
In systematic terms, risk refers to the possibility of anything arising that may affect 
organizations or individuals adversely (Daelen and Ven, 2010). Risk is different 
from uncertainty (Power, 2004), because uncertainties are not calculable, 
whereas risk can be calculated. Business activities give rise to various 
uncertainties that pertain to the application and practice of tax law. For example, 
businesses may be uncertain as to when and how to file a tax return, report 
income and pay income taxes. These uncertainties generate tax risk of different 
types, for example, registration risk, filing risk, payment risk, and reporting risk 
(Freedman, 2010)15. According to Neto (2017:55), “Tax risks include the risk of 
paying more or less tax than legally required… resulting in … additional costs 
which are difficult to measure. Errors in assessing the tax effects of transactions 
may lead to wrong business decisions.”  Ernst and Young (2004, cited in Milligan 
and Oats, 2009) define tax risk as “any event, action, or inaction in tax 
                                                          
15 Tax risks can further be classified as technical and non-technical, depending on whether they 
arise from legislative interpretation or from other areas. Technical tax risks arise mainly due to a 
knowledge gap or difficulty in interpreting tax legislation, for example, uncertainties in determining 
taxable income or tax calculation, while non-technical risk includes factors such as reputational 
risk; although it is a matter of debate whether tax disputes damage reputation (Freedman, 2008). 
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strategy…that adversely affects either the company’s tax or business 
operations.”  
 
Most small businesses lack proper tax knowledge (Kamleitner et al.,2012) and 
suffer from uncertainty in fixing their tax liabilities without the help of a tax adviser 
(Torgler, 2003). For small immigrant businesses, these difficulties are even more 
likely, due to cultural, linguistic and legal system differences (Kloosterman et al., 
1999; Liebig and Poza, 2005).  
 
The risk that a family business owner or a small business can bear is a critical 
factor in its tax compliance action (Xiao et al., 2001). Risk behaviors have been 
explained from different theoretical perspectives and approaches. Broadly, the 
perspectives are: analytical and behavioral. The analytical perspective suggests 
that, in risky or uncertain conditions, individuals make risk decisions by comparing 
the expected utility and cost of a given risk (Becker, 1968). The entire stream of 
public economics holds this view, and models tax compliance within the 
probabilistic framework of deterrent factors, i.e., penalty, audit and prosecution 
(Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo,1972)16.  
 
The deterrence-based risk theories of tax compliance have been challenged and 
extended to examine the importance of social norms, culture and demographic 
features in taking tax risk decisions. Several studies provide strong evidence that 
tax compliance attitudes are shaped by social as well as institutional norms and 
procedures (Togler, 2007; Kirchler, 2007; Tsakumis et al., 2007; Onu and Oats, 
                                                          
16 In analysing the maximization of expected income, an assumption of tax compliance in the 
original model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), risk and penalty were essential. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) reach new heights in explaining risk behaviour, arguing that, in general, individuals 
are risk-averse when facing gain and risk-seeking when facing loss.   
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2015). The non-risk-based theories propose improving tax compliance behaviors 
by stimulating trust, cooperation and respectful treatment of the taxpayer17.  
 
The non-risk or behavioral tax compliance view implies that taxpayers hold 
certain beliefs, which may not vary with the potential threat of punishment and 
sanctions, but rather with their ethical and moral standards. Power (2004:18) 
rightly comments that, ‘Individual attitudes to risk are far from being a given. 
Research… challenges highly rationalistic models of risk analysis which assume 
away the important psychological and cultural dimensions of risk understanding.”  
 
3.5.2 Tax Risk in Small Business Community  
 
To encourage tax compliance, it is important to know the tax risk attitude of 
immigrant family businesses who mostly belong to the small business category 
(Feltham et al., 2005; BIS, 2014; Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). It is thus relevant 
to know the basic features of small businesses, first to understand the nature of 
immigrant family businesses. According to the European Commission (2016), a 
small business is likely to have the features listed in Table 3.5. This definition is 
widely used by the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIR), 
although after the Brexit process is completed in 2019, a new definition of small 
businesses may be required. 
 
 
                                                          
17 For example, the intentions theory, developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), argues that 
individual attitudes towards tax evasion are affected by age, education, income and several other 
demographic features. Following the same line of thought, the norms of the tax compliance model 
contend that if a society considers evasion to be wrong and immoral, taxpayers will be less non-
compliant (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993). A society with a strong habit of non-compliance tends to 
encourage tax evasion to continue. An extension of this proposition is the inertia model, which 
asserts that once an individual is accustomed to certain norms and practices, it is difficult for 
him/her to suddenly withdraw from them. Similarly, a taxpayer with a long-standing history of tax 
compliance does not suddenly become a violator (Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993) due to the fear of 
detection by the authorities, but due to the habit of compliance. 
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Table 3. 5 Criteria for small business    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2016 
As shown in the Table 3.5, the first criterion that a small business must meet is 
to have no more than 50 employees; second, it must have a maximum yearly 
turnover of 10 million Euros; and/or third, it must have maximum total assets of 
10 million Euros. The employee headcount is a compulsory part of the definition, 
but not a sole criterion (OECD, 2009), whilst it is permitted to choose either of the 
criteria, turnover or total assets, to define small businesses (Federation of Small 
Business, 2011).  A single definition of small businesses is not enough, as 
businesses differ across countries and over time (OECD,2009).  
 
In many countries, small businesses are identified with hard-to-tax groups who 
often fail to register voluntarily and keep appropriate records of their income and 
costs, and who are often engaged in the informal sector (Thuronyi, 2004). Ojo et 
al. (2013:591) comment that, “Informality is the quintessential response of small 
firms to minimizing cost, risk, inconvenience and paperwork”, which has a 
detrimental effect on tax regulations. Tax risks not only pose a threat to the 
survival of small businesses, and push them to be informal; they also threaten 
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the family life of business owners,  as echoed by a Nigerian immigrant in London: 
“I used to do my businesses in a shop you know, but the over-heads; rates, taxes, 
bills, etc. were just too unaffordable ... but I’m doing well now that I operate from 
home ... the icing on the cake is that I have time to bond more with my children”, 
Ojo et al. ( 2013:599).   
 
Reviewing the literature on small business tax compliance, Kamleitner et al. 
(2012) point out the following three attributes of owner managers’ tax situations:  
a) Self-assessment and poor record-keeping lead to the opportunity for non-
compliance;  
b) In filing returns and facing different taxes, they need extensive knowledge 
of tax rules; 
c) because of partial disclosure of gross income, they may encounter 
different options for framing taxes. 
Based on a psychological perspective of tax compliance, these authors propose 
the following framework for the tax compliance of small business owners:  
Figure 3. 5 Psychological framework for small business owners’ tax compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kamleitner et al. (2012) 
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The framework, as shown in Figure 3.5, suggests that there are three main 
factors underlying small business owners’ tax compliance, each of which is 
influenced by several other factors. Perceived opportunity, for example, is being 
determined by risk-seeking attitude, age, gender, industry sector, norms and 
social networks and jurisdictions and culture.  Seeking an opportunity can be easy 
or difficult, depending on an owner’s knowledge and skills in handling tax laws, 
which are often complex and require expertise to deal with. Finally, in framing tax 
decisions, referring to prospect theory, Kamleitner et al. (2012) contend that small 
taxpayers view paying taxes, including paying employment taxes, as a loss. Tax 
noncompliance, thus, could be a natural consequence of paying taxes being 
perceived to be painful (Alm et al., 2004). 
 
In developing perception of tax risk, complicated tax systems and record-keeping 
play a vital role. In almost all business transactions, there is uncertainty as to how 
the specific tax law will apply, especially in complex areas of tax law. Sometimes, 
there is a lack of proper documentation to record a transaction.  Survey findings 
show that the complexity of tax law (86.6%) and the uncertainties it creates for 
businesses (82.9%) contribute highly to the generation of tax risk (PwC, 2004). A 
great deal of complexity, again, is being caused by changes in the legislation and 
in the accounting systems.  Added to this is the high tax rate, which makes tax 
compliance burdensome for taxpayers, who want to get rid of this by looking for 
loopholes in the tax law; and to complicate the tax law further, as Yuengert (1995) 
finds that a high marginal tax rate leads people to be self-employed and to take 
greater advantage of tax avoidance.  Self-employment gives them the opportunity 
to avoid detection by tax authorities and manage tax risk. In explaining the growth 
of immigrant self-employment in the urban US, Light and Rosenstein (1995) refer 
110 
 
to the contribution of easy tax laws. A tax regime favourable to immigrant 
businesses, with clear, comprehensible tax codes, and reduced tax risk, 
encourages immigrant business activities.  
 
Mejia et al. (2007) find that family owned businesses in Spain organize 
cooperative forums to manage tax compliance, to get exemption from tax, or to 
pay tax at a reduced tax rate. They (ibid: 117) note that a “family-owned mill can 
greatly reduce its performance hazard by voluntarily joining a cooperative, 
because of tax advantages.” Tong (2014) comments that when the business 
grows continuously, Chinese family firms in Singapore are converted into private 
limited companies, to take advantage of tax-breaks and reduce risk. In this 
connection, Mejia et al. (2007) comment that the socio-economic wealth family 
businesses possess helps decrease business risks, although it takes away family 
control of the business to some extent. Similarly, accounting and bookkeeping is 
viewed as a pivotally important support area for Latino businesses in the US, 
especially during the transitional and adaption period (Levitt, 1995).  
  
 Table 3. 6 Book-keeping method used and need for book-keeping training   
 
Source: Pabon and Klima (2017)  
 
Book-keeping support is inevitably required for small businesses, whether they 
use a tax adviser/accounting software or depend on manual skills to manage their 
taxes (Pabon and Klima, 2017). As Table 3.6 shows, those who maintain records 
manually, i.e. five out of seven respondents, or 71%, need more training than 
111 
 
those who use accounting software or appoint an outside accountant. Even 
respondents who refused to disclose their book-keeping method desired to have 
training on record-keeping.  
3.5.3 Culture, Tax Risk and Immigrant Businesses      
 
Looking at tax compliance from the viewpoint of taxpayers’ ethnic identity is 
important because of the way ethnic features define the identity of an individual. 
Constant and Zimmermann (2013:271) reflect that, “Ethnic identities of 
immigrants are important, because… ethnic identity defines who people think 
they are, how they perceive themselves with respect to others and how they make 
decisions in their everyday life.” Looking at Chinese and Turkish ethnic 
businesses in the UK, Altinay and Madanoglu (2014) provide empirical evidence 
that there is a positive relationship between ethnicity and the risk-taking 
tendencies of immigrant entrepreneurs. Loo and McKerchar’s (2011, cited in 
Yuan et al., 2013) study of ethnic groups in Malaysia illustrates that ethnicity is 
significantly correlated to risk behaviour and very likely to influence tax 
compliance indirectly. This leads Brink and Porcano (2017) to claim that 
taxpayers with certain cultural backgrounds may reveal lower tendencies to tax 
evasion when tax regulations create uncertainty, while some others may not. 
Danes et al. (2008:238), who carried out a cross-cultural risk study of Mexican 
immigrants in the US, suggest that, “Mexican Americans … [are more] inclined to 
be risk-takers than their mainstream counterparts” and that, “Hispanics tend to 
be …less inclined to be risk-takers than Euro-Americans.”  
 
Using findings from a survey of New Zealanders of European descent (Pakehea) 
and indigenous Polynesian New Zealanders (Maori), Frederick and Henry (2004) 
show that the former group are more inclined to be risk takers, and willing to 
accept uncertainty, than the latter. An ability to take risks inspires ethnic 
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communities to find creative and innovative ways of addressing business 
problems, including taxes. Frederick and Henry discovered that that legal codes 
are universally applicable to both these communities, with no preferential 
treatment, and it is individual attributes or risk-taking traits that make the 
Europeans more successful in their businesses than the Polynesians. Also, due 
to their risk-averse nature, Maori entrepreneurs see tax compliance as a more 
serious impediment than Europeans (Frederick and Henry,2004).  Among other 
studies, Xiao et al. (2001), using data from consumer finance sources, suggest 
that Caucasian family business owners are more risk tolerant than non-
Caucasian owners.  
 
Looking at the subject slightly differently and comparing the risk-taking attitudes 
of Indian and Bangladeshi small businesses, Amin and Banerjee (2007) argue 
that small business entrepreneurs in all cultures are ambitious and risk-takers. In 
the case of immigrants to the US, Delgado (2011) offers a complementary finding 
that risk taking is an essential quality both for entrepreneurs and for immigrants 
seeking a better life for themselves and their families. Similarly, tax evasion and 
non-compliance have a been a daily issue for small immigrant businesses in 
Australia, regardless of their ethnic identity, and these people believe that, “It 
represents a pay-off for taking risks”, Rothengatter (2005:305).   
 
Referring to approaches to entrepreneurship that suggest the quality is related to 
culture, Andrejuk (2016) argues that all immigrant communities are ambitious and 
risk-takers. One of the reasons for this, according to Andrejuk, is that immigrant 
entrepreneurs have a low perception of risk and view risk-taking as a route to 
achieving larger payoffs, although Basu and Altinay (2002) advance a contrary 
argument that thrift and hard work are the basis of immigrants’ success, rather 
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than risk-taking.  According to Whybrow (2005:56), “Migrants have a different 
mind-set when it comes to risk”. On the one hand, they acknowledge the danger 
in risk-taking; on the other hand, they see the opportunity that may arise from 
such a risk.  De Vries (2007), in his research, also finds that the risk aspect of 
looking for opportunity is implicit in the actions of immigrant businesses in New 
Zealand. It may be that frugality, industriousness, and risk‐taking – all three – are 
essential qualities for immigrant businesses (Yuan et al., 2013; Whybrow,2005; 
and Benson-Rea and Rawlinson, 2003).  
 
Against this idea, Constant and Zimmermann (2013) argue that the Asian -
American and the African American are found risk-averse compared to the white 
American. Morris and Schidenhutte (2005) comment that East Asian ethnic 
entrepreneurs take a risk only after a through calculation. Discussing the financial 
risk-taking behaviours of Asian immigrants in the UK, Dhaliwal (2008) points out 
that these people tend to be risk-averse but easily get frustrated by procedural 
bureaucracy.   
 
A wide range of tax compliance research studies have examined the effect of 
culture on taxpayers’ risk behaviour. An innovative way to examine the role of 
culture in tax compliance may be to explore the tax risk attitudes and tax 
management of immigrant taxpayers (Luttmer and Singhal,2014; Kountouris and 
Remoundou, 2013). Kountouris and Remoundou (2013: 105,117) conclude that, 
“Immigrants originating from countries with higher tax morale report higher 
individual moral persuasion towards paying taxes,” and, “Tax culture in the 
country of origin is a significant determinant of individual tax morale in the 
destination country.” Lee and Peterson (2000) reinforce this view that a society’s 
tendency to produce risk-taking, autonomous and proactive entrepreneurs 
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depends on its cultural foundation. Cultural identity, however, is only one item 
influencing attitudes to tax risk. A closely related factor here is the environmental 
or institutional setting surrounding the taxpayer. Cummings et al. (2001:11), 
based on the findings of a research study conducted in three different countries 
– the US, South Africa and Botswana – initially comment that a compliance 
decision, for a “given set of parameters and a given cultural baseline is a function 
of risk attitude”. Later, they contend that the differences in compliance behaviours 
across the three countries are not due to differences in risk attitude alone but also 
to differences in government behaviours and tax institutions.  
 
Dornstein’s (1976) explanation encompasses similar, yet wider, issues with far-
reaching effects on tax risk attitude. He emphasizes the importance of 
understanding an immigrant’s sociocultural background to understand his attitude 
towards tax risk and tax compliance. Dornstein finds that Israeli immigrants 
coming from underdeveloped or developing countries with nondemocratic socio-
political backgrounds are relatively less tax compliant than native Israelis or 
immigrants coming from developed countries. He further suggested that 
immigrants who have been longer in Israel are more tax compliant than 
immigrants who have had a shorter stay. In this connection, Alm and Torgler 
(2006) suggest that the effect of income and other tax compliance determinants 
on tax morale depends on the risk preferences of the taxpayers, among other 
factors. Again, income as a factor is likely to affect the tax risk behaviour of South 
Asian immigrants more strongly than others who are at high risk of poor income 
and social exclusion (ONS, 2011; IPPR.2007).Franceschelli (2013:58) comments 
that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are the most vulnerable income groups in the 
UK, which may be an outcome of their “working status; the level of deprivation of 
the areas where they live; low qualifications; and larger average family size.” 
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Therefore, in dealing with tax risk, Freedman et al. (2008) argue that emphasis 
should be placed on behavioural as well as structural factors.   
 
3.5.4 Tax Planning in Immigrant Family Businesses  
 
There remains disagreement about the use and need for tax planning in small 
businesses. Tax planning is not regarded as an inevitable feature of small 
immigrant businesses, nor is it a supporting tool for business success or 
satisfaction (Stanworth and Gray,1991 cited in Sian and Roberts,2009; Pabon 
and Klima, 2017). Of Latino businesses in the US, 50% do not have any written 
business or tax planning, yet they derive great satisfaction from their businesses 
(Pabon and Klima, 2017).  In explaining this, Stanworth and Gray (1991, cited in 
Sian and Roberts, 2009) submit that it is their independence and involvement in 
ownership, rather than money, that works as the motivational force for owner 
managers.  
 
However, there is evidence that tax planning is a pre-condition for successful 
management of family business wealth (Morris et al., 1997), not a device for 
taking undue and evasive tax advantages. Sian and Roberts (2009) and 
Poutziouris (2011) comment that owner-managers are less interested in using 
statutory accounting and financial statements for tax planning advantage. Nam 
and Herbert (1999) support this finding with evidence that there is a correlation 
between net income and the tax planning that family businesses undertake, which 
also indicates the bearing it has on tax risk and financial management. 
 
An OECD report (2009:97) on SME taxation points out that, “Multinational 
organizations are not the only business entities with opportunities taken to tax-
plan… perfectly legal opportunities may be taken by SMEs to minimize tax bills.” 
Many SMEs attempt to structure their business as a limited partnership, trust or 
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special corporate entity; or they may incorporate the business if the corporate tax 
rate is lower than the personal tax rate (OECD, 2009). Similarly, Ahmed and 
Braithwaite (2005) argue that, in many cases, small businesses are not much 
different to other taxpayers, especially in several attitudinal and psychological 
factors contributing to tax compliance. Ahmed and Braithwaite however comment 
that small businesses differ in terms of tax morale and work practices compared 
to other businesses, which seems contradictory, to some extent.  This is because 
attitudinal and psychological factors are essential elements in measuring tax 
morale (Brink and Porcano, 2016).  
 
Shailer’s (1993) observation is, however, different. She notes that the risk attitude 
of owner-manged firms is different with respect to the tax implications of debt and 
equity financing, which may cause them to get involved in off-balance sheet 
activities and organize tax planning to hide those activities. She adds (ibid: 
231,235) that, “Some firms represent double counting in that a number were the 
product of tax planning” and “taking advantage of different marginal tax rates” or 
tax relief.  There are ample of examples of small businesses attempting to 
characterise personal expenses as business expense, as in all other businesses 
(OECD,2009).  
 
Furthermore, for both family and non-family firms, non-debt tax shields, for 
example depreciation, are a widely used financial practice to reduce tax burden 
without increasing tax risk. Tax risk is usually higher when firms plan to reduce 
such risk by claiming deductions on expenditure and allowances, or taking debts 
with banks (Gracia and Andújar,2007). Christensen and Murphy (2004) contend 
that, compelled by the profit imperative, firms see in tax planning a euphemism 
for tax avoidance. However, Gallo et al. (2004:315) differ on this proposition and 
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contend that, “In relation to risk, FBs showed a certain amount of resistance. This 
is apparent in their more restricted use of permanent full-time personnel and in 
their considerably lower level of debt compared to NFBs.” Freedman et al. 
(2008:88) remind us that, “Responsible behaviour comprises transparency, 
openness, and ‘not doing planning that HMRC don’t like.”  
 
3.5.5 Taxpayer-Tax Adviser Relationships and Tax Risk Management 
 
Tax advisers, also called tax professionals, tax agents, tax intermediaries, tax 
preparers and paid preparers (Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996; Hughes and 
Mckercher, 2013) fulfil an essential social function. The authority to practice is 
endowed by the state, although tax practice in the UK does not have a licencing 
requirement. In Willmott’s (1986:563) words, “The state franchises elements of 
its power,” and this provides the opportunity to practice and bring taxpayers and 
the tax authority closer to each other (Trevino,2001; Mungham and Thomas, 
1982). In managing tax compliance and potential tax risks, advisers may easily 
influence taxpayers, as most taxpayers are unfamiliar with tax laws.  
 
In the case of small businesses, the possibility of tax advisers influencing tax risk 
perception and tax compliance behaviour is even higher, because small business 
owners cannot deal with complicated and frequently changing tax regulations as 
well as medium and large taxpayers do (Torgler, 2003; Sakurai and Braithwaite, 
2003). In the extant literature, the relationships between taxpayers and tax 
advisers have been examined from three major perspectives (Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2003). First, how aggressive tax professionals are in resolving tax 
decisions. Second, how taxpayers’ risk attitudes and preferences affect tax 
professionals’ tax planning decisions; and third, the general factors affecting the 
tax compliance decisions of tax professionals. Such studies can be differentiated 
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according to whether they are based on the taxpayers’ or tax professionals’ 
perspective.   
 
Tax professionals are like other professionals, for example medical and legal 
professionals, in wanting their freedom, independence and code of ethics 
respected (MacDonald, 1995; Johnson,1972). The research findings suggest that 
the profession is guided by two opposing factors – commercialism and client-
service (Johnson,1972). The former is manifest in their aggressive practices, and 
the latter in their altruism and social welfare attitudes (Elliott,1972).  Viewed from 
this perspective, the tax profession is no different from other professions: it is 
governed by both ideals and rational choice. Rationality here implies the 
exchange of gain between clients and tax professionals (Gracia and Oats, 2012; 
Parnaby, 2009); ideals are the motto of client service.  To achieve these goals, 
tax professionals may persuade their clients, or may use pressure, or both 
(Beckert, 2010). According to Sitalaksmi and Zhu (2013) risk perceptions and 
management practices differ considerably with respect to tax professionals’ 
motivation in relation to earning profit and securing loyalty from the taxpayers. 
Gracia and Oats (2012, p.10) comment that the tax professional- taxpayer 
relationship centres on the naturalized logic of give and take: “Advice is ‘sold’ to 
clients for financial return and seeks to provide a financial gain (tax saving) to the 
taxpayer clients.”  
 
The fact that tax professionals influence their clients in managing tax compliance 
is well documented in the literature, although the opposite –  taxpayers’ influence 
on tax professionals – is firmly contended and evidenced (Klepper et al., 1991). 
Torgler (2003:25) comments that the market for professional tax advice is well 
segmented: “Tax practitioners (taxpayers) are quite successful in finding their 
119 
 
suitable client (practitioner). There is a certain market segmentation.” Taxpayers 
who plan to reduce taxes and who are risk-takers find tax advisers who are good 
at finding loopholes (Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2001). Similarly, risk-averse 
taxpayers find tax advisers who can fulfil their demand.  In addition, results from 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) suggest that taxpayers usually trust their tax 
advisers. Likewise, Hite and McGill (1992) observe that taxpayers can express 
their preferences for conservative advice.  
 
On the other hand, Schmidt (2001) argues that under specific conditions 
taxpayers tend to agree with aggressive advice. In a balance-due prepayment 
position, taxpayers are more likely to accept aggressive advice than they would 
in a refund position. This finding is supported by the prospect theory, which 
envisages that individuals will demonstrate a higher risk disposition in loss 
(prepayment) situations and act risk averse in gain (refund) situations.  In the 
same vein, Schisler (1994) finds that in a loss situation, tax professionals are 
more aggressive, while in a gain situation they are more conservative.  Schisler 
contends that if clients have large tax liabilities, they prefer adopting aggressive 
tax plans and wish their professional to support them. Opposing clients’ wishes 
could result in a loss of business, which represents a risk to tax professionals.  
 
As concerns the role of tax advisers in evasive tax practices, there are mixed 
views (Sikka and Hampton, 2005; Gerstein and Friedman, 2013). Often, advisers 
are subjected to serious criticism and scrutiny for their role in designing 
exploitative tax risk management schemes (Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2003; 
Hughes and McKercher, 2013). Gerstein and Friedman (2013), in their study, 
referring to the survey done by the Gallup Organization, comment that “greed” is 
the main cause for dishonesty in tax practice. They also note some accounting 
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scandals, e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Time Warner etc., in support of their argument. 
One explanation for this could be the highly competitive nature of the profession 
(Thuronyi and Vanistendael, 1996; Hughes and Mckercher, 2013), which often 
leads to the erosion of ethical standards. In the face of intense competition, tax 
advisors may misrepresent their skills and talent.  Further, the high level of stress 
in accounting practices very often leads to suboptimal professional decisions.  
 
It is however inaccurate to claim that all tax advisers are engaged in aggressive 
tax practices. There are low risk, no fuss practitioners, just as there can be 
aggressive tax advisers (Sakurai Braithwaite, 2003). Christain et al. (1994) find 
that tax professionals do not influence their clients to be aggressive and are not 
impelled by monetary reward only. Above all, the complexities and difficulties of 
the tax laws and the constant flows of new legislation may cause risks of 
misinterpretation by tax advisors. Furthermore, tax professional services cannot 
provide a complete coverage of tax risk. Tax risk may still be there because of 
tax professionals’ knowledge gaps or oversight of an important tax fact.  
 
Based on findings from a longitudinal survey conducted across immigrant 
communities in New Zealand, Dunstan et al. (2004) note that knowing about the 
local tax system is a major area where immigrant businesses need help, after 
education and job support. Benson-Rea and Rawlinson (2003) support this 
observation by presenting evidence that 85% of immigrants need support on 
language and legal issues such as taxation laws for successful business 
settlement.   
 
In support of immigrant communities, Desiderio (2014:7) argues that immigrant 
businesses should have access to mainstream business support, particularly with 
respect to taxation and in areas of general administration and be allowed 
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“counselling for complying with tax regulations.” Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) 
comment that distance from government mechanisms of service delivery causes 
problems with settlements and assimilation of information for the immigrant 
communities.   Thus, one way to improve tax compliance and management of tax 
risk, and the taxpayer-tax adviser relationship overall, is to educate taxpayers 
about tax and accounting laws.  
  
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This section has dealt with the concept of tax complexity, offering a discussion of 
the major methodological approaches to this; it has shown how such complexity 
may influence tax compliance behaviours; and it has given a brief account of the 
complexity of the UK tax system and the challenges small businesses face in 
meeting their tax obligations. The section has also outlined the difficulties a 
complex tax system generates for small immigrant family businesses and given 
examples of how these can be addressed.  The chapter has discussed the ways 
immigrant family businesses manage the uncertainties that arise with respect to 
tax compliance and demonstrated that the difficulty of managing tax risk is greater 
for immigrant taxpayers because of cultural, linguistic and legal system 
differences. It has also presented a review of general risk theories to explain the 
risk-taking attitude of taxpayers under different circumstances.   
 
The review of the literature has shown that having an uncertain tax position not 
only threatens the very survival of immigrant businesses in the host country but 
may push them into the informal sector. A complicated tax system is one of the 
strongest factors, along with stringent documentation requirements, contributing 
to the generation of tax risk. The great majority of research findings claim that 
immigrants in general are risk takers, although there are exceptions. Added to 
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the ethnic identity of immigrants in affecting their risk-tolerance and tax-risk 
exposure is their socio-economic status.  
 
In managing tax risk, a common source of help is the tax adviser, who significantly 
influences the risk attitude of immigrants. Lack of tax and accounting education, 
and of access to institutional support, increases the difficulty of tax management 
further, but this can be resolved by providing support on language and legal 
matters to immigrant taxpayers.  The next chapter introduces the theoretical 
framework of the study and explains how it fits into explaining the tax compliance 
attitudes of small immigrant family businesses. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the creation of a theoretical framework for the study. A 
theoretical framework is a guide that informs the research process, models and 
data for the study. The theoretical framework that inspired the current research 
is the theory of practice of Pierre Bourdieu, one of the leading French social 
scientists and philosophers. This chapter beings with a discussion about the 
rationale of applying the Bourdieusian thoughts and the contending theories that 
could be applied. It then presents the theoretical framework  and identifies the 
theoretical constructs to be used in explaining and predicting tax compliance 
behaviours. The chapter links the main and subsidiary research questions with 
Bourdieusian concepts and explains them in detail.   
4.2 Rationale for Using Bourdieusian Thought  
 
This study adopted a Bourdieusian lens because it had been used to study the 
structures and practices (Portes et al., 2010) of a small community in Algeria 
called the Kabyle community, which seemed similar to examining the 
Bangladeshi community’s tax practice in the UK – the main objective of the study. 
We considered that, for achieving a deeper understanding of the tax compliance 
actions of immigrant societies, Bourdieu’s theory would be very useful and 
relevant.   
Using Bourdieu’s theory of practice as a framework would allow us to gain a 
profound idea about the cultural, institutional, social and economic aspects in 
which the immigrants operated and the way they adapted to tax compliance 
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strategies. By combining the macro, i.e., the wider tax environment, and the 
micro, i.e., Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK, levels of analysis (Portes et 
al., 2010; Mulligan, 2012), we would be able to describe the dynamic of 
interaction between the immigrant taxpayers and the tax system, and provide 
insight into their perceptions, conceptions and actions in relation to tax 
compliance.  
Application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is not new in business and tax 
research. For example, Oats and Morris (2015) look at tax complexity using 
Bourdieu’s symbolic power, while Gracia and Oats (2012) study the regulatory 
complexities between the acceptable and unacceptable boundaries of tax 
practice. Among others, Kraal (2013) analyses tax reform, and Picciotto (2007) 
studies the influence of language and social norms on tax complexity using 
Bourdieu’s theory.  
Bourdieu’s work is the most up-to-date in offering a grand perspective on society, 
people’s behaviour and thought. His theoretical framework argues that behind the 
smokescreen of “utility”, the basis of economic rationality, social-rules might play 
a strong role (Christoforou and Laine, 2014).  Bourdieu attempts to overcome the 
dichotomy between individual and structure, and proposes the idea of applied 
rationalism, the mid-point between rationalism and realism. Bourdieu is unique in 
claiming that social laws are statistical in nature, which implies that individuals 
are all alike and different at the same time. To Bourdieu, it is not maximization of 
economic benefits but “practical sense” or habitus (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005; 
Reay,2004) that guides our actions. Bourdieu also attempts to cover the blind 
spot of mainstream economics by introducing the role of power relations in 
decision making. 
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One may argue that Bourdieu’s theory of practice, at the basic epistemic level, is 
closely related to Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 1981; Driori et al., 
2010), and therefore Giddens could be used as an alternative.  Although there 
are similarities, Bourdieu’s view is more dynamic than Giddens’ for three reasons 
(Mahar et al., 1990). First, Bourdieu argues that individuals follow strategies 
connected with social practices rather than strategies connected to rules. 
Second, Bourdieu’s explanation of resources, in terms of capital (economic, 
cultural and social) is wider. Even his classification of capital is wider and deeper 
than those proposed in economics (Light, 2010; Lebaron, 2014).  Third, 
Bourdieu’s field, where social agents struggle for position and power, is more 
dynamic than Giddens’ static institutional field 
4.3 Theoretical Framework  
 
In developing the theoretical framework, Bourdieu’s (1993) framework for the field 
of cultural production and Drori et al.’s (2010) work on the habitus of transnational 
entrepreneurship was followed. 
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Figure 4.1 Tax field: A descriptive framework based on Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice 
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The upper section of the framework in Figure 4.1 shows that the habitus and 
capital social agents, immigrant family businesses in this case, possess interact 
with the social space to generate tax practice. In the social space there exists 
different fields, of which tax field is one. According to Bourdieusian philosophy, 
the field of power is the most powerful field and all fields are associated with one 
another in a relational structure. As reported in Figure 4.1, the field of power 
cross-cuts cultural field, economic field and tax field. We maintain that these are 
the distinctive fields that constitute the wider institutional context of tax 
compliance for an immigrant taxpayer, despite there being more possible fields 
and sub-fields, for example, family business field, legal and judicial field etc. 
The lower section of the framework shows the major theoretical constructs that 
explain and predict tax compliance practice which includes the conceptual 
elements18 of tax compliance, tax complexity and tax risk management. 
Conceptualization of these theoretical constructs can be made from different 
perspective and standpoints, for example, social, economic or political. This 
research applies the sociological view of Bourdieu to conceptualize them in the 
next section.  
4.4 Core Theoretical Constructs 
4.4.1 Tax Compliance  
Tax compliance as a construct refers to the timely reporting of all incomes and 
payment of taxes due on them. Compliance with tax obligations is one of the most 
                                                          
18 It is important to note here that theoretical constructs refer to the phenomenon, events or 
experience that the researcher wants to explore. For example, if a researcher is interested in 
studying how parents transmit their political perspective into their children, the theoretical 
perspective to study is “transmission of political perspective” (Toss and Waters, 2007:37). 
Theoretical construct is a latent concept that cannot be observed or measured directly. Validity 
and reliability of data are important criteria in measuring a theoretical construct. The major 
theoretical constructs in this research were studied through empirical data analysis as can be 
found in the empirical chapters 6 to 8 with their validity and reliability statistics.  
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important jobs for most taxpayers, particularly the family businesses (Morris et 
al., 1997) for the impact taxes have on family wealth and inheritance. To many 
taxpayers, meeting tax obligation is a matter of great worry which lead them 
depend on tax avoidance or evasion schemes. The tax risk attitude of the family 
businesses, mostly risk-averse due to their high reputational and image concern 
(Chen et al.,2010), plays an important role in their being happy or unhappy with 
the tax compliance attitude. Considering these essential natures of family 
business taxation, respondents in the survey were asked questions about their 
feeling, concern and the importance they give to tax compliance actions (see 
section 8.2 and survey research question 18, 23 and 24).  
4.4.2 Tax Complexity     
 
Tax complexity literature reviews the aspects of the tax system, specially tax 
legislation. These constructs make important contributions to the formation of the 
analytical framework. The main constructs of tax system complexity to be 
considered include:  
(a) Critical aspects of Tax complexity such as  
• Amendments to, and changes in tax laws are created in a way that 
increases the volume of tax legislation rather than lessening it, and the 
resultant increase in complexity in the interpretation of the laws (Karlinsky 
and Burton, 2011; Speer et al., 2014; Hall, 1994; Morris and Lonsdale, 
2004; PwC, 2004).  
• Difficulties in legislative interpretation as a core factor of tax system 
complexity. When faced with complexity about tax law, taxpayers either 
make over or under-payment of taxes, both of which may generate 
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uncertainty (Mulligan and Oats, 2009; Pabon and Klima, 2017; Frederick 
and Henry, 2004; Brink and Porcano, 2017). 
• Tax rate, calculations and taxable income have been a persistent source 
of tax complexity for small businesses and self-employed taxpayers, 
especially those who have no previous acquaintance with tax accounting 
or basic education (Shailer, 1993; Mitchell, 2012; Yuengert, 1995; Gracia 
and Andújar, 2007; Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999; Speer et al., 2014).  
(b) Perceptions of tax system complexity  
Taxpayers may have different range of perceptions about tax system complexity. 
Some may think it is difficult to understand the legal codes, some other may 
perceive the tax laws ambiguous.   How they perceive tax complexity to some 
extent depends on their educational levels and economic situations. Measuring 
tax system complexity thus requires measuring the socio-economic condition of 
the taxpayers. In this study, to assess their perception about tax system 
complexity three questions were asked in the survey to measure their general 
perception of the UK tax system. These three questions included aspects of tax 
system difficulties, uncertainties and complicatedness (see section 6.4.1 for 
elaborate discussion on the questions). 
 
4.4.3 Tax Risk Management  
 
A core theoretical construct in the literature is tax risk management that provide 
insights about the tax risk features and their management. In one way or another, 
the issues identified for tax risk have strong links to those identified with tax 
compliance. This suggests that tax compliance and tax risk issues in some cases 
originate from common compliance problems. The issues discussed in the 
literature include:  
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• Tax planning is any action undertaken by a company or individual to lower 
the overall tax burden. The problem of defining tax planning is drawing the 
borderline between actions taken within the boundaries of the law 
(acceptable) and tax avoidance (not acceptable) (Russo,2010). Tax 
planning in that sense connects us to the general issues of tax risk 
management. Usually small businesses and individual taxpayers have 
some sorts of written or unwritten tax planning that control risk attitudes 
and tax compliance functions (Shailer, 1993; Yong, 2011; Xiao et al., 2001; 
Badertscher et al., 2013; Stanworth and Gray, 1991; OECD, 2009). 
 
• The risk attitude of taxpayers influences how much risk they are willing to 
take. Not all taxpayers are equally willing to accept risk: some are 
aggressive, and others are conservative in taking tax risk. Cultural and 
ethnic identities, age, income levels, and so on have a strong bearing on 
risk attitudes and risk tolerance ( Delgado, 2011; Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2013; Dhaliwal, 2008; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; 
Kountouris and Remoundou, 2013). 
• Taxpayer-tax adviser relationships may evolve towards cooperation or 
exploitation. There is evidence that professional tax advisers are 
motivated more by commercial interests than altruism, each of which 
affects tax risk issues differently (MacDonald, 1995; Johnson, 1972; 
Beckert, 2010; Klepper et al., 1991 Gerstein and Friedman, 2013; 
Christain et al., 1994). 
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4.5 Connections Between Bourdieusian Concepts with the Research 
Question   
 
The theoretical framework used in a study influences on the choice of the 
research question and its implications or actions. In other words, the research 
questions raised should adequately describe the features of the theory. This 
section attempts to describe the link between the Bourdieusian concepts and the 
theoretical constructs on tax compliance, tax complexity and tax risk 
management.  
Table 4.1 The link between the Bourdieusian concepts and the theoretical 
constructs 
Main Research 
Question  
Subsidiary Question  Bourdieu’s concept  
 
 
Is Bangladeshi small 
family businesses’ 
engagement to the UK tax 
system problematic?   
 
What aspects of tax 
compliance are most 
problematic for small 
Bangladeshi family 
businesses in the UK? 
 
 
Bourdieu argues that a 
social agent’s perception 
and engagement to a social 
system largely depends 
their access to economic, 
cultural and social capital.  How do small 
Bangladeshi family 
businesses perceive the 
UK tax system and its 
complexity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How is tax risk managed 
in the Bangladeshi small 
business community?  
 
How do small 
Bangladeshi family 
businesses manage tax 
risk? 
 
Bourdieu suggests that 
people who move from one 
social structure to another 
experience conflict between 
field and habitus. Growing 
anxiety and insecurity in 
such an environment may 
cause risk-taking 
tendencies to become high. 
To what extent do small 
Bangladeshi family 
businesses rely on tax 
advisers? 
According to Bourdieu, the 
structural and functional 
homology between two 
classes of people tend to 
influence on how they 
select products or services. 
The similarities in social-
class position of the 
Bangladeshi immigrant 
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businesses and their tax 
advisers may determine the 
extent of dependence by 
the former on the latter.   
 
What is the nature of the 
relationship between the 
small Bangladeshi family 
businesses and their tax 
advisers? 
In Bourdieusian thought, 
power relation is a major 
factor in making social 
relationship. Power is not 
always crude and coercive, 
it can be benign and can be 
replaced with persuasion, 
influence, cooperation.  
What is the tax habitus of 
small Bangladeshi family 
businesses in the UK? 
                    
                  - 
Using Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus as an analytical 
tool to examine how 
immigrant businesses 
reproduce tax compliance 
in their everyday lives. 
 
As the Table 4.1 shows, the first subsidiary research question focuses on the 
major tax compliance problems taxpayers encounter, irrespective of their types 
and sizes, as identified in the literature. I fit the Bourdieusian lens to understand 
the nature of these problems from the viewpoint of taxpayers’ socio-economic 
and cultural status in the society, the essential concepts in Bourdieu’s philosophy. 
The second subsidiary question looks at the immigrant business owners’ 
perceptual understanding of tax system complexity from the same set of concepts 
as described by Bourdieu. These two subsidiary questions are related to the main 
research question one.  
The second main research question has three subsidiary questions, three to five. 
Subsidiary research question three links the tax risk management approaches 
applied by the small businesses in a conflicting field-habitus environment. 
Subsidiary research question four examines the extent on dependence from the 
viewpoint of structural and functional homology between the taxpayers and the 
tax advisers, while subsidiary research question five explores the power 
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dynamics in their relationship. Lastly, the main research question six uses 
Bourdieu’s master concept of habitus to the investigation of tax compliance 
behaviours in the immigrant business community.      
 
4.6 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
 
Bourdieu’s theory consists of three main elements –habitus, capital and field – 
and these should be approached together rather than in isolation if we are to 
make sense of his philosophy (Herman, 2004; Grenfell, 2007; Walther, 2014). 
Put in its shortest form, Bourdieu’s theory can be expressed as follows: [(habitus) 
(capital)] + field = practice. This shows that the interplay between habitus, capital 
and social field results in practice (i.e., actions or strategies) (Grenfell, 2008; Patel 
and Conklin, 2010; Walther, 2014; Sweetman, 2009). While habitus refers to an 
individual agent’s ways of thinking, speaking and acting, the social field refers to 
the rules or structured systems followed to carry out those actions, which can be 
limited or hindered due to insufficiency of capital (Patel and Conklin, 2010). We 
shall now discuss the top three concepts or pieces of Bourdieu’s theory in the 
appropriate context of the study and see how immigrant communities might 
internalize tax complexity and compliance.   
4.6.1 Habitus – the Psychosomatic Mind    
  
Habitus is a Latin word meaning habit, habitual, repetition, and the typical 
dispositions of the body (Jenkins, 1992; Light, 2010). Aristotle (under the term 
hexis), Hagel, Durkheim and Weber used this word to indicate “an acquired 
system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions”, 
(Jenkins, 1992:95). Habitus is one of Bourdieu’s most important theoretical 
contributions, although “perhaps the most vaguely defined” (Ignatow, 2009:101). 
Bourdieu retains the original meaning of the word and adds three more 
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dimensions to it. First, it is something inside the head of the individual. Second, it 
is visible in the actions of actors; and third, it is the sensory experience of actors. 
In Bourdieu’s (1990:45) own words habitus is,  
 
“A product of history that produces individual and collective practices …. 
It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in 
each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, 
tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over 
time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms.” 
 
Habitus is thus defined as the internalized representation of the external social 
structure that social agents acquire over their life time. It gives them their mental 
and cognitive structure, and represents a set of assumptions and behaviours, 
beliefs and attitudes (Patel and Conklin, 2010; Reay, 2004). As Sweetman 
(2009:493) comments, habitus refers to “our predisposed ways of thinking, acting 
and moving in and through the social environment that encompasses posture, 
demeanour, outlook, expectations and tastes.” 
 
Bourdieu believes that an individual’s actions cannot be understood in terms of 
his decision-making or of the supra-individual, “structures” (Jenkins, 1992) in 
isolation. He proposes that individuals produce thoughts and actions through their 
habitus, which in turn create their external social structure. Thus, habitus works 
as bridge between subjectivity and objectivity (Jenkins, 1992), or between agency 
vs structures (Sweetman, 2009). Structures in this case imply the rules and 
resources that determine and control individuals’ behaviours in a predictive way; 
whereas agency indicates freedom in making choices (Sweetman, 2009; 
Grenfell, 2008; Franceschelli, 2013; Reay, 2004).  
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Bourdieu attempts to overcome these dualities by introducing the concept of 
reflexivity (Franceschelli and O’Brien, 2014), according to which he argues that 
the external structure is reproduced by individual actions, and in return it informs 
individual actions: “reflexivity in social practice between the structural conditions 
of possibility (possibility and constraints) and actors’ use of these possibilities” 
(Jones 2009:39, quoted in Franceschelli, 2013). Thus, a habitus is a “structured 
and structuring structure” – “structured”, by the person’s past and present 
circumstances; “structuring”, through his or her present and future practices; and 
a “structure”, because of its systematic patterns (Grenfell, 2008).  
 
This leads us to argue that a taxpayer’s response to tax matters is initially 
influenced by his past and present actions. But it may take on a different shape, 
due to his present and future actions, eventually creating a pattern of tax 
compliance which he cannot break or come out of. Light (2010) comments that 
Bourdieu’s habitus explains how socially shared perceptions form and impose an 
individual’s mental condition, which the individual cannot break, so that he 
eventually gets trapped in the status quo – the children of the working class 
become workers and the elites become elite. 
 
An individual’s tax compliance decisions draw on a series of dispositions that are 
connected to his habitus (Driori et al., 2010). In our case, first-generation 
Bangladeshi immigrants, in the unfamiliar tax field of the UK, will attempt to 
comprehend tax obligations based on knowledge and experiences acquired in 
Bangladesh, since habitus is nationally and culturally bounded (Thatcher and 
Halvorsrud, 2016). Carney (2007) suggests that immigrants always depend on 
home-country experience for legal and trust issues. Older immigrants will take 
tax decisions combining their experiences in the home and host societies, as 
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habitus is a process involving an actor’s reproduction of a social position. 
Constant and Zimmermann (2013) reflect that immigrants do not have one single 
identity: they oscillate between the realities of the old and new world.  How the 
migrating habitus positions itself in the host society is a significant factor in 
adaptation or resistance to the new tax field (Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016).  
 
Habitus as a notion has features like those of tax system complexity. The tax 
system has features of uncertainty and indeterminancy (Krause; 2000; Slemrod, 
2009; Milliron, 1985), and the same is the case with habitus: having no “fine 
regularity … the habitus goes hand in glove with vagueness and indeterminancy”, 
as Bourdieu notes (1990:77). He adds (ibid:78) that due to the uncertain features 
of habitus, “one cannot depend on it entirely, in critical and dangerous situations”. 
Moreover, habitus is activated in the field, “and the same habitus can lead to very 
different practices and stances depending on the state of the field” (Bourdieu 
1990:116). The tax compliance practice of a taxpayer is thus highly dependent 
on the institutional contexts or fields a person faces and his or her ability to deal 
with these.  The following comment from an Indian immigrant entrepreneur shows 
how institutional context influences tax habitus: “In Switzerland … the rules are 
very clear and transparent. The British tax code is 2,000 pages; the Swiss tax 
code is 300 pages …In Switzerland, everyone follows the rule and pays the tax, 
no one evades it. You can negotiate with them. You can say, ‘I am being taxed 
too much, I would only like to pay this much tax,’” (Terjesen and Elam, 
2009:1110).  
 
Bourdieu’s idea of habitus is not confined to individual humans, but also extends 
to collective entities like family, organizations (Swedberg, 2011).  Lahire 
(2003:321) notes that, “Habitus could be a characteristic of groups as well as of 
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individuals.” Bourdieu (1998) also asserts that family transcends reality to its 
members, existing as a separate social universe, and each family habitus is 
governed by a specific set of rules. Family as habitus creates an individual 
habitus and is being created by an individual habitus. This duality of family 
habitus, including the dispositions of the family and family as a social field 
(Atkinson, 2016; Franceschelli, 2014), is maintained and reinforced through the 
intergenerational transmission of resources and family feeling (Bourdieu, 1998).  
 
Therefore, each family has its own practice (Atkinson,2016; Walther, 2014) 
regarding the economic and non-economic aspects of its life.  For example, a 
common family business habitus might be to conduct inter-generational transfer 
of the business in such a way that the tax burden, particularly capital taxes, is 
minimal (Westhead et al., 2002). Family business are likely to follow regulations 
and procedures that match their family interests rather than those of the 
government, as is apparent in their aggressive tax practices (Annuar et al., 2014; 
Schulze et al., 2001; Daily and Dollinger 1992; Haynes et al., 1999), although not 
all family businesses are tax aggressive (Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers and 
Niskanen, 2011).    
 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus however is criticised for being overly deterministic 
and ambiguous (Scott, 2012; Reay, 2004). Reay (2004:432) asserts, “Habitus 
has been subject to widespread criticism, mainly on the basis of its latent 
determinism.” Sayer (2005) comments that Bourdieu places more emphasis on 
the individual’s unconscious impulses than on everyday life reflexivity. In his 
concept of habitus, social flexibility and change is almost ruled out and 
“resistance appears to be an anomalous form of behaviour”, as Sayer (2005:23) 
continues. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is also criticized for denying the role of 
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ethical matters in human dispositions, except in some occasional cases 
(Crossley, 2001; Sayer, 2005; Sayer, 2010). 
 
4.6.2 Capital – Deciding an Actor’s Power and Position  
 
The term capital is used broadly in Bourdieu’s theory.  Bourdieu (1986:1) 
contends that capital not only refers to the mercantile exchange of material 
assets, but also to the intrinsic value of the asset. This is because, “Mercantile 
exchange is not of intrinsic value, but is always only a means to an end (profit, 
interest, wage, etc.)”, as Grenfell (2008:100) clarifies.  In Bourdieu’s theory, there 
are four forms of capital: economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Economic 
capital refers to money and property suitable for mercantile exchange, and it acts 
as the principal medium through which to determine the value of non-monetary 
capital (Gergs, 2003; Spigel, 2013).  
 
Cultural capital presents itself in an immaterial form, and may take several forms 
(Bourdieu, 1986): the embodied form, i.e., capital embedded in a person’s mind 
and body, for example, a muscular body; the objectified form, for example, books, 
movies and painting; by objectification, Bourdieu means the discovery of a theory 
expressed in the form instruments, pictures, machines and so on; and finally, the 
institutionalised form, for example, educational qualifications. Cultural capital in 
embodied and institutionalised forms has a limited life, while objectified goods 
live longer through their contribution to the related body of knowledge.  
 
Cultural capital creates a favourable context in which immigrants can become 
socio-economically active. Light (2005) argues that the Cubans and Haitians both 
arrived in the US in 1960s as wretchedly poor immigrants; but after a generation, 
the Cubans were much ahead of the Haitians in business because of their 
experience of running a business. Rothengatter (2005) reminds us that paying 
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taxes is a culture-specific behaviour and much of it is dictated by shared 
meanings derived from tax culture. In New Zealand, North and Trlin (2004) find 
that a cultural network not only helps finding tax advice, it also provides economic 
capital for ethnic businesses.  
 
By social capital, Bourdieu (1986) refers to the resources that arise out of social 
networks among social agents, or from “contacts with influential people” (Swain, 
2003).  Bourdieu (1986:10) elaborates that, “Social capital is the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition.” By its very nature, social capital is held in common ownership; and 
how much value it will generate depends on how much economic, cultural and 
symbolic capital the group members possess (Swain, 2003). Social connections 
regulate where to seek formal or informal tax advice (de Vries, 2007) and how to 
locate a tax adviser (Andrejuk,2016; Delgado, 2011). For immigrant communities, 
social capital also brings economic and financial prospects (Mitchell, 2012). 
 
Finally, symbolic capital comes from knowledge and recognition in the field: for 
example, goodwill and prestige earned by pre-eminence and seniority in a field. 
Bourdieu defines it as a disguised or intangible part of cultural and social capital 
that cannot be transmuted into economic capital. Bourdieu (1986) believes that 
the value of capital is different in different fields, and a form of capital important 
in one field may be unimportant or useless in another. Furthermore, the meaning 
and purpose of capital may vary with respect to the cultural identity of the actors 
this capital is ascribed to. Franceschelli and O’Brien (2014) find that South Asian 
Muslims in Britain use convertible resources from Islam, termed Islamic capital, 
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for children’s upbringing, and this guides the everyday life practices of that 
community rather than being merely religious practice.      
 
Bourdieu also argues that the inherent structure of the social world, the 
constraints we face, and the chances of overcoming these depend on how the 
different capitals are distributed among the actors in the field (Spigel, 2013). In 
Bourdieu’s (1986:1) own words, “The structure of the distribution of the different 
types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent 
structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints …determining the chances 
of success for practices.” Thus, with these four forms of capital, social agents 
work in their own fields to acquire and maintain power and position there.  
 
4.6.3 Field – The Social Space for Rules and Traditions  
 
Field, in Bourdieu’s theory, implies the network of social relations and the 
structured system of social positions within which individual agents struggle for 
resources, stakes and access (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu’s fields 
maintain a relational rather than an absolute structure, as in mathematics or 
psychology (Hilgers and Mangez, 2015). In our stage 1 framework, as a result, 
the five distinctive fields have been drawn into a relational structure, each having 
its own rules - rules of the game – elites and inferiors, dominator and dominated, 
and so on. Field actors implicitly agree to follow the rules, termed doxa, that are 
embedded in our everyday life in such a way that they are invisible, unremarkable 
and unquestioned (Spiegel, 2013; Jenkins, 1992; Hilgers and Mangez, 2015; 
Benson and Neveu, 2005). But what role does habitus play in the field? Briefly, it 
forms the links between an individual’s social domain and their structural space 
(Patel and Conklin, 2010; Lebaron, 2014). In other words, habitus deals with an 
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actor’s goals and inner constraints, while social fields determine the external 
conditions to achieve those goals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
 
As in our framework, to understand the tax compliance activities of the 
immigrants, it is essential to understand their cultural values and context. The 
cultural fields of immigrants are different from those of others (Danes et al., 2008), 
and they use a distinct cultural tool-kit, values or tradition to start and maintain an 
action. Ways of communicating and creating relationships, and the practices 
chosen, vary considerably among both immigrants and non-immigrants 
(McGoldrick and Troast, 1999). Cultural traits make some ethnic groups more 
entrepreneurial and risk-taking than others (Altinay and Madanoglu, 2014). Often, 
cultural homogeneity (Roth et al., 1989) influences how an ethnic group behaves 
with their tax functions. How cultural differences – or heterogeneity – are treated 
by the native or dominant culture is a crucial factor in developing immigrants’ tax 
habitus (Li, 2010).  
 
Discrimination and deprivation may push an ethnic community away from the 
system (Patel and Konklin, 2010). The poll tax levied on Chinese immigrants in 
New Zealand (de Vries, 2007) and the tax on Mexican immigrant employees in 
the US (Streich, 2005) are examples of how the native society may act in an 
oppressive manner towards immigrants. This type of oppression is, however, 
visible. Beside this, there is the invisible oppression exerted by the privileged 
classes over the subordinate classes. This happens quite naturally in a 
hierarchical social structure, and it is called “symbolic violence” by Bourdieu 
(1984). This is not overt or physical violence, but an unseen, hidden form of 
violence that takes the form of misrecognition of the distribution and exercise of 
power in society (Grenfell, 2008).  
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The legal and regulatory field is closely connected with tax compliance activities, 
which are also substantially different for immigrant businesses.  A natural 
consequence of this difference for immigrants is the need for legal and advisory 
support in an appropriate language (North and Trlin, 2004). The legal and 
regulatory systems of any country are developed in relation to the national culture 
of that country, which makes the tax system non-inclusive of minority groups 
(Tsakumis et al., 2007). Immigrant communities may attempt to address this gap 
by lobbying through their social networks or political connections (Drori et al., 
2010). The legal and regulatory frameworks also influence the ownership and 
formation of new businesses by immigrant communities. One Nigerian 
restaurateur in the UK, in Ojo et al.’ s (2013) study, reports that “our restaurant is 
barely surviving … cutting corners i.e., employing low-waged illegal staff, 
changing the ownership structure every now and then to evade business rates 
and taxes, etc.”  
  
Business organisations are an integral part of the economic field, whether they 
are owned by family or non-family members.  Bourdieu (2005:6) comments that 
it is “the family [that] provides the logic of exchange” and constitutes the centre 
of the domestic economy. He also (2005:203) asserts that economic reality must 
extend to family members by stressing that, “To refuse to calculate in exchanges 
between members of the household is to refuse to obey the principle of 
economy.” He further explains that business has its own norms and logic – 
business is business – “the economic illusio or the fundamental belief … the basis 
of the economic field” (Lebaron, 2014:42) and economic interest should be the 
guiding factor. Following Bourdieu’s theorization, it could be argued that family 
businesses are active agents in the economic field, oriented towards income and 
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profit (Lebaron, 2014). For an immigrant business, since the owner, employees 
and customers belong to the same community, the economic field may further be 
narrowed down to the ethnic or ethnic enclave economy (Levitt, 1995; 
Panayiotopoulos, 2006; Light and Bhachu, 2004). 
  
Immigrants form family and social networks in response to the unequal economic 
conditions they face in the host society (Halkias and Adendorff, 2014). The 
networks work as a field, integrating new and old immigrants from the same or 
different communities. The social capital available to the community out of this 
solidarity allows them to exploit opportunities, resolve problems and often 
manage credits (Light and Bhachu, 2004). The Bangladeshi catering industry in 
the UK, for instance, depends on community social networks for sourcing both 
skilled chefs and labourers. And the dependence on community connections for 
tax accounting and advisers is a phenomenon common to almost all immigrant 
communities (Andrejuk, 2014; Yong, 2011; Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014; 
Yuan et al., 2013). Within the social networks, there may emerge professional 
associations based on certain skills, languages or shared cultures: for example, 
the Bangladeshi accountants in Whitechapel, London, or the British curry 
industry, owned and organized by Sylheti Bangladeshis in the UK (Thaker and 
Barton, 2012).  Barley and Kunda (2004:271) refer to the way this phenomenon 
arose: a “network of practice … focused attention on the idea that … practice is 
an important nexus of organizing” and provided critical resources, including jobs, 
knowledge and services.   
 
The tax field is related to all the fields above in some way or the other, and several 
actors interact in the field with conflicting purposes and interests. Taxpayers are 
one of the leading actors in this field.  In Bourdieu’s view, the tax field is complex 
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because of the struggle and competing claims taxpayers face in making tax 
payments. Bourdieu et al. (1994:6) comment that, “Even today tax fraud bears 
testimony to the fact that the legitimacy of taxation is not taken wholly for granted.” 
Making intentional or unintentional mistakes thus becomes an essential part of 
the tax habitus. Tax administrators are the other key actor, working as a state 
agent (Menendez, 2001) to enforce the tax law. It is the state’s prerogative to 
make tax policies, having been empowered by the parliament; and tax 
administrators have only to administer and implement them (Cordes et al., 2005; 
Gill, 2000).  
 
Professional tax advisers, the defendants or agents of taxpayers, occupy a 
prominent position in the tax field. Their activities, conceptions and confrontation 
with tax law influence the tax field (Terdiman, 1984). For many tax professionals, 
tax law is a set of rules for playing a game with the tax authorities, and for bending 
the law when there is any ambiguity (OECD, 2008). Fogarty and Jones (2014), 
however, comment that tax professionals tend rather to solve the ambiguities in 
tax law, apparently serving two masters, the taxpayer and the tax administration, 
albeit imperfectly. The extent to which a tax adviser will play this game depends 
on the adviser’s cultural, ethical and social disposition (Doyle et al., 2012).   
 
The judiciary is another player in the tax field, and it has considerable influence 
on the functioning of the tax system, especially in countries where common law 
is the basis of the legal system. The judiciary defines, interprets or repeals a tax 
decision in a performative language. Such language indicates “a special linguistic 
capacity (one which is particularly inherent in the law) that makes things true 
simply by saying them” and creates something that will henceforth be taken as 
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the truth without just describing the facts, as happens in ordinary language 
(Terdiman, 1984:49).  
 
The executive and the legislature are the other two significant participants in the 
tax field. Taxpayers with strong political connections are exempt from taxation 
(McCarten, 2006).  Even in developed countries, the influence of politics on tax 
legislation is widely acknowledged.  Herber (1988) finds that political influence 
plays a vital role in the redistribution of income in favour of the rich in the US. 
Herber (1988:395) contends that, “The fact that middle-income and low-income 
Americans ‘outnumber’ the rich does not seem to offset this influence, likely 
because of their inability to organize effectively and finance the kind of lobbying 
effort that would be required to sustain a level of political influence commensurate 
with that of higher-income person.” In addition to these major participants, the tax 
field is occupied by other public agencies, for example, the auditor general, the 
public prosecutor and the police (Gill, 2000).  
 
Above these fields, comes the field of power, which, according to Bourdieu, is the 
supreme field that determines the position of a field in the global social space.  
To clarify this, Hilgers and Mangez (2015:185) observe that, “The field of power 
is … a metafield … fundamentally structured … in an opposition between cultural 
capital (dominated) and economic capital (dominant) … the structure and 
dynamics of the specific subfields derives from the field of power.”  Power 
relations enable actors to capture legitimacy or status and enhance symbolic 
capital in a society (Terjesen and Elam, 2009). Tax and legal relations and their 
extensions are connected to the field of power, which is the fountain of all 
“hierarchical power relations which structure all other fields” (Jenkins, 1992:66). 
Since everyone does not have the same power connections, they do not have an 
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equal ability to influence the field.  Immigrants in most countries are not even on 
the power ladder; and if they have any agenda, they move it within their local 
political networks (Drori et al., 2010; Terjesen and Amanda, 2009). The closer 
they are to those in the relationships of power, the higher will be their access to 
resources; which may result in better realization of tax management. Boden 
(2012) argues that power not only informs the tax policy and tax authority, but 
also the taxed subjects.  
 
4.6.4 Practice – Generation and Maintenance of Actions     
 
Practice is a major concept in Bourdieu’s theory. In the context of immigrant 
communities, practice implies activities that invoke, as Drori et al. (2010: 6) 
comment, the “aggregate set of interactions …. that shape and reshape both the 
individual and institutional contexts”. Thus, investigating immigrant family 
businesses’ tax compliance behaviours via the theory of practice demands 
consideration of those constructs that relate both to the individual level of actions, 
beliefs and cognition, and to the macro-level, i.e., the structural and institutional 
context.  According to Bourdieu (1990) practice is an outcome of habitus which 
provides principles and logic to social actors so that they can manage their 
actions.  Habitus thus dictates the practices that guide an immigrant family 
business to adapt to changed circumstances and manage uncertainties 
(Swartz,1997; Sweetman, P. 2009; Spigel, 2013).  
 
The process of practice can be better explained by considering the circular nature 
of habitus, i.e., the circularity that encompasses internal subjective and external 
objective conditions. In this circularity, the individual acts as a filter, absorbing 
and internalizing external objective practices and creating individual dispositions 
to function in a certain way. Later, the internalized dispositions are sent back  
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into the social world to reproduce and inform objective practice or objective 
structure (Franceschelli, 2013; Lahire, 2003). Lahire (2003:338 and 352) 
comments, “Habitus… rhetorically refers to ‘the internalization of what is external’ 
and ‘the embodiment of objective structures’” which can be explicated as – “The 
social world is inside us as well as outside us.” In the same fashion, Jenkins 
(2002:82) observes that habitus itself is subjective but is the source of objective 
practices generated “by the ‘objective’ patterns of social life”. 
 
In our stage 1 framework, practice is shown as the culmination of interaction 
between capital and habitus in the field, expressed as a formulaic relationship in 
the introduction of the chapter. As we see in Part B of Figure 4.1, the field 
generates some critical “outcomes” which refer to the “process, resources, 
structures and activities that lead to the development of a unique … habitus”, as 
Drori et al. (2010:18) argue.  The three outcomes produced in the field are internal 
and external resources, knowledge base, and legitimacy and control. These are 
the resources being produced in the field by immigrants’ habitus, and in the long 
run they come to shape that habitus. We maintain that the tax habitus of 
immigrants should be seen from a longitudinal perspective as producing and 
reproducing structures within their habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). The resources 
available for immigrant taxpayers in the new institutional context will inform their 
actions and strategies. The greater the support immigrant taxpayers have from 
embedded internal and external resources, the higher is the possibility that they 
will be compliant with tax rules. Likewise, the stronger their knowledge base on 
tax legislation and procedural issues, the more efficient they will be in managing 
tax complexities and tax risk. Finally, being close to relationships of power and 
exercising connections with the powerful will enable immigrant taxpayers to 
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achieve legitimacy in the host society and extend their network resource base 
further.   
 
 
4.7 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has described how the theoretical framework  was established, 
according to which the research question for the study, the research methods 
and the data analysis would be conducted. A description of the framework 
explained the rationale for choosing Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and the 
contribution this was expected to make to understanding the tax compliance 
practices of the immigrant community.  With reference to Bourdieu’s three main 
conceptual tools, habitus, capital and field, the chapter has showed how their 
interaction leads to actions or strategies. The context of the immigrant taxpayers 
was considered, to see how the Bourdieusian lens fitted over it, and how this lens 
reflected the reality of the external tax environment. A discussion of the core 
constructs from the literature on tax compliance, tax complexity and tax risk 
management established a conceptual alignment between these. Based on this  
framework, we shall attempt to construct the internal and external reality of the 
tax field, to explain how and why an immigrant taxpayer decides to adopt or reject 
the tax system of the host society. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapters reviewed the extant literature on immigrant family 
businesses’ tax compliance issues and identified a gap in the body of knowledge. 
This chapter will describe the formulation of the main research question and sub-
questions intended to help fill that gap; and it will indicate the evidence needed 
to answer these questions. In doing so, it will offer a comparison between the 
main research paradigms and methods that were available to the researcher for 
data collection and analysis, and it will provide an outline of the data sources and 
sampling procedures that were to be implemented. Finally, the chapter will 
provide a description of the fieldwork to be conducted among the Bangladeshi 
community in the UK.  
5.2 Research Questions 
 
The literature mentioned in the previous chapters could mainly be classified in 
three streams. The first stream focused directly on the topic of immigrant 
businesses’ tax compliance management, and included the works of 
Rothengatter (2005); Young (2011); Yuan et al. (2013) and Inland Revenue, New 
Zealand (2014).  The second stream focused mainly on the economic and risk-
taking behaviours of ethnic businesses; but as part of this, the tax compliance of 
immigrant communities was discussed as a secondary, or even a tertiary, issue. 
This stream included studies by Yuengert (1995); Rath (2000); de Vries (2007); 
Mitchell (2012), Kountouris and Remoundou (2013); Ojo et al. (2013); and 
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Kloosterman et al., 1999.  The third stream of literature discussed the tax 
compliance behaviours of family businesses in general, but not in the context of 
immigrant family businesses. Contributions included the work of Chen at el. 
(2010); Fama and Jensen (1983); Badertscher et al. (2013); Xiao et al. (2001); 
Christensen and Murphy (2004); Annuar et al. (2014); Schulze et al. (2001); Daily 
and Dollinger (1992); Loutzenhiser (2009); and Haynes et al. (1999).  
These three streams of literature provided little evidence of how immigrant family 
businesses engaged with the tax system, perceived the tax system or tax 
complexity, manged tax risk, maintained relationships with the tax advisers, and 
achieved tax compliance. Another aspect of the extant literature on tax issues as 
it related to immigrant communities was that it was confined mainly to New 
Zealand or Australia. None of the studies focused on immigrant taxpayers’ 
compliance activities in mainland Europe, a common destination for immigrants 
from around the world. It was this background that triggered the following three 
main and five subsidiary research questions:  
Main Research Question 1 
Is Bangladeshi small family businesses’ engagement to the UK tax system 
problematic?   
Subsidiary questions to main research question 1 
(I) What aspects of tax compliance are most problematic for small Bangladeshi 
family businesses in the UK? 
(II) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses perceive the UK tax system 
and its complexity?  
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Main Research Question 2 
How is tax risk managed in the Bangladeshi small business community?  
Subsidiary questions to main research question 2 
(III) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses manage tax risk? 
(IV) To what extent do small Bangladeshi family businesses rely on tax 
advisers?  
(V) What is the nature of the relationship between the small Bangladeshi family 
businesses and their tax advisers? 
Main Research Question 3 
What is the tax habitus of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK?  
 
The main research questions and the subsidiary questions listed above, and 
discussed below, have already been mentioned in Section 1.4. Once research 
questions have been framed, the need for research methodology arises. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2009:09) comment, “Research questions dictate what 
design and procedure are needed for answering them.” Research questions 
significantly define whether data-gathering should be based on observation, 
interview, documents, or even questionnaires, and guide the questions to be 
asked.  In the next section, we shall discus how each of the questions would be 
answered, along with sampling and data analysis techniques.   
5.3 Answering the Main and Subsidiary Research questions 
 
The answers to each subsidiary question, taken together, would answer the main 
the main research question with which they are related. It needs to be mentioned 
that the subsidiary questions and the questions to be asked in the interviews or 
in the questionnaire would be different in style and scope (de Vaus, 2001; Blaikie, 
2010). Interview questions or the survey questionnaire would provide the basis 
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for answering the subsidiary questions, while the subsidiary questions would 
answer the main research question. 
5.3.1 First Main Research Question 
 
The purpose of the first main research question was to identify the aspects of the 
law that created problems for the Bangladeshi small businesses in engaging with 
the UK tax system. The first subsidiary question under this main question looked 
at the aspects of tax compliance most problematic for them (discussed in section 
6.3). Data needed for each aspect of tax law would be collected from a 
questionnaire survey and through semi-structured interviews.  The second 
subsidiary research question under this main research question was to explain 
how immigrant family businesses perceived tax law complexities and how they 
related these perceptions to action, i.e., tax practice (discussed in section 6.4.1). 
Data to understand the perception-making process was mainly to be collected 
through in-depth interviews and would be analysed through interpretivism. Data 
collected by the questionnaire would be analysed using statistical tools.    
5.3.2 Second Main Research Question  
 
The second main research question aimed at understanding the tax risk 
management practices of the Bangladeshi immigrant businesses. The objective 
of the first subsidiary question under this main question was to identify the kind 
of tax risk issues immigrant family businesses faced, how they took decisions 
about their management, and who was involved in the management process 
(discussed in section 7.2).   
The second subsidiary question under this main question would examine the level 
of dependence on tax advisers and the underlying reasons for such reliance. 
Answering this question would involve considering what other sources of tax 
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advice there might be, whether or not they were used, and how business owners 
might make contact with them (discussed in section 7.4). The third subsidiary 
research question would look at the relational dynamics between immigrant 
family businesses and their tax advisers, which the theoretical framework 
suggested would be influenced by the cultural, social and socio-economic factors 
the individuals shared (discussed in section 7.5).  
A mix of qualitative and quantitative data would be used to answer these 
subsidiary questions and would be analysed using statistical tools and content 
analysis.  Descriptive statistics from a questionnaire survey would be used to 
support the patterns and themes that arose from the qualitative data.  
5.3.3 Third Main Research Question  
 
This question would explore how immigrant businesses adapted to tax practice 
in their everyday life in the host society (discussed in chapter 8).  This question 
would be answered directly with no subsidiary question under it. Applying 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, we would examine how socio-economic and 
cultural identity contributed to their engagement with tax compliance. It would 
explore the historical trajectory of the Bangladeshi community in the UK and its 
relationship with UK society. Answering this question would use both survey and 
interview data. It would use a multiple correspondence analysis to draw the 
relationship between different forms of capital and tax compliance attitude and 
would use interviews to interpret the nature of that relationship.    
5.4 Ontology, Epistemology and Methods  
 
Whatever way we approach a research study, it is influenced by certain views, 
assumptions and beliefs, which can be categorised into five main groups: 
ontology; epistemology; agency vs structure; methodological assumptions; and 
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axiological assumptions (Oats, 2012). Ontology refers to what we can know, i.e., 
what exists in the real world. It deals with social reality, whether it’s single or 
multiple, external or internal to our consciousness (Oats, 2012). Epistemology 
refers to how knowledge about reality can be gained and whether the knower and 
the known are the same or different (Seidman, 2006). On this “how” question, the 
research community is divided into two major groups: positivists and 
interpretivists. The positivist view of epistemology, the default option of 
quantitative research (Silverman, 2005), is that reality is single, whereas in 
interpretivism reality is multiple. Positivist epistemology indicates that the knower 
and the known are separate, whereas for interpretivists they are inseparable 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
Positivism adopts a scientific approach to the research process by taking natural 
science, a physics model, as the only basis for inquiry or knowledge, whether the 
research is about human or non-human objects. Positivism claims that 
knowledge is generalizable across time and place and that conclusions drawn 
should be the same, irrespective of variations in researcher or research setting 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The replicability of research and acceptance of 
knowledge only when it is supported by evidence – “empiricism” – are the central 
features of positivism (Seale, 1999).  These two conditions make quantitative 
work in the social sciences questionable, since such work is unscientific and it is 
difficult to measure social science phenomena in the way that physical objects 
are measured in pure science. 
Interpretivism as a philosophical view draws on people’s need to understand 
human experience, the culture they live in, and they society they belong to. 
Vygotsky (1986) asserts that experience is the systematic outcome of social 
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factors, which works as an external rule for individual thought. “Verstehen”, a 
German word from which the interpretivist movement began (Hammersley, 
2013), refers to in-depth understanding of human facts through exploration of the 
human environment and context. Interpretivism states that the researcher’s main 
task is to explore the distinctive socio-historical perspective when investigating 
how people’s strategies or actions unfold in a situation. In defining interpretivism, 
Holloway (1997: 93) states that, “The experiences of peoples are essentially 
context-bound and not free from time, location or the mind of the human actor.” 
Besides interpretivism, other approaches to understanding social reality include 
constructionism, critical perspective and structuralism, which are variations or 
modifications of interpretivism (Hammersley, 2013).  
Positivism is often the epistemological view associated with quantitative research 
methods, whilst interpretivism is associated with qualitative methods. Despite the 
philosophical foundations of qualitative and quantitative research being different, 
there is a close relationship between them (McKercher, 2012; Biber, 2010). Oats 
(2012) observes that it is possible for a positivist researcher to use qualitative 
data, and at the same time, for an interpretivist researcher to use qualitative data.  
For example, content analysis is located at the intersection of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, allowing a quantitative analysis of seemingly qualitative data 
(Kondracki et al., 2002).   
In between the two major assumptions, that of agency vs structure offers a debate 
as to whether humans are the outcome of their environment or create their 
environment.  The opposing views can be summarised as: individuals are 
determined by their environments, “determinism”; or they are free of it, 
“voluntarism” (Miles et al., 2014). There is also a subjectivity-objectivity debate 
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which encompasses universal law and contextual interpretations that relate to 
methodological assumptions. And, finally, there are the assumptions of axiology, 
which relate to the values, ethical practices and bias of the research or researcher 
(Blaikie, 2010). Positivists argue that a social inquiry is value free, whereas to 
interpretivist it is value bound (Oats, 2012: Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
5.5 Research Methods: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
 
Very often, research methodology and methods are confused. Methodology is an 
umbrella term that combines research design and methods (de Vaus, 2001). 
Research design deals with the question, “What evidence do I need to answer 
the research question?” while research method deals with, “How do I collect the 
evidence?” (de Vaus, 2001). Research methods in social science can be 
qualitative, quantitative or mixed, underpinned by the methodological 
philosophies of mainly positivism or interpretivism (Hamersley, 2013). And 
research designs can be experimental, case study, longitudinal or cross-sectional 
(Bryman, 2015; de Vaus, 2001). The present study would apply mixed methods 
as the research method and a cross-sectional approach as the research design. 
The rationale and relevance of the methodology adopted are presented below in 
the overall form of methodological paradigms.  
5.5.1 Qualitative Methods 
 
Qualitative research, derived from the Latin word qualitus, meaning quality, 
places the emphasis on words (Hammersley, 2013). The underlying argument is 
that people symbolize experiences through words and understanding human 
action requires an understanding of the words people use in their language 
(Seidman, 2006; Vogystsky, 1986). Thus, qualitative methods use relatively 
unstructured data and prefer verbal description and interpretation. A key aspect 
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of qualitative research is that it is conducted in a natural setting in the ordinary 
way of life (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), which enables an in-depth interpretation 
of the research context. Biber (2010) argues that qualitative research helps 
quantitative research by providing theories and contexts for developing survey 
instruments. Qualitative research is often criticized for the unstandardized nature 
of its data and the “forms of reporting that are closer in character to those of 
journalists and non-fiction writers” (Hammersley, 2013: 18).  Thus, there is a high 
chance of subjective bias in qualitative research, due to researchers’ social and 
personal characteristics and the “storytelling” or imaginative humanities mode of 
presentation researchers adopt (Silverman,2005; Hammersley,2013). Qualitative 
methods of data collection include interviewing, document analysis, observation 
and group studies (Seidman, 2006; Mason, 1996). Some common sources of 
documents are publications, the print media, archives, and websites (Hakim, 
2000).   
5.5.2 Quantitative Methods 
 
Quantitative methods – the word originates from the Latin quantitas, meaning 
amount – places the emphasis on numerical data (Hammersley, 2013). These 
methods demand serious validity and reliability of data (Silverman, 2005). In such 
methods, data are rigorously structured and standardized, and objectivity is 
maintained through data collection, measurement and analysis. Quantification of 
data may, however, be problematic because the real-world picture may be lost if 
the research is conducted under experimental conditions (Mason, 1996; 
Silverman, 2005). Measurement of social science problems following natural 
science techniques may result in the compromising of the central concept of the 
problem. Quantitative methods include closed-ended questionnaires, large 
survey data and time series data as methods of data collection, and the analyses 
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are mainly variable-centred.  It is widely recognised that statistical analysis of 
quantitative data in social science has many limitations and is sometimes flawed 
and devoid of reality (Hakim, 2000; Leander, 2001). Moreover, in research that is 
based on positivism, the “quantitative method cannot access some of the 
phenomena”, for example, lived experiences, social interactions, and 
perspectives on interactions (Sale et al., 2002:2).  
 
5.5.3 Mixed Methods  
 
Against a background of tension, if not mutual exclusivity, between the two 
research methods described above (Howe, 2004), mixed methods research 
advocates combining both qualitative and quantitative methods. The underlying 
philosophy of mixed methods is “pragmatism”, or “what works” (Howe, 2004). 
Mixed methods research uses both words and numbers (Bezeley, 2003) and 
integrates thematic and statistical analysis to answer research questions. Such 
research is not simply using two types of data: it is more than that. Tashakkori 
and Teddlie (2009) clarify that it involves two types of research question 
(qualitative and quantitative), two manners of developing research questions 
(emergent vs pre-set), two types of sampling procedure (probabilistic and 
purposive), two types of data analysis (statistical and thematic) and two types of 
inference (objective and subjective). Table 5.1 shows the differences between 
mixed methods and other methods.   
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Table 5. 1 Comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of different methods   
 
Source: Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010)   
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) comment that mixed methods research offers a 
way of balancing the” quantiphobes” – those disliking or fearing quantitative 
research, and the “qualiphobes” – those disliking or fearing qualitative research. 
As an approach that offers triangulation of methods (Biber, 2010; Mason, 1996; 
Solverman,2005), mixed methods bridge the two opposing research paradigms. 
A persuasive argument for mixed methods research is that research cannot be 
purely qualitative or quantitative. There is always a mix, to some extent (Bryman, 
2015).   
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A mixed methods approach is, however, controversial and has strengths and 
disadvantages like the other two approaches. Firstly, because it is difficult to 
integrate the competing paradigms of positivism and interpretivism in answering 
the same research question, or different aspects of the same question 
(Hakim,2000; Morse and Niehaus, 2009).  As a result, the credibility of the 
inference can be poor. Second, the idea of pragmatism contradicts the idea of 
axiology, since it does not clarify which values or whose values are maintained in 
the research. Mixed methods can be perilous if the researcher is not familiar with 
both qualitative and quantitative methods (Biber,2010).  Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2008) indicate that one of the major strengths of mixed methods 
research is to overcome the weakness of a single method and increase the 
generalisability of study findings, while its major weakness is that it integrates 
findings from quantitative and quantitative data, which may often contradict rather 
than supplement each other. About the mixing of quantitative and qualitative data, 
Sale et al. (2002:2) remind us that, “Just because they are often combined does 
not mean that it is always appropriate to do so.” 
 
Despite these criticisms and dangers, mixed methods research flourishes as an 
alternative approach because a single paradigm may not apply to all situations. 
Howe (2004:43) comments that, “Mixed-methods interpretivism has moved 
forward with the evolution of social science methodology during the past quarter 
century.” 
 
5.5.4 Mixed Methods in Tax Research    
 
In tax research, mixed methods have gained broad acceptance. To mention a 
few, Devos (2012) applies mixed methods in investigating the influence of tax 
return preparers on personal tax compliance; and Mohdali and Pope (2014) use 
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it to study the influence of religious faith on tax compliance. An increasing number 
of doctoral researchers in taxation have adopted mixed methods research in 
recent years (See Palil, 2010; Akhand, 2012; Hamid, 2014; Yucedogru, 2016). 
Similarly, a respectable number of academic researchers in taxation have been 
mixed methods oriented, doing both qualitative and quantitative work; or they 
have supervised doctoral students using a mixed methods approach (for 
example, John Hasseldine; Lynne Oats; Adrian Sawyer; Andy Lymer; Kevin 
Holland).  A strong reason for the increasing trend towards mixed methods could 
be the multidisciplinary nature of tax research (Lamb et al., 2005). Oats (2012:15) 
reminds us that, “Disciplines have their own ways of speaking about research as 
well as doing research.” In the same vein, Howe (2015: 8) argues that, 
“Differences in stakeholder worldviews are not uncommon in applied and 
interdisciplinary research, and this is one justification for mixed methods 
approaches.”  
Taxation as an academic discipline has usefully integrated researchers and 
audiences from diverse communities: for example, law, economics, accounting 
and sociology. A methodological pluralism in this field can link an economist, who 
mainly has a positivist view, and a legalist or a sociologist, who mainly have an 
interpretivist or critical view (Howe, 2015).  About the scope of mixed methods in 
tax research, Mckercher (2008:20) contends that, “The possibilities are endless 
and are not limited to just quantitative and qualitative.”  Mckercher (2008), for 
example, suggests that a focus group study or in-depth interviews can be 
conducted to identify key concerns about taxation, and the results can be used 
to develop a survey among a larger sample to make statistical generalization 
(qualitative method informs quantitative method).  The researcher may also do 
the opposite (quantitative informs qualitative).    
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Similarly, in exploring tax compliance in ethnic communities, Rothengatter (2005) 
comments that qualitative research helps generate new, as well as refine existing, 
hypotheses, and quantitative studies help with examining these further. Likewise, 
Ojo et al. (2013) argue that semi-structured interviews can help explore the 
complexities and nuances of ethnic businesses which would show up less well in 
the small sample size of a quantitative survey. In studying the tax compliance 
behaviour of immigrants in New Zealand, Yuan et al. (2013) conducted a survey 
using both structured and semi-structured questions. Besides the above reasons, 
mixed methods are also a good fit for a theoretical framework based on 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  Bourdieu himself applies statistical analysis and 
interviews in his work and is critical of work without empirical support (see his La 
Distinction, 1984 and The Social Structure of the Economy, 2005). Bourdieu 
comments that, “Theory without empirical content is empty, but empirical 
research without theory is blind.” (Bourdieu, quoted in Leander, 2001:345). 
Among contemporary researchers using Bourdieu, Bennet et al. (2009) have 
used a mixed methods study, while Zimders et al. (2009), Veenstra (2009), 
Cockerham and Hinote (2009) and Coulangeon and Lemel (2009) have 
attempted to quantify various aspects of Bourdieu’s concepts, including habitus.  
However, this research applies qualitatively driven mixed methods, with 
qualitative method playing the leading role and quantitative method playing an 
auxiliary role (Morse and Niehause, 2009; Biber, 2010; Howe, 2004).  In this kind 
of work, qualitative or quantitative data may be used sequentially or in parallel. In 
both cases, qualitative data plays the dominant role and quantitative data is 
“window dressing”. Sometimes equal weight is also given to each component 
(Howe, 2004).  
163 
 
5.6 Fieldwork and Data Collection  
 
One of the biggest challenges for research is to collect data. There were two 
major challenges for fieldwork in this research.   First, translating the research 
objectives into a meaningful questionnaire, which, on the one hand, had to be 
sound and reliable (Dolnicar et al., 2011) and on the other, simple and brief 
(Ferraro and Wilmoth, 2000). These features were essential because of the 
sensitive nature of the data, the busy business schedules of small immigrant 
businesses, and, in some cases, the latter’s lack of interest or unwillingness to 
share information (elaborated in Section 5.13).  Following fieldwork among 
Immigrant taxpayers in New Zealand, Yuan et al. (2013: 69) comment that, 
“Researchers studying immigrant business ownership and entrepreneurship 
have generally found that Asians are reluctant to discuss financial matters, let 
alone tax non‐compliance.”  Second, the fieldwork had an overseas character for 
the researcher, who is an international student in the UK, and this made the 
budget, logistics and rapport-building with respondents somewhat difficult.    
The data for the study were collected over a period of four months, from 
November 2015 to February 2016. The researcher started his fieldwork in 
London, where he had an acquaintance running a small shop. The shopkeeper 
and his wife also worked as community organizers, and the researcher asked 
them to introduce him to more people with small businesses like theirs. They 
proposed several people, sometimes providing mobile numbers or email 
accounts, and from these the researcher selected an initial sample; but that was 
not enough to build a large participant pool, so the researcher consulted 
Bangladeshi community leaders and Bangladeshi business associations in major 
UK cities both through personal contacts and, sometimes, by random telephoning 
or emailing. The researcher contacted Bangladeshi ethnic-specific organizations, 
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for example, the British Bangladeshi Association, the West London Bangladeshi 
Association, the Bangladesh Caterers’ Association UK, and the Bengali 
Association, Midlands.  Mosques, community cultural centres (Atfield et al., 2012) 
and taxi stands also played a key role in networking and accessing respondents, 
particularly in Exeter. For the Bangladeshi community, the mosque is not only a 
religious but also an ethnic centre, and here people introduced by the Imam, the 
leader of Muslim prayers, showed interest in cooperating and participating.  
 However, none of the small business owners was interested in connecting with 
their tax advisers. Based on personal references, a few tax advisers were 
emailed; but none responded, either because of a busy schedule or because of 
the risk of talking about tax and accounting issues with an unknown Bangladeshi. 
Thus, the researcher decided to go door-to-door approaching with Bangladeshi 
accounting firms in Whitechapel, London. One professional tax adviser in a 
Whitechapel firm of Bangladeshi accountants responded positively to a direct 
request for an interview, and then helped finding others.  Thus, the respondents 
were selected by a snowballing technique, one participant connecting with 
another (Warren, 2002: Seidman, 2006). 
This research used both primary and secondary sources for data collection. For 
primary data, a survey was conducted with two instruments, a structured 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, two different practices on the 
interviewing continuum (Seidman, 2006).   The structured questionnaire was 
preferred for quantitative analysis, whereas the semi-structured questionnaire or 
interviews were preferred for qualitative analysis.     
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5.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviewing  
 
Qualitative interviewing, also called in-depth, semi-structured or loosely 
structured interviewing (Mason, 1996) is a process where the interviewee acts as 
teacher and the interviewer as student (Johnson, 2002). These types of interview 
focus on a theme- or topic-based narrative approach (Morse and Niehaus, 2009) 
to clarify and extend the meaning19 of social practices.  Seidman (2006:9) argues 
that the purpose of interviews “is to not get answers to questions, nor to test 
hypotheses” but “understanding the lived experiences of peoples”, which makes 
it “hard to code with numbers.” Qualitative researchers also argue that, “Causal 
analysis is a deterministic view of human action, “which appears to be positivistic 
in character (Seale, 1999:39).  Interviews allow the respondents to explain their 
beliefs, actions and perceptions in a relaxed and open discussion.  The stories 
people tell in interviews are reflections of their experiences and consciousness. 
Interviews help overcome the drawback of pre-set answer patterns in a 
questionnaire survey, which cannot dig down into the inner or deeper meaning of 
a respondent’s observations. In that sense, interviews and survey questionnaires 
are mutually supportive of each other (Mason, 1996). 
Vygotsky (1986: 256) comments that, “A word is a microcosm of human 
consciousness.” Each experience humans gather has a beginning, a middle and 
an end, giving them an order that   establishes a causal relationship (Seidman, 
2006).  This feature of human experience, a beginning, a middle and an end, has 
a resemblance to Bourdieu’s habitus, which is a “structured and structuring 
                                                          
19 The phrase “meaning of experience” does not indicate satisfaction with life but the intellectual 
and emotional relationship between life and actions (Seidman, 2006), while meaning-making 
means translating experience into language (Vygotsky, 1986).  
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structure”, indicating one’s past, present and future (Grenfell, 2008), and justifies 
using interviews as a data collection method. This is because an interview may 
account for a person’s past and current behaviours by providing an account of 
the factors that influenced them in the past (Bryman, 2015). Further, the laws of 
experience and laws of logic or meaning-making are connected to each other 
(Vygotsky,1986). 
5.6.2 How Were the Interviews Carried out?  
 
To collect in-depth information about the research context and interpret tax 
compliance behaviour, 27 interviews were conducted with 15 small business 
owners and 12 tax professionals, all from the Bangladeshi community (see Table 
5.2). Tax advisers’ view was considered to check the authenticity of the 
interpretations made the immigrant businesses on a point of discussion. 
Comparing the views of the tax advisers with that of the taxpayers was important 
to elicit the different perspectives to a point of investigation. Having two different 
perspectives allowed the researcher to challenge the respondents about their 
opinion or belief about certain tax compliance or complexity issues. If a business 
advisers’ comment seemed suspicious it could be investigated or checked with 
the tax advisers and vice-versa.  Besides, in studying the nature of relationship 
between these two parties, which is one of the main research questions of this 
thesis, it is important to give the tax advisers an opportunity to be heard. At the 
beginning of the interview, the concept of tax compliance and complexity were 
discussed and defined with a potential respondent to make sure that they 
understood what the research was about, and they could converse clearly on the 
topic.  
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Seidman (2006) suggests that there is no fixed rule about the number of 
participants to be interviewed in a qualitative interview. The researcher should 
stop when information has reached saturation point, i.e., nothing new is being 
learned. Douglas (1985 quoted in Seidman, 2006) comments that if he were to 
pick a number, it would be 25, and to Collins et al. (2007) the number is two to 
five participants for a case study and 20-30 interviews for grounded theory.   
Interviewees from the business community were chosen from those who had 
participated in the questionnaire survey and expressed an interest in further talks. 
This research principally gathered small immigrant businesses’ perspectives on 
how they engaged with the tax system of the host country, as formulated in the 
main research question.  
In qualitative research, “purpose” or “convenience” is often the basis of sampling 
respondents, along with maximum variance sampling (Morse and Niehaus, 
2009), collecting information from various locations and from different classes of 
people (Biber, 2010; Mason, 1996). The Bangladeshi community in the UK is 
broadly divided into two groups: British Bangladeshis from the Sylhet district of 
Bangladesh; and those from other districts of Bangladesh (Burholt, 2004; Thaker 
and Barton, 2012). Interviewees from both these communities were used to 
maintain maximum variance sampling. 
Table 5. 2 List of participants in semi-structured interviews  
 
SL 
No. 
Code for 
Interviewees   
Profession Location Nature of business/ 
profession 
1 BO01 Business  London Laundry  
2 BO02  Business  Edinburgh  Catering  
3 BO03  Business  London  Catering   
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4 BO04  Business  Edinburgh  Money exchange  
5 BO05  Business  Edinburgh  Catering and driving  
6 BO06  Business  Exeter  Catering  
7 TA01 Tax 
professional  
London  Tax and accounting  
8 BO07  Business  Birmingham  Printing  
9 TA02 Tax 
professional  
London  Tax and accounting  
10 TA03 Tax 
professional  
Birmingham  Tax and accounting 
11 TA04 Tax 
professional  
London Tax and accounting 
12 TA05 Tax 
professional  
London Tax and accounting 
13 TA06 Tax 
professional  
London Tax and accounting 
14 BO08 Business  London  Catering  
15 TA07 Tax 
professional  
Exeter  Tax and accounting 
16 BO09 Business  Birmingham  Printing  
17 TA08 Tax 
professional  
London  Tax and accounting 
18 TA09 Tax 
professional  
London Tax and accounting 
19 BO10 Business  Birmingham  Catering  
20 TA10 Tax 
professional  
Birmingham  In-house accountant  
21 BO11 Business  Birmingham  Grocery  
22 TA11 Tax 
professional   
London  Tax and accounting 
23 BO12 Business  Birmingham  Catering  
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24 BO13 Business  London  Media and printing   
25 TA12 Tax 
professional   
London  Tax and accounting 
26 BO14 Business  London  Compensation claims  
27 BO15 Business  Exeter  Catering  
 
 
At the start of each interview, a letter of introduction from the lead academic 
supervisor (see Appendix A1), and a research participation and consent form 
(RPCF; see Appendix A2), which had been approved by the university ethical 
review committee (Appendix A3), were presented to the interviewee to ensure 
informed participation. The interview schedule can be seen in Appendix A4.1, a 
framework to provide the right direction and flexibility in developing questions 
based on the needs of the respondent being interviewed.  Appendix Table A4.2 
shows the constructs/dimensions developed from the interview questions and the 
associated literature and Bourdieusian concepts.    
Of the 27 interviews, 24 were conducted face-to face and three over the 
telephone (i.e., those in Edinburgh). Of the interviews, 18 were non-recorded (20 
h 50 mins), and nine were audio-recorded (9 h 10 mins). At the time of interview 
handwritten notes were taken with the permission of the participants which 
allowed the researcher to listen to them carefully and ask for any clarification. At 
the end of the interview the written hand notes were transcribed in detail to reduce 
memory bias and to improve the rigor of the interviews. Taking notes for the 
telephone interviews were easier since there was no need to make eye-contact 
with the respondent as it was for face to face interview. As a general rule, I tried 
to schedule one interviews a day and three in a week to ensure in-depth 
explorations and rigor of the interviews.     
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In design and conversational structure, a telephone interview is like a face-to-
face interview (Leon et al., 2003), and brings a better outcome if respondents are 
busy or feel intimidated in a personal encounter (Courage and Baxter, 2005). 
Interviews were conducted in Bengali, the native language of Bangladeshi 
people, and the same questions were put to all participants.  A 60-minute 
interview format was followed. However, seven respondents talked for 90 
minutes and three for only 50 minutes.  After conducting 27 interviews, 
information seemed to have reached saturation point, nothing new was 
forthcoming, and thus no more interviews were conducted.     
5.6.3 Questionnaire Survey: Sampling and Administration 
 
Interviewing the respondents may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
collect data on their tax compliance perceptions (Seidman, 2006). This study 
administered a survey questionnaire before the interviews for two reasons. First, 
survey questions in their closed-ended format are best to generate data summary 
and data pattern through descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. Cross-
tabulation, chi-square and factor analysis used in this study are statistical 
techniques that helped in this endeavour.  Second, although survey data provides 
succinct summary of the vast quantitative data, they cannot provide explanation 
of the underlying data pattern. Interviews with the respondents at a subsequent 
stage can interpret them and communicate the research findings eloquently.  
The findings of the initial survey results helped in identifying the issues of high 
importance that need further discussion with the respondents.  For example, the 
initial findings of the survey question, “which aspect of UK income tax law causes 
most problems for your business?” shows record-keeping and income 
determination are major concern for them, which are common problem for other 
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taxpayers as well as evident in the literature. The question asked in the interview 
“why do you think that ----- is a problem and complicates your tax payment 
decisions” provided important insight in uncovering the nature of the problem in 
immigrant communities.  
Bourdieu’s concepts have been instrumental in shaping the survey and the 
interviews. Survey questions on academic qualifications (Q.11), musical 
preference (Q.12), and places of visiting interest (Q.15) shaped measuring 
cultural capital. Questions on consultation about tax matters (Q.8), and 
involvement in community activities (Q.9) measured social capital.  Likewise, 
question on business capital (Q. 4) and ownership of residential property (Q. 14) 
measured economic capital. In other areas, for example, survey questions about 
the aspects of relationship between taxpayers and tax advisers, Bourdieu’s 
concepts of pressure (Q.29), trust (Q.30), satisfaction (Q.34) were used.  
For the questionnaire survey we used a purposive sampling consisting of 139 
businesses drawn randomly from a sub-group of businesses in London, 
Birmingham and Devon. Hirsch (2016:162) comments that by using purposive 
sampling we can perform regressions with unbiased estimates of the populations 
surveyed.  The questionnaire survey was conducted with small Bangladeshi-
owned businesses only and comprised 37 close-ended questions (see Appendix 
A5). The survey was administered both online and face-to-face, depending on 
respondents’ preference. A draft of the questionnaire and the research 
participation and consent form (RPCF) were approved by the university ethical 
review team for this survey as well.  
Before launching the online survey, the questionnaire was piloted among 12 
respondents, to see whether the structure was appropriate and whether the 
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questions conveyed the meaning properly. Piloting the questionnaire helped in 
identifying elements of confusion on the one hand, and on the other, it established 
access to participants. The elements of confusion clarified in the piloting process 
include rephrasing and restructure survey questions, Q.4, Q.12. Q.14 and Q.17, 
to better convey the meaning. The questions on symbolic capital were removed 
since those were not understandable to the participants. Three new questions, 
Q.30 and Q.36, were added to better measure the nature of taxpayer- tax 
professional relationship.    
The questionnaire was sent online to 73 respondents, of whom 63 responded. In 
face-to-face, and in some cases, telephone conversation, 66 business owners 
were approached, of whom 60 participated, altogether making a sample size of 
123 and a response rate of 88%. Of 123 samples, 22 were partnership 
businesses run jointly with non-family members, and 101 were purely family 
owned small businesses, who thus made up a response rate of 72%.  Small 
sample size is not a problem for a questionnaire survey. Basu and Gowsami 
(1999) used 118 samples of South Asian entrepreneurship in the UK, while 
Appold and Kasarada (2004) drew on 101 samples to study ethnic 
entrepreneurship and community relationships in South Africa.  
5.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation   
 
Data analysis simply refers to the systematic investigation, processing and 
arrangement of information in an intelligible pattern (Aneshensel, 2013). The 
approach to data analysis differs between qualitative and quantitative research. 
In qualitative research, as Miles and Huberman (2014:69) note, data analysis 
involves “coding data segments for category, theme and pattern development”, 
while in quantitative research, it involves testing a hypothesis by application of 
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statistical tools (Bryman, 2015). Whatever the approach, the ultimate objective of 
both is to give meaning to the facts.   Data interpretation, on the other hand, is 
the generation of creative and inventive insights from data which are not bound 
by the empirical facts (Gibson and Brown, 2009) and linking them to relevant 
literature and concepts (Bogdan and Biklen, 1998).  
5.7.1 Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews   
 
The focus of qualitative data analysis is “the word,” which is processed through 
three rigorous steps:  coding, patterning and establishing themes (Miles et al., 
2014). Codes are the smallest unit of text, selected from data chunks to 
categorize and bring together similar segments connected to a specific research 
question, theme or construct. Codes, in that sense, are condensations of data, 
enabling the researcher to identify the most meaningful material. Coding can be 
done in several stages or cycles. Codes derived in the initial cycle trigger pattern 
codes, which bring together similar codes in the subsequent cycle. Pattern codes 
may generate four related or unrelated arrays of summaries of the data chunk: 
categories or themes; causes or explanations; relationships among concepts; 
and theoretical constructs.  These pattern codes can be analysed in several 
ways, the most common being: narrative description; matrix display; and network 
display.  Narrative description can be classified into three categories – what, how 
and why – to synthesise the actions of participants (Czarniawska, 2004).  The 
matrix display illustrates the pattern codes in an easy-to-catch format of reflection 
and verification, while the network display describes the transformation process 
or the relationship dynamics among the actors or constructs (Moore and 
Niehause, 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Bryman, 2015).  
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In the next stage, the pattern codes are described and narrated through analytical 
memoing to synthesize the data into an advanced analytical meaning. Memos 
are the researcher’s reflections or capturing of thoughts about the codes. Finally, 
the analytical ideas are asserted or proposed in a coherent set of explanations. 
In an assertion, the synthesis is made through a declarative statement supported 
by evidence, whereas in a proposition the statement is made in an “if-then” or 
“why-because” format (Miles et al., 2014).    
5.7.2 Content Analysis  
 
The narratives gathered from the face-to-face interviews excerpts were broken 
down into codes, to generate nodes or sub-themes. We performed a cluster 
analysis of the codes created from the interview excerpts. As an analytical tool, 
cluster analysis 20(Romesburg, 2004) follows the following main steps: (1) Making 
a data matrix, with its columns showing the objects to be clustered and its rows 
giving descriptions of the objects; (2) Standardizing the data matrix; (3) 
Computing the values of resemblance coefficients to measure the similarity 
matrix among the objects; and (4) Clustering pairs of objects based on similar 
coefficients and reporting them in a tree or dendogram. We used NVivo (a 
software for analysis of qualitative data) for coding and categorizing data and 
finding the frequency of words of interest.   
There were several reasons for employing content analysis for this study. First, 
content analysis allows a systematic reading of vast amounts of textual data for 
the purpose of making replicable and valid inferences (Krippendorff, 2013). 
Second, content analysis gives meticulous attention to the “nuances and 
                                                          
20 In a cluster analysis, a similarity metric denotes the statistical method used to calculate 
correlation among clusters (Yousef et al., 2015). The Nvivo 10 cluster coding technique provides 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, Jaccard’s coefficient, and Sorensen’s coefficient to calculate the 
similarity metric.   
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embedded meanings of every word” in the analytical process (Miles et al., 
2014:08). Bryman (2015) comments that displaying data through matrices and 
then identifying the most common themes and patterns are the best ways to 
illustrate qualitative data. Third, it can process both words and numbers, which 
places it at the intersection of quantitative and qualitative methods, thereby 
allowing a quantitative analysis of seemingly qualitative data (Kondracki et al., 
2002; Bryman, 2015, Mckercher, 2013). 
 Finally, content analysis has been widely used in tax research and business 
research.  Farrar et al. (2013) employ it to study procedural, interpersonal, and 
informational fairness in Canadian tax jurisprudence. In their study of the impact 
of land tax on property valuations, Mangioni and McKerchar (2013) analyse 
respondents’ comments by content analysis. And Kasipillai and Chen (2014) use 
it to find the tax topics researched by masters and research students in Malaysia.  
5.8 Analysis of Structured Questionnaire  
 
The quantitative analysis for this research would include descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics would organize, analyse and present 
survey data through numerical and tabular techniques (Argyrous, 2011; Bryman, 
2004). Uni-variate and multivariate techniques would tease out the key features 
of the data set and its distribution. In consideration of the categorical nature of 
the variables, cross-tabulation and chi-square tests, factor analysis and 
correspondence analysis would be used. Each of these statistical techniques is 
discussed here.  
5.8.1 Chi-Square Test 
 
A chi-square test is a non-parametric statistical test used to answer questions 
about categorical or nominal variables. There are two major applications of chi-
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square tests: to test “goodness of fit”; and to test independence (Beri, 2005; Smith 
et al., 2009). For example, we may want to know: Do the numbers of tax compliant 
and non-compliant businesses in the Bangladeshi community match those in the 
general population; or, Is a taxpayer’s selection of a tax adviser related to ethnic 
identity? In both these cases, we are simply counting frequencies.  The chi-
square for goodness of fit will examine whether there is any difference between 
the frequencies of tax compliant and non-compliant Bangladeshi businesses in 
the UK that we observe through our survey data and the frequencies of compliant 
and non-compliant taxpayers that we would expect if the Bangladeshi community 
corresponded to, or fit, the UK national tax compliance profile. The chi-square 
test for goodness of fit is conducted to examine whether the observed results in 
a sample agree with the results suggested by the rules of probability (Beri, 2005; 
Field, 2010; Weinberg and Abramowitz, 2002).  
The chi-square test of independence shows the relationship between two nominal 
variables. In a two (tax compliant vs non-compliant) by two (educated vs non-
educated) contingency table, a chi-square test of independence indicates 
whether two categorical or nominal variables are associated or independent 
(Smith et al., 2009).  The chi-square independence test is also called a 
contingency table chi-square test. The equation for calculating chi-square in each 
of the cases is different (Beri, 2005).  In evaluating a hypothesis, we compare the 
Asymp. Sig value with our pre-set alpha (p value) of 0.05.  We reject the null 
hypothesis if the Asymp. Sig value is greater than our pre-set p value and vice-
versa. As non-parametric tests, chi-square tests are robust and do not depend 
on assumptions about the underlying population distribution.  Chi-square tests 
are used widely in tax compliance research (see Torgler, 2007: Devos, 2012). 
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5.8.2 Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to assess the underlying dimension 
of a set of items based on observed correlations between them (Field, 2014). 
Items highly correlated with each other are considered to have a single dimension 
or factor. Factor analysis is used as a technique when a variable cannot be 
measured directly, for example, knowledge or culture. In such cases, measurable 
and observable features of that variable are used to represent the target variable 
(Yong and Pearce, 2013). For example, scores for oral performance in the 
classroom or viva-voce exams could be considered a factor to be called 
“communication ability”. Here, the latter is inferred from the former, since it cannot 
be measured directly.  Royce (1963, cited in Kline, 1994:5) gives a more precise 
definition, stating that, “A factor is a construct operationally defined by its factor 
loadings” where “factor loadings are the correlations of a variable with a factor.” 
Thus, in the above example, the factor loading would be the correlations of the 
viva-voce exam with communication ability as its factor. Factor loadings over 0.60 
(irrespective of sign, positive or negative) are considered high, and over 0.30 
moderately high (Kline, 1994).    
In exploratory research where the main purpose, as in this research, is to explore 
a field, discovering the latter’s main constructs or dimensions is the major task.  
With the help of factor analysis, we identify which variables are important for 
understanding the power relationship between taxpayers and tax professionals. 
In tax research, factor analysis is a widely used statistical tool (see Yucedogru, 
2016, for factor analysis on the tax morale of owner managers; Chen et al., 2010, 
for tax aggressiveness by family business; and Lennox et al., 2012, for tax 
aggressiveness by public companies).  
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5.8.3 Correspondence Analysis  
 
It was Hirschfield (1935) who first formulated the idea of correspondence analysis 
(CA) in the 1930s. Following the seminal work of French mathematician Benzecri 
in his Analyse des Donnees, 1973, CA became extensively used in social science 
research (Blasius and Greenacre, 2006).  The application of this method was 
significantly increased by the work of Pierre Bourdieu (Lebaron, 2009; Hjellbrekke 
and Korsnes, 2009).   
As an exploratory multivariate method, CA produces graphical and numerical 
analyses of almost all data matrices with non-negative values, mainly involving 
frequency tables. The data used in CA is category-oriented and is suitable for 
conducting ranking and preference data, paired comparison data, and multi-
response tables, among others (Blasius and Greenacre, 2006). CA is closely 
related to principal component analysis (PCA), which also uses categorical data, 
and presents the rows and columns of the frequency tables in a high-dimensional 
Euclidean space (Hjellbrekke and Korsnes, 2009). But the main objective of this 
method is to capture the principal dimensions by redefining/eliminating the 
insignificant ones, based on correlations between the rows and column values, 
measured though chi-square statistics (Greenacre, 2006). The symmetric map 
thus produced by CA represents the maximum possible variance of a few 
dimensions or categories of a variable, usually in two dimensions (Lebart, 2006). 
This is somewhat like the coefficient of determination in a linear regression 
analysis, which indicates how much of the variance is being explained by the 
variables in the model. Each orthogonal axis or dimension of the CA accounts for 
a part of the variance.   
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Interpretation of a CA map requires the researcher to describe how the categories 
of the variable lie relative to one another, and how these categories spread out 
relative to the other variable in the graph.  In these maps, presentations are made 
in relative terms, showing that one category is different from another, but not 
giving any measurement of the difference. For example, the graph may show that 
educated people are more tax compliant than the non-educated people; but it 
cannot show how much more.  However, looking at the deviation of a dimension 
from the centre of the map, which represent the average of the dataset, one can 
understand the relative distance between them (Lebart, 2006). Due to its 
approach of embedding categorical data, MCA is also called homogeneity 
analysis. 
CA has gained increasing importance in survey research, where most data are 
collected as nominal or ordinal categorical items.  For its use of qualitative 
variables, this method is called “quantification of qualitative data”. MCA is an 
extension of CA, as CA uses two variables, whereas MCA uses multiple variables 
(Greenacre, 2006). There is no difference in interpreting the variables, as is the 
case in a simple CA. The categorical measurement of variables in this research 
proposes the use of CA as the fitting model. Correspondence analysis is not new 
in tax research. Rosid et al. (2016) use it to explore the nature of dependence on 
tax professionals by personal and corporate taxpayers in Indonesia; Tran-Nam 
et al. (2016) to study the impact of tax complexity on tax compliance; and Lozza 
et al. (2013) to show the relationship between political ideology and tax 
compliance attitudes.  
For the present research, the survey topics, the questions, their items and scales 
were based on the literature review and standard survey techniques, as 
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mentioned in Table 5.3. The survey contained 37 questions, of which some were 
used for descriptive statistics and some for inferential statistics. The 22 questions 
in Table 5.3 were chosen mainly to run inferential statistical analysis. The 
remaining 15 questions were to be used for descriptive statistics. Operational 
definitions of each of the variables will be given in the relevant data analysis 
section, supported with details of the reliability and validity checks.   
Table 5. 3 List of dimensions/constructs with related questions and literature  
 
Constructs/Dimension     Description  Variable 
type  
Example from 
Literature  
Questionnaire  
Question no  
Tax law difficulty Measuring whether the tax 
laws are difficult based on 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – very 
difficult, 2 – difficult, 3 – 
uncertain, 4 – not difficult, 
and 5 – not difficult at all. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Schenk, 2011 
Q. 20 
Tax law uncertainty Measuring whether the tax 
laws are uncertain based 
on respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – highly 
agree, 2 – somewhat 
agree, 3 – uncertain, 4 – 
disagree, and 5 – totally 
disagree. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Krause, 2000 
Q. 31 
Tax system 
complicatedness    
Measuring whether the tax 
system is complicated 
based on respondent’s 
stated preference on a 
five-point Likert scale of 1 
– very complicated, 2 - 
complicated, 3 - uncertain, 
4 – not complicated, and 5 
– not complicated at all. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Carnes and 
Cuccia, 1996 
Q. 19 
Problematic aspects 
of tax laws 
Decided on the basis of 
respondent’s comments 
on different aspects of tax 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Yong, 2011; 
Ingraham et 
Q. 21 
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law. The categories were: 
determination of taxable 
income; calculation of tax; 
book-keeping and 
accounting; frequent 
changes in tax law; 
lengthy tax procedure; 
and, other.  
al., 2005; 
Carnes and 
Cuccia, 1996, 
modified  
Academic 
qualifications  
 
 
Defined on the basis of 
respondent’s academic 
degrees. The categories 
were:    UK school 
certificate; UK 
undergraduate; UK 
master’s; Bangladeshi 
school certificate; 
Bangladeshi 
undergraduate; 
Bangladeshi master’s; 
Others. 
Nominal  Literature: 
Veenstra, 2009 
Q. 11 
Taste for music  Defined on the basis of 
respondent’s enthusiasm 
for music. The categories 
included: Bangladeshi; 
Hindi; English; Others.  
Nominal  Literature: 
Coulangeon 
and Lemel, 
2009; Bennett 
et al., 1999; 
Friedman, 
2016, modified  
Q. 12 
Cultural participation  Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference for the different 
options. The options 
included:  museum; art 
gallery; concert; cinema; 
community festivals/fairs; 
none. 
Nominal  Literature: 
Coulangeon 
and Lemel, 
2009, modified 
Q.15 
Business capital   
 
Measured on the basis of 
business capital 
respondents had. The 
categories included: less 
than £100,000; £100,000-
£200,000; £200,000-
£300,000; £300,000-
£400,000; £400,000-
£500,000; and above 
Nominal  Literature: 
Veenstra, 
2009, modified  
Q. 4 
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£500,000 but < 
£1,000,000. 
Housing condition  
 
Defined on the basis of 
whether the respondent 
lived in a rented property 
or one owned by 
himself/herself. 
Nominal  Literature: 
Veenstra, 2009 
Q. 14 
Social network  Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference for the different 
options. The options 
included: friends; 
accountants; community 
leaders; government 
offices; family members; 
others.  
Nominal  Literature: 
Veenstra, 
2009; Torgler, 
2003; 
Sepulveda, 
2008, modified  
Q. 8 
Community 
involvement   
Defined on the basis of 
whether the respondent 
preferred to be associated 
with community 
organisations or not. The 
three categories were: 
member or participant of a 
cultural organization; 
member or participant of a 
social organization; and 
member or participant of a 
political organization. 
Nominal  Literature: 
Veenstra, 
2009; Zimders 
et al., 2009, 
modified  
Q. 9 
Tax compliance  Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – very 
important, 2 – important, 3 
–uncertain, 4 – not 
important and 5 – not 
important at all.  
Ordinal  Literature: 
Kirchler and 
Wahl, 2010; 
Brink and 
Porcano, 2017, 
modified  
Q. 24 
Tax attitude  Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – very 
good, 2 – good, 3 – 
uncertain, 4 – not good 
and 5 – not very good.  
Ordinal  Literature: 
Kirchler and 
Wahl, 2010; 
Brink and 
Porcano, 2017, 
modified  
Q. 18 
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Reasons for tax help  Decided on the basis of 
respondent’s choice from 
6 categories: tax return is 
confusing; busy with the 
business; don’t 
understand the tax law; 
tax language is not easy; 
tax inspectors/tax officials 
are not helpful; and, other. 
Nominal  Literature: 
Yong, 2011; 
yuan et al., 
2013, modified  
Q. 22 
Satisfaction with tax 
advice   
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – highly 
satisfied, 2 – satisfied, 3 – 
uncertain, 4 – not satisfied 
and 5 – not satisfied at all. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Devos, 2012, 
modified  
Q. 34 
Quality of tax advice   Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – almost 
always, 2 – sometimes, 3 
– once in a while, 4 – 
rarely and 5 – never. 
 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Devos, 2012; 
Department of 
Labour New 
Zealand, 2012, 
modified  
Q. 32 
Pressure from tax 
adviser 
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a three-
point Likert scale of 1 – 
yes, 2 – uncertain, and 3 - 
no. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Beckert, 2010 
Q. 29 
Conflict with tax 
adviser  
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a two-point 
Likert scale of 1 – yes, 2 – 
no.   
Ordinal  Literature: 
Parnaby, 2009, 
modified 
Q. 27 
Type of tax adviser  Decided on the basis of 
respondent’s choice from 
three categories:  in-house 
tax adviser; hired tax 
adviser; both.  
Nominal  Literature: 
Akhand and 
Hubbard, 2016 
Q. 7 
Trustworthiness of tax 
adviser  
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five -point 
Likert scale of 1 – highly 
trustworthy, 2 - somewhat 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Devos, 2012; 
Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 
2001, modified  
Q. 30 
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trustworthy, 3 - uncertain, 
4 – not trustworthy and 5 – 
not trustworthy at all. 
Dependence on tax 
advice  
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five -point 
Likert scale of 1 –very 
seriously, 2 – seriously, 3 
– uncertain, 4 –  not 
seriously, 4 – not seriously 
at all. 
Ordinal  Literature: 
Devos, 2012, 
modified  
Q. 36 
Influence of tax 
advisers  
Measured on the basis of 
respondent’s stated 
preference on a five -point 
Likert scale of 1 – 
significant influence, 2 – 
some influence, 3 – 
uncertain, 4 – little 
influence, 5 – no 
influence. 
 
Ordinal  Literature: 
PwC, 2013; 
Klepper et al., 
1991, modified  
Q. 37 
 
 
All the questions or the ideas behind the questions in the survey emerged from 
the literature reviewed for this study. But they were modified to some extent to 
better match the purpose of the question they were associated with. As 
demonstrated in Table 5.3, there was enough support in the literature to raise 
survey questions on tax complexity, tax risk and tax compliance. However, there 
was a dearth of literature on quantifying Bourdieu’s concepts, because of the 
predominantly qualitative work done in this area. The few quantitative studies 
include Coulangeon and Lemel (2009); Bennett et al. (1999); Veenstra (2009) 
and Zimders et al. (2009). In this study, for example, in measuring economic 
capital, the items taken, business capital and housing conditions, were based on 
Veenstra (2009), who uses house ownership and household income as 
measures of economic capital. Housing conditions also represent a measure of 
social capital. The neighbourhood, whether it comprises privately owned 
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bungalows or subsidized public housing, impacts on the formation of social 
relations (Sayad, 1999). The items educational qualifications and participation in 
cultural and social organizations, to measure cultural and social capital 
respectively, were also inspired by Veenstra (2009).  Some items of social capital, 
for example visiting art galleries or concerts, were chosen from Zimders et al. 
(2009).   
 
Another item of cultural capital used was listening to music. Bourdieu comments 
(quoted in Bennett et al., 1999:171): “Nothing more clearly affirms one’s class, 
nothing more infallibly classifies, than taste in music.” Various studies have used 
listening to music as a measure of cultural capital. For example, Coulangeon and 
Lemel (2009) and Zimders et al. (2009) asked questions on how many times 
people listened to music. Bennett et al. (1999) asked questions on which genres 
of music –  jazz, classical, pop, and so on – were their respondent’s favourite to 
measure cultural capital.  
 
This study asked respondents whether they listened to Bengali, English or other 
music, rather than whether they listened to jazz, pop or classical music. There 
were two reasons behind this. First, music is not only a symbol of taste and 
culture; it is also a “strong marker of national identity” (Bennet 2015:143). The 
respondents in this study were immigrants, not natives as in the above-mentioned 
studies.  Questions on musical language could help measure both the cultural 
capital and the “sense of place” or national identity of respondents, which was 
very important for this study. Second, measuring musical taste through musical 
language not only measures cultural capital but also respondents’ economic and 
educational status.  This is because access to music requires money, knowledge 
and linguistic-cognitive ability (Bennett et al., 1999). Cui (2015) finds that Chinese 
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students in Canada listening to oriental music rather than English music are 
considered deviant and lacking in legitimacy and are denied access to social and 
educational fields. 
 
5.9 Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
 
A common concern in mixed methods research is the integration of qualitative 
and quantitative data. Bryman (2006) comments that in mixed methods, the 
purpose is not to subordinate one set of data to another, but rather to enable them 
to complement each other through the integration process. Data collected in 
semi-structured interviews may help with quantifying the variable in a structured 
questionnaire or help explain why a statistical variable is significant or 
insignificant. The integration of qualitative and quantitative data, therefore, 
depends on the purpose of the research and how, when and why they are 
collected (Morgan, 1998; Morse, 1991; Creswell, 2003; Bryman, 2006). 
 Qualitative and quantitative data can be collected simultaneously or sequentially 
(Morgan, 1998); one may have priority over the other, or they may have similar 
importance (Morse, 1991); and the purpose of integration may be explanation, 
exploration or triangulation (Bryman, 2006; Creswell, 2003). The major means of 
integration are the following:  
a. Triangulation:  Comparing the findings expressed by qualitative and 
quantitative data to see whether they converge, corroborate or conflict 
(Hair et al., 2011; Mark,2015); 
b. Complementary integration:  Replicating, verifying and generalizing the 
findings of one method with the results of another (Greene, 2007; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2009); 
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c. Developmental integration: The results of one method inform the design 
or structure of another: for example, sampling and measurement issues 
(Greene, 2007: Bryman, 2006); 
d. Initiation: The purpose here is to identify new areas of exploration, resolve 
paradoxes or conflicting evidence, and recasting the research question 
(Rossman and Wilson, 1985, quoted in Mark, 2015);  
e. Expansion: Applying different methods for different research question to 
extend research breadth and range (Greene, 2007); and 
f. Bracketing: Looking at a wide range of findings and how they diverge, 
rather than at their convergence as targeted in triangulation (Mark, 2015).  
  
The above six are the most common modes and reasons for integration; but 
besides these, there are some others (Bryman, 2006; Greene, 2007), for 
example: offsetting the weakness of one set of data by using another; increasing 
completeness in a research study by adding another perspective to the research 
problem; and improving credibility by combining two streams of data. Often, the 
purpose of mixed methods may not be any of the above, but rather to answer 
different questions by different methods, since some questions can be better 
answered by quantitative rather than qualitative data, and vice versa. For 
example, “how” questions or process matters are often better explained with 
qualitative data; whereas “what” questions may be better attempted with 
quantitative data.    
  
The present study combined quantitative and qualitative data to complement the 
findings from one set of data with those from another.  As stated in Section 5.3, 
all subsidiary questions used quantitative and qualitative data.  Thus, the purpose 
of integration in this study was completeness, or to offset the weakness of one 
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set of data by using another.  This objective required the researcher to consider 
the results of both datasets in reaching conclusions about the research question.  
 
5.10 Scales and Items of Survey Questions  
 
The scales and items of survey questions play a pivotal role in measuring a 
construct or variable.  In the questionnaire survey, 15 questions were posed 
directly, which is often criticized because direct questions may fail to elicit 
valuable information on respondents’ choices (Spector, 1992). However, asking 
direct questions has been a well-accepted practice in tax compliance and other 
social science disciplines for several reasons.  Kirchler and Wahl (2010: 7), to 
measure tax cheating as a variable, asked the question: “Have you ever evaded 
taxes or cheated on your income tax return?” with the obvious answer choices – 
“yes” or “no”. Likewise, Torgler (2003), to measure taxpayers’ awareness of IRS, 
asked, “Do you ever talk about IRS and its activities with your family?” offering an 
answer choice of “yes” or “no”. Torgler (2003:348) also measured tax avoidance 
with a single question with a binary answer choice: “Can you tell me whether, 
recently, you have known someone, or have heard someone you know comment 
about somebody who has: Managed to avoid paying all his tax (1 = yes, 0 = no).” 
Dolores et al. (2010:862) measured immigrant’s role in financing public 
expenditure by asking a question with a dichotomous variable, which took the 
value 1 if they thought they should pay tax, and 0 if they thought they shouldn’t. 
Of others, Dolnicar et al. (2011) asked mainly “yes-no” type questions to measure 
people’s taste for food in marketing research; and Ferraro and Wilmoth (2000) 
did the same to measure morbidity in medical science research.  
 
 Asking some direct questions not only makes the survey simple and 
parsimonious, but also increases response rates (Dolnicar at al., 2011). Morse 
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and Niehause (2009:79) comment that for mixed methods research “parsimony 
is perfection”, and data can be messy if the questions have supplementary 
components. In this connection, Ferraro and Wilmoth (2000 :173) suggest that a 
yes or no answer “is not a report about how one feels about a specific condition, 
but rather a report of a condition”.  This enforced binary measurement of variables 
as a replacement for the Likert scale (Dolnicar et al. 2011) is also reflected in 
measuring tax compliance.  In measuring reporting compliance, Christian and 
Alm (2014: 72) describe a “binary variable showing if the subjects reported the 
entire income to the tax administration, equal to 1 for full compliance and 0 
otherwise.” 
 
However, in most of the cases, this study used a five-point Likert-scale where the 
multidimensionality of the construct was considered more important (Bordens 
and Abbott, 1991; Spector, 1992). For Likert-type scaling, it is argued that to 
maintain reliability and validity, five to 10 scales are desirable, although it 
depends on the variable under measurement (Sullivan, 2001). Thus, this study 
used five scales, except in a few cases where it used three scales. Respondents’ 
attitude or opinion could be understood by asking them hypothetical questions 
directly, or by looking at their real-life experiences and actions. Likert-type scaling 
is based on the former, which is called “the revealed preference method”. In the 
revealed preference method, respondents freely state their opinions and attitudes 
in response to a question about a topic (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The strong 
point of the stated preference method is the wide range of choices it offers to 
capture a real-life scenario, which can be ranked ordinally to reflect choice.  
However, there are measurement problems in such approaches when the 
respondent gives a meaningless answer or chooses an answer that is not a true 
reflection of his belief.  Another problem of this approach arises when the 
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questions relate to the past life experience of respondents (Bordens and Abbott, 
1991).   
 
One of the critical questions in measuring a construct or variable is whether a 
single item or multiple item should be followed. In tax and other social science 
disciplines, there are ample examples of variables being measured with single 
items only. For example, Torgler (2003:273) asked only a single question to 
measure tax complexity, with a Likert-scale of five choices: “How complicated do 
you think our federal income tax laws and rules are for your particular income 
situation (1= not at all complicated/very easy to understand, 6 = extremely 
complicated/very difficult to understand)?” In other academic disciplines, Cook 
and Perri (2004) studied compliance with medication, and Khaled (2006) 
successfully measured happiness, both with a single question.  
With a single question, it can be difficult to measure a construct, particularly when 
it is non-concrete. The chance of measurement error is high in such cases.  
Nevertheless, there are good points to having a single question.  Bergkvist and 
Rossiter (2007: 175) argue that if the construct is unambiguous, “there is no 
difference in the predictive validity of the multiple-item and single-item measures.” 
Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007: 176) further comment that, “Preference for single-
item measures is not theoretically based but rather is practical, in that single-item 
measures minimize respondent refusal and reduce data collection and data-
processing costs.” Therefore, Bajpai (2011) suggests that the research objective 
should dictate whether to use a single-item or multi-item question. Despite the 
fact that constructs could be successfully measured with singe items, this study 
would in most cases use multiple questions.   
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5. 11 Cross-sectional Research and Causality  
 
Choosing the right research design is a highly technical decision, the result of 
which provides a bridge between the research questions and data analysis 
(Chambliss and Schutt, 2013).  A study can be designed in several ways: 
descriptive, correlational, experimental, cross-sectional and review (de Vaus, 
2001).  This study employed a cross sectional design, often called a social 
survey, which involved the collection of qualitative or quantitative data on more 
than one case at one point of time (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The process is like 
taking a slice that cuts across the population and then trying to understand its 
various parts from that slice (Chambliss and Schutt, 2013). In this design, more 
than one case is chosen to ensure variation in the variable of interest and identify 
differences between cases. A natural consequence of this is that data need to be 
systematic and standardized. The snapshot nature of data collection requires the 
participants to complete the questionnaire or otherwise provide the information 
simultaneously.   Since there is no time ordering of the variables, as is the case 
in time series or longitudinal data, any relationship found between them does not 
necessarily mean a causal relationship but is rather termed an association.  In 
this case, Bryman (2015) comments that researchers should be more concerned 
about relationships than causality.  
 
However, it is possible to infer causality in a cross-sectional research study. In 
terms of reliability, replicability and validity, cross-sectional research has both 
weak and strong points. Internal validity is usually weak, as there is no temporal 
order in the data collection, and thus it is difficult to claim causality (Howe, 2004). 
Reliability depends on how efficiently the questions can measure the variable, 
and replicability can be good when the research process and the selection of 
respondents are well presented (Bryman, 2015). External validity of cross-
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sectional research is good if the samples are randomly selected. Although, cross-
sectional designs are mainly followed in quantitative research, qualitative 
research can be successfully carried out with them (Miles et al., 2014; Hakim, 
2000). For this reason, employing a cross-sectional design was considered most 
suitable for this study, as it would use both qualitative and quantitative data.   
Moreover, this research would involve interviewing a number of people, which 
would entail using the cross-sectional design format (observations 1, 2, …n X 
cases, 1.2…n), where the criteria of reliability, validity and replicability would not 
be a matter to obsess over.  Bryman (2015:56) comments that a conversational 
interview style makes “the study more ecologically valid than research using more 
formal instruments of data collection”. Similarly, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
substitute internal validity for credibility, external validity for transferability, 
reliability for dependability and neutrality for confirmability of qualitative data. 
Credibility refers to presenting the reports to the interviewee, and transferability 
indicates rich descriptions of study settings rather than probabilistic sampling. On 
the other hand, dependability can be achieved by auditing – detailing data, 
methods and decisions – which also contributes to confirmability. Some 
researchers also challenge the epistemological assumption associated with the 
concept of validity on the ground, since social reality is multiple, not single, and 
thus cannot be measured objectively (Biber, 2010; Kuzmanic; 2009). 
5.12 Insider Research: A Challenge and an Advantage  
 
An insider researcher is one who is researching his or her own organization, 
community or culture (Andits, 2014). By distance, Voloder (2014) refers to the 
cultural, social, and identificational differences between the self and others, but 
not to a personal distance. In social science research, personal relationships 
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remain the vehicle for eliciting information and insight. To Aguilar (1981), an 
insider research study is one where the researcher has some experience of, and 
insight into, the research context, and the research object, through personal or 
professional experience.  
This researcher in this study shared the ethnic background and mother tongue of 
the respondents, which makes it an insider research study. This sometimes 
created problems for the researcher, who was challenged about the purpose of 
the research and suspected of intending to hand over tax information to HMRC. 
A Bangladeshi ethnic researcher in Los Angeles, Islam (200:35) comments that, 
“Because of my Bangladeshi origins … the community questioned my insider 
status.”  “Insiderness” also creates role confusion, a conflict between the daily life 
schedule and the researcher role; and the researcher may be uncritical about the 
data and its meaning (Pavlish and Parrish, 2012).   
According to the Ethics Guidance issued by the researcher’s university, it was 
necessary to ask respondents for a formal signature to indicate consent. This 
created a moment of alienation with some respondents, who suspected they 
might be being spied on.  In such cases, the researcher, as Ozkul (2014) 
suggests, must strike a balance between consent by act and the consent by 
signature. Insider research in a researcher’s own community always moves 
between suspicion and challenge. Andits (2014), a Hungarian researcher in 
Australia, comments that although “I had assumed that my nationality would give 
me fair access to the field, I soon discovered that consent within the Hungarian 
immigrant community is a lengthy and negotiated process.”   
One of the criticisms or drawbacks of insider research is that the researcher’s 
involvement with the organization or community that he represents may inhibit 
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his observation of social and cultural reality. It also raises questions about the 
power relations between the researcher and the respondents, which may hinder 
the free flow of information in the conversation.  This research was not free from 
such a risk. The researcher, a civil servant in the tax administration of 
Bangladesh, met two tax advisers in London who used to work as tax 
practitioners in Bangladesh.  Such unequal power relations can be tackled by 
reflective awareness and analytical scrutiny by the researcher (Wickins and 
Crossley, 2014; Brannick and Coghlan, 2007; Voloder,2014).  
Insider research has certain advantages over research by outsiders. First, insider 
research can easily decipher the meaning of deeply embedded social norms and 
beliefs practised by the participants (Pavlish and Parrish, 2012). Insider research 
can also make heard the voice of those who are underrepresented in, or excluded 
from, society.  In such research, neither the researcher nor the participants face 
any cultural shock. They can use the tacit knowledge they possess and can 
respect each other’s interests, being native and speaking the same language 
(Brannick and Coghlan, 2007; Wickins and Crossley, 2014).    
 A benefit of insider research, as Wickins and Crossley (2014: 228) argue, is that 
“access to qualitative and quantitative data is often easier”, which supports the 
mixed methods data collection of this research project. Insiderness is less likely 
to disturb the natural setting of the research environment and allows easy access 
to the community.  Participants will accept the researcher as a member of their 
own society and reveal facts freely (Sikes and Potts, 2008). This supports PhD 
research, which aims at creating new knowledge supported by standard research 
practice and convincing evidence, where personal or biased judgment are likely 
to stand out (Drake and Heath, 2010).   
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On balance, the advantages of insider research outweigh the disadvantages, 
especially because of the grasp of the research context insiderness allows. In this 
study, having the same language made it easy to transcribe the interviews 
meaningfully and sort out the data efficiently. It also reduced dependence on 
research assistance and increased the quality and response rate of data. Finally, 
to reduce anxiety among participants, ethical standards were seriously 
maintained, which will be discussed in the next section. Thus, the study results 
were not greatly affected by the researcher’s prior exposure to the community. 
5.13 Ethical Considerations   
 
Tax compliance is a highly sensitive topic (Torgler, 2003), because it deals with 
people’s private and classified information. This is especially the case when 
respondents have ambiguous feelings about their identity in the society they live 
in (Constant and Zimmermann, 2013). Sepulveda et al. (2008:20) find that 
immigrant entrepreneurs in the UK provide vague information on their economic 
activities and are “reluctant to disclose information on the sensitive issues 
investigated.”  Immigrants think that sharing information, particularly with an 
insider researcher, may not be safe. Not only taxpayers, tax advisers have these 
feelings about talking to a stranger about their internal business policies.  
It is only by demonstrating high ethical standards that researchers can motivate 
immigrant business owners to share information (Hakim, 2000; Haggen and 
Guillemin, 2012). Haggen and Guillemin (2012) comment that respect for 
participants, for their integrity and for human autonomy are the ethical principles 
that should form the basis of humane research. The researcher has no right to 
threaten or intimidate a participant for declining to participate in a survey or 
interview. In this research, the respondents to the survey and interviews were 
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informed of their rights from the beginning. They were told that they should share 
information only if they were willing to, and could withdraw at any time if they did 
not wish to continue.  
Maintaining the confidentiality of information and anonymity of respondents is 
another feature of ethical practice (Mason, 1996).  Respondents should be 
guaranteed that their information will be stored in accordance with the data 
confidentiality rules of the researcher’s university. If data sources need to be 
authenticated, the respondents can be pseudonymised (Haggen and Guillemin, 
2012; Silverman,2005). In this study, breach of confidentiality might have had 
negative consequences in terms of intracommunity risk, disruption of 
relationships and the creation of mistrust (Atfield et al.,2012; Kaiser, 2012). Kaiser 
(2012) suggests that confidentiality dilemmas should be addressed in all three 
stages – pre-interview, during the interview and post-interview.   
One important objective of the interview was to learn about the respondents’ level 
of general knowledge of the tax system and to challenge them if they were hiding 
information or misguiding the researcher. Tax advisers’ knowledge about the tax 
system and its complexity was evident in the discussion with them since most of 
them were professionally trained. The small business owners, on the other hand, 
had no specific knowledge about a tax code but they frequently mentioned about 
the complexities, time needed in tax calculations, income determination and 
record-keeping. They indicated that different definitions of wages, income, certain 
deductions and inconsistent method of payroll reporting were some of the major 
problems in the tax system. While the focus of discussion was on tax compliance 
and complexity of the UK tax system, some business respondents complained 
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that the volume of information in the tax code made it difficult to gather knowledge 
and engage with the tax system.  
5.14 Methodological Limitations  
 
Several limitations must be acknowledged before we make any claims for the 
study findings. First, this study looked at one community to understand their tax 
practice. Comparison with other communities could improve the generalisability 
of the study findings. However, the study covered multiple-locations and the wider 
population of the Bangladeshi community, which meant the research design was 
stronger (Hakim, 2000). Second, all the common limitations of survey research 
apply to the study. In a survey, what a respondent discloses and what he believes 
may be different things, which may affect the measurement of the variable.  
Bryman (2015) comments that the quality of perceptual and self-reported 
psychometric information depends greatly on how serious and truthful the 
respondents are in expressing their opinion. If they talk rubbish, it seriously 
affects the data quality.  Again, the reliability of the survey depends greatly on the 
item analysis, scales and wording of the questionnaire. 
A limitation for this study was that some questions were put directly to the 
respondents, out of consideration for the busy schedule of their everyday life. 
However, direct questions are not a major concern. In tax and other areas of 
social science, many studies have been successfully conducted with direct 
questions, as stated above.  Besides, the survey asked two-item questions in 
some cases, for example in cases of measuring tax complexity or tax compliance.  
There is support in the literature for using two-item questions.  Sheffrin and Triest 
(1992) used a two-item question in measuring attitudes towards tax compliance; 
and Murphy (2004) uses one to measure trust.  
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5.15 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has discussed the main and subsidiary research questions in 
relation to the gap in the extant literature. It has outlined contending research 
methods and attempted to justify the methods chosen as being the most suitable 
for the study. The chapter has offered a clear account of the plans for fieldwork, 
the selection of participants and the conduct of interviews, explaining what would 
be the major sources of data, how the data were to be collected, and how they 
were to be analysed to answer the research questions. The design and sequence 
for sampling and data analysis have been discussed. And, finally, validity and 
reliability issues, along with generalisability, have been elaborated. In the next 
chapter, we shall begin data analysis process and start by answering the first and 
second subsidiary questions.  
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CHAPTER VI 
TAX COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS AND PERCEPTION OF 
TAX COMPLEXITY AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will attempt to answer the first main research question: “Is 
Bangladeshi small family businesses’ engagement to the UK tax system 
problematic?”  by answering the two subsidiary questions under it. The first 
subsidiary research question, raised in Sections 5.3, was: “What aspects of 
tax compliance are most problematic for small Bangladeshi family businesses 
in the UK?” And the second was: “How do small Bangladeshi family 
businesses perceive the UK tax system and its complexity?” To answer the 
first one, the problems associated with the preparation and submission of tax 
returns will be analysed in section 6.3. To answer the second subsidiary 
research question, first, the perceptions of Bangladeshi immigrant family 
businesses (termed immigrant businesses) about the UK tax complexity and 
compliance will be discussed in section 6.4.1. Then, their perceived 
understanding of the tax system will be examined in terms of their socio-
economic and cultural background in sections 6.4.2 to 6.4.7 using both the 
survey and interview data. This cross-examination will demonstrate how and 
to what extent perception-making and conceptualization of tax compliance is 
an outcome of taxpayers’ social and economic conditions.  
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6.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
  
The data for this study were collected from two sources: face-to-face interviews 
and a questionnaire survey (see Section 5.6). The questionnaire survey was 
conducted among 139 Bangladeshi businesses in the UK, all of whom were small 
businesses. One hundred and twenty-three of them participated in the survey. 
However, data screening shows that 22 of them were business partnerships 
between unrelated persons: the partners were not related as parents, siblings, 
cousins or in any other relationship that could fall within the broad or narrow 
definition of a family business (Lipman, 2010; Gimeno et al., 2010). It is to be 
noted that close or distant family members can form a business partnership 
between them, but a business partnership formed by completely unrelated 
individuals is not a family business (see Section 3.2.1 for the essential features 
of a family business). Since this study took family businesses as the unit of 
observation, those 22 samples were dropped, and thus the questionnaire survey 
had an overall response rate of 72%.  In Table 6.1, the salient demographic 
features of the sample are presented.  
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Table 6. 1 Respondents’ demographic features (N=101) 
Characteristics   Categories  Frequencies  Percentages  
Ownership  
Structure  
 Company  
Sole 
Proprietorship  
73 
28 
72.3 
27.7 
     
Number of  
Employees  
 0-10 employees  
10-20 employees  
83 
18 
82.2 
17.8 
     
 
Total Capital  
(In Pounds 
Sterling) 
 
 < 100,000 71 70.3 
 100,000-200,000 12 11.9 
 200,000-300,000 8 7.9 
 300,000-400,000 
400,000-500,000 
500,000> but 
≤1,00,0000 
4 
2 
4 
4.0 
2.0 
4.0 
     
 
 
Academic 
Qualification  
 UK school 
certificate 
7 6.9 
 UK 
undergraduate 
24 23.8 
 UK master’s 9 8.9 
 Bangladeshi 
school certificate 
32 31.7 
 Bangladeshi 
undergraduate 
19 18.8 
 Bangladeshi 
master’s 
10 9.9 
     
 
Business Sector 
 Catering 42 41.6 
 Groceries  25 24.8 
 Transport  23 22.8 
 Others 11 10.9 
 
 
The table shows that most family businesses (72.3%) were privately held 
companies, with only 27.7 % being sole proprietors. Immigrant businesses with 
10-20 employees numbered only a few (17.8 %), and the majority (82.2%) had 
0-10 employees. Catering businesses constituted the major group (41.6%), 
followed by groceries (24.8%), transport (22.8%) and miscellaneous businesses 
(10.9%), for example travel agency, money transfer, printing and packaging, and 
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so on.  Immigrant businesses having a total capital below £100,000 made up the 
major band (70.3%), followed by those with £100,000-£200,000 (11.9%). A few 
businesses (13.9%) had a total capital of between £200,000 and £ 500,000, and 
a very few had over £500,000 (4.0%). In terms of educational qualifications, 
Bangladeshi school certificate was the major group (31.7 %), followed almost 
equally by the UK and Bangladeshi undergraduate degree groups, 23.8% and 
18.8% respectively.  
 
6.3 Problematic Aspects of Tax Compliance for Immigrant Businesses  
 
One way to understand what makes tax compliance difficult for a class of 
taxpayers is to examine the fundamental practical aspects of compliance.  
Various aspects – for example, the need to identify the appropriate tax forms, 
calculate tax, determine exemptions and deductions, and determine income, 
capital gains and tax credits – are potential barriers to compliance. Considering 
the type of taxpayers, i.e., immigrant businesses, and the nature of their 
businesses, i.e., small and family owned, the following five aspects of tax 
compliance were considered:  
• Determination of taxable income  
• Calculation of tax  
• Book-keeping and accounting 
• Frequent changes in tax law 
• Tax filing procedure   
 
The reasons for choosing these five alternatives, and the support provided by the 
international tax literature, were discussed in Sections 4.5 and Table 5.3.   There 
have been several studies that have shown that complying with the complexity of 
tax codes (Kaplow, 1996; Schenk, 2011; Milliron, 1985; Gratez, 1997; Snape, 
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2015), maintaining records (Levitt, 1995; Masurel et al., 2004; Inland Revenue, 
New Zealand, 2014; Pabon and Klima, 2017) and calculating taxable income and 
taxes (Mulligan and Oats, 2009; Kamleitner et al., 2012; Kloosterman et al., 1999) 
make it difficult to achieve tax compliance.   
Bar Chart 6. 1 Problematic aspects of tax compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bar Chart 6. 2 Problematic aspects of tax compliance viewed by organizational 
form   
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Bar Chart 6. 3 Problematic aspects of tax compliance viewed by business 
sector 
 
Bar Chart 6.1 shows that for most family businesses, book-keeping and 
accounting (34.7%) was the most difficult area contributing to tax compliance 
management, followed by frequent changes in tax law (24.8%) and determination 
of taxable income (17.8%). For a comparatively smaller percentage of 
respondents (14.9%), tax calculation created problems in achieving tax 
compliance.  Almost none of the respondents thought that the tax filing procedure 
was a major problem. Discussion with the respondents suggests that once the 
tax return is prepared with the help of their adviser it could be submitted easily 
opening an online account with HMRC. Understandably, compared to return 
preparation which requires determining taxable income and calculating tax 
liabilities, it is easier to file the return processed by the adviser except in certain 
cases (discussed further in section 6.3.5). 
 
However, the problematic aspects of tax compliances varied according to the 
nature and type of business. For privately held companies, as demonstrated in 
bar chart 6.2, determining taxable income or book-keeping and accounting 
seemed more problematic than the other aspects of tax compliance. On the other 
hand, sole proprietors perceived changing tax law as the most problematic area. 
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In terms of business sector affiliation, as illustrated in Bar Chart 6.3, catering and 
groceries businesses viewed determination of taxable income as a major 
concern, along with frequent changes in tax law and tax calculation. For transport 
businesses, book-keeping and accounting seemed to be the major concern. 
Overall, common concerns reported by the respondents, irrespective of business 
ownership or sector affiliation, included book-keeping and accounting, 
determining taxable income and frequent changes in the tax law.  How and why 
they emerged as problems is explained below:  
6.3.1 Book-keeping and Accounting  
 
As the interviews revealed, book-keeping and accounts preparation was a major 
concern for immigrant family businesses, mainly for two reasons: first, the cost 
and time involved in book-keeping; second, the risk or tax implications of poor 
book-keeping. Book-keeping is the job of an internal auditor or an accountant – 
a person whom small immigrant businesses could not afford in most cases.  
Some respondents expressed frustration that the legal requirement for keeping 
documents spanned several years, since the tax authority might demand them 
for audit or investigation purposes. These respondents stated that immigrant 
businesses lacked knowledge or expertise about how records could be kept. This 
was particularly burdensome in one-director-one-worker small businesses, where 
long hours were worked to manage the business.  When asked whether they 
considered record keeping a part of their daily activities, these respondents 
commented that keeping records for personal understanding and for tax returns 
were two different things, since mistakes in their documents might cause an 
unexpected tax burden.  
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Moreover, there was confusion among immigrant businesses about whether 
managing records was their job or that of their tax advisers. Some small 
businesses believed that documentation requirements should be arranged as a 
part of tax advice, while the tax advisers believed that it was the taxpayers’ duty 
to maintain documents in real time. A professional tax adviser observed that even 
if immigrant businesses kept records, there was a question mark over the 
authenticity of these, since most of the businesses had no real-time accounting 
system. They did their record-keeping job at the end of the month, or even later. 
Further, due to poor knowledge of accounts or poor basic education, in some 
cases, immigrant businesses experienced considerable difficulties in data 
management, resulting in document fabrication in some cases. When the 
documents reached the tax advisers, at the end of accounting year, there was 
not much time to correct the records and it becomes administratively and 
financially burdensome to help the businesses. 
The following comments are worth noting:  
Book-keeping cost is high. I need to maintain a full-time book-keeper only 
to maintain records. In addition, I go to the accountants and pay fees. I 
know that the return can be submitted online, but it cannot be prepared 
online. We need to work all over the years to make tax filing proper. (BO03) 
I would say that book keeping is the main reason for tax compliance to be 
complicated for us. Because it is a highly technical job to classify economic 
transactions in a way that would make tax compliance easy. We always 
try to ensure that the transactions we make don’t attract undue income tax. 
(BO09) 
The major difficulty for immigrant business tax compliance is incomplete 
documentation. They conduct much of their transactions in cash, which is 
not supported by appropriate documents. If they don’t maintain 
documents, they supply us with loose sheets of paper. (TA05)  
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On the matter of incomplete documentation and cash transactions, some 
respondents argued that an immigrant business was a community-dependent 
business.  For example, the staff, chef and owner in a catering business would 
all belong to the same community. One adverse consequence of community 
dependence was the need to pay the salaries of the staff and chef in cash, which 
complicated record-keeping. One restaurateur from Devon commented: “The 
restaurant business is a community business. Staff, chef and owner – everyone 
comes from the same community. We need to look after one another. The 
number of employees on paper and number of employees in practice often 
differs.” Therefore, cash transaction might not always mean hiding tax obligations 
but rather responding to community needs and reality (discussed further in 
Section 6.4.6). This business need was clarified with a strong argument by 
another business man, “Many employees will leave the firms if we don’t help them 
with the high tax burden. We are a minority community business. Our partners, 
clients, service holders are mainly from within the community. We cannot be 
harsh with them and take the risk of losing them. We understand there is risk 
involved in this, but sometimes there is no choice. We have to take risks for our 
survival. The tax authority should understand these obstacles we face. If the tax 
collection is easy, why do they leave the responsibility on us?” (BO14).  
On this point, professional tax advisers elaborated that book-keeping would have 
been easy if there were no game-playing attitude by business owners, and in 
some cases by book-keepers. It was not only tax advisers but also business 
owners who needed to adjust records and documents. One respondent stated 
that, “I advise the tax adviser what to do; rather than him advising me. I maintain 
documents, prepare profit-and loss-accounts and tell him to re-design according 
to my needs and expectations,” (BO04). In the business communities, such 
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practices are common. One storekeeper’s conversation with his accountant, 
reported in Morse et al.’s (2009:52) study of small business tax evasion, went as 
follows: “Last year I gave my accountant all recorded sales and all costs. 
Accountant says to me, Donald, the way you've done it, you've lost $80,000. You 
can't show a loss of $80,000, it's impossible; the I.R.S.'ll be all over you, you can't 
live where you live and show that.” Light (2005) adds that small immigrant 
businesses are normally unprofitable or earn profit below the industry average.  
Some others argued that record keeping would not have been a challenging task 
for immigrant business if the tax regulations and the requirements relating to them 
had not been complex. The lack of interest in keeping records properly among 
small ethnic businesses is well documented in international tax research. Yong 
(2011) finds that ethnic businesses in New Zealand fail to understand the 
importance of accounting information and they are more willing to pay others to 
keep records than to do this themselves. Similarly, Lignier (2009) comments that 
the Maori and some other communities of the Pacific region don’t appreciate the 
tax compliance benefits gained by properly maintaining accounting information.  
6.3.2 Frequent Changes in Tax Law 
 
Various reasons were put forward for why tax laws changed continually and how 
this affected compliance decision making. The aspects of tax law changes 
discussed in the interview included laws relating to tax rates, rebates, 
requirements of tax filing return information, tax refund, and any other issues they 
felt important.  The interview question, “In complying with income tax, which 
aspects of the tax laws create problems?” allowed them to discuss any legal or 
administrative issues having an impact on their tax compliance action.   Some 
respondents believed that laws changed routinely because there was always a 
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lack of clarity and straightforwardness in tax codes. Others argued that some 
taxpayers and professionals played around with the law. They wanted to benefit 
from the grey areas of tax law, and the tax authorities had to change these to 
stop unlawful use.  One tax adviser commented that large businesses were 
mainly responsible for the frequent changes in the tax law, for which small 
businesses suffered. On this point Bourdieu (1999, cited in Mumford, 2013:176) 
comments that non-compliance is practised by separating the “intent” of the law 
from its “content”, and it is the latter that is adhered to as strictly as possible. 
Bourdieu suggests that the violent history of taxation greatly threatens the stability 
of modern day tax systems.  
Another respondent added that it was not that HMRC had got into the habit of 
changing the tax system; it was rather that business and economic circumstances 
were changing every day, along with improvements in business transactions and 
recording technology. As a result, it was difficult to deal with taxpayers’ 
information unless tax legislation was overhauled.  
For immigrant businesses, it is difficult to follow changes in the tax law, which 
leads them to depend on tax advisers. Some respondents argued that it was the 
tax advisers’ responsibility to keep them aware of changes. One respondent 
commented, “Another problem is that tax law is always changing and we are 
faced with serious uncertainty. In fact, as far as the tax laws are concerned, we 
are living in an unknown world.  I feel it more than any other taxpayers because 
I am not solely dependent on my tax accountant,” (BO05). On the other hand, tax 
advisers commented that not only taxpayers, but also many tax advisers lagged 
behind changes in the tax laws. He stated that in the past, mistakes requiring a 
refund from HMRC could be corrected at any time. Then, in 2009, this rule was 
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changed, and mistakes had to be corrected in four years later this was further 
changed to three years; and now it was one year. He elaborated on the 
compliance difficulties caused by a recent change in tax requirements:   
 
The frequent changes made by HMRC have made it very difficult even for 
accountants to keep up with legislation. I would say that the new RTI 
requirement (Real Time Information, the reporting aspect of the payroll 
function whereby employers need to report to HMRC each time they pay 
their employees) has placed an extra administrative burden on employers. 
Whereas in the past we used to submit a P35 at the end of a submission, 
now the administrative requirement is a burden to small businesses. 
(TA03) 
Some respondents contended that changing tax law was the outcome of political 
compromise between the communities.  Governments came to power with a 
commitment to change. They changed public services to make citizens happy. 
So, the budget must be cut and adjusted according to their commitments. When 
there was a change in the economic planning of government, tax law must be 
changed to raise tax money. This observation went with the political perspective 
on tax compliance behaviour discussed in Section 3.4.2. Others believed that, 
“The British people like to change the tax system every year. Not only the tax 
system: they change almost everything. Especially when there is a new 
government they must change the tax codes. Taxation is one of the voting cards 
to entice taxpayers,” (Tax Adviser, TA02). 
However, a professional tax adviser (TA07) believed that it was not how often the 
tax legislation changed but rather how often one applied the law.  A tax adviser 
practised the law every day, which made it easy for him to follow and apply the 
changes. But taxpayers used the legislation once a year, or even less, which 
made it difficult to follow the changes.  For the immigrant community small 
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businesses, given their low tax and accounting skills, keeping track of legislative 
changes was even harder – or impossible. Boll’s (2012) ethnographic study of 
tax compliance suggests that tax law is something that most taxpayers don’t know 
in detail.  Perhaps this is even more the case for immigrant businesses, which 
have no basic idea of, or interest in knowing, the laws or their changes. Moreover, 
HMRC has changed the tax system from a manual to an online system, which 
ethnic taxpayers are not used to. The above tax adviser added that a major 
reason for frequent changes in the UK tax system was its administrative 
decentralization; the tax office was managed and administered from different 
regions of the country, which were different in terms of their managerial and 
efficiency level.  
6.3.3 Determination of Taxable Income  
 
What taxable income is, and how it is to be computed, is a difficult concept for 
immigrant businesses. Analysis of the interviews suggested that when their tax 
returns were placed before business owners, the first question they asked of their 
tax advises was about total taxable income. They always questioned how it was 
derived and how it could be reduced. In a self-assessment tax system, such as 
the UK’s, the majority of immigrant taxpayers are usually careful and concerned 
to make their income tax payments.  But they don’t have proper knowledge of 
what can be claimed as deductible expenses, in addition to not having proper 
record-keeping or cash flow management skills.  
In explaining the potential difficulties, some respondents stated that in a business 
there were hundreds of transactions over a year and sorting a tax admissible 
expense from an inadmissible one was challenging. Only a handful of 
Bangladeshi immigrant business owners had any idea about what was a “family 
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or personal expense” and what was a “business expense”, as one respondent 
observed (Tax Adviser, TA12). Immigrant family business owners believed that 
business was family and family was business, which mixed up business 
expenses with personal and family expenses, as this tax adviser explained. In his 
The Social Structure of the Economy, Bourdieu (2005) argues that business is 
business, and this economic logic must be extended to the family members of a 
business organization. His analysis of the association between the overlapping 
economic interest of family and family business provides some explanations for 
why family expenses are mixed up with business expenses by immigrant 
businesses.  
Another tax adviser (TA08) noted, “Some ethnic business owners provide 
household consumer receipts, food receipts, to make them allowable. We say to 
them that these are your personal expenses.  They even include their clothing 
expenses in the claim.” This observation was supported by other respondents, 
who also raised other difficulties in taxable income determination for Bangladeshi 
ethnic businesses.  
What they don’t know is which are partly and which are fully allowable 
expenses for tax purposes. They mix up business and personal 
allowances. They (Bangladeshi businesses) don’t show the income they 
have back home, lest they are charged with higher tax burden. (Tax 
Adviser, TA04) 
For most Bangladeshi small businesses, it’s a question of whether the rent 
they pay for houses, which is absolutely used for residential purpose, is a 
deductible expense.  Often, they are confused whether to report income 
on an arising or a remittance basis. There are many Bangladeshis who 
spend months at a time in Bangladesh, leaving their businesses to their 
children. Taxable income will be different according to whether they 
declare income on an arising or a remittance basis. (Tax Adviser, TA07)  
213 
 
Some other respondents stated that what was more complicated for them to 
understand was capital gains tax and capital allowances. Many business owners 
didn’t know what a personal allowance was, or how to calculate or deduct it. They 
also didn’t understand the income tax threshold or the tax-free personal 
allowance. When they learned that part of their total income was not taxable, they 
were happy.  Respondents observed that family ownership of a business created 
great scope for complexity in taxable income determination. For example, when 
a property was being used for both residential and business purposes, it was very 
difficult to apportion the expenses between business and family. In the cases of 
family businesses, a basic trend was to split income over different tax files among 
family members, which might or might not be illegal, and might take the form of 
tax evasion, thus further complicating the determination of taxable income. A 
small business owner observed: 
It is not surprising that a very wealthy business man in the Bangladeshi 
community says that he does not have any income or property, because 
all his incomes are transferred into the names of family members having 
no income or no taxable income. Wives are made directors in the business 
only for tax purposes.  Just to split the income. (BO02) 
Some respondents argued that with family ownership, the nature of business and 
how transactions were represented had much to do with the complexity of taxable 
income determination.  For example, in an online based business, it might be 
easier to estimate sales as transactions to be recorded; but where transactions 
were predominantly cash-based, hiding turnover was easy.  Hiding cash, 
however, was a pure case of tax evasion rather than a problem of taxable income 
determination. 
In the opinion of others, the problem of income estimation lay elsewhere. The 
possibility of a high tax demand and assessment of business income, when 
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businesses were audited or inspected by the tax authorities, encouraged many 
business owners to report lower income at the return filing stage. One respondent 
expressed disappointment that HMRC thought that business income would 
always go higher, and could never fall. This respondent pointed out: “To be very 
frank, accounting skills are severely lacking among HMRC accountants. They 
always enhance income. I went to the tribunal and challenged the inspectors 
about the estimation made of my client’s income. They make wild assessments 
of the firm’s income.” In the same way, a London-based restaurant owner, with 
considerable disappointment, complained that the tax authority caught him 
because his income had dropped a little from the previous year. “What they don’t 
understand is that income may fall. Why should one always have an increasing 
income?” (BO08) 
6.3.4 Calculation of Tax Liabilities  
 
To some interviewees, of all the tax compliance problems, applying the 
appropriate tax rate and calculating the tax burden was the toughest, particularly 
to those who did not just leave this to a tax adviser. In the interviews, seven 
respondents stated that they had an adviser to share ideas with; but in the end, 
they liked to file their tax return themselves.   
Once the tax return was prepared, small businesses routinely asked to their 
advisers why the tax rate was so high and how this was calculated. Most 
immigrant businesses’ first reaction to calculated tax was that this was not their 
tax bill, as one tax adviser commented. One reason for this was financial illiteracy 
and an inability to differentiate between accounting profit and tax profit.  On this 
point, one tax adviser (TA01) had this to say: “The profit determined based on 
financial accounting and the profit based on tax accounting are different. They 
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think that the accounting profit was low and has now been made higher after the 
capital allowances are considered. They don’t understand the effect of such 
allowances.” This echoed the observation made by a fellow tax adviser, “When 
we produce the accounts they want to see the profit figures. As businessmen, 
they have some idea of how much the profit could be. If our calculation matches 
theirs, they approve it,” (Tax Adviser, TA09). 
For small business owners with employees, the next thing that complicates tax 
calculation is the payroll tax and national insurance contributions for their 
employees. To them it is unnecessarily burdensome and difficult to understand.  
A London-based small business owner stated, “Collecting PAYE is sometimes 
hard because the tax rates become high when you adjust for NICs. NICs are 
around 12% and the basic tax rate is 20%, which makes the tax burden 32%. 
This is very high.  Many employees will leave our firms if we don’t help them with 
the high tax burden,” (BO14). This comment suggested that Bangladeshi ethnic 
businesses, particularly in the catering industry, created more of an ethnic-control 
economy than an ethnic-ownership economy. Light (2005) comments that if a 
business sector is controlled more by its employees than by its owners, it is better 
defined as an ethnic-control economy than an ethnic-ownership economy.  
Immigrant business owners think that there should be a flat tax rate or lump-sum 
taxes for small businesses. Even PAYE should be withdrawn for small 
businesses because of the tax compliance cost it imposes on them (Hasseldine, 
1995). Morse et al. (2009:38) argue that small businesses not only carry out huge 
cash transactions and underpay taxes but also “underpay social security and 
other payroll and self-employment taxes.” They find that in the US sole proprietors 
use unreported cash income to pay unreported wages to employees or pay their 
own unreported self-employment income. One of the reasons that ethnic 
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employers help their employees with unreported wages is because the 
“employer’s firm only exists because it pays low wages”, as Light (2005) argues.  
In support of this statement, another businessman commented that, due to high 
tax rates, he could not keep workers, which was an exclusively tax induced 
problem for the Bangladeshi business community.  In interpreting this community 
aspect of developing perceptions about tax rates and calculations, a tax adviser 
commented that Bangladeshi small businesses always compared the basic tax 
rate of the UK, i.e., 20% to that of Bangladesh, i.e., 10%. This comparison gave 
them a sense of a high tax burden in their mind and they began questioning tax 
calculations. The following comments are noteworthy:  
The comparatively higher tax rate in the UK tax system than that of 
Bangladesh indirectly complicates their tax calculations. We have that 
legacy and mind-set. The first generation British Bangladeshi was affected 
by this attitude; the second generation is being affected by the first 
generation. There has been an infiltration of cultural belief about tax 
payment. (TA01)  
To be in a low tax band, they even register or buy property in the name of 
others here in the UK or in Bangladesh. We live in this country, but our 
mind remains in Bangladesh. We have the same habits and practice as in 
Bangladesh. We want, when we retire, to return to Bangladesh. So, part 
of the income must be saved to take to Bangladesh. (TA04)  
These observations however were not acceptable to another businessman, who 
argued that UK tax rates and NICs were reasonable considering the strong social 
welfare system of the country.  He commented, “How can the government run the 
welfare system if you don’t pay them the money? Tax is being used to fund 
welfare benefits,” (BO05). This indicated that it was very important to motivate 
immigrant communities to be aware of their tax liabilities and dispel confusion. 
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One tax adviser stated that to motivate confused taxpayers, he drew pictures on 
paper and demonstrated the various aspects of tax calculation.  Although it was 
difficult to understand the calculation process, 90% of his customers agreed to 
the taxes calculated and paid them.   
6.3.5 Tax Filing Procedure  
 
Only a handful of respondents stated that the tax filing procedure was often a 
problem. By tax filing procedure, they meant the ways a return was prepared and 
filed, and the way subsequent disagreements with the tax authorities were 
managed. Most family businesses got their return prepared and filed by tax 
advisers. Thus, they did not have much trouble in filing returns. Online submission 
made filing even easier; but many respondents said that they shared their online 
password with their accountants so that the latter could submit their return. When 
asked why he didn’t do the online submission himself, a respondent said that he 
felt it was safer if it was done by his adviser. Others said that they didn’t have the 
technical knowledge to deal with the online filing system. Moreover, errors in 
submission might cause further trouble with tax compliance. At the other extreme, 
a tax adviser commented that filing a tax return was the taxpayer’s obligation, not 
that of the tax adviser. There were examples of tax advisory firms not filing the 
return within the deadline and the taxpayer being penalized for late submission.  
On the matter of whether they sought advice from HMRC or a tax clinic on any 
aspect of return filing, a business owner complained that it took him long hours 
to get connected with the HMRC tax advice centre. Besides, the quality of service 
was not adequate or was often confusing. He commented that, “Sometimes I 
phone HMRC. They are the gentlest and the deadliest people. If you are honest, 
there is no problem. But if you are wrong, and that is a wilful, you cannot escape,” 
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(BO08). This respondent indicated that tax help was usually needed more when 
there was a tax dispute. But the experience of the respondents in dealing with tax 
audit cases with HMRC had not been good.  The above-mentioned respondent 
continued, “I had a Hansard enquiry into my business when I sought help from 
HMRC, because at that time I had no tax adviser. But I did not get any help. Later 
I managed to engage a Cambridge graduate tax lawyer at a high fee. When he 
took up the case, the litigation was solved.” Similar experiences were shared by 
others. An Edinburgh based businessman gave the following account:  
The tax inspectors usually don’t accept our views. They claimed that my 
business expenses were high, but I did not disclose them because that 
would have increased my income. Based on this assumption, they 
increased my tax bill. In fact, in my restaurant, my friends and I passed 
time at night, after all guests had gone, and while we were there we ate 
and drank. The tax inspector on that ground added an additional sale of 
£60,000. I was surprised at this. Then after a lengthy battle, the inspector 
reduced the additional sales to £3,000. I was still dissatisfied with this and 
challenged the estimate, but the inspector requested me to accept this 
increase.  When I accepted this, they brought up a new issue. They 
charged me with an additional VAT payment of £10, 000. I reacted and 
asked them to rectify the VAT bills.   Every time I sent them a letter and 
explanation, they did not reply. They just kept on sending me the same 
letters with their raised tax demands. Finally, they issued me with a letter 
saying they would go to court if I didn’t pay the VAT bill. Finding no option, 
I called the helpline and described my position. Hearing me out, they asked 
me to send all the documents I had about this case.  I faxed the documents 
to them and was expecting a favourable response. But nothing happened. 
After six months, a letter came from the local office saying that I should 
pay the extra taxes and VAT, because I was supposed to submit all the 
documents by 30 April, which I had not.  I wrote to them again saying that 
I needed to talk to their high officials. It’s been six months, but I have not 
heard anything from them. This is mental harassment I am going through. 
(BO03)  
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This quote is an example of the ongoing mistrust between the taxpayers and tax 
administration which creates confusion and disputes between them. The tax 
liability determined by the local tax officers are often unfair and there is little or no 
help in resolving them from the higher tax administration. Observations about the 
exorbitant tax and VAT demands and the mental harassment undergone because 
of this is a clear evidence of the misunderstanding and nonconfidence on the tax 
system.   
Discussion with the respondents indicated that having a helpline or tax clinic was 
to them a mere formality that did not provide meaningful support. For Bangladeshi 
immigrant businesses whose first language was not English, seeking advice 
through a helpline was more difficult. Even if one has an effective communication 
skill in a language, it is far more difficult to grasp legal language.  However, some 
respondents suggested that HMRC inspectors were helpful and understandable. 
They argued that if someone was innocent and made a mistake, tax inspectors 
would share their knowledge and guide them. This observation is supported by 
Currie et al. (2016), who illustrate that the role of tax inspectors in the UK is 
changing from traditional regulator to that of being an enabler and customer 
focused manager, particularly with respect to big businesses.  A tax adviser 
stated, “The question is, do you really want to pay your taxes? HMRC is sitting 
there to help. They will talk to you for hours and advise you about whatever you 
need. They will appreciate you,” (Tax Adviser, TA09). In addition to the above five 
aspects of tax law, a miscellaneous option was there in the survey questionnaire. 
However, no respondent picked that option.  
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6.4 Immigrant Businesses and Tax System Complexity 
 
Tax system complexity or tax complexity, the two are used interchangeably 
(Slemrod, 1996; Chau and Leung, 2009), is one of the key factors in developing 
taxpayers’ attitudes to tax compliance (Fisher et al., 1992; Torgler, 2007). It is 
one of the non-economic causes of reduced tax morale and higher tax 
compliance cost (Katz and Bommarito, 2014: Torgler, 2007), and it affects tax 
compliance actions severely (Richardson, 2006; Tsakumis et al., 2007). Tax 
complexity may affect the reporting and disclosure behaviours of taxpayers 
(Hasseldine, 2015) and create problems in identifying taxable income and 
exemptions (as discussed in Section 3.3).   
This section examines what tax system complexity means to immigrant 
businesses, why it occurs and why it matters for their tax compliance using the 
survey data regarding taxpayers perception of tax complexity and access to 
different forms of capital.   In discussing this, the section is divided into two parts. 
First, it investigates whether immigrant businesses perceive the tax system as 
complex or not. Second, it attempts to explain their perceptions of tax system 
complexity from their socio-economic and cultural perspective. Vryonides (2009) 
studied the educational choices made by Greek and Cypriot children in relation 
to their parent’s possession of cultural and social capital. Referring to Bourdieu, 
Vryonides (2009: 130) argues, “Families inherit different social positions and 
unequal amounts of capital …. some are relatively better equipped, better placed 
and more informed to make successful choices.” Bourdieu (1984) contends that 
social network and upbringing shapes one’s meaning-making and perception-
development processes (Bourdieu,1984). Therefore, it is vitally important to look 
at the tax complexity perceptions of immigrant businesses from their cultural and 
social position to improve understanding of their attitude to tax compliance. 
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6.4.1 Perception of Tax System Complexity in Immigrant Businesses  
 
To assess the attitudes towards tax system complexity of immigrant businesses, 
three questions were asked, each of which captured various aspects of 
complexity: “In your opinion, how complicated is the UK tax system”; “How difficult 
is it for you to deal with the tax system of the UK?”; and “To what extent do you 
agree that you seek tax advice due to uncertainty about income tax regulations?” 
Each of the questions asked for answers on a five-point Likert-type scale. The 
first survey question attempted to measure “complicatedness”, the second 
question measured, “difficulty” and the third question, “uncertainty” – all the three 
aspects measuring “tax system complexity”. Relevance and justification for 
selecting each of these survey questions and support from the tax compliance 
literature has been discussed in Table 5.3.  
Table 6. 2 Thematic grouping of survey questions on tax system complexity with 
descriptive statistics, N=101 
Concepts  Items Frequency  Percent  Mean S. D. 
Tax system 
complicatedness  
very 
complicated  
50 49.5 2.09 1.342 
complicated  20 19.8 
uncertain 11 10.9 
not 
complicated  
12 11.9 
not 
complicated 
at all  
8 7.9 
Tax system difficulty  very difficult  51 50.5 2.02 1.288 
difficult  22 21.8 
uncertain 9 8.9 
not difficult 13 12.9 
not difficult 
at al  
6 5.9 
Tax system 
uncertainty  
highly agree 45 44.6 2.20 1.241 
somewhat 
agree 
32 31.7 
uncertain 9 8.9 
disagree  7 6.9 
fully 
disagree  
8 7.9 
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Bar Chart 6. 4 Respondents’ perception of tax system complicatedness (left)  
Bar Chart 6. 5 Respondents’ perception of uncertain tax regulations (right)  
 
 
Bar Chart 6. 6 Respondents’ perception of tax system difficulty (left)  
Bar Chart 6. 7 Respondents’ perception of tax law ambiguity (right)   
 
According to Table 6.2, the mean responses for tax system complicatedness was 
2.09, that for tax system difficulty 2.02, and that for uncertain tax regulations was 
2.20, suggesting that Bangladeshi immigrant businesses generally believed that 
the UK tax system was complex for them.  The frequency distribution and the Bar 
Chart 6.4 show that nearly 50% of the respondents perceived that the UK tax 
system was “very complicated” for them.  Of the remaining 50% of respondents, 
19.8% thought that the tax system was “complicated”, 10.9% thought it was “not 
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complicated” and a marginal 7.9% believed it was “not complicated at all”. Around 
10% of respondents were uncertain whether they thought the tax system was 
complicated or not.  With respect to tax system difficulty and uncertainty about 
tax regulations, respondents had a similar view.   For example, 50.5% perceived 
that the tax system was “very difficult” for them to deal with, and 44.6% “strongly 
agreed” that tax regulations were uncertain. In addition to the three thematic 
questions on tax complexity, another question – “Do you feel that the income tax 
laws related to your business are ambiguous?” – was asked with the binary 
answer choice Yes-No. This question was asked to compare whether answers 
made to the thematic questions agreed with those made to this single item 
question – a way of checking internal consistency.  The frequency distribution 
and the Bar Chart 6.7 show that 70% of respondents said that the income tax 
laws were ambiguous or unclear to them.  
The question that may arise here is what knowledge the respondents had about 
the tax system based on which they expressed the opinions. To assess their 
knowledge about the UK tax system several questions were asked in the survery 
and semi-structured interviews. The survey questions like “who do you consult 
when you have an income-tax-related problem?” (Q.08), “which aspect of UK 
income tax law causes most problems for your business?” (Q.21) “for which of 
the following reasons do you go to a tax adviser?  (Q. 22) reflect their access and 
knowledge about the tax system. Further, specific questions asked in the 
interviews, “what are your views about the UK tax system?”, “what are some of 
the issues of the UK tax system that influence your income tax compliance?”, “in 
complying with income tax, which aspects of the tax laws create problems?  Why 
do you think that ----- is a problem and complicates your tax payment decisions?”, 
“” and “do you have any ideas about what may be the consequences of not paying 
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income tax?”  were asked to further understand their knowledge about the UK tax 
system. When a respondent stated that the tax system was complicated to them 
or not, they made the answer based on the knowledge and perception they 
developed throughout their interaction with the tax adviser, tax authority and other 
stakeholders in the tax system. This study was aimed at measuring their 
perception about tax compliance and tax system, as set out in section 1.3 and 
ideas of their tax knowledge helped in understanding the comments they made 
in the interviews. However, making an assessment of their tax knowledge was 
not an objective of this study.  The next sections of this chapter will attempt to 
show how the “resource” and “stakes” Bangladeshi immigrants possess might 
have influenced their perception of the tax system.  
6.4.2 Cultural Capital and Its Importance in Shaping Perception of Tax 
Complexity and Compliance  
 
People’s cultural background impinges on their perception of social reality. 
Looking at people’s way of life, choice-making and social actions using 
Bourdieu’s capitals is not new (see Wallace, 2016; Burke, 2016; Vryonides, 
2009). Burke (2016) used Bourdieu’s cultural capital, along with social and 
economic capital, to understand respondents’ life history, while Wallace (2016) 
used black cultural capital to understand race and racialization. However, the 
significance of culture has largely been overlooked in tax compliance research, 
other than in cross-cultural tax research (Yong, 2011). In Bourdieu’s philosophy, 
the cultural status of an individual, what he terms “cultural capital”, influences his 
actions and interpretation of world phenomena. In Sections 3.13 and 4.3.2, we 
discussed how Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital might influence people’s 
behaviour, expectations and preferences.  
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Cultural status was mentioned as a crucial factor for respondents’ 
accomplishment of tax compliance actions. There were business owners and tax 
advisers who strongly believed that being loyal to state obligations was a part of 
cultural norms. They claimed that the Bangladeshi culture valued loyalty and 
contentment over all other things, which made them responsible and responsive 
to state obligations. One respondent stated, “As a Bangladeshi person, I am 
content with what I have, and that’s part of my culture. To pay no taxes is 
cheating. We Bangladeshis are loyal, and our religious values do not even permit 
taking interest from banks,” (BO07). By referring to the refusal to take bank 
interest, the respondent meant that anything illegal or unlawful, either in the eyes 
of his religion or those of the law of the land, should not be pursed. By mentioning 
the bank interest example, he might have been indicating that if he could forgo 
interest income, why would he not be able to part with some of his income for 
income tax purposes. This observation makes some sense when we consider 
that McGee (2008) finds that Bangladeshi have the highest tax ethics among 13 
Asian countries; although other studies have had different findings (Torgler, 2004; 
Siddiki, 2014; Pan-Suk et al., 2013). 
This view was however questioned by a professional tax adviser, who argued 
that one of the reasons that they were loyal was because they didn’t have the 
skills to understand accounting and tax problems. They, perhaps, would have 
behaved differently if they knew all the loopholes in the tax system. A fellow tax 
adviser had the same perception about Bangladeshi immigrant businesses. He 
believed that the tax culture or tax attitude a person carried with him when he 
migrated to a new country impacted on compliance behaviours in the country of 
settlement. He commented that complexity in the tax system would be greatly 
reduced if people’s mind-set in relation to tax payment changed positively.  The 
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following comments, one by a tax adviser and the other two by business owners, 
elaborated the debate:  
The Bangladeshi small business carries the legacy of Bangladeshi tax 
culture directly or indirectly. As you know, in Bangladesh, tax evasion is 
pervasive. Most Bangladeshi small businesses come to us with the 
question – how can I end up paying minimum tax or no tax? To address 
this question, we need to look at the laws that can help them pay less tax. 
Maybe Bangladeshi small businesses carry the same cultural legacy of tax 
practice from Bangladesh? (Tax Adviser, TA06) 
Community, culture, language is not a problem. I have an ambition. I want 
to earn money. Particularly, I need to send money to Bangladesh, not just 
me but almost all Bangladeshis. I don’t think that our educational level 
impacts much. We as a nation have a good education, but very 
frustratingly it is not valued and respected here in UK society. The things 
that make tax compliance decisions complicated are maths and 
accounting phobias. Most people don’t understand accounting. English 
language or any language is not difficult. (BO11) 
I am coming from a culturally backward society and trying to cope with a 
fast-moving tax system. We Bangladeshi people are at a remove from the 
mainstream community. We may educate ourselves about the tax system, 
but the cultural differences don’t disappear merely through education. For 
this cultural reason, we always have a tendency to return home or to 
develop an establishment in Bangladesh. Otherwise I feel uprooted.  The 
cultural gap also deepens my attitude to hoarding my income rather than 
parting with it. (BO12)  
The resentment expressed by the business owner quoted above (BO11) that his 
education was not valued in the UK points to Bourdieu’s (1993) proposition that 
in an unfamiliar field, it is the dominant culture that enjoys the power to define the 
value of minority culture (Oliver and O’Reilly, 2010). In this case, the value of 
educational qualifications, styles and habits, and of their knowledge of 
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Bangladeshi businesses, are determined by British society.  The migrant British 
worker’s experience of Spanish society reflects this reality, as Oliver and O’Reilly 
(2010:54) point out: “Members of the British community, for example, spurn the 
need for bureaucracy or for official recognition of credentials and qualifications… 
extolling the virtues of a regulation-free Spain: ‘Chris, for example, he has no 
papers, no qualifications, but he is a brilliant electrician, and here he has got loads 
of work.’” 
In this debate, one respondent emphatically contended that Bangladeshi 
immigrant businesses might lack knowledge and education, but they had the right 
attitude to paying tax. Respondents stated that paying tax required specialized 
and technical knowledge and had nothing to do with cultural values. Even tax 
professionals didn’t know all the laws and made mistakes because of the complex 
tax legislation. This respondent, however, admitted that one of the consequences 
of poor educational qualifications was that ethnic communities could not apply 
their mind to tax and wanted a quick-fix to any tax problems. Moreover, people 
felt more uncomfortable with complexity because they could not read the basic 
laws and maintain business records.  
Similar explanations were given by other respondents, who pointed out that the 
cultural background of immigrants, their educational qualification and religious 
faith, seemed not to have any impact on developing perceptions of tax 
compliance or complexity. To them, what mattered was how long one had been 
in the business and how long one had been involved with tax compliance 
activities. The more experienced one was in business and compliance activities, 
the better one was at dealing with the tax system. They thought the tax system 
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was naturally complex and so was tax compliance; and yet some complexities 
arose from Bangladeshi cultural norms and habits. One respondent observed:  
Perception of tax compliance would only be different if one knew what was 
there in the tax law.  Ninety per cent of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses 
do not have any idea about the income tax system of the UK. That’s not 
even a matter of education. Because, you can educate them about the 
importance of tax compliance, but you cannot teach them the tax codes, 
or how to do the tax return line by line. (BO06) 
Another problem identified by the respondents was the multiculturality of UK 
society, where different groups of people had different norms and habits of 
record-keeping, business management and tax decision making. The UK tax 
system did not consider these diverse ethnic facts when they formulated tax 
codes. The respondent argued:  
Culturally all ethnic communities in the UK, whether from Iran or Brazil, are 
similar as far as tax compliance is concerned. It’s not cultural 
backwardness, it’s having a new system. One reason that the UK tax 
system is complex is because of its massive multiculturality. People from 
diverse cultures and habits live in this country.  You cannot address the 
tax issues and behavioural practices of taxpayers of all cultures in a 
country like this. What you think fits with one culture may conflict with 
another. (TA07)  
In between these two extreme arguments, some respondents believed that the 
role of culture in tax payment was inconclusive. This was because in all cultures 
there were people who were tax non-compliant to some extent, of whom some 
were highly educated. But at the same time, cultures with good education 
systems were generally more tax compliant than cultures with poor education 
ones, as he commented.   Some cultures did not value education as an essential 
factor, at least not higher education. People coming from a backward culture had 
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to fight for their economic viability, which did not permit their children to pursue 
higher studies.  They could not spend a huge amount of money on academic 
excellence.  As a result, in communication, language and legal matters, they 
always lagged behind the educated classes. Light (2005) notes that language 
skills and unaccredited human capital are major obstacles for ethnic 
communities. This problem remains with Bangladeshi people, as these 
respondents observed. This argument matches Bourdieu’s conception of 
working-class children, who are trapped in the social status quo –  who go to local 
authority schools or free schools, whereas the elite go to private schools (Light, 
2010).  Bourdieu (1984) argues that educational qualification is a determining 
factor for the cultural capital and social class of an individual. His analysis of 
French social classes during the 1960s in La Distinction, provides compelling 
evidence of how education, social class and cultural practices are related and 
how education reproduces social inequality.     
Although respondents had different opinions about the role of culture in 
developing attitudes to tax, they unanimously agreed that Bangladeshi 
immigrants lacked proper education, language and communication skills – the 
inevitable elements of Bourdieu’s cultural capital. This suggests the need to have 
an account of the cultural capital of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses in the UK.  
6.4.3 Volume of Cultural Capital in the Bangladeshi Business Community  
 
Using Bourdieu’s criteria, the Bangladeshi business community’s cultural capital, 
or their access to cultural resources, was measured based on their self-reported 
achievement in, or involvement with, education, music and other aspects of 
culture.  Measuring cultural capital with these elements was grounded in the 
literature, as summarized in Table 5.3. DiMaggio (1982) is one of the leading 
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researchers after Bourdieu (Robson, 2009) to use musical taste, visiting art 
galleries and attendance at symphony concerts to measure cultural capital 
among school students. In this study, three thematic questions were asked in the 
survey to measure the cultural capital of the respondents: “What academic 
qualification do you hold?”; “Which of the following types of music do you like to 
listen most?”; and “Which of these places or events do you like to visit most?” 
Each of the questions were asked on multiple categorical choices.  
 
Table 6. 3 Thematic groups of survey questions on cultural capital with 
descriptive statistics 
N=101 
Concepts  Items Frequency  Percent  Mean S. D. 
Educational 
qualification   
UK school 
certificate 
7 6.9 3.61 1.456 
UK undergraduate 24 23.8 
UK master’s 9 8.9 
Bangladeshi 
school certificate 
32 31.7 
Bangladeshi 
undergraduate 
19 18.8 
Bangladeshi 
master’s 
20 9.9 
Taste for 
music  
Bangladeshi 66 65.3 1.72 1.124 
Hindi 12 11.9 
English 8 7.9 
Other 15 14.9 
Cultural 
participation  
Museum  8 7.9 3.95 1.352 
Art gallery  11 10.9 
Concert  13 12.9 
Cinema  15 14.9 
Community 
festivals/fairs 
54 53.5 
 
According to Table 6.3, the majority of the respondents (60.4%) were educated 
in Bangladesh and 39.6 % of them were educated in the UK. Those who achieved 
an educational qualification in Bangladesh mostly had a school certificate 
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(31.7%), and those who achieved an academic qualification in the UK mainly had 
an undergraduate degree (23.8%).  In terms of taste for music, only 7.9% listened 
to English music, while the rest of the respondents listened to Bangladeshi 
(65.3%) or Indian music. In terms of cultural participation, from five possible 
choices, more than half (53.5%) indicated that they preferred attending 
community cultural festivals to visiting a museum or art gallery.   
There is no established cultural index which could be used to compare and show 
Bangladeshi businesses’ position in UK society in terms of the cultural resources 
they enjoyed. Sanders et al. (2014), based on the Ethnic Minority British Election 
Study, suggest that Bangladeshis have the lowest educational levels in the UK, 
whereas Africans have the highest.  
However, based on these three scales, it could be argued that Bangladeshi 
cultural capital is community centred: educational degrees were mostly earned in 
Bangladesh; and there was an inclination towards Bangladeshi music and 
Bangladeshi community festivals. These findings were in line with Bourdieu’s 
argument that ownership of cultural capital, to some extent, is related to 
“resources of the family of origin” (Robson, 2009:113). Applying Bourdieu’s 
concept of cultural capital, Alina (2011) finds that immigrants’ educational 
qualification and access to cultural resources in Germany are much lower than 
that of the native Germans, particularly in secondary and upper level education. 
In interpreting this, Bourdieu (1999, cited in Wallace 2016) contends that the 
power arrangement of the social field in which an ethnic community operates can 
limit the conversion of cultural capital. How much value the cultural capital of 
Bangladeshis will generate in the UK depends on how they position themselves 
in the British social hierarchy.  
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Table 6. 4 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system 
complicatedness according to their ownership of cultural capital  
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system complicatedness;  
% within column indicates aspects of cultural capital. 
 
Table 6. 5 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system difficulty 
according to their ownership of cultural capital  
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system difficulty; % within 
column indicates aspects of cultural capital. 
 
 
How complicated is the 
UK tax system  
UK  
educated 
BD 
educat
ed 
BD 
music  
Non-BD  
music  
Within 
community 
Beyond 
community 
complica
ted 
Count 27 43 44 26 37 33 
% within row 38.6% 61.4% 62.9% 37.1% 52.9% 47.1% 
% within 
column 
67.5% 70.5% 
66.7% 74.3% 
68.5% 70.2% 
uncertain Count 5 6 8 3 5 6 
% within row  45.5% 54.5% 72.7% 27.3% 45.5% 54.5% 
% within 
column 
12.5% 9.8% 
12.1% 8.6% 
9.3% 12.8% 
not 
complica
ted 
Count 8 12 14 6 12 8 
% within row 40.0% 60.0% 70.0% 30.0% 60.0% 40.0% 
% within 
column 
20.0% 19.7% 
21.2% 17.1% 
22.2% 17.0% 
Total  Count 40 61 66 35 54 47 
% within row 39.6% 60.4% 65.3% 34.7% 53.5% 46.5% 
% within 
column  
100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
100.0% 100.0% 
100.0% 
How difficult is the tax 
system  
UK  
educated 
BD 
educated 
BD 
music  
Non-
BD  
music  
Within 
community 
Beyond 
community 
Difficult Count 33 40 46 27 38 35 
% within row 45.2% 54.8% 63.0% 37.0% 52.1% 47.9% 
% within 
column  
82.5% 65.6% 69.7% 77.1% 70.4% 74.5% 
uncertain Count  2 7 6 3 4 5 
% within row 22.2% 77.8% 66.7% 33.3% 44.4% 55.6% 
% within 
column  
5.0% 11.5% 9.1% 8.6% 7.4% 10.6% 
not 
difficult 
Count  5 14 14 5 12 7 
% within row 26.3% 73.7% 73.7% 26.3% 63.2% 36.8% 
% within 
column  
12.5% 23.0% 21.2% 14.3% 22.2% 14.9% 
Total  Count 40 61 66 35 54 47 
% within row   39.6% 60.4% 65.3% 34.7% 53.5% 46.5% 
% within 
column   
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 6. 6 Immigrant business owners’ perception of uncertain tax regulations 
according to their ownership of cultural capital  
 
Uncertain tax 
regulations  
UK 
educated 
BD 
educated 
BD  
music 
Non-BD 
music 
Within 
community 
Beyond 
community 
agree Count 31 46 50 27 39 38 
% within 
row 
40.3% 59.7% 64.9% 35.1% 50.6% 49.4% 
% within 
column  
77.5% 75.4% 75.8% 77.1% 72.2% 80.9% 
uncertain Count 2 7 7 2 6 3 
% within 
row 
22.2% 77.8% 77.8% 22.2% 66.7% 33.3% 
% within 
column   
5.0% 11.5% 10.6% 5.7% 11.1% 6.4% 
disagree Count 7 8 9 6 9 6 
% within 
row  
46.7% 53.3% 60.0% 40.0% 60.0% 40.0% 
% within 
column   
17.5% 13.1% 13.6% 17.1% 16.7% 12.8% 
Total  Count 40 61 66 35 54 47 
% within 
row 
39.6% 60.4% 65.3% 34.7% 53.5% 46.5% 
% within 
column  
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of uncertain tax regulation; % within 
column indicates aspects of cultural capital. 
 
Careful examination of the cultural resources enjoyed by immigrant businesses 
and their perceptions of tax system complexity, as reported in Table 6.4, shows 
that, of those who perceived the UK tax system complicated, 61.4% were 
educated in Bangladesh, as opposed to 38.6% who were educated in the UK. 
Perception of tax system complicatedness was also higher among those 
respondents who preferred Bangladeshi music over other musical choices 
(62.9%) and those who participated in Bangladeshi cultural activities rather than 
those of other communities.  Of those who were uncertain whether the tax system 
was complicated, the majority had a Bangladeshi education, Bangladeshi musical 
preferences and participated in Bangladeshi community festivals only.  
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Similarly, as reported in Table 6.5, of the respondents who viewed the UK tax 
system as difficult, 54.8% had earned their academic qualification in Bangladesh, 
as opposed to 45.2% in the UK. Respondents who liked Bangladeshi music and 
participating in the cultural activities of Bangladeshi communities felt the tax 
system to be more difficult than those who liked non-Bangladeshi music or 
participated in the cultural activities of communities other than their own.  
Individuals who were uncertain whether the UK tax system was difficult had the 
same cultural traits, i.e., Bangladeshi education or a preference for Bangladeshi 
music. Finally, respondents who agreed that the tax regulations in the UK were 
uncertain had a Bangladeshi academic degree, Bangladeshi musical tastes or 
Bangladeshi community involvement, as reported in Table 6.6. The results of chi-
square tests of independence showed that there was a statically significant 
relationship between taxpayers’ educational qualifications and perceptions of tax 
system complicatedness (χ2= 1.190, DF= 2, p = 0.049), perceptions of tax system 
difficulty (χ2= 3.497, DF= 2, p = 0.031) and perceptions of uncertain tax 
regulations (χ2= 1.463, DF= 2, p = 0.029). Musical preference and participation 
in cultural activities were not found statistically significant.  
One of the explanations for higher levels of complexity perception among people 
with Bangladeshi cultural resources might be the language barrier and minimal 
years of schooling, because the majority of these people had a school certificate 
from their country of birth, which was not so useful in the UK.  Rothengatter (2005) 
argues that immigrants who receive education and training in their country of 
settlement can quickly de-ethnicize themselves and can achieve greater 
exposure to the mainstream culture, which has significant implications for their 
internalization of the tax system and their position on tax compliance. However, 
this does not happen to any great extent among the Bangladeshi community. The 
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British Bangladeshi community, including British-born Bangladeshis, believe that 
learning Bengali is very important if they are to maintain their Bangladeshi 
heritage and cultural roots (Blackledge, 2011).  To Bangladeshis, “Knowledge of 
the national language carries the features of the Bangladeshi/Bengali heritage,” 
which echoes Bourdieu’s view that “Heritage is reproduced through class and 
education,” (cited in Blackledge, 2011: 133). 
The answer to the question of why a segment of people who drew on Bangladeshi 
cultural resources felt that the tax system was not complicated or difficult might 
be that they had high social or economic resources. In his Forms of Capital, 
Bourdieu (1986) clearly mentions that cultural capital does not function in isolation 
but through a complex web of interaction with, at least, two other forms of capital: 
social and economic. Oliver and O’Reilly (2010:50), referring to Bourdieu, 
comment that, “The structure of social space cannot be understood through 
economic position or culture alone.” The next section looks at the social 
resources of the respondents.  
6.4.4 Social Capital and its Importance in Shaping Perception of Tax 
Complexity and Compliance 
 
The class background of immigrants is different from that of natives (Alina, 2011; 
Franceschelli,2013). Immigrants are alienated from the mainstream community 
and are often discriminated against when trying to access institutional support 
(Wang and Lo, 2000; Fix and Passel, 1994).  This section focuses on the social 
products, resources and rewards (Vryonides, 2009) that Bangladeshi small 
businesses revealed they enjoyed, the way these businesses networked with the 
broader society, and how they carried out their tax compliance activities. Looking 
at the tax compliance activities of immigrant communities from the perspective of 
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their social background is very important in the Bourdieusian perspective, as this 
is one of the three forms of capital in his theory.  
Analysis of interviews suggested that immigrant business owners viewed filing 
tax returns properly and paying due taxes in good time as a pre-condition for 
engaging with UK society. For tax advice, most respondents said that they went 
to a tax adviser from the Bangladeshi community so that they could discuss 
problems easily in their own language. To some people, the mosque and social 
gatherings like the annual Bangladeshi festival or other community festivals were 
the cultural places to discuss tax issues. Others took the view that involvement in 
political activities offered an appropriate background for such discussions. As a 
community, Bangladeshis like to live close to each other; but at the same time, 
they are divided into diverse socio-political groups based on their political beliefs 
and their region of origin in Bangladesh. The major Bangladeshi diaspora in the 
UK is from the Sylhet district of Bangladesh, and these people like to be among 
other Sylhetis. One respondent said, “You will see that every Bangladeshi wants 
to be identified by the Bangladeshi village where he was born or by the 
Bangladeshi political party he supports. You won’t find this among the Indian and 
Pakistani communities,” (BO04). Shams (2012) finds that Bangladeshi 
immigrants in the US are divided into various groups and maintain competing and 
contentious identity groups – for example, Bangladeshis, Bengali Muslims, 
Bengali Hindus, and so on – based on language, religion, region or political 
organization. Whether they are involved in political or other social organizations, 
they believe that to increase their sense of being included and recognized in the 
host society, they need to pay income tax.  
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However, Bangladeshis argue that social inclusion through the tax system is a 
two-way process. The tax system needs to be simple; but at the same time, 
immigrant communities should take steps to familiarize themselves with the UK 
tax system. One respondent commented that his children better access to, and 
acceptance in, UK society which, he believed, would make them better taxpayers. 
He stated: 
I live in UK society and I would not do anything to harm it. By paying taxes 
and being compliant to its tax system, I am trying to set an example to my 
children and to others. My children have a better idea of UK society and 
the law of the land. I am sure they will be better taxpayers. (BO07) 
However, there were respondents who felt that social isolation deprived them of 
formal or institutional social relationships. The cultural differences between them 
and mainstream British society created obstacles in accessing and engaging 
appropriately with the tax system. Eade et al. (2007) observe that the majority of 
Polish immigrants think that “whiteness” is an asset in British society, the lack of 
which causes racial discrimination for non-white and ethnic minorities. Non-
whiteness also indicates a cultural distance from the mainstream society.  Being 
isolated from UK society, some respondents perceived the tax system to be 
oppressive and to some extent exploitative of immigrant communities. One of the 
respondents commented, “The Bangladeshi community views the tax officers and 
the Revenue as ‘demons’ who are essentially out there to get people’s money or 
make their lives more difficult,” (Tax adviser, TA03). Respondents indicated they 
felt they were being dominated rather than being cooperated with when they dealt 
with the tax or other regulatory systems in the UK. They believed that such a 
feeling might have been due to ethnic identities, a feeling that was insidious and 
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imperceptible. A UK-born Bangladeshi small business owner had this to say to 
explain his perception of the tax system:  
In this society, we have a feeling of “We and They” or “Us and Them”. We 
feel the regulatory agency of the country in a different way from the way 
we felt back home. First, we are in a different country; second, the tax 
authority is a kind of regulator and they don’t pay us much attention. We 
contribute to the local economy, not to integrate with mainstream society 
but to prove our worth in that society. By contributing to society, we 
rationalize our stay in this country, or show some sense of belonging to 
the society. We are paying taxes because there is no other way but to pay. 
It’s not a choice but something we are compelled to do. (BO12)  
The feeling of domination as represented above is evocative of Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic violence, the invisible, unequal power relations in a society 
which can neither be blamed nor escaped (Oats, 2012). Ethnic minorities and 
“race” as a discourse are invisibly construed as a problematic norm in a white 
dominated society (Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016).  Shannon and Escamilla 
(1999) find that due to the asymmetrical power relationship, Mexican immigrants 
in the United states are subjected to symbolic violence, particularly their children 
in schools. According to Gracia and Oats (2012) the regulatory relationship 
between HMRC and taxpayers is characterised by aspects of symbolic violence 
in its erroneous interpretation of tax affairs and failure to provide to legal guidance 
and clarifications.  
Furthermore, the feeling of “we and they”, as described by the above respondent, 
is a common case among immigrant social groups (Anderson, 2013), and 
perhaps even more within the Bangladeshi community.  One respondent, in 
Blackledge’s (2011: 132) study of the Bangladeshi community in the UK, 
commented, “We may have become British Bangladeshis or British Indians, but 
we don’t have fair skin and we don’t mix with them.”  Putnam (2003 :166) argues 
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that in a country with high social capital, “Government is ‘we’, not ‘they’,” which, 
“reinforces government legitimacy”.  Therefore, to reduce this social gap and the 
power distance, respondents suggested that HMRC needed to make a 
friendly initiative towards the Asian community. To connect the small immigrant 
business community with the tax system, they suggested using social media and 
mobile apps, where everyone’s participation would be easy. Thomas (2017) 
argues that tax compliance may be less burdensome and simpler if user-friendly 
websites and mobile applications can be developed for taxpayers. He finds that 
some professional tax advisory firms in the US offer mobile-app-based services 
on record-keeping and deductions, while SARS (the South African Revenue 
Service) offers return preparation services. Mobile-app-based services have also 
been launched by the New Zealand IRS to help small businesses file GST returns 
(eGov, 2015), and in India to help taxpayers find the relevant tax rates (First Post, 
2017).  
Some respondents, beyond these power issues, identified a different dimension 
of tax system complexity.  They contended that the chronic welfare dependency 
of the Bangladeshi community resulted in massive tax compliance complexities. 
Small businesses needed to manage their tax returns in such a way that the 
welfare benefits continued. On this point, one respondent disagreed and 
commented that the abuse of social welfare was more a case with other 
immigrant communities and not with Bangladeshis. This observation could be 
supported from similar studies. In their study, Thatcher and Halvorsrud (2016) 
particularly mention Polish immigrants in Britain who generally work in low-paid 
jobs and abuse the welfare system. This welfare subculture also indicates social 
exclusion and explains the problematic tax compliance attitude that immigrants 
develop because of the harshness of their daily life experiences as immigrants 
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(McKenzie, 2016). The British attitude survey shows that people perceive benefit 
manipulation as a more serious offence than tax avoidance, and people from 
abroad, or immigrants, as claiming more benefits (Geiger et al., 2017). 
In a serious tone, one respondent stated: “If you speak community wise, I think 
we are more respectful of the UK tax system. Whatever you say, we pay tax, not 
like the … people, who don’t pay taxes at all, and come here to claim welfare 
benefits. I never say that I had a loss in my business,” (BO09). Comparing the 
UK system with the Bangladeshi tax system, where there was no social welfare, 
he commented that one might be reluctant to part with his hard-earned income to 
the tax authority in Bangladesh. But in a country of high social security like the 
UK, one should not mess up his tax payment.  
Some respondents stated that some Bangladeshi immigrant businesses were 
strongly connected with broader society, whilst some were operating just within 
the local community. Those with a broader network had better access to 
information about tax practice and were careful about tax compliance. This 
argument was found supportive when one small business owner who was also 
the president of a Bangladeshi community in a leading UK city, said that he was 
a centre point connecting community tax advisers and small businesses. This 
brought him a reputation in the community, and at the same time got him better 
personal support with his accounts and tax filing by his tax adviser. This reminded 
us of Bourdieu’s recognition that social connections are used to produce 
economic capital and a community association brings social capital (Swain, 
2003). Alm and Torgler (2011) argue that tax payment decisions are motivated 
by the social networks and social contexts to which a taxpayer or group of 
taxpayers belongs. Taxpayers with greater social identity and higher social 
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positions have a greater sense of guilt and more altruism, and thus demonstrate 
a higher moral attitude to tax. 
6.4.5 Volume of Social Capital and the Bangladeshi Small Business Community 
  
Following the Bourdieusian literature, two thematic questions were asked in the 
survey to measure the social capital Bangladeshi small businesses possessed 
and to see how, and with whom, they networked to solve tax compliance 
problems. This was important because, for Bourdieu (1986), individual habitus 
results from social interaction and the sharing of experiences with others.  The 
questions asked were: “Who do you consult when you have an income-tax-
related problem?” and, “Do you hold any of the following positions to serve your 
community?” The first question asked for responses on a five-point Likert- type 
scale and the second one asked for responses on a three-point scale. 
Table 6. 7 Thematic groups of survey questions on social capital with 
descriptive statistics  
N=101 
Concepts  Items Frequency  Percent  Mean S. D. 
Social network  Friends 16 15.8 2.17 0.970 
Accountants  69 68.3 
Community leaders 6 5.9 
Govt. offices 3 3.0 
Family members 7 6.9 
Community 
involvement  
Member or 
participant of a 
cultural organization 
21 20.8 2.31 0.797 
Member or 
participant of a 
social organization 
28 27.7 
Member or 
participant of a 
political 
organization 
52 51.5 
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According to Table 6.7, most respondents (68.3%), went to tax accountants to 
deal with income-tax-related problems. A handful of immigrant businesses talked 
to their friends and family members to understand tax problems. Almost none 
went to any government office to seek advice on tax matters. This finding is by 
the fact that due to a language and accent barrier, they avoided government 
offices, as some respondents revealed in the interviews. In this regard, Bourdieu 
(1991:109) comments, “The use of language… depends on the social position of 
the speaker, which governs the access he can have… to the official, orthodox 
and legitimate speech.” About the linguistic problems of Moroccan immigrants in 
France, Bourdieu (1999:61) comments that, “They speak roughly … and what 
they say is almost unintelligible.”  Thatcher and Halvorsrud (2016) find that even 
naturalized British citizens with a high position in society are open to 
discrimination. Similarly, other than serving the community through business, the 
majority of Bangladeshis like to serve the community by being a member or 
participant of a political organization (51.5%) followed by social organizations. A 
preference for cultural organizations is the lowest of the three.  Arguably, a 
community who group themselves according to home-country political and 
regional identity, as discussed in the previous section, are likely to be more 
interested in being associated with political or social organizations than cultural 
ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Table 6. 8 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system 
complicatedness according to their ownership of social capital  
 
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system complicatedness; % 
within column indicates aspects of social capital. 
 
Table 6. 9 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system difficulty 
according to their ownership of social capital  
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system difficulty; % within 
column indicates aspects of social capital. 
 
 
 
 
How complicated is the 
tax system  
accountants others  cultural 
organization 
 social 
organization 
 political 
organization 
complicated Count 47 23 17 16 37 
% within row  67.1% 32.9% 24.3% 22.9% 52.9% 
% within 
column  
68.1% 71.9% 81.0% 57.1% 71.2% 
uncertain Count 9 2 1 4 6 
% within row  81.8% 18.2% 9.1% 36.4% 54.5% 
% within 
column 
13.0% 6.3% 4.8% 14.3% 11.5% 
not 
complicated 
Count 13 7 3 8 9 
% within row  65.0% 35.0% 15.0% 40.0% 45.0% 
% within 
column  
18.8% 21.9% 14.3% 28.6% 17.3% 
Total  Count 69 32 21 28 52 
% within row  68.3% 31.7% 20.8% 27.7% 51.5% 
% within 
column  
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Is the tax system difficult?  accountants Others  cultural  
organization 
 social 
organization 
 political 
organization 
difficult Count 50 23 12 21 40 
% within row  68.5% 31.5% 16.4% 28.8% 54.8% 
% within column  72.5% 71.9% 57.1% 75.0% 76.9% 
uncertain Count 7 2 4 3 2 
% within row 77.8% 22.2% 44.4% 33.3% 22.2% 
% within column  10.1% 6.3% 19.0% 10.7% 3.8% 
not 
difficult 
Count 12 7 5 4 10 
% within row 63.2% 36.8% 26.3% 21.1% 52.6% 
% within column 17.4% 21.9% 23.8% 14.3% 19.2% 
Total  Count 69 32 21 28 52 
% within row  68.3% 31.7% 20.8% 27.7% 51.5% 
% within column  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 6. 10 Immigrant business owners’ perception of uncertain tax regulations 
according to their ownership of social capital  
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of uncertain tax regulation;  
% within column indicates aspects of social capital. 
 
Cross-tabulation between access to social capital and perception of tax system 
complicatedness suggested, as reported in Table 6.8, that of those who 
perceived the UK tax system to be complicated, 67.1% consulted a professional 
tax adviser to solve their tax problem as opposed to 32.9% who sought help from 
others, friends, offices or community leaders. Viewed according to involvement 
in community activities, those connected with political organizations found the tax 
system more complicated than did those involved in social and cultural 
organizations. Those who were confused about whether the tax system was 
complicated or not also had an adviser or involvement with political organizations. 
Table 6.9 suggests that respondents seeking support from accountants or 
involved in political organizations viewed the tax system as more difficult than 
those who sought support from other sources or were involved in cultural or social 
organisations. Also, immigrant businesses involved in cultural organizations or 
dependent on tax advisers were more uncertain regarding tax system difficulties.   
As regarded perceptions of uncertainties in tax regulations, the same pattern was 
Uncertain tax regulations accountants Others  cultural  
organization 
 social 
organization 
 political 
organization 
difficult Count 52 25 16 22 39 
% within row  67.5% 32.5% 20.8% 28.6% 50.6% 
% within column  75.4% 78.1% 76.2% 78.6% 75.0% 
uncertain Count 5 4 4 3 2 
% within row 55.6% 44.4% 44.4% 33.3% 22.2% 
% within column  7.2% 12.5% 19.0% 10.7% 3.8% 
not difficult Count 12 3 1 3 11 
% within row 80.0% 20.0% 6.7% 20.0% 73.3% 
% within column 17.4% 9.4% 4.8% 10.7% 21.2% 
Total  Count 69 32 21 28 52 
% within row  68.3% 31.7% 20.8% 27.7% 51.5% 
% within column  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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found, as reported in Table 6.10.  To sum up the findings, the perception of tax 
complexity or difficulties about the tax system or uncertainties regarding tax 
regulations was higher when immigrant businesses interacted with professional 
tax advisers than when they used other sources of support. The results of chi-
square tests of independence showed that there was a statically significant 
relationship between taxpayers’ social network (e.g., tax adviser or other) and 
perceptions of tax system complicatedness (χ2=1.073, DF= 2, p = 0.023), 
perceptions of tax system difficulty (χ2=0.607, DF= 2, p = 0.037) and perceptions 
of uncertain tax regulations (χ2=1.645, DF= 2, p = 0.051). Community 
involvement (e.g., involvement in cultural, social or political organizations) was 
not found statistically significant.  
To explain the reason why the tax system is perceived to be complex despite 
almost all immigrant businesses using professional tax advisers, De Vries (2007) 
comments that there is also a lack of trust between the professionals and 
taxpayers. In his study, he found that the Chinese and Dutch immigrants in New 
Zealand expressed difficulties in working with professional accountants and 
emphasised the need to improve trust in tax professionals. This study has 
critically examined the relevance and presence of trust in the tax professional-
taxpayer relationship (see section 7.4.1, para 6). In the factor analysis (section 
7.5.1) trust emerges as an important factor for tax client-taxpayer relationship, 
meaning dependence and confidence. Finally, section 7.5.5 further explains the 
different aspects of trust and cooperation in the professional tax practice.  
Some of them were also very suspicious about the value of the service they 
received from accountants.  One commentator in his study affirmed that his 
attitude to accountants was: “I take your advice with a grain of salt” or “the 
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accountant is the last one I get advice from,” (De Vries, 2007: 39 and 96). Again, 
through social networking, individuals collect information and knowledge about 
social customs (Hashimzade et al., 2014) that help them develop a positive 
attitude to tax.  It is through social interactions that people develop perceptions 
about other citizens’ attitudes to tax, as discussed in Section 3.4.1 on sociological 
perspectives on tax compliance.  
6.4.6 Economic Capital and Its Importance in Shaping Perception of Tax 
Complexity and Compliance  
 
Bourdieu states that economic capital is the most significant of all forms of capital 
and thus becomes the central issue in “nearly every transmutation of capital” 
(Veenstra, 2009: 65).  For immigrant businesses, it takes time to accumulate 
social capital in the destination country, and they have less cultural and economic 
capital than the native population (Bodvarsson and den Berg, 2013:274).   
Roberts comments (1995:42) that, “Immigrant groups differ widely in the nature 
and strength of their social ties, and these differences are likely to affect the 
pattern of their economic adjustments.”   Around this reality, this section deals 
with how economic circumstances influence the tax compliance attitude of 
Bangladeshi immigrant businesses.  
Analysis of interviews showed that an increase in business income meant an 
increase in family wealth, unless too much of it was soaked up by tax and national 
insurance contributions. Cash transactions, as discussed in Section 6.3.1, were 
a way of doing business that allowed businesses to reduce NICs and tax 
payments. There were several reasons for preferring cash transactions. First, 
most immigrant business owners had families back home who needed financial 
support for survival. “…The other money goes to Bangladesh. Here is one crucial 
issue relating to the immigrant communities. All Bangladeshi people have some 
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responsibility, property or engagement in Bangladesh,” (BO05). Second, due to 
isolation from mainstream society, most of them had a plan to return to 
Bangladesh and thus needed to buy properties there, as discussed in Section 
6.3.4.  
Third, state benefits were a regular source of income for most Bangladeshi family 
businesses. Higher tax payments might call into question their eligibility for state 
benefits. Liebig and Poza (2005) point out that migrants are usually less 
dependent on earned income, if there is scope for unearned income. Finally, 
showing a good business income made businesses more susceptible to tax audit 
and investigation. Some respondents were aggrieved that the only reason their 
tax return was audited was because of their good and steady income. The reality 
of cash-based transactions for employees was somewhat different. These people 
needed to be paid in cash so that they were not burdened by tax payments, so 
this was an evasive tax practice that gave them access to welfare benefits, as 
discussed in Section 6.4.4 above. A summary of business owners’ comments on 
cash transactions is presented in Table 6.11.  
Table 6. 11 Respondents’ observations on the need for cash transactions.  
 
Respondent  Profession/nature 
of business 
Comment  
Business 
Owner 
(BO02)  
Restaurant 
Business, 
Edinburgh   
If a worker gets £250 per month, around 1/3rd 
goes to the govt exchequer. So, we need to 
help them with the cash salary to keep them 
beyond the tax system. 
Business 
Owner  
(BO04)  
Washing and 
Laundry, London  
All our Bangladeshi staff want to get paid in 
cash, which creates a problem to tax 
compliance. You cannot get a Bangladeshi 
staff unless you pay them in cash.  
Tax Adviser 
 (TA04)  
Professional Tax 
Adviser, London 
It’s helpful for both the employees and 
employers to pay less hourly wages and 
mostly in cash to get rid of the tax 
complications and contractual hassles of 
holiday and other annual leaves. 
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Tax Adviser 
(TA07)  
Professional Tax 
Adviser, Exeter 
In family businesses, which are the general 
picture in much Bangladeshi business, there 
is a benefit to cash flow. 
Business 
Owner 
(BO13) 
Media and 
Printing, London  
Most of our transactions are carried through 
banks, but there are cash transactions also, 
for example, workers’ salaries.  
 
 
Tax Adviser 
(TA10) 
 
 
In-house 
Accountant, 
Grocery Business, 
Birmingham  
 
 
We receive a bundle of cash payments from 
our customers. I don’t know why they spend 
and earn in cash.  The Bangladeshi people 
like to pay in cash in the shop. 
Business 
Owner(BO15) 
 
Restaurant 
Business, Exeter  
We need to pay tax and NICs for our staff. 
We sell in cash to pay employee wages, 
which we don’t want to do but there is no 
other way.   
Tax Adviser 
(TA11) 
Professional 
Adviser, London  
I did not accept his accounts because he did 
not show his cash sales which is at least 30% 
of his total sales (referring to a Bangladeshi 
restaurant business) 
 
Table 6.11 reflects comments made by eight respondents who represented about 
one third of the total respondents. In a qualitative understanding of a problem 
however, the frequency of reference does not carry much significance.  It should 
be mentioned that the statements reported here did not deal with the legality or 
illegality of cash transactions,but indicated the socio-economic reality that 
complicated the tax compliance activities of immigrant businesses.  
 In the international tax literature, there have been many discussions of the cash 
economy of immigrant communities. For example, Halkias (2007:5) observes 
(quoted in Delgado, 2011:75) that, “The immigrant’s main goal in the country is 
to make money quickly to either send back home to his or her family or to take 
back with him or her upon returning home. Therefore, immigrants who are 
sojourners are inclined to seek self-employment in industries where start-up costs 
are relatively low, where competition is minimal, where capital can be raised 
quickly, and where assets can be easily liquidated and turned into cash.” Delgado 
(2011:88) comments, “In New York bodegas (small grocery stores) are often the 
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targets of crime because they are cash business and are very hard to see into 
from the outside (small windows are often covered with advertisements).” Burholt 
and Wenger (2003:63) found that British Bangladeshis, particularly those from 
the Sylhet district, send remittances to Bangladesh to help relatives in 
establishing and running businesses. Becucci (2017) had similar findings about 
Chinese ethnic businesses in the Prato, Italy, who sent income and wealth to 
China rather than spending it in Italy.  
However, some respondents disagreed with the above observations and 
provided a distinct perspective on the problem. They argued that cash-based 
transactions used to happen in the past.  With the widespread introduction of 
online banking and card transactions, the majority of business operations were 
now conducted through card payments. As an example, one respondent stated, 
“Card payments cannot be concealed. For example, the directors getting paid 
their meal allowances, travel, etc. has to be reported. No way to hide this,” 
(BO08).  Others claimed that most of their transactions were carried through 
banks. If there were any cash transactions, they were recorded properly in the 
account books.  One respondent confirmed that he would always avoid making 
cash transactions because cash transactions might increase tax liabilities. He 
stated, “If you pay by cheque, you can claim the expenses confidently in your tax 
file. But un-vouchered cash transactions are difficult to substantiate to the tax 
office,” (BO15).  This observation agrees with that of Morse et al. (2009), who 
comment that business taxpayers are more interested in showing income 
realized in cheques than in cash to appear genuine to the tax office.   
Other than the issue of cash transactions, there are tax professionals’ fees and 
record-keeping expenses (discussed in Section 6.3.1) which add to the tax 
250 
 
compliance costs of immigrant businesses. There is ample evidence that small 
businesses bear disproportionally higher tax compliance costs, which impacts 
their compliance behaviour severely (e.g., Hasseldine, 1995).   The perception of 
high tax compliance costs is not a concern of immigrant businesses alone: their 
tax advisers also admit it. “Small firms come to small advisers like us. They cannot 
go to well-established accountants because they cannot afford the costs. For cost 
reasons, small businesses cannot appoint an in-house accountant,” (Tax Adviser, 
TA01).  Respondents expressed concern that compliance costs could shoot up 
when there was litigation with the tax authority, because small accountants could 
not plead a difficult tax case.  
6.4.7 Volume of Economic Capital and the Bangladeshi Business Community  
 
In measuring the economic position of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses, two 
thematic questions were asked in the survey questionnaire: “What is the total 
capital of your business (in British Pounds)?” and “What is the ownership status 
of the house you live in?”  The answer options for the first question were 
categorized based on size of business capital, and for the second question based 
on ownership of the house they lived in.  
Table 6. 12 Thematic groups of survey questions on economic capital and 
descriptive statistics  
N=101 
Concepts  Items Frequency  Percent  Mean S. D 
Business 
capital  
below £100,000 71 70.3 1.62 1.289 
£100,000-£200,000 12 11.9 
£200,000-£300,000 8 7.9 
£300,000-£400,000 4 4.0 
£400,000-£500,000 2 2.0 
Above £500,000 4 4.0 
Home 
ownership   
Owned by you or 
your family 
75 74.3 1.26 0.439  
Rented 26 25.7 
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As shown in Table 6.12, most Bangladeshi small businesses (70.3%) had a 
business capital of less than £100,000. The mean value 1.62 for five capital 
categories indicates that the majority of the businesses had capital of less than 
£200,000. Only a very few, around 10%, had business capital of £300,000 or 
more. In terms of residential property ownership, the majority (74.3%) lived in 
their own or family-owned houses, and only a few lived in rented accommodation. 
Having a low business capital for Bangladeshi immigrants is understandable 
because most of them finance the business out of family savings or money 
borrowed from friends, since they have less access to formal capital market 
institutions (Basu and Altinay, 2002; Poutziouris, 2011). Bourdieu argues that 
relationships and social networks enable the exploitation of economic resources 
(Bourdieu, cited in Danes et al., 2008). The other aspect of economic capital is 
that the home ownership among Bangladeshi immigrant business is high, which 
is similar to home ownership among immigrants in other countries. In fact, home 
ownership among immigrants in many countries is found to be high.  Darden 
(2015) finds that in the 10 major metropolitan cities of the US, the home 
ownership rate of Asian communities is 59.7%, which is higher than that of 
immigrants from Africa and South America. 
Table 6. 13 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system 
complicatedness according to their ownership of economic capital 
 
How complicated is the tax system  below 
£100,000 
over 
£100,000 
Own Rented  
complicated Count 49 21 53 17 
% within row  70.0% 30.0% 75.7% 24.3% 
% within column  69.0% 70.0% 70.7% 65.4% 
uncertain Count 9 2 8 3 
% within row 81.8% 18.2% 72.7% 27.3% 
% within column 12.7% 6.7% 10.7% 11.5% 
not 
complicated 
Count 13 7 14 6 
% within row  65.0% 35.0% 70.0% 30.0% 
% within column 18.3% 23.3% 18.7% 23.1% 
Total  Count 71 30 75 26 
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% within row 70.3% 29.7% 74.3% 25.7% 
% within column   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system complicatedness; % 
within column indicates aspects of economic capital. 
 
 
Table 6. 14 Immigrant business owners’ perception of tax system difficulties 
according to their ownership of economic capital 
 
How difficult is the tax law  below  
£100,000 
over 
£100,000 
Own Rented 
difficult Count 48 25 54 19 
% within row 65.8% 34.2% 74.0% 26.0% 
% within column  67.6% 83.3% 72.0% 73.1% 
uncertain Count 7 2 5 4 
% within row  77.8% 22.2% 55.6% 44.4% 
% within column  9.9% 6.7% 6.7% 15.4% 
not difficult Count 16 3 16 3 
% within row 84.2% 15.8% 84.2% 15.8% 
% within column  22.5% 10.0% 21.3% 11.5% 
Total  Count 71 30 75 26 
% within row 70.3% 29.7% 74.3% 25.7% 
% within column  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of tax system difficulty;  
% within column indicates aspects of economic capital. 
 
Table 6. 15 Immigrant business owners’ perception of uncertain tax regulation 
according to their ownership of economic capital 
 
Uncertain tax regulations  below 
£100,000 
over  
£100,000 
Own  Rented  
agree Count 55 22 60 17 
% within row 71.4% 28.6% 77.9% 22.1% 
% within column  77.5% 73.3% 80.0% 65.4% 
uncertain Count 6 3 6 3 
% within row 66.7% 33.3% 66.7% 33.3% 
% within column 8.5% 10.0% 8.0% 11.5% 
disagree Count 10 5 9 6 
% within row 66.7% 33.3% 60.0% 40.0% 
% within column   14.1% 16.7% 12.0% 23.1% 
 Count 71 30 75 26 
% within row 70.3% 29.7% 74.3% 25.7% 
% within column  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: % within row indicates perceptions of uncertain tax regulations; 
 % within column indicates aspects of economic capital. 
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Seen from the perspective of respondents’ economic circumstances, as shown 
in Table 6.13, of those who viewed the tax system as complicated, the majority 
(70%) had business capital of less than £100,000, as opposed to 30% who had 
business capital of more than £100,000. Likewise, the majority of those who lived 
in their own property (75.7%) thought that the tax system was complicated for 
them, as opposed to those living in rented property. A comparatively higher 
percentage of respondents in those groups having less business capital or 
owning residential property were uncertain whether the tax system complicated 
or not. For the other two aspects of complexity, tax system difficulties and 
uncertain tax regulations, the pattern was same, as reported in Tables 6.14 and 
6.15. To a higher percentage of respondents having business capital of less than 
£100,000, or owning a house, the tax system seemed to be difficult or the tax 
regulations uncertain.  In sum, the tax system was proportionately more complex 
for those who had less business capital or those who owned a house. Immigrants 
business owners with higher business capital or living in rented accommodation 
felt the tax system to be less complex.  The results of chi-square tests of 
independence showed that there was a statically significant relationship between 
taxpayers’ business capital and perceptions of tax system difficulty (χ2=2.724, 
DF= 2, p = 0.053) and their home ownership and perceptions of tax system 
difficulty (χ2=1.634, DF= 2, p = 0.042). No other variables were found to maintain 
a statistically significant relationship.  
6.5 Chapter Summary  
 
In answering to the question: “Is Bangladeshi small family businesses’ 
engagement to the UK tax system problematic?”, this chapter has shown that for 
most immigrant taxpayers, book-keeping and accounting was a major tax 
compliance problem, mainly because of the cost and risk involved in failing to 
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maintain proper records. Immigrant businesses found it hard to determine taxable 
income and tax calculations and were puzzled about the expenses that were 
allowable or disallowable in tax returns. To them engagement with the UK tax 
system was a difficult job. Underlying their perception of tax complexity and 
compliance were their educational qualifications, whether earned in the UK or in 
Bangladesh, and their social networking to solve tax problems. Their perceptions 
of tax system complexity were also influenced by their home ownership status 
and amount of capital invested in the business.   
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CHAPTER VII 
Tax Risk Management and Tax Adviser-Immigrant 
Business Relationships 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is to answer the second main research question: 
“How is tax risk managed in the Bangladeshi small business community?” by 
answering to subsidiary research questions three, four and five. The third 
research question, as formulated in Section 5.2, was: “How do small Bangladeshi 
family businesses manage tax risk?” To answer the third subsidiary question, we 
shall examine the concept of tax risk in immigrant businesses in section 7.2, their 
sources and nature in section 7.3 and the way tax risks are planned and managed 
in section 7.4. The fourth question was: “To what extent do small Bangladeshi 
family businesses rely on tax advisers?” To answer the fourth subsidiary research 
question, we shall examine the extent to which immigrant businesses depend on 
professional tax advisers in section 7.5, and why they depend on them in section 
7.5.1. The focus will be on how important and realistic it is for immigrant 
businesses to depend on professional tax advisers. And the fifth subsidiary 
question was: “What is the nature of the relationship between the small 
Bangladeshi family businesses and their tax advisers?” To answer the fifth 
research question, we shall examine the power dynamics between the tax 
advisers and the immigrant business owners in section 7.6 and investigate 
whether this is a relationship of the domination of one by the other, or a 
relationship of cooperation and trust in sections 7.6.5. The chapter conclusion will 
be presented in section 7.8. 
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7.2 The Concept of Tax Risk in Immigrant Businesses   
 
Tax risk is a part of the general attitude to risk of an individual. Research evidence 
suggests that immigrant entrepreneurs usually take more risk in venture capital 
and new business formation when they have access to a social network in the 
country of destination (Umblijs, 2012; Gutiérrez and José, 2015).  The question, 
however, is – are tax risk and non-tax business risks perceived and managed in 
the same way by immigrant businesses? How do they vary in the new champ, 
the host society battlefield? According to Bourdieu’s social theory, an immigrant’s 
position in his or her new social space is determined by the economic and cultural 
resources he or she possesses and the experiences he or she has lived through 
(Burke et al., 2016), which in turn affect his or her aspirations, expectations, 
strategies and actions. 
Comments from the survey respondents affirmed that immigrant businesses 
viewed tax risk in the same way as they viewed other business risks. They 
believed that taking risks was a common feature of business society, but the risk 
must be measurable and tolerable.  In an unequal power relationship21 between 
immigrants and the tax authority of a destination country (Eliassi,2013), taking an 
undefined tax risk was likely to worsen their position in the tax field. The following 
comments from respondents can be cited:   
 We have been taking risks in a way that is tolerable and measurable. We 
have never been caught or questioned by the tax office because we are 
very confident of what we do and how we manage our tax risks. If you run 
                                                          
21 The native people usually occupy a subject position and the immigrants are assigned with an 
object position (Eliassi, 2013). This creates an unequal system of domination and subordination, 
the “hosts” being the dominant society and the “guests” the dominated. In this unequal distribution 
of power immigrants are forced to struggle more to access to the social resources.  
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a business, you must take risks, but you must look at the legal side of it. 
(BO04)  
If I make a profit of £100, 000 and my accountant suggests to me a legally 
acceptable action to reduce profit, then I will do it. But if HMRC is going to 
come and find a great hole in my tax file, I will not do it. I don’t feel 
comfortable with such practices. I need to have a comfort zone. What I 
have is good enough for me. I want to take risks on manufacturing, 
marketing or other matters, not on tax. (BO07)  
People want to pay tax, especially the under- or uneducated people, 
because we don’t have the expertise or skills to take risk and fool the tax 
office. (BO10) 
According to the economic perspective of tax risk analysis, as discussed in 
Section 3.5.1, people will take tax risks so long as it benefits them in generating 
tax savings. In other words, taking risk in tax returns is like making money through 
tax savings or creating more economic capital, provided that the risk-venture is 
successful. Dilley (2017) argues that taking risk, in the Bourdieusian sense, is a 
strategy for capital accumulation. However, economic capital accumulated 
illegally may mean a loss of honour, status or social prestige, i.e., symbolic 
capital. In Bourdieu’s theory of practice, all forms of capital are “convertible and 
reducible in the purest form to symbolic capital”, as Terjesen and Elam 
(2009:1105) put it. But the reverse may happen: economic capital earned 
deceptively may give rise to “symbolic liability” rather than “symbolic capital”. Tax 
risk, to the respondents, was unlike an investment risk, which might cause loss 
to the owner without too much damage to his social reputation. Being caught by 
the tax authority in a deceitful tax position would involve a much higher loss of 
social status. The above respondent, BO07, explained this further: “It is wise to 
spend money to avoid risk. I am a risk taker on my investment, not on all risks.  
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Taking a tax risk is not in my nature. I take business risks whenever profitable, 
for example, investing in new machinery.”  
On the other hand, there were respondents who questioned whether small 
immigrant businesses with a lowly social position had any prestige or honour in 
the eyes of native British people. They commented that of all the capitals, what 
immigrant communities lacked most in a foreign land was perhaps symbolic 
capital, i.e., legitimacy and power in the mainstream society.  
The rules of the game or, in this case, the rules of tax risk management, however, 
were somewhat different in the eyes of tax professionals. They thought that it was 
a fallacy that immigrant businesses were concerned about reputation or social 
acceptance, particularly when most of them were careless in maintaining tax and 
business documents, a common source of tax risk and complications (as 
discussed in Section 6.3.1). One tax adviser (TA05) observed, “The major tax risk 
centred on immigrant businesses is incomplete documentation. It is an inherent 
risk.” Engaging in improper data management, either due to lack of tax 
knowledge, i.e., cultural capital, or due to the inability to appoint an in-house 
accountant, i.e., economic capital, was ingrained in the tax practice of immigrant 
businesses as if it was their “second nature”; that is, they did it unconsciously.  
In a migrant habitus, where habitus-field disjuncture or “unsettledness” is more 
likely (Morrin, 2016; Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016), risk-taking by lack of proper 
documentation may become a normal practice. Bourdieu and Sayad (1964, cited 
in Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016) comment that people who move from one 
social structure to another experience hysteresis because of the conflict between 
field and habitus. And growing anxiety and insecurity in such an environment may 
cause risk-taking tendencies to become high. Drawing on Bourdieu, Hardy 
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(2008:144) notes that, “There is a high level of risk associated with hysteresis, 
since for a time at least, field struggles take place in the context of an unknown 
future.” Alternatively, there may simply be careless risk-taking behaviour 
unrelated to the unsettled fit between habitus and the social field the risk taker 
lives in. 
The limbo experienced by immigrant businesses during the hysteresis period 
may cause profound psychic impact on them and fragment their habitus – “torn 
by contradiction and internal division”, as Bourdieu describes it (Bourdieu 2004, 
quoted in Friedman, 2016). The uncertain conditions in their new life and “the 
emotional turmoil one might feel when habitus lags or tugs” (Morrin, 2016), may 
produce a search for non-compliance opportunities in tax returns, although the 
opposite may also happen. For example, Alm (2012) cautions that the effect of 
uncertainty on tax compliance is ambiguous. A risk-averse taxpayer will respond 
to uncertainty by being compliant, while a risk taker will underreport.  On the other 
hand, immigrants’ perception of tax risk is also associated with the cultural, 
political and economic milieu of the new society. For example, migrants, in 
countries like Peru or Thailand, where tax evasion is very high, and in countries 
like Canada or the US, where tax evasion is very low (Rethi, 2010), are likely to 
form different tax habitus.  
7.3 Sources and Nature of Tax Risks and Tax Advice in Immigrant 
Business Communities  
 
The relationship between social capital and tax management is a well discussed 
topic in the literature of ethnic entrepreneurship (Light and Bonachich,1988; Yuan 
et al. 2013). Immigrant businesses mainly look for support from within the 
community, due to their inability to establish access in the mainstream community 
(Levitt, 1995).  
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Interviews with the 15 business owners revealed that 11 of them had a 
Bangladeshi accountant or tax adviser, while only four had either a Pakistani or 
English tax accountant. One respondent (BO09) stated, “The accountants are 
ethnically of two kinds mainly: English and non-English. You will find that most 
Bangladeshi taxpayers go to Asian accountants.”  The similar class background 
of Bangladeshi small businesses and small advisers made it easier for the former 
to approach the latter than to approach a non-Bangladeshi tax adviser. Bourdieu 
(1984) finds that the social characteristics of audiences in the French theatre are 
in congruent with the characteristics of the actors performing in the theatre, due 
to the structural and functional homology of these two classes of people (Swartz, 
1997). Swartz (1997:130) clarifies this as, “Consumers in subordinate social-
class positions tend to select products produced by producers in the subordinate 
positions within the field of cultural production.” 
Likewise, all the 12 Bangladeshi tax advisers interviewed stated that around 70% 
of their tax clients were from the Bangladeshi community, with the rest from other 
ethnic communities, for example, Turkish, Pakistani, Indian or Jamaican. Only 
three tax advisers said that they had English clients along with Bangladeshi or 
other ethnic clients. The need for an ethnic accountant in immigrant communities 
is well-reflected in the following comments:  
Your accountant is your financial doctor; you should tell him everything. 
Although they maintain professionalism, sometimes we tell them that I 
need some cash withdrawal for personal purposes, so I am issuing a 
receipt for a business expense. Often, they don’t support issuing business 
expense receipts to meet personal expenses, but sometimes they also 
approve it. (BO08) 
We take the help of a professional tax accountant. We have an internal 
accountant who does only invoicing. All the tax issues, VAT returns, 
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income tax, all the PAYE, everything goes to my accountant across the 
road. (BO07) 
Most Bangladeshi accounting firms in London and Birmingham are situated in 
business centres run mainly by Bangladeshis, which makes it easy to find an 
adviser. Certain parts of London, for example, Whitechapel, and Birmingham, for 
example, Small Heath, are Bangladeshi and South Asian immigrant ghettos, 
neighbourhoods for dispossessed and deprived immigrants (Wacquant, 1999). 
The geographical proximity between tax advisers and tax clients indicates that 
Bourdieu’s field is not only a meta-arena of competition and conflict, it is often a 
spatial field. Dilley (2017:126) reminds us that, “Games may in practice be 
concentrated in a particular geographical location”. Bourdieu (1996) himself 
clarifies that agents may be classified by their location or by their place of 
permanent residence i.e., by land or by home, which is a way of occupying the 
social space. He notes (ibid:14), “Spatial distances on paper are equivalent to 
social distances.”  
The way tax risk activities are gauged and managed by immigrant communities 
rests on the nature of the economic activities they are engaged in. In other words, 
the tax risk habitus to some extent reflect the underlying economic activities of 
social agents. For example, an imbalance of income and expenditure in their tax 
return may force a business owner to be more creative, or even evasive, with 
their tax obligations and to look for an illegal risk management technique. Two 
examples from interviews make this clear: 
The Bangladeshi community taxpayers say they don’t have profit in their 
business, but they run posh cars, send their children to private school. 
They don’t show the real profit; thus, they do many terrible things in their 
expense claims. Often, they inflate the expense illegally. (BO01)  
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I don’t allow my accountant to touch my profit. Once the accounts are 
prepared I ask him whether there is any means to reduce the taxes further. 
In fact, he gives me some tips in advance on how to calculate the profit so 
that the tax is minimal. The only thing we want to make sure of is that I 
don’t pay the real tax. If someone wants to pay income taxes fully, he 
cannot survive, nor can he do business. The tax liability is huge. Moreover, 
once you pay tax, you need to pay tax every year, otherwise they will be 
suspicious of you. (BO11)  
The management of tax risk would be different in the above two cases, although 
the underlying reality or the motive of risk management is the same: accumulation 
of economic capital. With economic interest, the other aspect that influences the 
risk habitus is the historical origin of the Bangladeshi community in British society.  
Weber and Dawes (2005) suggest considering the life-trajectories or histories of 
individuals to explore the habitus of economic decision-making of social agents.  
As a community, the Bangladeshis started their journey as seaman in British 
ships in the 1940s. In search of better life, they used to disappear from the ship 
when it landed at any British land port (Choudhury and Drake, 2001; Basu and 
Altinay, 2002).  Their initial jobs were mostly cooking or cleaning. With mass 
migration in the 1970s and 1980s, the community grew (ONS, 2011), and self-
employment or small businesses (IPPR, 2007) emerged as their new social 
stance, i.e., “position taking” in the British social space. Rising to the field of 
business from low-paid jobs, or even no jobs, was difficult, since such changes 
were not systematic. The structural difference between jobs and business made 
their position in the field more uncertain. Bourdieu (1996:10) comments, 
“Comparison is possible only from system to system,” otherwise comparison 
“risks unduly identifying structurally different properties.”  
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The structure of tax legislation and its stability over time is another factor that 
shapes tax risk habitus.  If there are frustrations about tax regulation (PAYE, 
company tax, VAT), as many respondents indicated in the interviews, or 
complaints about tax administration, for example, “It’s panicking to meet a tax 
inspector,” taxpayers question the legitimacy of tax regulation and may be 
prepared to defy it. The approach the tax authority takes to ethnic communities, 
if they appear to be disbelieving or mistrusting of them, may affect the risk habitus 
of immigrants, as Berezin (2005:111) argues that, “Trust and risk are directly 
proportional to each other.”   If HMRC, the regulator and the site of power (Gracia 
and Oats, 2012; Kraal, 2013), imposes a tax burden without the consent or 
“comfort” of the immigrant communities, the latter will look for loopholes in the tax 
system. For example, the resentment that one respondent expressed at the one-
sided, non-consensual imposition of tax by HMRC – “Every time I sent them a 
letter and explanation, they did not listen to me and … they would go to court if I 
didn’t pay the demanded VAT” (BO03) – had led him into a new battle for power 
and existence. 
On the other hand, those who are satisfied with the tax system submit returns 
and pay taxes following the field doxa, i.e., accepting tax payment obligations 
naturally, without a sense of oppression and a tax evasion plan. If taxpayers view 
tax payment as a public duty to be “taken for granted”, it becomes a doxic practice 
through the illusio of practical sense or common sense (Morrin, 2016, Kraal, 
2013) to respect tax obligations.  
 
7.4 Tax Planning, Tax Risk Management and Power Relations  
  
In small businesses, the culture of tax planning is not strong, especially when it 
comes to producing a documented tax plan of the type often produced in medium 
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and large companies.  The survey responses to the question of whether 
immigrant businesses had a documented tax planning strategy showed that only 
39.6 % had a tax plan. Tax plan in this case means a formal or informal 
arrangement between the tax advisers and the taxpayers to keep them, i.e., 
taxpayers informed and aware of the potential tax changes. In a very few cases, 
these plans were written as a part of an overall business plan or tax consultancy 
agreement.   One tax adviser (TA08) commented, “We provide a business and 
tax plan to existing and new small businesses. In fact, the plan is on overall 
business issues which include tax matters.” In many cases, these plans are 
written, although they can be informal, as in the case of one small business owner 
(BO15), who stated that, “The tax accountant gave me some instructions which I 
keep in my dairy and try to follow. He also gives me guidance and warnings 
beforehand if there are any serious changes in legal matters, for example, 
changes in tax rates.”  Similarly, a tax adviser (TA06) said that he formally offered 
a “tax planning scheme” to help reduce taxes to a client who was curious to know 
the likelihood of the scheme getting him into trouble with the tax office. In reply, 
the tax adviser informed his client, “We are trying it for the first time, and don’t 
know the likelihood.”  About the nature and purpose of small business tax 
planning, one tax adviser (TA09) said the following: “Tax planning issues are 
there in family businesses. If the director of the company does not work anywhere 
else, he is eligible for an individual allowance of £10,600.  After this allowance, 
he should take the rest of the money as dividends, because money taken under 
PAYE is very expensive and not tax efficient. So, the tax planning here is to take 
a salary below £10,600 and take the rest as dividends. In that case, the dividend 
is not charged any tax if you pay the basic tax rate, having an income of £32, 000 
or less.”   
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There were however others who did not have any tax planning, formal or informal, 
written or verbal, for their businesses (for example, BO08 and BO09), which was 
acknowledged by a tax practitioner (TA11) with the comment, “For small 
businesses, we don’t have any planning.” The survey findings indicated that 
60.4% did not have any idea what a tax risk management or tax planning scheme 
meant.  Those having no tax risk planning thought that, “Small businesses have 
no capacity to take a tax risk; big businesses have big expectations and high tax 
risks,” (BO06).  This observation supports Bourdieu’s (2005) comment that large 
businesses define the field logic and occupy a prominent position in the economic 
and power structure of their society.  
In the interviews as well, most of the respondents commented that they did not 
have any written tax planning documents, but had had some informal discussion 
around the potential risk they might face with their return submission. However, 
they felt the need to have a tax plan. “We don’t have a documented tax plan.  I 
will ask my tax adviser about this. Every penny works. If I can reduce my tax bill, 
why not?” as one respondent (BO13) observed. This observation suggested that 
tax planning was equated with reducing the tax bill or increasing economic capital 
to some extent.   
Increasing economic capital, however, does not mean taking a tax advantages 
through deceitful tax planning but rather through efficient management of 
business wealth (Morris et al., 1997). For example, one tax adviser (TA09) 
commented that he would always advise his client “to take salary up to a certain 
amount and claim that as an expense rather than taking the whole as dividend”. 
OECD (2009) research on small business tax compliance shows that they, like 
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large businesses, have tax planning strategies to take advantage of lawful means 
of reducing tax bills.  The following observations from tax advisers can be noted:  
We provide clients with a tax plan. The planning is different, depending on 
the structure of the business. But usually the small businesses don’t like 
to have a plan, they don’t have many tax issues. In fact, the large 
businesses have too many tax issues and need to think in advance. (TA05) 
Tax issues come as a priority in the business plan, because they affect 
both the mortgage and finance matters of the business. Most businesses 
don’t know how much corporation tax is and how, through tax planning, 
corporation tax can be minimized. (TA08)  
In making tax planning and risk decisions, community relationships play a key 
role. In the Bangladeshi community, tax advisers know most of their clients and 
their business activities personally, which allows them to make a good tax plan 
or business assessment. In immigrant communities, the economic field is much 
narrower than that it is for native businesses (Levitt, 1995: Light and 
Bhachu,2004), but this may allow close social networking and easy tax and 
business decisions. This chimes with Bourdieu’s (1993) comment that in a 
familiar context, the very disposition of a social agent gives him a ‘feel for the 
game’ without much planning or conscious deliberation. A situation in which 
taxpayers and tax advisers come from and belong to the same social space and 
cultural background makes it easier for them to cope with each other and be 
effective in planning the tax strategies to undertake. The above tax adviser 
(TA08) continued:  
Since we work in the Bangladeshi community, we know more about the 
Bangladeshi community and [know] each of our clients well. And the 
clients also share everything with us, disclose many facts with us. But non-
Bangladeshi clients hide things from us. And we also don’t know much of 
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their business. Clients from other countries give us limited information; 
they don’t give us all the information. 
In supporting this statement, another tax adviser (TA09) added:  
We plan based on client type. We call it “know the clients first and their 
needs”. We cannot give a plan if we don’t know their income, expenditure, 
rents. 
A tax planning strategy, however, is not just a mutually settled document between 
business owners and tax advisers: it can often be a mechanism of control. A tax 
adviser may use tax planning or tax advice as a power tool to control taxpayers’ 
business and risk behaviour (Klepper et al., 1991; Sitalaksmi and Zhu,2013). 
Bourdieu suggests that power is central to establishing control and changing 
organizational identity by changing the distribution of capital (Oakes et al., 1998).  
The power relations between small immigrant businesses and other actors in the 
tax field, especially large businesses, play a crucial role in the creating of the 
former’s tax habitus. Some respondents argued that small firms, as compared 
with large companies, virtually evaded no taxes. These respondents believed that 
large companies maintained a strong alliance with the political party in power to 
manipulate the tax system in their favour. One respondent asked, “How many 
Bangladeshi curry businesses do you need to add up to be like Marks & Spencer? 
Because of large business tax evasion, we the small businesses are made the 
scapegoat.” Small businesses constitute 50% to 90% of the business field 
(Feltham et al., 2005; Rayney, 2013) in almost all countries, yet they have little 
or almost no control over the tax field.  
Small businesses cannot utilize their knowledge to benefit their own business, 
but only to struggle with the big businesses who dominate the field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). Dobbins (2005) notes that powerful firms can shape the 
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regulations to their own advantage, and all others must then obey them. The tax 
system, thus, is not class-neutral but reproduces class distinctions among 
taxpayers of different classes, which might be seen as one of the reasons for 
planning a tax scheme (Ebrahim,2003).  
Tax planning in immigrant businesses is not always about taking lawful 
advantages: it may be used as a device for intentional tax evasion.  There can be 
taxpayers who use tax planning to manage gaps in their accounts. To them tax 
planning and risk management are euphemisms for tax avoidance (Christensen 
and Murphy, 2004). For example, a small business owner (BO02) observed, “To 
manage the risk of cash transactions, we talk to accountants to help with this gap. 
They prepare the accounts in such a way that the gap is not disclosed.” This 
aggressive financial reporting is illegal, and falls within the area of tax evasion 
rather than tax planning. Although tax planning and tax evasion are two distinct 
concepts, drawing a sharp line between them can be difficult in some cases. 
Frank et al. (2008: 468) argue, “Aggressive tax reporting … through tax 
planning… may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion.” Denis Healy 
(cited in Halla 2011:399), a former Chancellor of Exchequer in the UK, strikingly 
phrased this idea as, “The difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is 
the thickness of a prison wall.” This situation of managing tax gaps through 
aggressive tax planning essentially constitutes the “rules of the game”, or the 
interaction, between immigrant businesses and their tax advisers. Gracia and 
Oats (2012:11) comment that, “Taxpayer clients, although motivated by financial 
gain (economic capital), thus engage with HMRC and their advisors in the 
possible game of tax avoidance. Such routines of practice naturalise the industry 
of tax planning and avoidance, and more controversially tax evasion.” 
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In this connection, it is pertinent to mention one respondent having an educational 
qualification earned from a prestigious UK university, who pointed to the 
widespread welfare dependence of Bangladeshi immigrants as a reason for high 
tax risk exposure. He argued that immigrant communities in the UK from 
developing countries entered into a new social field where the benefits they 
received from the tax system were often more than the contribution they made in 
the form of tax payments. This respondent (BO07) stated, “I think that the UK’s 
welfare system has to be reformed to stop evasive tax practices by some 
immigrants. The welfare abuse is more with the immigrant class.”  But at the same 
time, others thought that welfare benefits might make people more responsible 
towards the tax system, because, “Tax payments get much easier when you have 
state support,” (TA01). By state support, the respondent referred to the various 
public services, for example, health care, and the income support one gets in 
one’s old age.  
This divergence in opinions about the link between welfare benefits and taxpaying 
attitudes suggests that the group habitus of people of the same class may be 
similar, but there can be differences at the individual level habitus (Laine, 2014), 
which is termed homology in Bourdieu’s praxeology. It is very likely that immigrant 
businesses, although having a Bangladeshi background, may have different tax 
risk habitus because of disparities in the volume of capital they hold (Burke, 
2016).  
7.5 Dependence on Tax Advisers: How Does It Occur and To What 
Extent?  
 
Is dependence on tax advisers a habit or a necessity? What makes such 
dependence a reality in small business taxation? This section deals with why 
immigrant businesses depend on tax advisers and explores the extent of such 
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dependence. It will examine whether such dependence is a one-time or a 
permanent phenomenon in small business tax practice. Of the sampled 101 
immigrant businesses, 82.2% had a hired or contractual tax adviser to manage 
tax compliance, 11.9% had an in-house accountant, and a minority (6.9%) had 
both. Binomial test statistics achieved by combining these three categories into 
two – either having an appointed or an in-house tax adviser – showed that there 
was a statistically significant difference between the group of immigrant 
businesses who depended on an appointed adviser and those who depended on 
an in-house adviser (p = 0.000).  
Survey findings indicated that uncertainty in the tax system was one of the 
reasons for depending on tax advisers. 76.3% of respondents said that they 
sought tax advice to resolve the uncertainties in tax legislation.   
Table 7. 1 Dependence on tax advisers and perception of uncertainty about 
income tax regulations   
 
 
Have a hired or in-
house tax adviser?  N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum 
of 
Ranks 
Test statistics*  
Seek advice due to 
uncertainty about 
income tax 
regulations? 
Hired tax adviser  
82 48.16 
3949.
50 
Mann-Whitney 
U=437.50, 
P=0.011 In-House tax 
adviser 
12 42.96 
515.5
0 
Total 94   
*Grouping variable: Hired or in-house tax adviser.  
A Mann-Whitney U Test, as reported in Table 7.1, was conducted to see which 
groups of immigrant businesses, those having a hired or contractual tax adviser 
(group = 1) or those having an in-house one (group = 2), perceived higher 
uncertainty in the tax regulations. The mean rank values showed that those who 
had a contractual tax adviser (mean score = 48.16) had a higher perception of 
uncertainty than those having an in-house tax one (mean score = 42.96). Test 
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statistics showed that the level of uncertainty in the tax adviser group was 
statistically significantly higher than in the in-house tax accountant group (U = 
437.5, p = 0.011).  
One way to understand the wider meaning of dependence on professional tax 
advice by business owners is to explore the various reasons for appointing a tax 
adviser. Survey results suggested that the principal reason was the confusion 
about filling out the tax return (30.7%), followed by language difficulties in tax 
legislation (25.7%). A handful of respondents commented that they depended on 
tax advisers because they were busy with business or didn’t understand tax laws 
because of their complex structures. Chi-square test results suggested that there 
was no statistically significant difference (Chi-square = 2.485, P = 0.478) between 
the proportions of immigrant businesses who depended on tax advisers because 
of confusion about tax returns, because of difficult tax legislation, or because they 
were busy with their business. 
Table 7. 2 Reasons for dependence and choice of tax advisers  
 
 
Reason for dependence on tax adviser  
Total 
Fisher’s 
exact test  
tax return 
confusing 
busy 
with 
business 
don't 
understand 
tax law 
tax 
language 
is difficult 
Tax 
help  
in-
house 
Count 1 5 3 3 12 Chi-
Square = 
5.317, 
DF = 3, 
P = 0.035  
% 
within 
row 
8.3% 41.7% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% 
within 
column 
3.2% 25.0% 12.5% 11.5% 11.9% 
tax 
adviser 
Count 30 15 21 23 89 
% 
within 
row 
33.7% 16.9% 23.6% 25.8% 100.0% 
% 
within 
column 
96.8% 75.0% 87.5% 88.5% 88.1% 
Total Count 31 20 24 26 101 
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% 
within 
row 
30.7% 19.8% 23.8% 25.7% 100.0% 
% 
within 
column 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 7.2, with its cross-tabulation between type of tax advisers, in-house or 
contractual professional tax adviser, and the reasons why they depended on 
them shows that being busy with business was the major reason for appointing 
an in-house accountant (41.7%). For this group of respondents, it was also an 
inability to understand tax laws and difficult tax languages that caused them to 
depend on tax advisers. Those who went to a professional tax adviser thought 
that confusion about their tax return (96.8%) was their major concern, followed 
by difficult tax language (88.5%). To test whether dependence on tax advisers 
was independent of the type of tax-adviser, a Fisher’s exact test was conducted22. 
Test statistics showed that there was a statistically significant difference between 
the type of tax advisers they choose and the reasons they needed them (Chi-
square = 5.317, DF = 3, P =0 .035).  
A further question that it was hoped would reveal the level of dependence was to 
explore how seriously business owners took the recommendations or 
suggestions of their tax advisers.  On the question: “How seriously do you take 
the recommendations of your tax adviser?” 39 out of 101 respondents reported 
that they would take the suggestions of tax advisers very seriously. This 
seriousness indirectly indicated the level of confidence in, or dependence on, 
their tax adviser. There were some respondents, however, who indicated that 
                                                          
22 Cross-tabulation showed that there were four cells having an expected frequency of less than 
five. As a result, Fisher’s exact test was more suitable than a chi-square test.  
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they did not take the recommendations seriously, which perhaps pointed to 
disagreements or lack of confidence in the tax advice.  
Table 7. 3 Dependence and acceptance of tax advisers’ recommendation    
 How seriously do you 
take the 
recommendation of 
your tax adviser?  N 
Mean 
Rank 
Test statistics*  
Reason for 
dependence on tax 
adviser 
Very seriously 39 55.63 Chi-Square = 
9.198, 
DF = 4, 
P =0 .056 
Seriously 27 46.35 
Uncertain 12 32.13 
Not seriously 16 25.72 
Not seriously at all 7 14.71 
Total 101  
*Grouping variable: how seriously the recommendations are taken  
 
As the Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 7.3 shows, there was a statistically significant 
difference in the acceptance of recommendations made by tax advisers in relation 
to the various aspects of service business owners sought from them, (Chi-Square 
= 9.198, P =0 .056), with a mean rank score of 55.63 for taking recommendations 
very seriously, 46.35 for taking recommendations seriously, 32.13 for being 
uncertain, 25.72 for not taking recommendations seriously and 14.71 for not 
taking them seriously at all.    
7.5.1 Flow of Tax Advice and Dependence Mechanism  
 
Delving into the interview excerpts revealed several concepts, as mapped in 
Figure 7.1, that reflected how dependence on tax advisers grew in the everyday 
business of immigrant communities. Whether or not to depend on a tax adviser 
initially reflected being influenced by the legal and technical difficulties faced in 
making a tax return and the account-keeping process. The level of technical 
difficulty, however, depended on the nature of the business: for example, 
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complexities in a driving business were likely to be different from those in a 
catering business. 
 
Figure 7. 1 Dependency framework in ethnic tax practice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Candidate’s own figure created from interviews with respondents 
 
A concomitant reason for dependence is the busyness of business life for the 
main man in a family business, where most activities are planned and managed 
by one person or a handful of people.  Despite the busyness of business life, and 
the legal difficulties, a business owner could attempt to do a tax return on his or 
her own if there were sufficient free advisory services on tax and accounting along 
with helpline facilities. The following observations are worth noting:  
 
I have some accounting knowledge, based on my university 
degree, and so does my wife, but still we like to go to the 
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accountant. Because we are busy, it’s difficult to prepare the 
accounts. (BO15) 
 
It is very difficult to communicate with HMRC as the call centre 
staff are not well trained in accounting or tax law. Previously, 
senior officers were assigned to answer complex tax inquiries 
and investigation. Now they are mostly replaced by tax collectors 
who do not understand tax calculations. (TA03) 
 
As shown by the comment of the above tax adviser (TA03), it is not only the 
taxpayers, but often the advisers, who call the call centre for advice. It might be 
because they lack current information about a tax code or need to talk on behalf 
of their client. Furthermore, some respondents stated that the tax administration 
not only imposed tax on them: it also expected that they should learn tax and 
accounting or pay an accountant to work for them. Criticizing this, one respondent 
(BO09) stated, “In fact, HMRC does not want to make the tax accountants 
unemployed. If the tax law was simple, many tax accountants would lose their 
job. It would create a further burden on the economy.” Supporting this, a 
professional tax adviser (TA12) commented that many accountants had taken up 
this profession because they could not find anything else to do.  
 
 Respondents claimed that dependence on accountants often came naturally. “I 
go to an accountant, because they are there,” (BO09). It became a tendency, an 
inclination or a propensity programmed into their body and mind to seek tax 
support, perhaps because of a belief in the symbolic power of the tax advisory 
profession. The source of such symbolic power in tax advice is the advisers’ 
cultural capital, i.e., their knowledge of accounting and taxation. Ebrahim (2003: 
17) notes that with the symbolic power, “the ‘expert’ enters, as an individual or 
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group that is socially sanctioned (e.g. doctors, lawmakers, teachers, development 
consultants), to determine what is right and what is wrong.” 
 
Referring to Bourdieu, Christoforou and Laine (2014:8) comment that inequality 
of capital is the source of power, and in economic decision-making, “technical 
and power issues can be very hard to disentangle.”  Bourdieu clarifies that any 
capital, cultural or economic, can turn into symbolic capital when it is recognized 
and valued in society (Lebaron, 2014), and “symbolic productions possess the 
ability to exercise another kind of power”, i.e., symbolic power (Paolucci, 
2014:64).  In Bourdieu’s (1992:170) own words, “Symbolic power, a subordinate 
power, is a transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form 
of the other forms of power.”  
Absolute dependence on the symbolic power of tax advisers was well manifested 
in the comment of one respondent (BO06), who stated that, “When I have a 
problem in tax payment, I always think that that is solvable by tax advice or 
planning and my accountant can help me with that.” Respondents thought that 
small businesses depended on advice as a matter of routine, and since giving tax 
advice was their business or profession, advisers were likely to have professional 
expertise. Some others thought that dependence on accountants came from the 
trust taxpayers placed in them. In the interviews, trust emerged as an important 
ingredient that held the client-tax professional relationship together. One 
respondent (BO13) observed, “I have a great trust in my accountant. I feel that I 
should learn the tax law, but there is an accountant who helps me. I wish I could 
have an accountant of my own for my business.” The role of trust was also 
highlighted with expressions like “I believe” (BO04) or “I depend” (BO12) used by 
the respondents in describing their relationship with their advisers (see Section 
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7.5.5 for further discussions on trust and cooperation in the tax professional-client 
relationship).   
Immigrant businesses with higher economic capital, measured in terms of 
business capital, tended to depend more on in-house tax advisers than on a hired 
one, because of the volume of business activities or their financial ability to afford 
one. The exploratory interviews suggested that three business owners had an in-
house accountant, in addition to hired tax advisers who would finalize the tax 
return.  All of them had future plans to employ a dedicated tax accountant who 
could manage all tax and accounting functions without the need of an outside tax 
adviser.  A business with an in-house adviser would not only dominate in tax 
matters, in comparison to those depending on hired advisers, but would also 
enjoy a higher possibility of increased tax savings and after-tax return on capital. 
Seen from the Bourdieusian perspective, having an in-house tax accountant 
could be equated with the organizing of legal and technical strength, or 
domination, in the tax field by economically solvent businesses. Too much 
dependence on external accountants might cause loss of business secrets and 
exposure to business competition. In the Bourdieusian philosophy, accumulation 
of resources and attainment of domination require a fine-balancing between 
them.  
Alternatively, one might argue that smaller amounts of economic capital, i.e., the 
cost of maintaining a fully-fledged tax and accounting section, were sacrificed by 
some businesses to earn higher amounts of economic, and/or perhaps cultural, 
capital (i.e., reduced external dependence might mean increased tax knowledge 
or cultural capital). Tax knowledge can be a rich source of cultural capital for 
business. This is because knowledge and technology, tax knowledge and tax 
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software included, are important parts of business culture which enable 
businesses to take advantage in a competitive market. Jackson (2012:106) 
argues that, “A business can invest in cultural capital in much the same way it 
can invest in reputational capital, human capital and other types of capital.” For 
example, a business owner (BO07) commented, “My aim is to employ a 
dedicated, educated accountant in the firm so that they can look at everything. If 
we employ someone, I reckon he will help with the tax return. It would be 
beneficial for the company. If I pay him 15 to 20 grand more, he will be doing 
other jobs as well.”  But financially weaker businesses cannot afford an in-house 
adviser or a top-ranking adviser and pay huge money (fees). Therefore, the 
financial strength of the business matters a lot when it comes to deciding whether 
to depend on a tax adviser working on a contract or hire a permanent one and 
sustain this relationship in the long term. 
Through mutual dependence between immigrant businesses and tax advisers, 
there occurs a transmutation of capital. The tax advisers, the holders of embodied 
cultural capital such as educational credentials in accounting and tax services, 
convert this into economic capital in exchange for fees.  A review of the academic 
and professional qualifications of the 12 tax advisers, as reported in Table 7.4, 
shows that all of them have professional or academic qualifications in taxation 
and accounting.  
Table 7. 4 Professional qualifications of tax advisers 
 
Professional qualification  Country 
degree 
earned 
No of 
participants  
Field of practice  
Professional degree (ACCA, FCA) UK  3 UK and 
Bangladesh  
Academic degree (business, 
accounting) 
UK  3 UK only  
Professional degree (CA, FCMA) Bangladesh  4 UK only  
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Academic degree (Business, 
accounting or others) 
Bangladesh  2 UK only  
 
 
All the tax advisers practised only in the UK, and mostly within the Bangladeshi 
or other immigrant communities, except for the three professional tax advisers 
who had earned their qualifications in the UK.  The amounts of cultural capital 
described above had been earned using economic capital, and now they were 
being used to obtain economic returns, the usual process of conversion and 
reconversion of various capitals through economic capital (Veenstra, 2009).  
7.6 Nature of Immigrant Business-Tax Adviser Relationship  
 
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate the nature of the relationship 
between business owners and tax advisers.  A critical question here was how to 
measure different forms of influence or power relations, if any, between the two 
parties.  To answer this question, first the survey questionnaire on the dimensions 
of these relationships was analysed; and later this information was interpreted in 
conjunction with the interview data.  
The survey questionnaire was analysed using factor analysis. Factor analysis is 
a statistical technique that helps with simplifying a correlation matrix by identifying 
the variables with high correlations from a complex set of variables (discussed in 
Section 5.8.2).  Applying this technique, a concept is measured by assessing its 
underlying dimensions. Highly correlated items are considered to have a single 
dimension. To measure participants’ perception of various aspects of influence 
and power in the taxpayer-tax professional relationship, 11 questions were 
asked. To ensure the conciseness of the questionnaire, respondents were asked 
to respond by indicating their agreement or disagreement with different 
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dimensions of formal or informal pressure they might face from their tax advisers. 
The questions and their measurement scales are shown in Table 7.5. 
Table 7. 5 Survey questions and measurements of variables for factor analysis   
SL 
No. 
Questions/variables  Symbols  Measurement  
1 How often does your tax adviser 
update you about risks in tax 
activities? (Survey Q 26) 
RiskUp Very often – Often – Uncertain 
– Not often – Not very often 
 
2 Have you ever been agitated with your 
tax adviser for any of his tax 
decisions? (Survey Q 27) 
AgtAcc Yes – No  
3 How easily can you consult with your 
tax adviser to discuss a tax 
issue?  (Survey Q 28) 
ConAcc Very easily – Easily – 
Uncertain – Not easily – Not 
very easily 
4 Do you feel pressurised by your tax 
adviser to undertake risky tax 
activities? (Survey Q 29) 
PressAcc Yes – Uncertain – No  
5 How trustworthy is your tax adviser 
regarding your income tax 
management (filing, tax payment 
etc.)? (Survey Q 30) 
TruAcc Very trustworthy – 
Trustworthy –   Uncertain – 
Not trustworthy – Not 
trustworthy at all 
6 To what extent do you agree that you 
seek tax advise due to uncertainty 
about income tax regulations? 
(Survey Q 31)  
UncReg Highly agree – Somewhat 
agree – Uncertain – Disagree 
– Fully disagree   
7  How often do you feel impressed at 
the level of professional knowledge 
your tax adviser has? (Survey Q 32)   
ImpAcc Almost always – Sometimes – 
Once in a while – Rarely – 
Never  
8 Do you think that it is important for a 
tax adviser to have a professional tax 
license? (Survey Q 33) 
ProLic Yes – No  
9 How satisfied are you with your tax 
adviser? (Survey Q 34) 
SatsAcc Highly satisfied – Satisfied – 
Uncertain – Not satisfied – Not 
satisfied at all   
10 Do you think that your tax adviser has 
sufficient knowledge of tax practice?  
(Survey Q 35) 
KnowlAcc Yes – No 
11 To what extent does your tax adviser 
have an influence on your tax 
decisions? (Survey Q 37) 
InflAcc Major influence – Some 
influence – Uncertain – Little 
influence – No influence 
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7.6.1 Factor Analysis  
 
A principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the 11 items with oblique 
rotations. The correlation matrix, Table 7.6, shows the pattern of the relationships 
between the variables. There is no variable that does not correlate with any other 
variables.  The highest correlation is .594, and the lowest .001. There is no 
correlation coefficient of .90 or above between any variables; thus, there is no 
problem of multicollinearity. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant at 
p =0 .000 or p=0. 050. 
Table 7. 6 R-Matrix of factors  
 
 
The determinant for the correlation table is 0.026, which is greater than the 
necessary value of 0.00001 (Field, 2010). To ensure the sampling adequacy of 
the data, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was verified and, at KMO = 0.583, this 
is mediocre according to Hutcheson and Sofroniou’s (1999) standard. The 
Bartlett’s measure is significant, at p < 0.001, suggesting that the correlation 
  ProLic AgtAcc ConAcc PressAcc ImpAcc SatsAcc KnowlAcc UnReg InfAcc RiskUp TruAcc 
Correlation  ProLic  1.000 .194 .001 .164 .231 .066 .144 .040 -.064 .149 .231 
AgtAcc  .194 1.000 -.073 .266 -.310 -.255 -.340 .021 -.052 -.109 -.156 
ConAcc  .001 -.073 1.000 -.051 .147 .240 .044 .106 .872 .010 .111 
PressAcc  .164 .266 -.051 1.000 .074 -.020 -.133 .086 -.054 .244 .160 
ImpAcc  .231 -.310 .147 .074 1.000 .563 .470 -.038 .206 .103 .322 
SatsAcc  .066 -.255 .240 -.020 .563 1.000 .594 .105 .251 .131 .285 
KnowAcc  .144 -.340 .044 -.133 .470 .594 1.000 -.029 .078 .142 .277 
UnReg  .040 .021 .106 .086 -.038 .105 -.029 1.000 .085 -.029 -.096 
InfAcc  -.064 -.052 .872 -.054 .206 .251 .078 .085 1.000 -.026 .141 
RiskUp  .149 -.109 .010 .244 .103 .131 .142 -.029 -.026 1.000 .552 
TruAcc  .231 -.156 .111 .160 .322 .285 .277 -.096 .141 .552 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) ProLic  .026 .498 .051 .010 .254 .076 .345 .264 .069 .010 
AgtAcc  .026  .234 .004 .001 .005 .000 .418 .304 .138 .059 
ConAcc  .498 .234  .307 .071 .008 .333 .145 .000 .462 .135 
PressAcc  .051 .004 .307  .232 .420 .093 .196 .295 .007 .055 
ImpAcc  .010 .001 .071 .232  .000 .000 .352 .019 .152 .001 
SatsAcc  .254 .005 .008 .420 .000  .000 .148 .006 .096 .002 
KnowAcc  .076 .000 .333 .093 .000 .000  .389 .220 .079 .002 
UnReg  .345 .418 .145 .196 .352 .148 .389  .199 .388 .171 
InfAcc  .264 .304 .000 .295 .019 .006 .220 .199  .397 .080 
RiskUp  .069 .138 .462 .007 .052 .026 .019 .388 .397  .000 
TruAcc  .010 .059 .135 .055 .001 .002 .002 .171 .080 .000  
Determinant = 0.026 
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matrix is significantly different from an identity matrix. The correlation matrix 
shows the correlation between the variables, which is the starting point for 
understanding and performing factor analysis. If the variables are not correlated 
at all, then the off-diagonal components of the matrix will be zero and such a 
matrix is called an identity matrix. If we derive an identity matrix, this will suggest 
that the variables are independent of one another, and thus we cannot expect 
clusters of variables that measures similar things. The difference between the 
correlation matrix and the identity matrix in our case indicates that the variables 
are correlated, and they form a cluster (Field, 2010). The individual KMO values 
are produced in the diagonal of the anti-image matrix in Table 7.7. None of the 
values is below 0.50 and the off-diagonal values are small. Thus, all the variables 
can be included in the factor analysis. 
 
 
Table 7. 7 Anti-image Matrix   
 
Four factors have eigenvalues over 1 and they account for 67.08% of the 
variance.  Factor one has an eigenvalue of 2.827, which accounts for 22.35% of 
the variance. Factor two explains 16.72% (eigen value = 1.840), factor three 
explains 14.33% (eigen value = 1.576) and factor four explains 10.33% of the 
variance (eigen value = 1.136). 
 
ProLic AgtAcc ConAcc PressAcc ImpAcc SatsAcc KnowAcc UnReg InfAcc RiskUp TruAcc 
Anti-
image 
Covaria
nce 
ProLic .763 -.234 -.077 -.015 -.175 .090 -.099 -.080 .090 -.019 -.110 
AgtAcc -.234 .689 .053 -.206 .173 -.036 .117 .045 -.058 .072 .046 
ConAcc -.077 .053 .522 .003 .047 -.044 .039 -.010 -.190 -.029 .029 
PressAcc -.015 -.206 .003 .794 -.118 .003 .098 -.096 .014 -.153 -.041 
ImpAcc -.175 .173 .047 -.118 .533 -.194 -.059 .083 -.061 .070 -.057 
SatsAcc .090 -.036 -.044 .003 -.194 .788 -.237 -.117 .012 -.010 -.042 
KnowAcc -.099 .117 .039 .098 -.059 -.237 .547 .045 -.017 -.021 -.031 
UnReg -.080 .045 -.010 -.096 .083 -.117 .045 .928 -.012 -.003 .093 
InfAcc .090 -.058 -.190 .014 -.061 .012 -.017 -.012 .515 .041 -.051 
RiskUp -.019 .072 -.029 -.153 .070 -.010 -.021 -.003 .041 .640 -.311 
TruAcc -.110 .046 .029 -.041 -.057 -.042 -.031 .093 -.051 -.311 .578 
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Table 7. 8 Pattern Matrix     Figure 7. 2 Scree plot of factors  
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring; Rotation Method: Oblimin with 
Kaiser Normalization. Cut off (≥0.20) for inclusion of an item as a factor.   
 
Table 7.8 shows factor loadings after rotation.  Given that we hypothesized that 
the items might be correlated, we chose oblique rotation to run the factor analysis. 
The first factor consists of three items or variables: being impressed with the 
professional knowledge of an adviser; being satisfied with the adviser’s service; 
and the tax adviser’s standard of professional knowledge. The factor loadings 
range from -.703 to .749 for these three variables. The questions that are highly 
loaded on factor one relate to the different aspects of professional standards and 
the knowledge of the tax adviser; therefore Factor 1 can be labelled the factor 
representing adviser’s tax knowledge.  
The second factor consists of two items which refer to the ease of consultancy 
and professional licencing status of the taxpayer, with factor loadings of -.922 and 
-.968 respectively. These items relate to aspects of support available from a tax 
adviser, which we may label as cooperation and professional esteem. The third 
factor consists of three items, agitation, influence and pressure. The factor 
                            Factor 
 1 2 3 4 
ImpAcc .703    
SatsAcc .759    
KnowlAcc .745    
ConAcc  -.922   
ProLic  -.968   
AgtAcc   .622  
InfAcc   .426  
PressAcc   .449  
RiskUp    -.767 
TruAcc    -.681 
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loadings for these items range from .449 to .622. The items that load highly on 
factor three relate to different aspect of power exercised by tax professionals, 
which we may label coercive pressure. The fourth factor consists of two items, 
updating tax risk and level of trust of the tax adviser. The factor loadings of these 
range from -.681 to -.767. The items that load highly on factor four relate to 
aspects of trust and dependence on a tax adviser, which we may label 
dependence. The scree plot indicates the number of factors to retain, and since 
it has four points of inflection, which matches our factor pattern matrix, as shown 
in Table 7.8, all four factors are to be retained.23  
These four factors to some extent mirror Freidson’s (1986) findings on the 
professional-client relationship.  According to Freidson (1986), in a formally and 
legally structured relationship, as in that between professionals and clients, there 
can be four possible interactions. First, a disagreement between them, a situation 
where the client may withdraw from the service and the professional loses control 
over them. Second, the client’s service expectations can only be met by 
conforming to the professional’s suggestions, so the client acquiesces to the 
instructions of the professional. Third, the desire of each of the parties conforms 
to that of the other, whether their underlying logics are the same or different. 
Fourth, the client’s expectations differ from the professional’s, but the client is 
persuaded by the professional.  In the next section, we shall explain the four 
factors of the relationship with the help of the interview data.  
                                                          
23 Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales on factor 1 was .739, for factor 2 it was .621, for factor 3 it 
was -.696 and for factor four it was .710.  The reliability for all the factors was good. However, the 
negative alpha value for factor three indicates that items in this subclass were reverse-phrased. 
Field (2010: 675) notes, “For factor analysis, this reverse phrasing doesn’t matter, all that happens 
is you get a negative factor loading.” 
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7.6.2 Cluster analysis of Interviews   
 
To identify the codes, words, phrases or sentences expressing ‘power’, ‘control’, 
‘questions’, ‘advice’, and ‘influence’ in the interviews were selected first. These 
were then categorised and summarized to group them into similar classes or 
clusters. The categorization of themes was organized around the major aspects 
of the taxpayer-tax adviser relationship, which could be supportive or exploitative 
in nature.  In the subsequent phase, these themes were explored to understand 
the overall pattern of the relationship.  
As the dendogram in Chart 7.1 illustrates, the first cluster consists of four related 
nodes, managing tax risk, mistakes and agitation, mutuality of control and 
informal tax advice, all of them indicating aspects of uncertainty in tax risk 
management. Interpretation of these nodes reveals that small businesses mainly 
seek professional advice to reduce tax risk in return filing. An inaccurate tax return 
not only involves additional paperwork but also increases the likelihood of higher 
tax risk and penal action from the tax authority. In the interview, one business 
owner observed with agitation that his tax accountant had made a mistake in his 
tax return, which prompted an HMRC investigation and yielded additional taxes 
payable. To manage tax risk, business owners act jointly with tax professionals 
in the preparation, filing, reporting and remitting of tax.  If the tax professional 
disagrees with the proposed income declaration, business owners leave the tax 
return to a decision by the accountant rather than taking a risk on their own.  
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Cluster Chart 7. 1 Cluster analysis of nodes by coding similarity 
 
 
 
The next cluster contains three nodes relating to aspects of quality support – 
getting accounting support, being carefree and dependence reality. “Sound 
accounts and complete documents are the backbone of tax returns,” as one tax 
accountant stated, “but making them proper and consistent with the requirements 
of tax law is a tedious job. Small businesses prefer a practically experienced 
person who can back them up at a low cost.” The adjoining cluster of bitter 
experiences, exploitation and tax dodging, however, indicates aspects of power 
or influence occurring as a cluster interacting with the feature of quality support. 
In cluster analysis, the dendogram not only reports the related concepts but also 
describes the intersections between co-occurring concept groups (Yousef et al., 
2015).  
The power cluster suggests that dependence on tax professionals may often be 
troublesome when the professionals impose unfavourable business terms and 
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conditions on their clients. In explaining this professional attitude, some 
respondents attributed it to the non-mandatory licencing requirement for 
practicing tax that makes practitioners unaccountable to clients. They argued that 
small business accounting and tax service was not a well-paid profession. To 
survive in this profession, it was often necessary to exploit the clients financially.  
Bradley (2004) finds that professional practitioners in immigrant communities 
(i.e., doctors, lawyers etc.)  take advantage of the ignorance of their customers 
and monopolize their business. One tax adviser (TA02) explained the nature of 
such exploitation in the following way:  
In the beginning, when the clients come, tax advisers don’t say 
anything about service fees to pay. They ask for a minimum fee, so 
that the client is in. When the contract has been signed, they start to 
exploit them [the client] by saying this and that. Sometimes, they use 
references to tax inspectors and HMRC, saying that there is a 
chance of being caught for a certain tax situation, but that can be 
managed if the accountant takes some action or provides a 
supporting paper. (TA02) 
 
Thus, there can be exploitation in two ways. First by imposing hidden fees beyond 
the agreement that was made between the two parties; and second by 
exaggerating the threat of HMRC action. This respondent further commented that 
small business accountants were almost free-birds, having no strict regulations 
binding them. This concern about professional standards in small business 
accounting practices indicates that the relationship between clients and tax 
advisers can be exploitative and harassing.  A small business owner made a very 
strong case about financial exploitation:   
My accountant has no professional degree, which I came to know 
later. In one year, I had a tax of £27,000; then he said that he could 
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reduce the tax below £20,000 if I gave him £4,000 over his fees. 
So, I agreed, and he helped. Later he asked me for more money, 
saying that there may be an inquiry from HMRC. This time I did not 
respond.  He then asked for the password of my HMRC online 
account which I gave him on trust. With that he went to my account 
and applied for a VAT refund without informing me. (BO10) 
Those who come to the tax accountant know nothing of the tax law. 
And it’s very easy to exploit them. I know there is an exploitative 
group of accountants. (TA07) 
Interviews with the respondents revealed that this exploitative tax practice could 
get worse when the clients wanted to fire the adviser and hire a new one. Usually, 
in such cases, they were faced with high exit fees and refusals to hand over past 
records and documents.  Sometimes the tax advisers threatened the clients with 
disclosing secret business information to the tax authority. These comments from 
small businesses suggested that following their own interests through exploitation 
and deliberate misinterpretation of the law could be habitual conduct in small 
business tax practices. What the tax advisers failed to understand, as some 
respondents commented, was that it was high quality and intelligent solutions to 
tax problems that retained and expanded practitioners’ client bases, not the use 
of coercion.   
7.6.3 Power and Domination in Professional-Client Relationship  
 
In Bourdieusian thought, power is not always crude and coercive. Power can be 
benign and can be “replaced with persuasion, consent, choice, influence, and 
negotiation,” (Swartz, 2010:58). In an organizational or social relationship, power 
is used as an organizational force rather than a threat or a pressure. In 
professional tax practice, the presence of exploitation, as discussed above, 
suggests such benign power may also be used.  The three major nodes, control, 
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influence and power, were identified and summarized from the interviews. 
Interpretation of the related narratives showed that coercive tax practice was 
implicit and context-dependent. It did not happen on a regular basis. The following 
observations uphold the meaning and context of coerciveness in professional tax 
practice:  
We terminated our accountant because one of the directors had 
arguments with him about our net tax payment. The accountant was 
good initially, but later he was trying to control all our tax issues 
without consulting us. (TA10) 
If you go to a Bangladeshi or Asian accountant, they will start with 
an initial fee as it is fixed. But later, they will ask for more, and at the 
end of the year, you may find that the bill you have paid has been 
doubled or in some cases tripled. This is a professionalized 
bureaucracy they are practicing. They will say to you that the steps 
in return-filing are easy, but once you complete the agreement they 
increase the number of steps. (BO09) 
There are accountants who influence clients to undertake a certain 
tax position and take risk. Many clients have told me about this, and 
I also sit as a tax adviser on a community-based Bangla radio 
channel where many people ask this type of question. (TA08) 
We have many misunderstandings with the accountants. 
Sometimes they demand documents which are not relevant. The 
accountants provide service for money. They don’t seem to care 
much about professional reputation. They always consider the 
benefit they can earn from the client. (BO14) 
 
The business owners’ comments suggest that in an economic relationship like 
that with a tax professional, power and violence, as in the Bourdieusian 
vocabulary, are inherent. The only exchange that matters in such a relationship 
is the professional fee, based on negotiation. One of the above respondents 
290 
 
(BO09) use of the term “professionalised bureaucracy”, which, as Currie et al. 
(2015:1292) explain, is an organisational arrangement, “where professionals 
represent peer interest, rather than organisational interest” or public service.  
If tax is viewed as a tool of social control and surveillance (Poupeau, 2014), tax 
advisers, as one business owner (BO09) comments, act as an intermediary 
between the tax administration and the taxpayer. In relation to the performance 
of this role, Fogatry and Jones (2014) comment that tax advisers can exert 
pressure or be “loose cannons” in auditing client documents before sending them 
to the tax department. One tax adviser in Fogarty and Jones’ (2014:294) study 
stated, “I’ve had… client situations where I sort of felt like I was being bad cop.” 
Inability to pay a proper fee, irrespective to the quality of service, may lead to 
rejection of clients. The position professionals take in the tax field, and the 
gatekeeping power they hold (Parnaby,2009), compared with the 
under/uneducated immigrant business owners, allow them enjoy domination over 
tax clients. Hak (1994: 472) argues that the client will find that his or her 
relationship with the tax professional ultimately rests on the authority of the 
professional, “with the effect that he or she has little choice but to accept the 
practitioner’s opinion”. 
Establishing domination becomes more likely when tax clients have weaknesses 
or errors in their accounts, for example, when expenditure exceeds income. 
Above all, tax law relates to shifting economic capital from one social agent, i.e., 
the taxpayer, to another i.e., the state, and in such a shifting process a wrong 
account or a defective tax return gives much power of abuse to the adviser. 
“When I had a problem with HMRC, my accountant was playing foul with me.  
Smelling that there may be complexity and problems in my tax file, he felt that 
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there would be an opportunity to earn more fees,” as one respondent (BO08) 
observed. The cognitive structure of tax professionals is so well furnished with 
tax and accounting knowledge, compared to that of their clients that it may cause 
them to think that taxpayers are too “uncultured or stupid to notice the domination 
to which they are subject,” (Poupeau, 2016: 221). Respondents in the interview 
resented that professionals used tough language when it came to signing the 
checklist declaration with the tax return to reduce their professional risk. The tax 
professionals knew that tax practice was an esoteric phenomenon for the 
taxpayers (Tan, 1999) and clients had almost no ability or knowledge to challenge 
the culture of tax practice. This seemed an accurate picture when one 
professional tax adviser (TA09) commented,” Only a few people can prepare their 
accounts and only a very few can do the tax return by themselves.” 
In the working of the power relations, the positions of the tax advisers and their 
clients in the social class structure becomes a crucial factor. The positions tax 
advisers hold in their professional hierarchy have a corresponding equivalence in 
the social hierarchy of the clients, and this is called “structural correspondence” 
(Swartz, 1997).  If an adviser’s class position in his social hierarchy is higher than 
the corresponding position of a tax client, it becomes easier to exercise power 
over the client than if a tax client has an equal or higher social class position. 
There was evidence, both in the survey and the interviews, that some 
respondents had a conflictual relationship with their advisers which was a cause 
of agitation between them. For example, 46% of respondents in the survey 
reported that they had been in an agitation with their tax advisers. In interpreting 
the nature of this agitation, the respondents refereed to the corresponding class 
position and the emergent power relations with the tax advisers. The comment 
from the respondent, BO09, a community leader and a business owner, that he 
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received extra care and honour from his tax adviser due to his social position and 
grievance expressed by another respondent, BO11, that the accountants are 
more supportive to the large businesses than the poor bolster such findings.  
In the interviews, there was evidence that some business owners had control 
over their tax advisers; but in some cases, on the other hand, advisers held power 
over clients, which reflected a structural opposition in the tax professional-client 
relationship (Swartz, 1997). According to the tax advisers, as TA01 explained, 
such a conflict was the result of a normal agent-principal gap. The accountants 
were the agents of the taxpayers. The principal-agent relationship always suffers 
if there is mistrust and suspicion. For example, the principal may be anxious 
about whether the agent is passing irrelevant information to HMRC, which could 
result in a higher tax burden. 
7.6.4 Professional Knowledge and Domination  
 
Being knowledgeable and being able to produce tax-reducing management 
techniques, as tax professionals do, may define the boundary of relational 
domination. Bourdieu (1998) comments that the relationship of domination is 
based on knowledge, communication and recognition. Tax professionals achieve 
professional knowledge by accreditation with professional bodies, or with 
academic institutions, as shown in Table 7.4, which brings them recognition and 
scope to use symbolic domination. This expert status, even when not justified, is 
highly valued by the undereducated immigrant small business owner, to whom 
any person with technical abilities is an expert (Ebrahim,2003).  
Some respondents believed that “every field has some specialized knowledge” 
(BO08) and that the tax field was no exception. They thought that it might be 
possible, as a layman, to know some of the law, but not the whole of it, as tax 
293 
 
professionals did. This respondent stated that if someone had a specialization, 
then he was to be consulted; and that was not just the case in the tax field but in 
any field. Specialized knowledge bestowed the ability to speak with authority, 
although tax professionals had no right to impose anything beyond the client’s 
wish.  This observation contradicted the earlier findings reported in Section 7.5.2, 
which suggested that tax professionals wielded coercive power as a result of their 
professional expertise.  This contradiction also suggested that the tax field and 
the relations between the actors in it were far more complicated than one might 
imagine, and could not be reduced to one simple explanation. The tax advisers’ 
authority over their clients could also be understood by how their skills and 
qualifications related to their profession. An accountant does business with his 
pre-existing expertise, training and credentials (Bradley, 2004); but other 
businesses may be unrelated to the educational or occupational background of 
their owners. Allen (1991) comments that state licensing of tax skills and 
specialist tax knowledge empower professionals to gain strategic control and 
occupational domination over clients.  
Further, if Bourdieu’s field means “production, circulation, and appropriation of 
goods, services, knowledge, or status” as Swartz (2010: 48) reminds us, then tax 
knowledge becomes a stake in the struggle for field domination and accumulation 
of capital. One respondent (BO09) made this clear by commenting, “Even if you 
want to evade tax, you must have the knowledge,” indicating that tax evasion 
could be used as form of capital accumulation. Spire (2011, quoted in Poupeau, 
2014) shows how tax avoidance by the rich gives them access to more financial 
and institutional resources. It is a common belief among accountants and among 
immigrant businesses that it is only professional knowledge, and standard and 
quality of service, that works as a real source of domination and client-hunting: 
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“The best way to influence a client is to win the case in the tax appeal forum. So, 
you must know law, accounting, and their interpretations and meaning”, as one 
tax adviser (TA03) observed.  
The distinct and authoritative knowledge of professionals (Wilmott, 1986) permits 
them to undertake taxation services and establish a strategic control over them 
(Parnaby, 2009). Parnaby (2009) argues that the role of a professional is that of 
an “intermediary” and the source of such a role is the proprietorship of specialized 
knowledge and training.  
A few respondents commented that the only reason they changed accountants 
was because of low quality advice or major flaws in return-filing. One business 
owner commented that in last six years he had replaced three accountants 
because of their lack of up-to-date tax knowledge. This comment was 
supplemented by that of an accountant, who said that a quality check on each 
return is an essential function of tax risk management. A leading tax adviser and 
professional accountant (TA11) explained this, saying that “We sometimes refuse 
a client if there is a gap in our understanding of his accounts. This is because, I 
am affiliated with the ICEAW. Sometimes ICEAW representatives come to see 
what I have been doing with my clients. They may check any file and if they find 
any real problem they may take action.” Another tax adviser (TA09) commented, 
“There is a professional penalty or cancellation of licence if there is any misdoing 
or misinterpretation by accountants.” Therefore, if the business owner’s 
disclosure is perfect, tax professionals have the least control or influence over 
him as a tax client.  Tax professionals argued that they did not have any legal 
authority over the clients.  At best, they could issue a warning letter to alert the 
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client to rectify errors in a case of non-cooperation.  Forcing clients was risky; it 
might backfire, as one accountant observed.   
 
7.6.5 A Relationship of Cooperation and Trust  
 
An inescapable feature of a tax adviser-client relationship is cooperation. The 
ability to cooperate depends on shared values, mutual trust and understanding 
of each other’s goals.  In a community tax practice, local immigrant businesses 
are not unknown to advisers. A community tax practice develops through the 
network of family, friends and neighbours, who form the stock of social capital. It 
is not only a professional relationship but a social or family relationship that builds 
on common norms and social control. The social bond makes tax compliance and 
risk management a “reciprocally confirming relationship” (Fantasia, 2010:36). 
Grenfell (2008) notes that trust, cooperation and collaboration are integral to the 
cultivation of social capital. In immigrant communities, trust and cooperation can 
positively stimulate mutual benefits.  
 Once in a relationship of commitment and attachment, people become 
cooperative rather than competitive (Sayer, 2010). Cooperation is not only a 
requirement of ethnic tax practice but a requirement for managing competition in 
professional tax advice. Tax professionals know that clients will leave for other 
advisors if they are not well treated. A professional tax adviser (TA12) stated that 
losing a client was losing business, which made him and his colleagues very 
careful in dealing with clients. Another tax adviser (TA09) thought cooperation 
was the sole basis of tax practice: “If someone does not cooperate, I just say to 
him, I cannot help you, please take your papers and find someone else.”  It was 
argued by both taxpayers and tax advisers that lack of trust created 
misunderstanding and difficulties in tax compliance actions. Small businesses 
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believed in their accountant “as if he performed prayers behind the Imam24, as 
long as he does not take us in a wrong direction,” (BO04). Minority immigrant 
communities, “caught in the middle” of black and white immigrants, as Light 
(2005: 650) points out, have to employ cooperation as a means of survival.  
To the clients, it is respect and professional integrity that keeps them doing 
business with an accountant rather than disbelief and disregard. For immigrant 
business owners with low or no education, it becomes a necessity to work within 
a framework of cooperation and trust, as explained by the following business 
owner.  
On tax matters, I do what my accountant asks me to do. The tax operation 
is a secret job that we decide with our accountants, and it’s not possible to 
discuss these things without his consent.  I am solely dependent on my 
accountant because I don’t have much education on this. (BO12) 
Cooperation in Bourdieusian terms is not a free gift, but is based on rational 
choice, with both the parties having something to exchange to strengthen their 
relationship.    
I help my accountant with my business, provide him with free printing and 
packaging services, and he takes care of my tax file. It’s a kind of barter 
system. I am never charged more than the initial fee we settle at the 
beginning. We have some mutuality in trading. (BO09)   
The reciprocity between business owners and tax advisers in the above example 
can be explained with the help of Bourdieu’s concept of the economy of symbolic 
goods that “deals with the ambiguity of practices in gift-giving,” (Adolff, 2016:10). 
In the exchange of gifts, the barter is concealed, and the parties involved feel it 
as a selfless individual act.  The business man who is giving free printing services 
                                                          
24 Someone leading prayers in Islamic tradition.  
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to his tax adviser is not calculating the benefit he might derive from such an 
action; nor are they parties to a collusive alliance on tax evasion. It’s just a 
“mutuality of trade” as the respondent termed it, to develop stronger social bonds 
and communication. However, there is nothing that is fully free. In an exchange 
of free services, the taxpayer receives extra care and support on his accounts 
and return filing without paying any additional or exploitative fees, which accrues 
to him as a symbolic surplus. Adloff (2016) adds that a cooperation-based 
relationship generates reciprocal obligations and a positive response towards 
one another.   
Some clients may, however, be treated badly and have a trust-shattering 
experience: for example, an accountant submitting a VAT refund application to 
HMRC from the client’s online account without his knowledge (discussed in 
Section 7.5.2); leaving the client stranded at the time of a critical HMRC inquiry 
(discussed in Section 7.5.3), or even running away with client’s tax money 
(discussed in Section 7.5.6). If there is lack of reliability, or there is mistrust, as 
stated above, then the solution is to change the accountant, “Then I decided to 
change him,” as one respondent (BO08) commented. Accountants can also be 
changed on grounds of questionable accounting practices. An in-house tax 
adviser (TA10) stated, “We don’t do anything greyish in our accounts because 
we had a few times when there was a VAT and income tax audit from HMRC. So, 
we changed the accountant.” 
7.6.6 The Relationship Matrix: Summarizing Qualitative Data 
  
In this section, respondents’ observations are pooled and summarized through a 
coding matrix to describe and compare the prevalent types of relationship among 
them.  The matrix, Table 7.9, lists the business owners and the accountants in 
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column one and the major themes emerging from them in row one. The number 
in the matrix cell refers to the frequency, or the number of times, a word or 
comment is mentioned by a respondent. A zero cell implies that there was no 
comment from a respondent about the theme in question.  
 Nine codes represent various features of power and domination in the immigrant 
business-tax professional relationship. Some respondents from the business 
community stated that they had had bitter experiences dealing with tax advisers. 
One respondent (BO02) stated, “Sometimes, the accountant absconds with the 
tax money. It happened with a … (one South Asian accountant) in Edinburgh. He 
was not a certified accountant, just a book-keeper who was doing the business 
out of experience. The clients asked him to pay the taxes on their behalf and 
trusted him with their money, to deposit with the treasury. The accountant ran 
away with the money.”  Such an observation is coded as “bitter experience”, as 
shown in the table. Respondents in the business owner category, such as BO04, 
BO09, BO12 and BO15, mentioned bitter experiences in their interviews, while 
other business owners did not have anything to say about this issue. 
Understandably, there was no tax adviser who acknowledged or accepted such 
an event.  
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Table 7. 9 Coding matrix on the diverse nature of tax adviser-immigrant 
business relationships  
 
 
Notes: B – business owners; T – professional tax advisers; numbers in the table 
refer to the frequency a sub-theme (code) was mentioned by the respondent.  
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BO01 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 
BO02 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BO03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 
BO04 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
BO05 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BO06 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 
BO07 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 
BO08 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
BO09 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BO10 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
BO11 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BO12 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 
BO13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
BO14 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BO15 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 
TA01 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 
TA02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 2 
TA03 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TA04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
TA05 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 
TA06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TA07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
TA08 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 
TA09 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TA10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
TA11 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 
TA12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 
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Another theme that emerged from the business owners’ interviews was 
“exploitation” in times of danger. They stated that sometimes advisers abandoned 
the client if there was a tough tax enquiry likely from HMRC. Then came “client 
harassment” as a major example of power and domination in their relationship. 
Interestingly, one professional tax adviser (TA11) acknowledged there was client 
harassment, as did business owners BO02, BO04, BO07, BO10, BO11 and 
BO14. Other themes indicating use of power and domination included 
expectation of high fees, foul play, client hunting, high exit cost, misrepresentation 
of clients’ business accounts and conflicts.   
On the other side, there were 12 themes that indicated trust and cooperation in 
an effective taxpayer-client relationship.  There were several business owners 
and tax advisers who opined that manging tax risk and getting proper accounting 
support sustained their relationship in the long-run. For example, there were six 
business owners, BO01, BO04, BO06, BO08, BO12 and BO15, and five tax 
advisers, TA02, TA04, TA05, TA09 and TA12, who argued that cooperation was 
the basis of the professional-client relationship. Some of them mentioned its 
importance more than once.  Respondents placed the same level of emphasis on 
trust, correct advice and quality of work in making such relationships meaningful 
and productive.  
In summary, two patterns are worth noting from the matrix about the nature of 
relationships: first, the existence of power and domination, which was mainly a 
concern of business owners rather than of tax professionals; and second, the 
existence of trust and cooperation, which almost equally concerned both small 
business owners and tax professionals. The frequency of comments indicates 
that a relationship of cooperation and trust was more prominent than one of power 
301 
 
and domination in community-based small business tax practices.    
7.7 Which Kind of Relationship is More Active? 
  
A common challenge in a mixed-methods approach is how to combine the 
findings of quantitative and qualitative data. According to Morgan (1998), the 
objective of mixed-methods may be integration or explanation. In this research, 
one set of data was used to triangulate and interpret the findings of the other set 
of data. For example, the survey data showed the correlation between aspects of 
relationships, as presented in Table 7.6, but could not offer any contextual 
interpretation of those relationships. In this case, qualitative data could provide 
an explanation of why they were correlated by narrating the comments and 
arguments made by the respondents in the in-depth face-to-face interviews. 
Therefore, the roles of quantitative and qualitative data were complementary 
rather than competing.   
It can be argued, based on findings from the factor analysis of survey data and 
the coding matrix of interview data, that there exists both projection of power and 
cooperation in relationships between small immigrant businesses and their tax 
practitioners. The main observations of the integrated data are twofold: first, small 
businesses depend on quality tax advice, due to the uncertainty they face in the 
discharge of their tax obligations; second, tax advisers often use their influence 
on small businesses to make them follow their instructions, mainly in order to 
expand their client base and to generate higher professional fees.  
The interview data revealed that the small businesses’ main concern was to 
handle the uncertainty they experienced in dealing with their tax position, for 
which they expected quality tax care and support. Some of the small business 
owners had a good understanding of tax law but they seriously lacked any 
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knowledge of book-keeping and accounting. Knowing tax law and their 
interpretation of it took them only half way to tax return filing. Without sufficient 
knowledge of the classification of financial transactions, and the methods of 
recording and summarizing these, dealing with tax risks was difficult. This 
observation was supported both by the small business owners and by the tax 
professionals. The findings from interviews also showed which aspects of quality 
accounting support reduced uncertain tax conditions. Satisfaction with tax advice, 
accounting knowledge and consultancy were some of the factors that emerged 
as the important aspects of taxpayer-tax professional relationships.    
With respect to power-based or pressure-oriented relationships, the interview 
data illustrated that client domination and client constraints were the main two 
channels for controlling clients. This observation mainly arose from small 
business owners, but was supported to some extent by some tax advisers. It was 
revealed in the discussions that some clients had had bitter experiences in 
managing their tax risks, with tax professionals demanding high fees, particularly 
in times of precarious tax positions. They also suffered from deliberate 
misinterpretation of the tax law and the client-hunting attitude of tax professionals. 
Due to the manipulative attitude of some tax advisers, small businesses had to 
adopt and put into practice to the tax practices that were suggested to them.   
A widespread problem for most small businesses was that it was difficult to move 
away from a tax professional if there was any dispute over the tax bill. It was 
understandable that client harassment or conflicts were less likely to be 
acknowledged by the tax advisers, since these were not part of their professional 
mandate. Sometimes a huge exit fee was charged, or important documents were 
not returned, so that clients would decide to stay with, or come back to, the 
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practice. Supporting this complaint from small businesses, the quantitative 
component of the data analysis offered evidence that aspects of professional 
influence did exist in tax experts’ dealings with tax clients.  Factor analysis results 
showed that features like pressure by accountants or disagreements with 
accountants got high factor loadings.    
7.8 Chapter Summary  
 
To the answer of the second main research question: “How is tax risk managed 
in the Bangladeshi small business community?”, this chapter has argued that how 
immigrant communities manage tax risk depends on who they know in the society 
and who they are in their social world they live in. Immigrant businesses are less 
aware of new tax system, and may have inadequate or no tax knowledge.  A well-
connected immigrant business has wider opportunities to discuss and plan their 
tax compliance actions. Bangladeshi community businesses are largely limited to 
community accountants for tax advice, which enables a free flow of information 
between the two and an understanding of the level of risk they may take. This 
chapter has shown that response to, and management of tax risks, to some 
extent, are culturally determined. Since Bangladeshi immigrants mainly network 
with accountants through friends and community members, their tax risk 
management practices are mainly shaped by this micro and inward-looking social 
circle. This chapter has further shown that tax advisers play a critical role in 
introducing and explaining the taxation process, as well as undertaking the formal 
legal process of tax-return filing. Their relationship with their clients may be 
cooperative or power based. Use of power was a concern more likely to be 
mentioned by immigrant business owners than by tax advisers; while a 
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relationship of cooperation was sought by both parties in effective management 
of tax risk and compliance.  
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Chapter VIII 
Tax Habitus of Immigrant Businesses 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the third main research question: “What 
is the tax habitus of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK?” Using 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as an analytical tool, we shall examine how 
immigrant businesses reproduce tax compliance in their everyday lives in the host 
community. In order to do this, this chapter will first assess the attitude of the 
immigrant businesses to the UK tax system in section 8.2. It will then investigate 
the role of taxpayers’ cultural and socio-economic conditions in developing 
perceptions about tax compliance attitude in section 8.2.3. In section 8.3, the 
chapter will explore the ways their racial and ethnic identities influence on their 
perception making about tax compliance and in section 8.4, the link between 
taxpayers’ morality and ethics and tax habitus. Finally, the chapter will discuss 
tax habitus from the viewpoint of taxpayers’ social class positions in section 8.5 
with the chapter conclusion in chapter section 8.6.    
 
8.2 Immigrant Businesses and Their Attitude to Tax  
 
In expressing their attitude to the UK tax system, the survey respondents for this 
research commented freely on tax complexities, tax risks, tax evasions and tax 
compliance. In the interviews, most respondents indicated that, to them, obeying 
the tax system and being compliant with tax laws was very important.  This 
obligation did not arise from the legal system as such: rather, they felt that to 
make their earned income safe, and halal, i.e., permissible to use, they should 
file tax returns on time. Some respondents argued that, to be compliant with the 
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tax system, what one needed most was the right attitude and loyalty to the state.  
The following comments from respondents are worth mentioning:  
 
I want that my establishment is based on honesty and truth. That’s why I 
have re-invested a lot of money; otherwise I could have done lot of silly 
things. That’s not my aim, my aim is to make sure that everything is done 
according to the law and this way I feel that I make money in a halal way. 
(BO07) 
 
In complying with tax, nothing is problematic or difficult, if you have the 
right attitude, which many people don’t have. (TA04) 
 
 
Both respondents, despite coming from opposing professional backgrounds, one 
a business man and the other a tax professional, highlighted tax attitudes as a 
crucial factor in compliance generation. The tax professional, however, 
contradicted the business man, commenting that many taxpayers lacked a proper 
attitude. Some tax professionals believed that a game-playing mentality, i.e., 
challenging the tax system, the Bangladeshi legacy of poor tax culture, and the 
tendency of immigrants to return home, might have affected their tax attitudes 
(elaborated in Section 8.2.1). 
 A respondent commented, “Tax compliance becomes complex when one does 
not want to comply and looks for an opportunity for non-compliance. We 
undertake many hidden or clandestine business operations to avoid tax liability. 
Anything done in the dark is supposed to be complex,” (BO12).  This comment 
was elaborated on by another respondent (BO05), a former chef, now a 
restaurateur and a professional taxi driver, who said that, “almost every night we 
used to burn receipts on the stoves so that we were not caught by the tax man.” 
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When a sales receipt was burned, the related purchase receipts were burned as 
well.   
Beyond the issue of attitudes, respondents believed that there was a generation 
gap in relation to tax compliance. The old immigrants who came to the UK in the 
early 1950s and 1960s had no idea about income tax, because income tax was 
not part of the system at that time in East Pakistan, as Bangladesh was then 
known. Therefore, for these early immigrants, tax was a new concept in a new 
land. Among second-generation British Bangladeshi businesses, however, 
income tax was widely known and practised and had become a part of their 
economic habit.  
 
In Bangladesh, the tax system is new. People recently coming from there 
now know about this. But those who came in the past did not know 
anything about income tax. Coming to the UK, we found these things new 
to us, so it took a long time to orientate ourselves about the tax system. 
Again, when we came to the UK, the first generation was mostly engaged 
in small jobs, where owners used to pay income tax for their staff. Now we 
are in business, we are learning about the tax system and growing our tax 
habit. (BO10) 
Some other respondents, as well as those quoted above, used the word “habit” 
while talking about tax attitude. Similarly, one professional tax adviser (TA07) 
suggested that “people of different cultures and habits” was one of the reasons 
for tax complexity, meaning managing tax issues in a multicultural society like the 
UK was difficult when people had different habits. Another professional tax 
adviser (TA12) cited habit and norms to explain why the tax compliance attitude 
of some Bangladeshis had not changed: “The old habit of Bangladeshi people 
…has not changed.”  
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The use of” habit” implies that if one has embraced a certain state of mind, it is 
difficult for one to withdraw from it. A taxpayer with a long-standing history of tax 
compliance is unlikely to suddenly become non-compliant, or vice versa. The 
concept of “habit”, or “tax habit” can in some ways be linked to Bourdieu’s habitus, 
which, according to Swartz (2012:102) was derived from German historian Ervin 
Panofsky’s concepts of “mental habit” and “habit-forming force”. It must however 
be remembered that “habitus” is not a posh name for “habits”, because “habits” 
does not have a generative and transposable component (Laine, 2014). Habitus 
has a creative or rejuvenating power, and such creativity is not random but 
systematic. Paolucci (2014:27) comments that habitus may be a derivation of 
habit but that, it certainly “does not coincide with the thoughtfulness of habit and 
habitation that habitus produces.”    
Respondents to the survey argued that the self-assessment tax system and its 
complex legislation was hard to penetrate, sometimes even for the professional 
tax adviser. Added to this was a lack of interest in learning about tax 
requirements. Some respondents commented that, despite having insufficient 
knowledge about the implications of tax compliance, they nonetheless took their 
compliance duties seriously. But HMRC was not sympathetic to even small 
delays in return filing or technical problems, which created distance and 
disrespect towards them.  A respondent suggested an explanation for this: 
I think that the attitude of HMRC to us is often a great hindrance to tax 
compliance. They should understand that it’s my money and my 
convenience must be respected. The tax authority should overcome its 
dominating attitude towards clients if it really is a service provider. If I shut 
down my business, how will they collect my taxes? We run the business 
to run our family. Everything comes after the family. (BO14) 
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In this statement, the respondent criticizes the “service provider role” of HMRC 
and expects enhanced cooperation for family businesses because of their poor 
financial situation.  
This view however was contradicted by other respondents who argued that 
HMRC and the English community generally were highly supportive of immigrant 
communities. They stated that the tax administration in Bangladesh was much 
harsher in dealing with clients. These respondents seemed content that there 
was no financial corruption in the UK tax system.  One respondent offered a very 
good explanation as to why Bangladeshi immigrants should be tax compliant, and 
another supported him, as follows:  
The English community is highly tolerant; we are building mosques after 
mosques with the money earned in this country, sometimes paying tax on 
it properly, sometimes not. They even allow us to build a mosque by 
demolishing a church which was old and did not have many church goers. 
Would it be possible to build a church in Bangladesh in this way? The 
English community helps foreigners, they look at you politely. (BO02) 
 
I am an immigrant here, and I don’t want to spend my money in 
Bangladesh. I will spend it in the UK, because I get services here.  People 
shouldn’t want to remit money if there is no family need.  (TA01)  
 
To understand their attitude to tax compliance, respondents were asked three 
questions: “How do you feel when you pay income tax?”; “How concerned are 
you about your income tax filing?”; and “How important do you think it is to pay 
income tax? All these questions related to the tax attitude or tax morale issues of 
the respondents (Brink and Porcano, 2016; Alm and Torgler, 2006). The 
questions were to be answered on a five-point Likert-type scale. 
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Table 8. 1 Frequency distribution of responses on various aspects of tax 
compliance attitude   
 
Feeling about tax 
compliance  
Concern about tax 
compliance  
Importance of tax 
compliance  
Categories  Percentage  Categories  Percentages  Categories  Percentages  
Very good 59.4% Very 
concerned 
42.6% Very 
important 
49.5% 
good 15.8% Concerned 26.7% important 17.8% 
Uncertain 6.9% Uncertain 10.9% Uncertain 7.9% 
not good 
10.9% 
Not 
concerned 
9.9% Not 
important 
13.9% 
Not very 
good 
6.9% Not 
concerned 
at all 
9.9% Not 
important 
at all 
10.9% 
Total 100% Total 100% Total 100% 
Mean  1.9 2.18 2.18  2.19 
S.D.  1.35 1.345 1.345  1.447 
 
 
As the Table 8.1 shows, on the point of how they felt about paying income tax, 
59.4% responded that they” felt good”, as opposed to 10.9% responding “not 
good”. However, a comparatively lower number of respondents were concerned 
about their tax compliance. When asked how concerned they were about their 
tax compliance, 42.6% commented that they were very concerned, as opposed 
to 9.9% having “no concern” about income tax compliance. But almost half the 
respondents, 49.5%, believed that tax compliance for them was very important, 
and only a minority, 13.9%, thought it was not very important to them. If the 
answers are re-categorised into three option-choices, the table shows that the 
percentage of respondents who felt good about being able to comply with taxes 
is 75.2%; the figure for those who were concerned is 69.3%; and the percentage 
for those who thought that tax compliance was important is 67.3%; so, the second 
and third percentages are similar. Their answer pattern suggests that most 
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respondents viewed tax compliance as an important responsibility about which 
they were concerned and felt good when they could achieve it.  
 
8.2.1 Bangladesh – A Field of Comparison  
 
Whether the UK or Bangladesh was the ideal place to live was a direct or indirect 
issue in forming the tax compliance habitus. Some respondents believed that 
because of the cultural shocks they had experienced they should return to 
Bangladesh, and there was no point in parting with their hard-earned money. 
They had a feeling that they were not in the right place. Some others felt that life 
in Bangladesh was better than life in the UK and were always thinking of returning 
when their children had received their education and were established. This 
dilemma about settlement often complicated tax compliance for them.  
Thatcher and Halvorsrud (2016) comment that past structures imported from the 
immigrants’ country of origin influence the strategies for action they adopt in the 
host society. Bourdieu (1958, cited in Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016) indicates 
that if there is a rupture in the social set-up, the habitus takes time to catch up 
with the changes. According to Ingram and Jessie (2016), those who attempt to 
integrate the structuring forces of old and new fields into their habitus but fail to 
do so oscillate between the two fields and produce a destabilised habitus.   
Further, as discussed in Section 6.3.4, Bangladeshis always compare the tax 
rates of the UK with those of Bangladesh and feel that the tax burden in the UK 
is higher. But at the same time, they feel that the welfare system of the UK is 
strong and so it makes sense to participate in its tax system.  Some Bangladeshi 
small businesses, on the one hand, carry the tax culture of Bangladesh, whilst 
others, on the other hand, are respectful of the UK tax system, although they 
mostly perceive the tax system as complex. 
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It is natural for immigrants to compare their home country experience with that in 
the host country and reinvent themselves.  In exploring the habitus of British 
migrants in Spain, Oliver and O’Reilly (2010:52) argue that the British migrants 
“are essentially placed within two social spaces – the British and the Spanish”.  
Pointing to Bourdieu (1990), they stress the possibility that the habitus of British 
migrants transforms or reinvents itself in the unfamiliar Spanish space.  This 
transformation process relates to Bourdieu’s idea of divided or cleft habitus, which 
refers to the “mechanism of the mind-sets of individuals who have experienced a 
considerable disjuncture between the present circumstances and the world in 
which they were originally raised and socialized”, as Thatcher and Halvorsrud 
(2016:89) explain.  
8.2.2 Contradictions and Differences in Opinion  
 
Throughout the discussion, some respondents expressed differences of opinion 
about some topics. For example, one respondent (BO07) claimed that his positive 
attitude to the tax system made it easier for him to comply with tax legislation, 
while another one (TA04) stated that not many people had the right attitude to tax 
(Section 8.2).  Again, some respondents rejected the tax system, arguing that tax 
collectors were demons and non-cooperative, while some others’ views about tax 
collectors were just the opposite.  They thought that the service they got from the 
welfare state (TA01), and the tolerance the English community showed to 
immigrants (BO02) made it worthwhile to actively participate in the tax system 
(Section 8.2).   
Differences of opinion among respondents often confuse some readers, who 
believe that every respondent should have the same or a similar perspective on 
a topic.  In reality, conflicting interview responses uncover the multidimensionality 
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of a problem (Antin et al., 2015) and capture the tension (Watson,2006) 
respondents face in dealing with a situation. Conflicting discourses on tax 
compliance attitudes or the tax system which emerged in the interviews do not 
indicate that the respondents were dishonest; rather they shed light on the 
struggles they faced in accomplishing tax compliance.  Changes in the interview 
contexts may cause respondents to rely on different stocks of knowledge and 
experiences which make their interpretations different (Holstein and Gubrium, 
1995 cited in Watson, 2006). 
In Bourdieu’s own philosophy, it is argued that people from the same class can 
have different worldviews, because despite belonging to the same class, they 
may differ in their social and personal trajectories and ownership of cultural and 
economic capitals (Weinninger, 2005; Power, 2004). Power (2004) submits that 
in social science research, methodological triangulation is one way of finding the 
truth, the other way being to understand a participant’s “logic of practice”, that is, 
what is revealed through his/her contradictory remarks.  Bourdieu (1996:26) 
shows how the meaning of “reality” varies in the life of one of his respondents, 
due to her split existence as a Moroccan immigrant in France.  
Watson (2006:367) comments that ambiguities, contradictions, inconsistencies – 
all can be labelled tension, which “can yield insights into the research process” 
and introduce new meaning into a concept. More importantly, inconsistencies can 
improve the validity and reliability of qualitative data (Miles and Huberman, 2014; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Validity in this case does not only mean the content 
of a concept (Bryman and Cramer, 2005) but also the irony of incompatible beliefs 
“grounded in the crisis of representation” (Lather, 1995: 41).  The crises people 
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go through and the stories they tell and re-tell offer an explanation of the 
generative and transposable nature of their actions (Watson, 2006).   
One concern, however, is how to arrive at a conclusion out of the contradictory 
views respondents express. To Power (2004), this depends on the 
epistemological view of the researcher.  In the positivist tradition, it is achieved 
through triangulation of participants’ comments supported with other data or 
evidence. In the post-positivist tradition, it is achieved through understanding 
reality, which is multiple and context bound. Listening to contradictory remarks, 
as Power claims referring to Bourdieu, can unravel the ambiguities respondents 
face in their everyday lives and provide deeper understanding of their logic of 
practice.  
The use of Bourdieu’s work as a theoretical framework in this study makes 
contradictory comments a more relevant and dependable sense-making tool. To 
reach a conclusion, the puzzling aspects of interviews over tax compliance could 
have been counted and a frequency distribution could have been made. But in 
an interpretivist analysis seen through the Bourdieusian lens it is more useful to 
confront the comments of one respondent with those of another. Bourdieu (1996) 
reminds us that blind trust in the respondents is not enough to understand the 
distortions embedded in the social structures where the interview is taking place. 
8.2.3 Tax Compliance, Social Space and Immigrant Businesses:  A Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis  
 
The relational properties of different aspects of tax compliance attitudes and 
aspects of capitals can be shown by multiple correspondence analysis (MCA).  In 
Bourdieu’s work, MCA is an analytical technique that reflects relational aspects 
of his theory of practice. In Bourdieu’s own words, “I use correspondence analysis 
very much, because I think it is essentially a relational procedure,” (cited in 
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Hjellbrekke and Korsnes, 2009:35). MCA axis 1 represents the most dominant 
dimension and axis 2 describes the next most important dimension. Each axis 
consists of a multidimensional space and the variables in the space are 
considered active (Hjellbrekke and Korsnes, 2009).  
Figure 8. 1 Category quantification for tax compliance variables 
 
 
Figure 8. 2 Plot of discrimination measures for tax compliance variables  
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Each of the variables in the category plot, as shown in Figure 8.1, has five 
categories. Two categories of the variable tax compliance concern – very 
concerned and concerned – are grouped together at the top of the plot, while the 
other three categories – uncertain, not concerned and not concerned at all – are 
grouped at the bottom. The large discrimination measure of concern along 
dimension 2 is a result of these two categories being very different from other 
categories of concern. Similarly, one category of the variable tax compliance 
importance – very important – is very far from the other categories and yields a 
greater measure of discrimination in the second dimension. Two categories of the 
variable tax compliance feeling – very good and good – are grouped together at 
the middle of the plot, indicating that these two categories show almost equal 
measures of discrimination in both dimensions. Nearly all the variance in the data 
is accounted for by the solution, 51.6%, of the first dimension and that of the 
second, 48.3%. The alpha coefficient (α) for the first dimension is 0.736, and for 
the second dimension is .664, suggesting that the items maintain acceptable 
internal consistency. 
The discrimination measure plot, as shown in Figure 8.2, shows that the variables 
– tax compliance feeling, tax compliance concern, and tax compliance 
importance have relatively large values on both the dimensions, indicating 
discrimination measures in both the first and second dimensions.  This suggests 
that all the categories in each of the variables spread across both the dimensions. 
It makes sense that immigrant taxpayers may be concerned or not concerned, 
they may feel tax compliance to be important or not, and they may have a good 
feeling when they pay income tax or not.  
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Figure 8. 3 Category quantification for all capital variables 
 
 
Figure 8. 4 Plot of discrimination measures for all capital variables 
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The spread of the category quantifications in Figure 8.3 shows two categories of 
business capital, £300,000-£400,000 and £400,000-£500,000, grouped together 
at the bottom right of the plot and showing a greater measure of discrimination in 
dimension 1. The capital category £100,000-£200,000 is very close to dimension 
2 and shows a full measure of discrimination in it. The other categories are far 
apart from these two categories and discriminate in both dimensions. This 
indicates that the respondents’ class or position in society strongly connected to 
their ownership of business capital.  Of the educational categories, UK master’s 
degrees and UK school certificates are grouped together, while non-UK master’s 
degrees and non-UK undergraduate degrees are grouped together, indicating 
two distinct classes based on education. If we look at cultural participation, 
museum and cinema goers are grouped together at the bottom of the plot, while 
visiting art galleries is quite separate.  For community involvement, categories of 
political organization are highly loaded in dimension two.  Visiting government 
offices, a category of consultation or social networking, is quite separate from 
other categories.  The first dimension accounts for 30.54% of the variance, and 
the second-dimension accounts 25.492%. The alpha coefficient (α) for the first 
dimension is 0.688, and for the second dimension is .612, suggesting that the 
items had acceptable internal consistency. 
It is important to note that there is no agreed minimum value for Cronbach’s 
alpha, although it is often claimed that it should be more than .70.  In their study 
on the relationship between cultural and personal values, Wugayan and 
Serprenant (2006:41) use Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .51, .53 and .55, and 
they allow “alpha values below .70 to be acceptable in research of exploratory 
purpose”. Similarly, Khalique et al. (2015:80) comment that an item can be 
considered to have an acceptable level of consistency “if the Cronbach’s alpha 
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value is within 0.5 to 0.7”. Some other studies also confirm that a score below.70 
is acceptable for exploratory research (for example, Bertolini et al., 2011:14; 
Boyle and Schmierbach, 2015:139; and Hair et al., 1995:641). Carter (2010 :311) 
contends that the “user of the measure has to determine how reliable the test 
should be depending on the circumstances of the study.” In this study, the 
Cronbach’s alpha for most items is above or near 0.70 and well above the 
minimum level of 0.50.  
The discrimination measure plotted in Figure 8.4 shows that the first dimension 
is related to the variables housing and music. About the interaction between 
habitus and habitat (i.e., housing), Bourdieu (1999:128) reminds us that, “If the 
habitat shapes the habitus, the habitus also shapes the habitat.” These variables 
have large discrimination measures in the first dimension and a small 
discrimination measure in the second dimension. For both these variables, the 
categories are positioned far apart in the first dimension only. Academic 
qualification, capital and consultation have relatively large values in both 
dimensions, and cultural activities and community involvement have a large value 
in the second dimension and a small value in the first dimension.  
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Figure 8. 5 Joint category quantification for tax compliance and capital variables 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 6 Joint category plot of discrimination measures for tax compliance 
and capital variables  
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The major pattern of groupings in the joint category plot of tax compliance and 
various capitals in Figure 8.5 illustrates that respondents with low business capital 
with UK undergraduate first degrees feel good about achieving tax compliance 
and think that tax compliance is important. Those having a non-UK school 
certificate or Bangladeshi school certificate, and who go to tax advisers for 
consultation, are very concerned with their tax compliance obligations, take 
compliance action seriously, and feel very good when it is accomplished. Another 
major grouping is the class of taxpayers who listen to Bangladeshi music, are 
involved in political organizations and have business capital of over £500,000. 
This group thinks that tax compliance is not important to them at all and are not 
concerned with it either. A few categories, for example, seeking advice from 
government offices, preference for non- English music, and meeting a community 
leader for help, are quite separate from the other categories of the variable, tax 
compliance concern.  The first dimension accounts for 24.773% of the variance 
and the second dimension accounts for 21.044%. The alpha coefficient (α) for 
the first dimension is 0.763, and for the second dimension is 0.682, suggesting 
that the items had acceptable internal consistency.  
The plot of discrimination measures in Figure 8.6 shows that the first dimension 
is related to the variables of compliance concern, housing and academic 
qualification. These variables have large discrimination measures in the first 
dimension and small discrimination measures in the second dimension. For both 
these variables, the categories are located far apart in the first dimension only. 
Cultural activities, consultation and tax compliance feelings have relatively large 
values in both dimensions. Music, capital and tax compliance importance have a 
large value in the second dimension and a small value in the first dimension. The 
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variable community involvement is located very close to the origin, which 
indicates that it does not discriminate at all in the first two dimensions.  
The results of the multiple correspondence analysis show that the tax compliance 
attitudes of Bangladeshi immigrants depend on whether they earned their 
educational qualifications in the UK or in Bangladesh. Attitudes vary across 
respondents in respect of the volume of economic and social capital they own. 
One distinguishing feature of their tax habitus is that they compare tax 
compliance activities in the UK with those in Bangladesh, which strengthens the 
idea of cleft or divided habitus among immigrant communities.  
8.3 Race, Habitus and Tax Compliance  
 
Bourdieu’s habitus is initially about class, but in a racialized social system the 
habitus one possesses may be a racialized or ethnicised habitus (Perry, 2012). 
Bangladeshis in the UK are a racial minority and Bangladeshi small businesses 
are invisible in the identity landscape of the UK business community. As 
Bangladeshi small businesses belong to a racialized migrant community, the tax 
compliance difficulties they encounter may not be an issue of importance to the 
UK tax authority. Smallbone et al. (2005) contend that because of their racial 
identity, Asian business owners in London are not considered trustworthy and are 
penalized in many ways. Being discriminated against is a common phenomenon 
for immigrant communities in New Zealand (Yuan et al., 2013), and such 
discrimination may make the tax and business environments complex and 
uncertain (Wang et al., 2014). Immigrants believe that race is one of the most 
significant criteria for discrimination. 
The “Bangladeshi” identity, the social identity of Bangladeshi immigrants in the 
UK, subjects them to different forms of discrimination and reinforces the 
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development of a racialized habitus within them. Often, they are panicked at 
being subjected to implicit or explicit discrimination, even though some of them 
have achieved high educational success and economic integration into UK 
society. Rothengatter (2005:281) observes that much of the perception that 
immigrants are noncompliant with tax laws is stereotypical, divisive and racist, 
and that it inhibits “the successful social integration of migrant entrepreneurs into 
the destination society” and its “overall tax morale”. 
To Bourdieu (1999:62) ethnicity is a stigma for immigrants which is inscribed in 
their skin, name and facial features, and which “radicalizes the handicap linked 
to the lack of certificates or qualifications … more specifically cultural capital.” 
This may make their acculturation in the host country poor. For example, 
Bangladeshis in the UK have the lowest level of majority acculturation, familiarity 
with British culture and language, because of their religious-cultural belief 
(Sanders et al., 2014). This tendency is common not only among new immigrants 
from Bangladesh, but also among second-generation immigrants who have been 
living in the UK for many years. But the reasons for such feeling are different 
between these two generations. To suggest an explanation for this, Sanders et 
al. (2014:36) comment that the “Bangladeshi … second generation, having grown 
up in Britain and been educated in British schools, have somewhat different 
frames of reference from their parents. The second generation expects to be 
treated in the same ways as their white British peers, whereas the first generation 
may be more likely to frame comparisons with …non-migrant kin. In line with this 
interpretation, we find that the second generation are actually more likely to report 
discrimination.”  
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Lack of acculturation and respect for the UK regulatory system by Bangladeshi 
immigrant businesses is evident in the following statement: “If you are not 
respectful to the UK tax authority, why are you here? You should return to 
Bangladesh. No one forced you to live here”, as one small business owner said 
in response to those who were disrespectful to their tax obligations. In other 
cases, the lack of respect was expressed more directly, when respondents, for 
example, BO11, held the view that native British people were equally or more tax 
non-compliant.  With the help of an adroit middleman, or due to social power, the 
native UK taxpayer managed to stay outside the radar of the tax authority, as 
these respondents believed.   
Another respondent, BO04, curiously asked whether the interviewer was aware 
that some members of parliament in the UK had been found to be underpaying 
taxes. He also felt shame that he had to pay capital gains tax only because he 
was not an MP or a member of the upper echelon of society.  The Bangladeshis 
who judged tax collectors as “demons” also indicated that they didn’t feel any 
relationship with the British tax system. Such an indication should not only be 
viewed as cultural disjuncture, but also as racial antagonism (Cui, 2015). 
The racialized habitus is, however, not fixed but evolves over time, and moves 
through a dialectic relationship between the social structure and the individual 
agent. There exists a cyclical influence between them, with “structure guiding 
human behaviour, and human behaviour constantly modifying structure, albeit 
largely at the margins,” (Ebrahim, 2003:16). For example, a taxi driver in 
Bangladesh has no idea of what tax compliance might be. On the other hand, a 
taxi driver in the UK knows his tax obligations once he qualifies for his driving 
license, as his qualification is sent to HMRC so that he can be included in the tax 
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network. One respondent (BO05), a restaurateur and professional taxi driver, 
commented, “In fact, when I got my professional driving licence, the driving office 
said that your driving qualification is sent to HMRC.” This echoes Bourdieu’s 
(1990) comment that one’s disposition is produced by one’s material condition in 
the social system.  
The inter-dependence of Bangladeshi small businesses and Bangladeshi tax 
advisers, as discussed in Section 7.4, is another example of racialized habitus. 
Drawing on Bourdieu, Perry (2012) finds that in raising financial support, white 
church workers in the US depend wholly on white donors, while African American 
church workers depend on both white and non-white races. Due to a common 
racial identity, their in-group solidarity gets a durable shape and is sustained over 
a prolonged period. Their racially constituted dispositions are an expression of 
their common racial upbringing and cultural preferences.  
8.4 Migrant Ethics, Morality and Tax Compliance Habitus  
 
Tax compliance behaviour is found to be strongly linked with taxpayers’ ethical 
standards and morality (Torgler, 2007; Alm and Torgler, 2006). A social agent’s 
disposition is so inculcated and embodied in their mental structure that a practice 
incompatible with their material condition may be "denied as unthinkable, even 
ethically wrong,” (Perry, 2012: 92).  
In Bourdieu’s social theory, there is not much written about tax compliance and 
ethical behaviour. He rather looks at tax compliance habitus as a power struggle 
between the state and the taxpayers and between different taxpayers 
(Mumford,2013). Sayer (2010) comments that, in his discourse on habitus, 
Bourdieu largely ignores the ethical dimensions in individual decision or choice 
making. However, Sayer (2010) believes that analysis of both the micro and the 
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meso levels of habitus is necessary for understanding people’s ethical and moral 
dispositions. The micro level of habitus consists of the bodily (i.e., accent, 
gesture, appearance, clothing) and cognitive (i.e., taste, perceptions, touch) 
elements, while the meso level consists of the interactions individuals make with 
other actors, practices and institutions.  
In Ignatow’s (2009) view, however, ethical matters can be understood through 
Bourdieu’s lens by examining how individuals make moral judgements in their 
everyday lives. He argues that individuals make moral judgements by evaluating 
the standards available in the cultural repertoires they have at their disposal. In a 
community with high ethical standards, violation of tax laws will trigger contempt, 
shame and guilt in taxpayers’ psyche; and in return it will affect their moral 
disposition and judgement. Seen from this viewpoint, tax morale is linked to the 
moral habitus of individuals, which is the result of their moral judgment.  
In the interviews, there were respondents who repeatedly stressed that they felt 
it unsupportive of the state to avoid tax obligations, in a country that provided 
them with so many public services and social welfare benefits.  One respondent, 
BO09, stated, “I feel that government gives me service, so I should pay some 
money in this or that way.” The ethical or moral issues, however, may fail when 
one’s action is driven more by economic gain than morality. For example, when 
a video-camera was installed in one restaurant premises by HMRC inspectors to 
count number of customers served, the restaurant owner, BO05, established a 
take-way delivery service to make sales estimation by the tax authority difficult. 
In explaining this practice, he himself attributed it to his “Asian mentality” that 
made outsmarting the tax authority a virtue rather than a vice.  
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Meso-level interaction is one way to reduce the gaps in worldviews among social 
agents. Bangladeshis in the UK, through interactions with UK tax and non-tax 
institutions, will modify the tax habitus that they brought with them from 
Bangladesh.  A revised habitus will direct them towards a belief that tax is not 
only an economic but also a moral issue.  This also implies that a revised habitus 
will lead to isomorphism, or what Bourdieu prefers to call homology (Weinninger, 
2005), between an individual’s habitus and the social structures that surround 
him. Vaisey and Lizardo (2010:04) argue that, “Any homogeneity of attitudes and 
normative orientations among actors is thus understood to be the result of 
interactional influence processes that post-date the origins of friendship ties 
rather than the product of cultural similarities that pre-date those ties.” 
Interactional homogeneity however may be affected when a taxpayer applies 
conscious or unconscious strategy or calculation to be successful in certain 
actions.  Bourdieu (1990 cited in Sayer 2010) never rules out the possibility that 
habitus can accompany strategic calculation on the part of someone performing 
an action. In the interviews, there were respondents who, on the one hand, were 
serious about tax compliance but, on the other hand, were involved in huge cash 
business activities. Such a dichotomy in behaviour indicates that taxpayers as 
game players can choose different strategies, consciously or unconsciously, as 
tennis players do on a tennis court – Bourdieu’s favourite example of the 
conscious vs unconscious strategies that a habitus can take 
 
 
8.5 Immigrants’ Class Position and Tax Habitus  
 
Racial identity is one way to understand one’s social position, while class identity 
is another. Class position, or class perception, is blurred for many people; or 
people may be uninterested in identifying their class position. Revealing one’s 
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class may mean revealing tastes, behaviours and in some cases choices.  In 
contemporary British society, people are less interested in discussing their class, 
particularly when they belong to the lower or middle class (Savage et al., 2010). 
In the study under discussion, no questions were asked about the social class of 
the respondents directly, although four respondents introduced the term “class” 
in the interview. For example, one small business owner, BO03, referred to 
welfare abuse in the UK as an “immigrant class” problem. A tax accountant, 
TA07, while talking about his own community, observed that they didn’t belong to 
the “educated, cultured class” of Britain, and identified this as one of the strongest 
reasons for their suffering in their social space. To them, in brief, “Bangladeshis” 
meant an undereducated immigrant class.  Savage et al. (2010) argue that class 
identity seems to be a less frequent or a less fitting word to identify immigrant 
communities, because their main marker is ethnic identity.  
Response to state obligations, understanding of power and power relations – all 
related to the respondents’ ethnic or immigrant class.  In explaining the nature of 
the immigrant class, Friedman (2016) suggests that they have an oscillating 
identity, becoming strangers in their own society and guests in the host society. 
Drawing on Bourdieu, she contends that immigrants have a double isolation in 
their life: first from their field of origin; and second in the destination field. 
Bangladeshis are found to suffer from high social distance in the UK. The average 
social distance between ethnic communities and white British citizens is 15, 
measured as a percentage of respondent answers, while Bangladeshis have an 
average social distance of 18 (Sanders et al., 2014).  
People tend to support policies that favour the activities of their own class rather 
than those of others. Owing to class and life-style differences, immigrants are 
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reluctant to fulfil tax compliance obligations for reasons which are reflected in the 
question – “Why should we pay for them when they are doing things that we 
wouldn’t do?” as David Willets, a British Conservative MP, commented in 1998 
(cited in Li 2010:3). Since immigrants internalize themselves as external to 
society, they are less likely to own that society in the same way as the mainstream 
classes do (Li,2010).  In the Weight of the World, Bourdieu (1999) and a team of 
his colleagues use an ethnographic account to point to the antagonism to their 
ethnicity that immigrants experience over housing and identification. 
In Bourdieu’s social theory, class represents an occupational classification of 
labour based on the economic and cultural capital possessed by individuals. 
Bourdieu (1999) comments that in certain spaces, for example in visiting a 
museum, one may need appropriate cultural capital; but in some other spaces, 
such as legal institutions, one not only requires cultural but also economic and 
social capital. He shows that the highest echelon of the social classes, which 
combines these capitals, includes industrialists, academics, lawyers and so on; 
while small business owners, primary school teachers and so on belong to the 
middle class (Weinninger, 2005). However, small business owners from the 
native community and those from the ethnic community may not be 
straightforwardly comparable. This is because, in the social and economic milieu, 
the ethnic classes are mostly absent and disconnected, and they lead a life within 
themselves (Bourdieu, 1999). This seems true for Bangladeshis, who prefer 
maintaining their homeland network and loyalty rather than entering the host 
country network, as Shams (2016) finds among Bangladeshi immigrants in the 
US.   
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Again, a native owned small business and an immigrant owned small business 
may be significantly different because the former is likely to hold relatively more 
cultural capital (i.e., language, accent and communication) than the latter. 
Bourdieu (1984) contends that occupational categories within a class can be 
differentiated based on the relative preponderance of capitals within that 
category. For instance, there are differences between “small business owners, 
endowed primarily with economic capital, and primary school teachers, endowed 
primarily with cultural capital,” although the two groups belong to the same social 
class (Weinninger, 2005:128).   
In addition to differences in capital ownership, the trajectory of Bangladeshi 
immigrant businesses and that of native British small businesses also differs 
widely. Sanders et al. (2014) found25 that of the five main ethnic groups in the UK 
(e.g., Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Black Caribbean, Black Africans), the 
Bangladeshis expressed the highest level of interest in, and preparedness to 
participate in, violent protest against war or taxation in the UK. Even their average 
protest score was slightly higher than the white British one. This finding from 
Sanders et al. (2014) implies that Bangladeshis in Britain are more opposed to 
government policies about war and taxation than the other ethnic groups, 
although, of all ethnic groups, they have the highest amount of trust and 
satisfaction in British democratic and political institutions.    
Differences in the relative preponderance of capital and historical trajectory will 
produce class-specific habitus or immigrant class habitus. If habitus become 
                                                          
25 Sanders et al. (2014:128, Table 2) show that the ethnic groups register similar levels of 
preparedness for violent protest against war and taxation (average score: 15%), which is 17% for 
Bangladeshis, 16% for Indians, 15% for Whites, Pakistanis and Black Africans, and 11% for Black 
Caribbean. Although they are similar, the figure is slightly higher among Bangladeshis and lower 
among Black Caribbean. Similarly, on trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy 
in Britain, Bangladeshis scored 67% and 76% respectively, higher than any other ethnic group.  
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class based, then practice will also be class based, since one follows the other.  
Therefore, the tax compliance practice of Bangladeshi immigrant small 
businesses will not only to differ from that of native small businesses; it may also 
differ from that of other immigrant communities whose class situation and class 
experience may be different.  
8.6 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has discussed Bangladeshi immigrant business owners’  tax habitus 
and their actions, expectations and feelings towards tax compliance. As an 
immigrant business community, most Bangladeshis consider tax compliance an 
important social function and are concerned about the timely discharge of this 
social responsibility.  Findings show that tax compliance attitudes vary widely with 
the educational qualifications and volume of capital taxpayers possess. UK 
educated immigrants, and those with low economic capital, feel tax compliance 
to be a more important responsibility than those who received their education in 
Bangladesh or who have high economic capital. On these people’s way to 
compliance creation, cultural and linguistic issues come as a major barrier, along 
with their “Bangladeshi” social identity. Added to this is a mindset, or home 
country experience, resulting from a tax system where non-compliance is a major 
feature. The unsettled mental and physical status, whether to stay as a lifelong 
immigrant or return to the homeland, produces a divided or cleft tax habitus in 
Bangladeshi immigrants and complicates tax compliance actions.  
This chapter has argued that habitus is a class-based concept which, in turn, 
makes tax compliance a class-based practice. From that perspective, the tax 
compliance habitus of the Bangladeshi community may not vary from that of the 
mainstream community, but it is likely to vary from that of other immigrant 
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communities. We have also argued that interactions and feelings of 
“belongingness” among immigrant and mainstream communities may establish a 
homogeneity or behavioural homophily in the tax habitus of the immigrant 
businesses. In the next chapter, we shall present the conclusion of the thesis.  
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion: Tax Compliance in Immigrant Business 
Communities in Theory and Practice 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of the research for this thesis was to deploy Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
to examine the tax compliance practice of Bangladeshi family businesses in the 
UK. In order to achieve this objective, three major research objectives were 
proposed. The first objective was to identify the aspects of tax compliance that 
created difficulties for Bangladeshi family businesses’ engagement with the UK 
tax system. The second objective was to examine the nature of the relationship 
between Bangladeshi family businesses and their tax advisers in managing tax 
compliance and tax risk. The third objective was to explore the socio-economic 
and cultural issues that influenced the tax habitus of Bangladeshi family 
businesses.  This concluding chapter will attempt to pull the three objectives 
together and identify the role of ethnic identity in Bangladeshi family businesses’ 
engagement with the host country tax system. The chapter will proceed as 
follows. Section 9.2 will reflect on the study context and the unit of analysis that 
has underpinned the research.  Section 9.3 will present the main findings of the 
research questions undertaken by the study. The chapter will then focus on the 
overall study findings and the contribution of the thesis in Section 9.4; the 
implications of the research findings for theory in Section 9.5; and the 
generalizability of the study findings in Section 9.6. The chapter will conclude by 
discussing the limitations of the study and the potential areas of future research.   
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9.2 Tax Compliance in Immigrant Businesses: Context and Interpretation  
 
The thesis was premised on the idea that immigrant taxpayers encounter major 
problems in engaging with the tax system of the destination country. Achieving 
tax compliance is a difficult job, which gets far more critical if it is to be 
accomplished in an unfamiliar society.  A review of the extant literature revealed 
two distinct features of tax compliance studies of immigrant communities. The 
first stream of literature focused on the contributions immigrants made to the 
public coffers and the benefits they took in exchange from the state (Dustmann 
et al. 2010; Fix and Passel, 1994; Wang and Lo, 2000; Rowthorn, 2008; 
Dustmann and Frattini, 2013). These studies presumed that any gap between 
contributions and benefits was an indication of the immigrants’ level of 
engagement with the host country’s tax system. In these studies, there had been 
little attempt to focus on how immigrant societies connected themselves with the 
tax system of the new society and the struggles they faced in achieving tax 
compliance.  The identity of the immigrants and their alien social status, combined 
with a general lack of English language and cultural differences, accentuated 
many of their difficulties in accomplishing the state obligation of tax compliance.  
The second stream of literature assumed that all small businesses suffered from 
similar tax compliance problems. The issue of business owners’ identity, whether 
they were natives or immigrants, had largely been overlooked in evaluating their 
tax compliance attitudes (McGoldrick and Troast, 1999; North and Trlin, 2004; de 
Vries, 2007; Carney, 2007; Constant and Zimmermann, 2013; Shams, 2016). 
The common cultural and social origins of immigrants from a country unite them 
into a small group whose perceptions of tax and other regulatory agencies are 
likely to be similar. In some studies, it was claimed that immigrant societies 
viewed tax complexity as a major threat to managing compliance, although these 
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studies did not delve deeply into the underlying reasons for such a claim (Light 
and Bonachich, 1988; Yuengert, 1995; Department of Labour, New Zealand, 
2002; Yuan et al., 2013; Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2014). 
 Further, some studies suggested that a common feature of immigrant 
businesses was to depend on tax advisers from within the same community, 
without exploring the nature of such dependency and the power dynamics that 
might underlie it (Levitt, 1995; Chrisman et al., 2003; Janjuha-Jivraj, 2003 
Andrejuk, 2016). In a multicultural society like the UK, where immigrant 
businesses make a significant contribution to public revenues and employment 
creation, there is a special need to explore these businesses’ views about the tax 
system and tax compliance management.  
In consideration of the above limitations in the tax compliance literature, this study 
proposed the following three main and five subsidiary research questions, with 
the expectation that an answer to these questions would fill the void in 
understanding the tax compliance perceptions of immigrant family businesses.  
Main Research Question 2 
Is Bangladeshi small family businesses’ engagement to the UK tax system 
problematic?   
Subsidiary questions to main research question 1 
(I) What aspects of tax compliance are most problematic for small Bangladeshi 
family businesses in the UK? 
(II) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses perceive the UK tax system 
and its complexity?  
Main Research Question 2 
How is tax risk managed in the Bangladeshi small business community?  
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Subsidiary questions to main research question 2 
(III) How do small Bangladeshi family businesses manage tax risk? 
(IV) To what extent do small Bangladeshi family businesses rely on tax 
advisers?  
(V) What is the nature of the relationship between the small Bangladeshi family 
businesses and their tax advisers? 
Main Research Question 3 
What is the tax habitus of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK?  
To answer the research question, this study applied a Bourdieusian lens, since 
the research problem seemed more a sociological than an individual one. 
Bourdieu’s praxeology, i.e., what people do and how they do it, is distinctly social; 
and his theoretical approach is based on the relational structure of social agents 
as expressed in his conceptual triad of habitus, capital and field (Sections 4.1 and 
4.3). Chapter 6 attempted to answer the first main research question with the help 
of first and second research sub-questions, which focused on the most 
problematic areas of tax compliance encountered by Bangladeshi family 
businesses and their perceptions of the UK tax system. Chapter 7 dealt with 
second main research question by attempting to answer research sub-questions 
3, 4 and 5, discussing immigrant businesses in terms of their tax risk 
management practices, the extent of their dependence on tax advisers in solving 
tax issues, and the relational dynamics between them and their tax advisers. 
Finally, Chapter 8 tackled the third main research question, which explored the 
tax habitus of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses.  
9. 3 Summary of the Main Findings 
 
The main objective of the study was to explore the ways in which Bangladesh 
family businesses managed tax compliance and engaged with the tax system of 
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the UK. This section will discuss the main findings of the three main questions in 
light of the five subsidiary research questions developed in Section 5.3 and 
demonstrate whether the research questions were attempted correctly. It will 
show the contributions the study makes to the relevant field of knowledge.  
9.3.1 Problematic Aspects of the UK Tax System for Bangladeshi Family 
Businesses 
 
This was the first main research question to be attempted. The aim of this 
question was to identify aspects of the tax system that created most problems for 
Bangladeshi businesses in their efforts to achieve tax compliance and their 
perception of tax system complexity.  The first component of the main research 
question was attempted by the first subsidiary research question. The aspects of 
the tax system that were found to be problematic are summarized below with their 
underlying explanations.  
9.3.1.1 Maintaining Documents and Accounts   
 
The findings from the survey data showed that maintaining records, i.e., book-
keeping and accounting, was the most critical problem. Of the respondents, 
34.7% stated that they suffered most from record-keeping burden in tax return 
preparation (Section 6.3). Analysis of in-depth interviews with survey 
respondents revealed that the excessive cost of maintaining transaction records, 
and the risk associated with having incomplete documents if they were audited 
by HMRC, made this a difficult tax compliance task for them. The study found 
that keeping records for personal use and keeping them to cope with legal 
requirement were virtually two different requirements (Section 6.3.1). For small 
businesses with insufficient, or no, knowledge of taxation or accounting, and 
without any accountant of their own because they could not afford one, keeping 
proper records and satisfying the tax authority were difficult challenges.  
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Findings suggested that dependence on cash business operations, in order to 
make informal payment of staff salaries or bills, was a widespread practice in 
immigrant community businesses, and complicated record-keeping functions. On 
this point, there were two different explanations: one coming from the tax advisers 
and the other from business owners. The former group of respondents argued 
that much of the cash business and associated record-keeping difficulties arose 
due to the negligence and game-playing attitude of business owners. In contrast, 
the latter group of respondents believed that it was due to the business reality of 
immigrant-owned small businesses, with their overwhelming dependence on 
community members for staffing, sales and purchase of goods and services 
(Section 6.3.1). International tax literature supports these findings that negligence 
(Yong, 2011), improper documentation (Lignier, 2009) and cash transactions 
(Morse et al.,2009) are a common feature of small and immigrant businesses’ 
taxation issues.  
9.3.1.2 Frequent Changes in Tax Law  
 
To a quarter of the respondents (24.8%), frequent changes in the tax law 
emerged as a problematic area of tax compliance (Section 6.3). The major 
problem that abrupt changes in tax legislation created was uncertainty in making 
tax returns. As the law changed, so did tax codes, their relevance and tax 
calculations. Legislative changes were not only a problem for the business 
owners but also for the tax professionals (Section 6.3.2). It was argued by the 
respondents that small business tax advisers were not adequately trained to keep 
track of the changes in tax legislation. The research found that immigrant family 
businesses and their tax advisers had concerns that the UK tax system was 
subject to regular administrative reform, giving rise to different tax filing and 
service standards. Respondents stated that centrally administered tax 
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jurisdictions and locally administered tax jurisdictions did not provide similar 
levels of satisfaction in their tax compliance services. Respondents argued that 
the creation and changing of tax legislation was, to some extent, related to the 
political atmosphere and regime changes in the UK (Section 6.3.2). All political 
parties of the UK had their own ideas about budgetary allocations and public 
funding, and changes in tax legislation and the tax system were an important item 
for attracting votes.  
9.3.1.3 Determination of Total Income  
 
Determining taxable income was as the next problematic aspect of generating 
tax compliance (Section 6.3). Explanations from the respondents indicated that 
the concept of income and that of taxable income created confusion for them. 
Categorising allowable and non-allowable expenses from numerous 
transactions, and determining total taxable income, was a real mystery for a 
taxpayer who had no basic knowledge of the concepts involved. This mystery 
was intensified by their belief that business and family were a single entity 
(Section 6.3.3), which made them feel that business expenses and family 
expenses should not be differentiated when it came to allowable tax expenses.  
This finding is supported by Coleman and Freeman (2002:152) who argue that 
many immigrant-owned small family businesses in Australia, due to troublesome 
experiences with the government, emphasise family over business, which 
influences their attitude “towards voluntary tax compliance and to the ATO.”  
Findings suggested that income-splitting was another issue that played an 
important part in tax compliance actions (Section 6.3.3, fourth paragraph). Family 
members were included in the business ownership to spread business income 
and to increase tax savings, which often resulted in tax evasion. Taking 
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advantage of these opportunities added complexity in income determination, 
because of the administrative and technical issues involved in such tax-related 
arrangements. It was argued by respondents that determination of income was 
also complicated by the potential threat that HMRC would disbelieve the 
submitted return and demand more tax. As a safeguard, the initial income 
declaration was kept low to keep some room for HMRC audit adjustment. The 
respondents criticized the typical assumption of HMRC that business income 
could never fall, and that taxpayers would always to report higher income than in 
previous years.  
9.3.1.4 Tax Calculation  
 
Then came tax calculation, where many immigrant business (14.9%) were not 
sophisticated enough and encountered difficulty in applying the appropriate tax 
rate to their income (Section 6.3). To most immigrant businesses, the marginal 
tax rate was too high, and calculating taxable profit as separate from accounting 
profit, to which tax credits and allowances were applied, was difficult (Section 
6.3.4). Calculating accurate tax liability was more difficult if it involved complicated 
financial transactions, especially capital income. International tax literature 
supports the idea that accurate calculation of tax liability is difficult in a self-
assessment tax system because of the cognitive ability and energy taxpayers 
need if they are to process tax information (Slemrod and Gillitzer, 2014).  
 It appeared from respondent observations that complying with requirements for 
payroll tax and contributions to national insurance caused much psychological 
and practical discomfort. Collecting payroll taxes with any degree of accuracy 
meant imposing an extra burden on wages and increasing the possibility of losing 
essential business staff (Section 6.3.4), in addition to the increased administrative 
cost for record-keeping (Section 6.3.1). In an ethnic-controlled business, for 
341 
 
example, in the Bangladeshi curry industry, where employees are mainly 
supplied from within the community, retaining staff for their unique expertise is 
perceived to be more important than being a sincere taxpayer. Such dependence 
on ethnic labour is also one of the reasons for the bulk cash transactions 
immigrant businesses make (Section 6.4.6). This finding is supported by extant 
literature (Delgado, 2011, Halkias and Adendorff,2014; Kloosterman et al.,1999: 
Andrejuk, 2016). Zhou (2002) comments that immigrant entrepreneurs and their 
co-ethnic workers prefer cash transactions since it makes tax evasion easy for 
them, although such practices create a highly problematic record-keeping and 
accounting burden on the owners.   
9.3.1.5 Return Filing Procedure  
 
A few respondents stated that tax filing procedure was a problem because of their 
technical inability or lack of confidence to manage online return submissions 
(Section 6.3.5). However, leaving the return submission function to a tax adviser 
and sharing the password for their online account with this person often created 
fraudulent tax practices. Seeking tax advice from the HMRC online help desk or 
tax clinic was an option; but business owners’ experiences of seeking advice from 
the helpline might not be always be rewarding, sometimes due to a linguistic 
barrier, sometimes due to an innate fear of sharing sensitive business details with 
a tax office representative. There were examples in the interviews of occasions 
when, at a time of critical tax problems, tax help had been much needed, and not 
much help had been forthcoming, which frustrated the taxpayers and meant hiring 
advisers at high fees.  
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9.3.2 Perceptions of Tax System Complexity by Immigrant Businesses  
 
This was the second component of the first main research question that was 
attempted to be addressed by the second subsidiary research question. In 
answering to this question, first, the extent to which immigrant businesses 
perceived the tax system as complex was measured; then explanations for such 
perception were explored.  Three aspects of tax system complexity, developed 
after an exhaustive literature review (described in Section 3.3), were identified – 
“difficulty”, “uncertainty” and “complicatedness”. When these were measured on 
a Likert-type scale (see Table 5.3, Section 5.8), the results suggested that 
Bangladeshi immigrant businesses perceived the UK tax system as complex. It 
was found that nearly 70% of immigrant businesses owners viewed the UK tax 
system as complex, as opposed to a minority of 30% to whom it was not complex 
(Table 6.2, Section 6.4.1).  Responses made concerning perceptions of tax 
complexity were scrutinized in the context of immigrant businesses’ socio-
economic status, and measured using three of Bourdieu’s four forms of capital: 
cultural, economic and social. Because of measurement difficulties, symbolic 
capital was not considered. 
Cultural capital was measured with respondents’ self-reported answers to 
questions on educational qualifications, musical preferences and participation in 
cultural activities (Section 6.4.2).  In terms of educational qualifications, the 
majority of Bangladeshi immigrant business owners were found to have a school 
certificate or undergraduate degrees earned in Bangladesh. They preferred 
Bengali music over other types and participated more in their own community 
cultural festivals than by visiting those of another community or visiting a museum 
or art gallery. The bottom line was that Bangladeshi immigrant businesses’ 
accumulation and use of cultural capital was deeply entrenched within their own 
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community. The thesis found that Bangladeshis who obtained their cultural 
capital in their own country perceived the UK tax system as more complex than 
those who obtained this capital in the UK (Section 6.4.3).  So, the research 
suggested that cultural identity impacted on how these taxpayers perceived the 
tax system and responded to the requirement for tax compliance actions. There 
were, however, contradictions to such findings and these suggested that tax 
acumen was not so much a reflection of cultural background, since it was difficult 
to manage compliance if one lacked reasonable business as well as tax 
accounting knowledge.  A tax system is inherently complex; and in a multicultural 
society (Section 6.4.2) where the cultural practices of immigrant communities are 
largely ignored in the tax policy making process, it may appear more complex 
than one might anticipate.  
The second form of capital was social capital, the network of social relationships 
needed to secure membership of local and mainstream institutions. Two 
questions were asked to measure social capital: the first question was about the 
persons whom the respondents consulted for tax help; and the second one was 
about the respondents’ level of involvement in social activities. Findings indicated 
that most immigrant businesses (68.3%) consulted professional tax advisers from 
within the Bangladeshi community, and in some cases, there was consultation 
with friends and family (Section 6.4.4). For socialization, the respondents were 
mainly interested in involving themselves in Bangladeshi political party 
organizations active in the UK. The research found that despite immigrant 
businesses retaining the services of tax advisers, most of them felt the tax system 
to be formidably complex. This meant that, on the whole, they appointed a tax 
adviser to prepare tax returns or accounts, without there being any flow of tax 
knowledge from their advisers that might improve their understanding of the tax 
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system. A lack of trust between taxpayers and their advisers, as de Vries (2007) 
points out, may also be a reason that negatively affects the former’s perceptions 
of the tax system.  
It appeared from the research for this thesis that immigrant business owners 
involved in political activities tended to perceive the tax system as more complex 
than those involved with other social or cultural organizations.  In this regard, 
some respondents explained that tax was a critical element for social 
engagement and inclusiveness. For a person to be involved in a political 
organization and to earn social recognition through this would require him to 
practice proper tax compliance behaviour, which was difficult for members of 
immigrant communities due to their alien status and poor economic situation in 
the destination country. This finding, to some extent, contradicts that of Slemrod 
and Gillitzer (2014), who argue that political engagement deters people from tax 
non-compliance as though the tax system were complex. Immigrant taxpayers 
who are isolated from the mainstream society are at an increased risk of non-
cooperation with the tax system, or even oppression by it.  A large power distance 
between “We” and “They” increases the gap between immigrant businesses and 
the tax administration (Section 6.4.4).  It is, however, argued that second 
generation immigrants may become better socialized in terms of British culture 
and be better taxpayers.   
Economic capital was perhaps the most important component in people’s status 
and choice making. Two questions, one about total business capital and the other 
about residential property ownership, were put to the respondents to measure 
their possession of economic capital. The research found that most immigrant 
business owners (70.3%) had business capital of less than £100,000, and only a 
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very few (fewer than 10%) over £300,000 (Section 6.4.6). Limited access to 
formal credit, and the use of pooled savings from friends and family, could be one 
explanation for this low volume of business capital. In contrast, homeownership 
was high (74.3%) among immigrant business owners, perhaps because they 
found investment in residential property to be a sounder proposition than 
investment in business.  
Cross-tabulation between perceptions of tax complexity and business capital 
showed that those who perceived the tax system as complex mainly belonged to 
the low business capital group (Section 6.4.7). There was also evidence that the 
majority of homeowners perceived the tax system to be complex, while the 
majority of those who lived in rented property viewed it as easy. In other words, 
the tax system was proportionately more complex for those who had a lesser 
amount of business capital and those who owned the house they lived in than for 
those who rented their accommodation.  
Economic circumstances affected perceptions of tax system complexity 
significantly.  The respondents’ explanations indicated that, in order to minimize 
or eliminate taxes, Bangladeshi immigrant businesses preferred cash 
transactions. The resulting tax savings from such operations were transferred to 
support families back home or invest in property. Remittances sent abroad 
without an accompanying statement in the tax return increased the complexity 
and scale of tax issues (Section 6.4.7). It was found that fees paid to tax advisers 
added to the tax compliance burden and remained a matter of concern for low-
income immigrant businesses. Such concerns got much higher if small 
businesses had to deal with the tax administration or the tax courts over extra tax 
audits and litigation. Another fact that contributed to their perception of tax system 
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complexity was the underreporting or hiding of income from the tax authority to 
maximise social welfare benefits, which was both a social and an economic 
explanation (Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.6) for their perceptions of tax system 
complexity.  
9.3.3 Tax Risk Management and Immigrant Business -Tax Adviser 
Relationships  
 
To understand how tax risk is managed in the immigrant society was the second 
main research question for the study which was attempted by third, fourth and 
fifth subsidiary research questions. The third subsidiary research question 
examined what tax risk management meant to immigrant businesses, the fourth 
one looked at the extent to which they relied on professional tax advisers, and 
the fifth one investigated the nature of relationship between them and their 
advisers (Section 5.3.2). The research found that immigrant businesses viewed 
tax and non-tax risk in the same way: risk should be something manageable, 
tolerable and measurable.  A business would enjoy higher profits or more 
economic capital if tax risk could be managed successfully; but undefined risk 
might affect business and social position negatively (Section 7.2). Several 
respondents noted that they considered tax risk very carefully, although some of 
them were found to be careless about keeping proper business records, which 
was one of the reasons for increased tax risk. Keeping proper documents might 
have been difficult for immigrant businesses due to their transitional or 
transformative habitus in the new field, or their inherent carelessness about tax 
matters.  
Starting from their old Bangladeshi habitus, immigrant businesses experienced 
conflict about tax compliance and tax risk in the UK social setting until they caught 
up with a new habitus. As they navigated the new tax field, they built up a new 
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tax strategy and formal or informal tax planning. To immigrant businesses, having 
good tax planning meant reducing tax bills in a lawful way; but such planning 
could also be shadowy and could cross the boundary between tax avoidance and 
evasion (Section 7.4). In taking effective tax risk action, the community 
relationship between immigrant businesses and their tax advisers, where 
everyone knew everyone else and it was difficult to hide business and life style 
information, played a significant role. While the community relationship might 
produce benefits in virtuous tax risk management, it might also be one of the 
reasons for exploitation and domination (Sections 7.4 and 7.6.3). Tax advisers 
might use their knowledge and expertise as a mechanism of client control.  
Findings suggested that immigrant businesses habitually depended on social 
welfare benefits, which induced some of them to underreport income and take 
higher tax risks, while it encouraged others to be more responsible about tax 
obligations (Section 7.4). This dichotomy in tax risk behaviour within the same 
class of people indicated that individual tax habitus might be different from class 
or group habitus, due to differences in their relative possession of cultural, 
economic and social capital.   
The research found that most Bangladeshi immigrant businesses depended on 
Bangladeshi tax advisers, and Bangladeshis were the major clientele of 
Bangladeshi accountants (Section 7.4). This structural and functional homology 
allowed immigrant businesses to share all tax concerns with their accountants. 
Underlying their tax risk behaviour, the nature of the economic activities they were 
engaged in played a critical role. Excessive imbalance between expenditure and 
income forced some immigrant businesses to adopt creative or evasive tax risk 
management practices. Added to this were unstable tax legislation and the 
attitude of the tax authorities, which encouraged immigrant businesses to disobey 
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the tax system and engage in risky behaviour.  Taxpayers satisfied with the tax 
system accepted and performed tax obligations naturally and attempted to avoid 
risky tax actions.  
The extent of dependence on tax advisers by immigrant businesses was high. 
More than 80% had a contract with a tax adviser; and the rest either had an in-
house accountant or an in-house accountant and a contractual arrangement. 
Uncertainty in the tax system was one of the important reasons for such 
dependence, and immigrant businesses depending on contracted tax advisers 
perceived the tax system as more uncertain than those depending on in-house 
accountants (Section 7.5). Further investigations suggested that confusion about 
return filing and incomprehensible legal language remained prime reasons for 
seeking an external tax adviser, while busy and voluminous business operations 
led to appointing an in-house tax adviser. It was found that most immigrant 
businesses considered their advisers’ recommendations seriously, which gave 
an idea about the serious extent of dependence on tax advice.  
The nature of their business impacted on business owners’ dependence on tax 
advice. Some businesses were significantly more complicated than others, and 
needed more tax planning arrangements and expert tax advice. Along with 
business complexity, volume of business capital mattered in choosing tax 
advisers (Section 7.5.1). Businesses with higher capital tended to depend more 
on in-house advisers than on hired ones. Some respondents claimed that they 
would be able to lower their dependence on advisers if HMRC would increase 
the number of free accounting support services or easy-to-connect helpline 
services. Helpline facilities as a source of tax advice were not only sought by the 
taxpayers, but often by the tax advisers for information or clarification of tax rules. 
Some frustrated immigrant businesses felt that a simpler tax system could reduce 
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the need for tax advisers and save taxpayers money spent on professional 
consultation. 
However, since advisers were always available, and they had the symbolic power 
of professional expertise, dependence on them came naturally (Section 7.5.1). 
This observation goes with Bourdieu’s proposition that symbolic power is a 
transformed and transfigured form of other powers emanating from cultural, 
economic or social capital.  The finding that tax professionals hold symbolic 
power also has support from the literature. Addison and Mueller (2016) argue that 
professional accounting and tax firms enjoy great symbolic power, which they 
earn by their talent and technical expertise. Their engagement in the tax risk 
game or their possibility of outwitting the tax authority depends to a great extent 
on how much expertise they have as professional.  
This research showed that immigrant businesses generally believed that almost 
all tax problems could be referred to and solved by advisers if the relationship 
with them was based on mutual trust and respect. They further believed that 
hiring an internal tax accountant was quite profitable, since such an accountant 
could generate more tax savings than a tax adviser engaged under contract. A 
dedicated internal tax expert could produce more economic capital for the 
business, on the one hand, and on the other, could consolidate their social 
position within the tax field. Therefore, dependence on tax professionals can be 
viewed as a transmutation of cultural capital (an adviser’s qualifications and 
expertise) to economic capital (a business owner’s tax savings and income). The 
fact that tax professionals produce economic benefits for taxpayers is well 
documented in the literature (Hite and McGill, 1992; Sakurai and Braithwaite, 
2001; Sikka and Hampton, 2005; Gerstein and Friedman, 2013). Stephenson 
(2015) claims that the underlying motivation for hiring tax professionals has been 
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to minimize tax risk and maximize money savings by making the tax return 
accurate and avoiding audits by tax authorities.  
It appeared that the nature of the relationship between tax advisers and immigrant 
businesses could be one of power and influence or of cooperation and support 
(Sections 7.6, 7.6.3 and 7.6.5). Factor analysis of 11 items showed four factors – 
professional knowledge, cooperation and esteem, dependence, and coercive 
pressure – that described the perceived relationship in immigrant business-tax 
adviser relationships (Section 7.6.1). These four factors, cumulatively, explained 
67.8% of the variance among all the variables used in the factor analysis. 
Similarly, cluster analysis of interview excerpts revealed that an uncertain tax 
environment and the expectation of quality and accurate tax returns were the 
reasons for hiring a tax adviser. However, their relationship passed through a 
unique blend of hierarchical authority, caused by professional power and 
influence and norms of reciprocity, which in turn was caused by professional trust 
and mutuality.  
The form of professional power was not like a threat or pressure, but was a benign 
organizational force happening contextually (Section 7.6.3). In a relationship of 
exchange between two economic agents, i.e., businesses and professions, 
based on give-and-take, the exercise of power by one over the other was normal. 
Tax advisers’ gatekeeping role in regulating access to tax and legal services was 
one of the factors that gave them the power to dominate clients’ tax decisions. 
The corresponding class positions of the taxpayers and the tax advisers mattered 
in this power game.  If a tax adviser’s social position was higher than the 
taxpayer’s, domination was easier and happened without being noticed. If the 
class position of an immigrant business owner was higher than that of his/her tax 
adviser, the domination rule might not work or might even be put into reverse. 
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The semi structured interviews provided evidence of this structural opposition in 
tax professional-client relationship.  
In the sphere of domination, professional knowledge played a moderating role. A 
tax adviser with higher professional qualifications and accreditation enjoyed 
higher social recognition and symbolic domination. It was through tax knowledge 
and the quality of their service that advisers survived in the struggle for the tax 
field and in client-hunting and client-retention (Section 7.6.4). Tax professionals 
could seldom control a client if the client’s disclosure was perfect. The relationship 
discourse thus moved within the bounds of trust and cooperation, mutual 
understanding and respect (Section 7.6.6). In a community tax practice, trust and 
cooperation acted as the glue in the relationship.  One tax practitioner, in Fogarty 
and Jones’s (2014:292) study, comments “trust is everything” that builds 
partnership with clients and “a team trying to accomplish a goal.” These authors 
assert that client loyalty and trust improve working relationships and bring 
efficiency in tax practice.  
This reliance on mutual trust and cooperation, as opposed to coercive tax 
practice, indicates that the relationship between taxpayers and tax advisers is far 
more complicated than one imagines and cannot be reduced to a simple 
explanation (Section 7.6.4). As well as trust, there is the possibility of a breach of 
trust in dealing with a client’s tax and accounting records. Bitterness may also 
develop in the relationship due to exorbitant and unagreed fees charged by the 
adviser, particularly at times of danger. This finding matches that of Roberts 
(2001), who finds that tax professionals know every detail of taxpayers’ financial 
position and can extract fees disproportionate to the services they provide. He 
further argues that, from whatever perspective it is viewed, e.g., functionalist, 
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interactionist or critical, their relationship is governed by self-interest and 
professional welfare rather than public interest or public welfare.  
9.3.4 Tax Habitus of Bangladeshi Immigrant Businesses 
 
The third and the final main research question looked at the set of assumptions, 
beliefs and attitudes of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses that produced their tax 
compliance thoughts and actions within British society (Section 5.3.6).  To answer 
this question, the tax and the social fields, the forms of capital and the struggles 
that Bangladeshi immigrants faced in British society were identified. In the area 
of tax compliance, the cultural attitude to tax was found to have important 
implications for tax system engagement. It was found that some respondents felt 
that being loyal to the tax system and paying taxes was a precondition for their 
existence as immigrants in British society (Section 8.2). But there were 
respondents, at the same time, who were habituated to illegal tax practices and 
being free riders in society. Underlying their tax attitudes, home country 
experience and exposure to home country taxation played a critical role, 
particularly for first-generation immigrants. It was apparent from the interviews 
that first-generation Bangladeshi immigrant businesses had no or little 
experience or “habit” of paying income taxes. It was in the UK that they had 
developed the habit of tax payment.   
The tolerance and respect of native British people towards immigrant 
communities and the high quality of British public services encouraged 
Bangladeshi business owners to transform their internalized attitudes to tax 
compliance.  However, immigrant business owners’ tendency to return to their 
homeland often made them careless about host country tax regulations. The 
interviews highlighted that, due to social isolation, they always compared the UK 
tax rate with that of Bangladesh and looked for ways to pay low or minimum taxes, 
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although they were attracted to the social welfare benefits of UK society (Section 
8.2.1). This contradiction indicated that Bangladeshi immigrant businesses 
oscillated between these two social fields, which between them produced a 
destabilized or divided tax habitus.  
Survey findings illustrated that immigrant businesses held positive attitudes to tax 
compliance, measured with three attitude components, including their 
perceptions of (a) the importance of tax compliance; (b) concern about tax 
compliance; and (c) feelings about tax compliance. These perceptions, however, 
varied with the social class position of immigrant businesses (Section 8.2.3).  
Three major patterns of perceptions emerged: first, immigrant business owners 
with low business capital and with academic qualifications from the UK thought 
tax compliance was important and they felt good when compliance was achieved; 
second, immigrant business owners with high capital and involved in political 
organizations viewed tax compliance as rather unimportant; and third, immigrant 
business owners with Bangladeshi academic qualifications and who were 
dependent on tax advisers were very concerned about their tax compliance 
obligations.  
The racial identity and social gap immigrant businesses faced in UK society made 
them feel outsiders in the UK, which undermined their motivation to engage with 
the tax system. It was observed by some business owners that the treatment they 
received from tax inspectors was not very pleasant (Section 8.3). They believed 
that tax compliance or even non-compliance would have been much easier if they 
did not have the social identity stigma of being an immigrant. This finding was 
consistent with that of Wenzel (2007) who states that people with inclusive social 
and national identity show greater concern for tax compliance and attribute 
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greater legitimacy to the tax system than those with subgroup identity. Wenzel 
(2007) also argues that tax ethics and a sense of shame and guilt are positively 
related to how a subgroup of taxpayers position themselves in society relative to 
other taxpayers and the tax authority.   
Racial prejudice was one significant factor given as a reason why most immigrant 
businesses depended on a Bangladeshi tax adviser. With racial identity, tax 
habitus was modified by the business owners’ ethical and moral standards.  It 
was found that some respondents felt that not paying taxes and sending money 
to Bangladesh was morally wrong and ethically demeaning when British society 
provided them with so many high-quality services and types of support, often free 
of charge (Section 8.4). Such an influence of morality and ethics on tax habitus, 
however, did not mean that immigrant businesses as taxpayers would not resort 
to conscious and unconscious tax compliance strategies. Strategic calculation 
was a part of performing an action which might not conflict with one’s moral and 
ethical norms.  
Class identity was another vital factor intertwined in the habitus-forming process. 
The research suggested that immigrant businesses’ tastes, behaviour and 
choices were the outcome of their class status (Section 8.5). In the interviews, 
the respondents related some of their behaviours, for example welfare 
dependence, to their immigrant class problems. Bangladeshi small businesses 
as a social or ethnic class were found to maintain a high social distance from 
British society. Life-style differences made them less willing to embrace the UK 
tax system. Even when the class position of a native and an immigrant business 
owner were the same in terms of their occupational category, the former was 
likely to hold more cultural capital than the latter. This matches the results of the 
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study by Huang et al. (2016), in which they argue that class and the overt social 
stratum occupied are deciding factors for immigrants to New Zealand in entering 
the accounting profession, along with the institutionalization of racial/ethnic 
discrimination.  
The research found that the social and historical trajectory through which a class 
of people made sense of the world had an impact on their tax habitus.  The 
research study proposes that, since habitus is class-based, tax compliance 
practice is also likely to be class-based (Sections 8.5 and 8.6). Thus, the tax 
compliance practices of Bangladeshi small businesses are likely not only to differ 
from those of native taxpayers but also likely to be different from those of other 
immigrant business communities in the UK because of the differences in their 
racial and class experiences.  
9.4 Overall Study Findings and Contribution 
 
There has been ample research examining the effect of demographic and 
ideological variables on tax compliance attitudes; but there is little research on 
how taxpayers’ identity as immigrants creates challenges as they fulfil their tax 
obligations in a new social context ( North and Trlin, 2004; de Vries, 2007; 
Constant and Zimmermann, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013; Inland Revenue, New 
Zealand, 2014). This research contributes to the relevant body of knowledge by 
providing empirical evidence on the tax compliance practices of immigrant 
businesses and the struggles they face in engaging with the tax system of a new 
social field. This study adds a new knowledge on immigration literature at a time 
when immigrants constitute 3.3 per cent of global population and greater rate is 
anticipated for the future (United Nations, 2015). Growing migrations in cities not 
only leave them with growing population but also with growing tax bases. 
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Knowledge on immigrants’ tax attitude would enable the tax authorities to better 
exploit the tax revenues.  
The key contribution of the thesis is to the development and application of 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the study of immigrant businesses’ tax 
compliance behaviours. As elaborated in Chapter 4, this thesis has drawn on 
Bourdieu’s social theory and has documented the interplay of his conceptual triad 
of capitals, habitus and field in the fulfilment of tax compliance activities by 
immigrants in an unfamiliar social space (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu et al., 1994; Ojo et al., 2013; Lebaron, 2014; Li, 2010). 
This research has provided empirical evidence that immigrant businesses’ 
perceptions about the host country’s tax system are grounded in their 
sociocultural and economic status, inherited from their own countries, which are 
likely to change as they assimilate the culture of the destination society (see also 
Ignatow, 2009; Terjesen and Elam, 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo, 2010; Drori et al., 
2010; Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016).  
This research argues that tax compliance, like other social practices, is 
intertwined with taxpayers’ racial and class positions, and how they perform it is 
likely to be unconsciously conditioned by the thoughts and beliefs acquired from 
the various social fields they have traversed. Based on the empirical evidence 
(Sections 8.2.3, 8.3 and 8.5) and Bourdieusian argument, the study suggests that 
the way Bangladeshi immigrant businesses behave in response to their tax 
compliance obligations may not only differ from that of the native business 
taxpayers but also from that of other immigrant businesses in the UK.  
While the study argues that low knowledge levels of bookkeeping, and less 
chances for tax planning are major problems for immigrant business tax 
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compliance, it acknowledges that they are not uniquely Bangladeshi small 
business issue. Review of international tax literature (Rothengatter, 2005; 
Greenhalgh and Lowry, 2011; Kamleitner et al., 2012; Pabon and Klima, 2017) 
suggests that they remain as common problem for small business taxation, 
whether owned by immigrant or non-immigrants families. The significance of this 
findings in the particular context of the Bangladeshi immigrant businesses is that 
due to the huge dependence on Bangladeshi community for workers and to help 
them with payroll taxes, maintaining proper documents becomes difficult (Section 
6.3.4). Added to this is the financial burden of supporting families back in 
Bangladesh make them indulge in document manufacturing and evasive tax 
practice (Section 6.4.6). 
In this connection, the study further claims that the huge volume of illegal cash 
transactions and the resultant tax evasion is mainly an economic problem; for the 
business owners, the motivation for this is to reduce cost of business and for the 
worker is to save income. Businesses having cash transactions tend to have no 
records, suggesting that having cash and having no records go together and 
cannot be separated. This is consistent with other studies e.g., Haynes et al. 
1999. Further, HMRC (2018) are aware that small businesses make up the 
largest proportion of unpaid tax and this research adds to our understanding of 
why this is the case. 
The study found that lack of trust with some tax advisors would cause clients to 
incur a greater tax liability. Lack of trust is one of the reasons for confusion and 
disputes between them which creates difficulties in the working relationship 
(Sections 7.5.1 and7.6.3). Untrustworthy tax practice gets worse when the tax 
advisers charge high exit fees and threatens to disclose business secrets to tax 
authority. Both the tax advisers and the tax advisers in the interview believed that 
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trust and cooperation stimulate mutual benefits and ultimately improve tax 
compliance actions (Section 7.5.6). Finally, this study adds to our understanding 
of how family ownership and management influence tax compliance practices by 
immigrant businesses and the influence of the tax advisers on them. 
 
9.5 Implications for Theory 
  
The thesis has fulfilled its main research goal of helping us understand tax 
compliance practices in the specific context of Bangladeshi immigrant family 
businesses in the UK. It has shown the importance and relevance of Bourdieu’s 
sociological approaches to the formation and maintenance of immigrants’ ethnic 
and group image during the acculturation process in a foreign country where they 
constantly face questions about race, class and identity (Shannon and Escamilla, 
1999; Smallbone et al., 2005; Perry, 2012; Wallace, 2016).  
In this thesis, the structure of the tax field, the host country institutional context, 
and its mechanism of operation were presented from a relational perspective to 
demonstrate the formation of tax habitus of the immigrant communities (Figure 
4.1). The sociological reasoning behind the tax field and habitus is reflexive and 
potentially circular or bidirectional, which means that the tax habitus of 
Bangladeshi immigrant businesses affects the UK tax field, and in return the UK 
tax field affects the tax habitus of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses (Jenkins, 
1992; Sweetman, 2009; Reay, 2004).  
The findings of the research study were broadly consistent with Bourdieu’s 
theory. For example, Bourdieu’s argument that different forms of capital have a 
significant role in how people configure their strategies and actions in the field 
proved to be useful in this study. The research showed that people’s perceptions 
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of the tax system differed widely according to the stocks and the quality of their 
capital (Section 6.4.3, figures 8.1-8.6, Section 8.2.3). 
In consistent with Bourdieu’ philosophy, the research found that first-generation 
Bangladeshi British who had no idea about income tax had adapted to the UK tax 
system through years of interaction, working and living in the UK (Sections 6.4.4 
and 8.2). This transformation of beliefs and actions to tax compliance by 
Bangladeshis might have been triggered by the various influences these people 
underwent in the social and tax fields of the UK. At the same time, immigrant 
business owners who felt uprooted in the UK (Section 6.4.2) or constantly 
compared life, tax rates and the tax system in the UK with those of Bangladesh 
(Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.3) represented a cleft or divided habitus, which meant 
they found it problematic to fully participate in the UK tax system (Ingram and 
Jessie, 2016; Thatcher and Halvorsrud, 2016).  
The reproduction of hierarchy in the tax professional-client relationship was 
another area where the Bourdieusian view made a positive contribution to theory. 
The evidence that tax advisers exercised power in controlling taxpayers’ tax 
decisions (Section 7.5.3) and used professional knowledge as an instrument of 
symbolic domination (Section 7.5.4) supported Bourdieu’s proposition that power 
acts as one of the governing dimensions in everyday social life. Fogarty and 
Jones’s (2014) observation is similar to this finding. They state that tax 
professionals’ knowledge has a special meaning and creative ability in furnishing 
resources to clients by strategically putting such knowledge in the context of tax 
determination.     
Where this thesis differs with Bourdieu is over the impact of ethics and morality 
on the formation of habitus. The thesis argues that in a country of high tax morale 
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and ethics like the UK (see Section 2.5.2), violation of tax laws is highly likely to 
affect moral dispositions or tax habitus (Section 8.4). For instance, there were 
some respondents who expressed concern and remorse about evasive tax 
practices by immigrant businesses (Section 8.4, fourth paragraph). One 
respondent felt morally persuaded to comply with the UK’s income tax laws and 
pay tax – “the government gives me service, I should pay some money” – as he 
commented. This contradicts Bourdieu’s rigid and overly deterministic concept of 
habitus, which restricts the possibility of social mobility or social change, except 
at the margins (Ebrahim, 2003; Reay, 2004).  
An important implication of the study findings is that the global tax authorities 
need to consider that immigrants are a separate community of taxpayers. 
Immigrants in the lower socio-economic group usually suffer from poor education 
and social network. For them, it is particularly difficult to manage access to quality 
information, keep proper accounting records and fulfil the bureaucratic 
requirement of taxation. Establishment of community-based tax and accounting 
help centres is likely to increase their tax knowledge and may encourage them to 
be more transparent about their business and economic activities.  However, 
state funded tax education programme can be one way a help them overcoming 
this difficulty but at the end it is legal responsibility of the immigrant communities 
to educate and socialize themselves with the tax system. Immigrants should bear 
in mind that tax compliance is a strong evidence for their intention of being a good 
immigrant. 
 
In summary, the findings of the thesis could be understood from different 
perspectives and theoretical angles; but in uncovering the mental and social 
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structures of the tax compliance behaviours of an immigrant community, 
Bourdieu’s ideas and concepts were found to be more contested than others.    
 
9.6 Generalizability of Study Findings   
 
Immigrant communities across the world have many things in common, such as 
social isolation and economic difficulties (Section 3.2.2). Immigrant businesses 
are increasingly dependent on their own community for business and tax advice, 
and they display similar attitudes to tax compliance management. The 
international literature suggests that a complex tax system is a problem for 
immigrant businesses in almost all countries (Section 1.1). The literature also 
indicates that the cultural and social practices of many immigrant communities 
are similar in many respects (Section 3.2.3).  For example, Bangladeshi 
immigrants have much in common with Indian and Pakistani immigrants in terms 
of religious, cultural and economic habits. According to Moxon (2004), British 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian (Muslim) enclaves have tended to be 
homogeneous during the last two generations and have re-created the traditional 
life they used to live “back home”. These similarities between the communities 
indicate some possibilities that the results of the thesis may be relevant to these 
wider groups of immigrant businesses as well as to Bangladeshi businesses.   
It must, however, be remembered that, according to Bourdieusian arguments, 
immigrant businesses with different historical, cultural and economic trajectories 
may exhibit a different tax habitus and different relational dynamics with their tax 
advisers. It is also important to consider that, despite immigrant communities 
having common features, each of them has its own class experience, education 
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and racial identity. Therefore, the study findings need to be verified when the 
study context differs.  
The analytical framework, research design and sampling methods of this 
research also impinge on the generalizability of the study findings in aspects other 
than contextual factors. The study used a mixed methods research design and 
conducted a field survey, in addition to in-depth face-to-face interviews (Section 
5.5.3). The high response rate of 72% meant that the external validity (Section 
5.6.3) and factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (Sections 7.5.1 and 
8.2.3) supported the reliability and construct validity of the data – necessary 
conditions for the generalizability of research findings. In the case of interviews, 
maximum variance sampling was followed and interviews were conducted until a 
saturation of information was reached (Section 5.6.2), which is an essential 
condition for the analytic generalizability of qualitative data.  However, the large 
number of survey participants from catering businesses (Section 6.2) may not 
reflect the reality of other immigrant business communities. This may negatively 
impact on the generalizability of the study.  
9.7 Limitations of the Study 
 
While the research problem was studied with a sound research method, there 
were some limitations to the study that need to be acknowledged. First, the 
variables chosen for factor analysis were measured from a survey questionnaire, 
and in this, method bias is very common. Survey-based studies have the 
limitation of using perceptual data rather than the actual behaviour of the 
respondents. The study took 11 variables to measure the nature of relationships 
between tax advisers and immigrant businesses, but these respondents were 
busy and often insecure in discussing tax compliance issues with an outsider 
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(Sections 5.12 and 5.13).  As a result, the study may have omitted factors that 
might have had an important bearing on the tax professional-client relationship. 
However, to mitigate this problem, survey techniques were followed carefully to 
ensure that the measurements of variables were accurate. Most variables were 
measured through multiple-item questions and the reliability measures for each 
of them were satisfactory. Furthermore, the first factor accounted for 22.35%, 
second factor accounted 16.72%, third factor accounted for 14.33% and the 
fourth factor accounted for 10.33% of variance in the sample (Section 7.5.1).  
Second, the study sample was small, and the research was conducted within the 
context of small Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK. The results of studies 
of other immigrant business communities in the UK or in other countries might be 
different. Dobbins (2005) argues that countries usually differ significantly in 
several dimensions. Thus, findings arrived at in UK society may not fully apply to 
small immigrant businesses in other countries. The purposive sampling was also 
a limitation for the generalizability of the study findings. To mitigate this problem, 
participants were selected from different regions of the UK, for better 
representation of the study population. Moreover, it is possible for purposive 
sampling to be successfully used to perform unbiased estimates of the surveyed 
population (Hirsh, 2016).  
Third, some survey questions in the study were asked directly with yes-no answer 
choices. There is a criticism that direct questions limit the answer choices of 
respondents and may fail to capture valuable information. Similarly, there were 
some variables measured with single item questions. There are however ample 
examples in taxation and in other studies based on questionnaire survey where 
direct and single item questions have been successfully used to produce 
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scholarly academic works (Section 5.10). Moreover, this research collected 
qualitative data through in-depth interviews to supplement quantitative data and 
consolidate the research findings.  
9.8 Future Research 
  
Research into immigrant businesses’ engagement with the tax system using 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice as a guiding framework seems to be novel in fiscal 
sociology. This research considered only one case, small Bangladeshi family 
business taxpayers. Future research might focus on taking multiple immigrant 
communities to explore how tax compliance practices and tax adviser-taxpayer 
relationships differ in distinct cultural and social contexts. Besides small family 
businesses, as used in this study, future research could focus on large or medium 
sized businesses whose possession of economic and social capital would be 
higher than that of small businesses. This research did not address the 
significance of symbolic capital. Future research could examine how symbolic 
capital develops from the other three forms of capital and influences tax attitudes. 
The sample size in this study was small. It is suggested that future studies 
consider a larger data set comprising more variables and extend it to other 
immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and North America, to gain a more 
comprehensive view of the problem. Further research could compare a native 
and an immigrant community to see how their tax habitus differed from each 
other. Future research could also use different analytical methods to test whether 
there exist different degrees of influence for each of the factors used in measuring 
the nature of the relationship between tax advisers and taxpayers. An exciting 
area of future research would be to examine the transformation of tax attitudes 
and the shifting meaning of tax compliance over immigrants across generations.  
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To conclude, this research was carried out from the standpoint of immigrant 
taxpayers and immigrant tax advisers. The views of the tax administration and 
other social and economic agents actively engaged in the tax and economic fields 
were not consulted. Conversations with other stakeholders could open new 
layers of tax compliance narratives about immigrant communities. Finally, the 
study of the tax habitus of family owned immigrant businesses may be different 
from that of non-family immigrant businesses, another potential topic for future 
research. 
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I would be grateful for any information and assistance that you can provide to Mr Akhand. 
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Professor Lynne Oats 
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Email: L.M.Oats@exeter.ac.uk 
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A2: Research participation and consent form  
My name is Zakir Akhand; I am a PhD candidate in the University of Exeter.  My 
research looks at the tax compliance behaviour of immigrant family businesses 
in the UK, taking Bangladeshi Businesses as the case. This research involves a 
survey for which I need your participation. All information gathered will be strictly 
confidential, and will be stored according to standard research ethics. I can 
assure you that the outcome of this research will not contain any details by which 
participants can be identified. Also, if you would like a copy of the study, please 
provide me with your address and I will send you a copy when it is published. It 
would be appreciated if you would provide your answers to this survey within the 
next two weeks.   
Your participation in this project is completely voluntary and you may refuse to 
participate at any time. If you have any questions about this research, you can 
call me at my cell number (07825018651) or email me (zha202@exeter.ac.uk). 
You may also contact my dissertation supervisor, Professor Lynne Oats, (email -
L.M.Oats@exeter.ac.uk, Tel: +44(0) 1392 726267) if you have questions about 
your rights as a participant in this study. If you agree to participate in this research 
project, please sign below: 
 
I agree to participate in the survey/interview:  
 
[Circle one]: 
 
Yes   No 
__________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
Participant's signature   Date   Investigator's signature  Date 
 
__________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
Participant's name:     Investigator's name: 
 
Participant’s age: 
 
Participant’s organization: 
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A3: Ethics Form:  University of Exeter Business School  
This form is to be completed by PGR student and signed by the primary project supervisor.  Only 
students with a lead supervisor in the Business School can apply for ethics clearance to the 
Business School ethics panel.  Those with a lead supervisor in another school or institution should 
seek advice from their relevant ethics panels.   
When completing the form be mindful that the purpose of the document is to clearly explain the 
ethical considerations of the research being undertaken.   Please include relevant and adequate 
detail for the ethics review panel to make their decisions about the ethical considerations you 
have made for your project.  Please note that it is the responsibility of the student and supervisors 
to identify where their research may raise ethical issues, familiarise themselves with the ethics 
procedures and submit their work for review well in advance of starting their project. 
Retrospective ethics applications will not be considered.   
Once completed, please submit the form electronically to and post a hard copy to Business 
School Research Office, Forms will only be forwarded for approval once the hard-copy has 
been received.  
University of Exeter’s Ethics policy relating to research 
 
The University of Exeter is research intensive and dedicated to furthering knowledge in a 
responsible and exacting manner. In the conduct of research by academic staff and students 
the University strives to protect the safety, rights, dignity, confidentiality and anonymity 
(except where covered by an appropriate protocol) of research subjects, the welfare of 
animals and the sustainability of the environment. The University also endeavours to 
safeguard the wellbeing, rights and academic freedom of researchers and the reputation of 
the University as a centre for properly conducted, high quality research. The University 
maintains a separate Code of Good Practice in the Conduct of Research which it requires all 
researchers to follow26. 
 
Ethical issues are manifest in a wide variety of research activities and arise especially when 
the conduct of research involves the interests and rights of others. The adoption of an ethical 
position in respect of such research requires that the researcher observes and protects the 
rights of would-be participants and systematically acts to permit the participants to exercise 
those rights in full accordance with UK law. Ethical practice in such cases requires that 
participants and/or legal guardians, at a minimum, be fully informed, free to Volunteer, free to 
opt out at any time without redress, and be fully protected in regard to safety according to the 
limits of best practice. The Business School follows the policy set by the University of Exeter. 
 
The University also upholds principles of integrity and the need for researchers to be honest 
in respect of their own actions in research and their responses to the actions of other 
researchers. Researchers will be required to comply with requests to the University under the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 and practice openness in their research endeavours 
wherever possible.  
 
Part A: Background of the research project 
Title of project 
 
Tax Compliance in Immigrant Communities: Bangladeshis in 
the UK 
                                                          
26 http://www.exeter.ac.uk/research/toolkit/throughout/goodpractice/ 
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Name of lead researcher / 
Primary investigator for this 
project and affiliation 
Md Zakir Hossain Akhand 
PhD Student, Department of Accounting  
Business School, University of Exeter  
Name(s) of other researchers 
and affiliation (s) 
1. Professor Lynne Oats, Department of Accounting  
2. Dr Gregory Morris, Lecturer, Department of Accounting   
Start and estimated end date 
of project 
November 14, 2014 to November 30, 2017 
Source of funding for the 
project  
From the PGR budget 
Is this application being made 
prior to a grant application? 
Which funder? 
No 
Aims and objectives of the 
project 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the research is to understand tax compliance and the 
tax risk management practices of small immigrant family business, 
taking Bangladeshi businesses in the UK as the case. The specific 
objectives are (1) to identify the aspects of tax compliance most 
problematic for Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK and to 
understand their perceptions of tax system complexity; (2) to examine 
the extent of dependence and the nature of the relationship between 
tax advisers and Bangladeshi family businesses in the UK in 
managing tax risk and achieving tax compliance; and (3) to explore 
the tax habitus of Bangladeshi immigrant businesses in the UK by 
examining the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors influencing 
tax compliance disposition in the hostland. In exploring the research 
problem, Bourdieu’s theory of practice will be employed. Therefore, at 
the empirical level, this study will draw upon aspects and insights of 
sociological and institutional interactions in the tax field and provide 
an interpretation of social norms, culture and tax compliance. 
Is the main applicant employed 
by the UEBS for the duration of 
this project?  
Note: only researchers 
employed by the Business 
School can apply for ethics 
clearance by the UEBS ethics 
panel. 
Yes  
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Part B: Ethical Assessment 
 
Please complete the following questions in relation to your research project. If you answer Yes to 
any of the sections, please elaborate  
   
 Yes No 
Research that may need to be reviewed by NHS NRES Committee or an 
external Ethics committee (If yes please provide details as an annex) 
 No 
Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through the NHS or 
the use of NHS data or premises and/ or equipment? 
 No 
Does the study involve participants age 16 or over are unable to give 
informed consent? (e.g. People with learning disabilities: see mental 
Capacity Act 2005.  All research that falls under the auspices MCA must 
be reviewed by NHS NRES) 
 No 
Research that may need a full review  No 
Does the research involve other vulnerable groups: children, those with 
cognitive impairment, or those unequal relationships? (e.g. your own 
students) 
Have you read the appropriate Act; ethical practices governing research 
with the group you aim to study? 
 No 
Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access 
to the groups or individuals to be recruited? (e.g. students at school, 
members of self-help group, residents of a nursing home?) 
 No 
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their 
knowledge and consent at the time? (e.g. covert observation of people 
in non-public places?) 
 No 
Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics? (e.g. sexual activity, 
drug use) 
 No 
Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, 
vitamins) to be administered to the study participants, or will the study 
involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind? 
 No 
Will tissue samples (including blood) be obtained from participants?  No 
Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study?  No 
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Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or 
negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life? 
 No 
Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?  No 
Will the research involve administrative or secure data that requires 
permission from the appropriate authorities before use? 
 No 
Is there a possibility that the safety of the researcher may be in question? 
(e.g. in international research: locally employed research assistants) 
 No 
Does the research involve members of the public in a research capacity?  No 
Will the research take place outside the UK?  No 
Will the research involve respondents to the internet or other visual/ 
vocal methods where respondents may be identified? (i.e. through the 
findings) 
 No 
Will research involve the sharing of data or confidential information 
beyond the initial consent given? 
 No 
Will financial or other inducements (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to the participants? 
 No 
[ESRC ethics initial checklist27] 
Part C: Further and brief details for any sections answered ‘Yes’. If you answered ‘yes’ to 
any of the above sections, please elaborate with detail here.  Each in turn. 
 
 
Part D: Project Summary (Ethical Considerations) 
Provide an overall summary of the Research that will be employed in the study and 
methods that will be used (no more than 250 words) 
As mentioned above, this research aims at understanding the tax compliance and tax 
risk issues of small immigrant family businesses in the UK.  In achieving this objective, 
the research will first look at how tax complexity affects the tax compliance behaviours 
of small immigrant businesses in the UK.  It will then examine how tax professionals 
influence tax risk management practices in immigrant businesses in the UK. Finally, 
the research will investigate the tax habitus of Bangladeshi small businesses in the 
UK by considering their socio-economic and ethno-cultural identities in British society.  
In exploring the research problem, new sociological institutionalism, drawing upon 
aspects of social norms and culture will be applied.  
The study will be based on mixed methods research. Specifically, semi-structured 
interviews will be conducted along with open-ended questionnaires. Data collection 
will be accomplished from November 4, 2015 to January 15, 2016 in the UK. For 
                                                          
27 ESRC ethics initial checklist, Framework for Research Ethics (FRE), (2010). 
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selecting the respondents, the researcher will depend on purposive sampling among 
small Bangladeshi family businesses. Interviews will be conducted face-to-face and 
by telephone and will be recorded by using a recording mechanism subject to the 
approval of the interviewees. The researcher will not engage anyone to assist in the 
collection and transcription of data. For analysis of interview data, Nvivo-20 will be 
used. 
Part E: Ethical Considerations for method(s). 
List each of the methods you aim to use to recruit participants and describe the methods you 
will use to gain their ‘informed consent’ (If written consent will not be obtained for any of your 
methods, this must be justified). At the least the following should be considered for each 
method. 
- Confidential and anonymity for all participants and organisations 
 
- Storing of data according to the UK Data Protection Act and also any additional provisions 
you have to make for the data in other countries where your study is based. [Note: If the 
project inVolves obtaining or processing personal data relating to living individuals, (e.g. by 
recording interviews with subjects even if the findings will subsequently be made 
anonymous), you will need to ensure that the provisions of the Data Protection Act are 
complied with. In particular you will need to seek advice to ensure that the subjects provide 
sufficient consent and that the personal data will be properly stored, for an appropriate period 
of time.] 
 
- Voluntary participation following informed consent  
 
- Please attach a copy of every Information Statement and Consent Form that will be 
used, including translation if research is to be conducted with non-English speakers.  
Document in verbatim to be provided in cases where consent is to be obtained 
verbally. 
 
- Confidential and anonymity for all 
participants and organisations 
Statement attached  
- Data will be stored according to the 
UK Data Protection Act 
Statement attached  
- Voluntary participation following 
informed consent will be ensured  
Statement attached   
 
Will there be any possible harm that your project may cause to participants (e.g. psychological 
distress or repercussions of a legal, political or economic nature)? What precautions will be taken 
to minimise the risk of harm to participants? 
 
Part F: Data protection 
How will you ensure the security of the data collected? What will happen to the data at the end 
of the project, (if retained, where and how long for).  Please follow guidelines provided by the 
No, there is no possibility that the project will cause any mental harm or stress to the 
respondents. 
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University of Exeter on Data protection to complete this section 
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/recordsmanagement/. 
I will not disclose /use data except for the purpose of the research. Only I, as the 
researcher, will have access to the medium on which primary data is stored and they 
will be secured when not in use. The transcriptions will be stored in the university 
database on the u-drive and will be password protected. They will only be used for 
academic purposes and strict confidentiality will be maintained at all stages of the 
research.  
 
Part G: Notes and Additional Information: Please provide any additional 
information which may be used to assess your application in the space 
below. 
 
 
 
 
Part G: Checklist: Please ensure that all sections are ticked before submission.  The form 
will be rejected without review if any sections are incomplete. 
All sections A, B, C (if relevant), 
D,E,F and G (if relevant) in this 
form have been completed 
yes The study has not started yet yes 
Number of methods to be used 
(note each below and place in 
tick in the box for consent forms 
attached to application form) 
yes The form has been signed and 
dated by the principle 
investigator/ lead 
researcher/supervisor 
yes 
Any other relevant documents 
have been attached (e.g. copies 
of CRB certificates)  
N/A Other attachments: none 
Where an ethics application has 
also been submitted to an 
external ethics panel (NRES) 
copies of approval letters have 
been attached 
N/A   
 
Signatures:  
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I have considered all ethical implications for this project and declared all the relevant aspects for 
consideration of the University of Exeter Business School ethics panel.  
Name:  Md Zakir Hossain Akhand                                             (PhD candidate) 
Signature: Signed by Email (Md Zakir Hossain Akhand) 
Date: 28/10/2015 
 
 
Part D: Supervisor’s Declaration 
As the supervisor for this research I can confirm that I believe that all research ethics issues have been considered in 
accordance with the University Ethics Policy and relevant research ethics guidelines.  
Name: Professor Lynne Oats                                                                (Primary Supervisor) 
Signature:  
Date:28/10/2015 
 
For administration use only: Ethical Approval 
 
Comments of Research Ethics Officer and 
Research Strategy Group. 
[Note: Have potential risks have been 
adequately considered and minimised in the 
research? Does the significance of the study 
warrant these risks being taken? Are there any 
other precautions you would recommend?] 
 
This project has considered the key issues of 
protecting participant data.  I am satisfied that 
the researcher has taken due precautions. I 
presume the research refers to NVivo-11, 
which is the latest version of this software. 
This project has been reviewed according to School procedures and has now been approved.  
Name:         Adrian R. Bailey                         (Research Ethics Officer) 
Signature:  
Date:  30th October 2015 
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A4:1 Interview Guide 
 
Introduction: A brief explanation of the purpose of the research and the identity 
of the researcher will be made, and an assurance given of full confidentiality/ 
anonymization of the data and requested records. 
The following are examples of some general and specific questions to be put to 
family business owners and the tax advisers. This list is not exhaustive: 
    
Broad questions to small business owners:    
1. Could you tell me a little about your business and yourself?   
2. Who looks at the income tax activities of your business?  
3. What are your views about the UK tax system?  
4. How do you feel when you pay income tax?  
 
Specific questions to small business owners:  
1. What are some of the issues of the UK tax system that influence your 
income tax compliance?  
2. In complying with income tax, which aspects of the tax laws create 
problems?  Why do you think that ----- is a problem and complicates your 
tax payment decisions?   
3. What strategies do you normally apply to overcome these problems? 
4. Do you have any ideas about what may be the consequences of not 
paying income tax?  
5. What sort of tax risk do you face in running your business? What do you 
usually do in identifying the tax risk?  
6. Do you think that cultural norms and practices influence tax compliance 
behaviour? 
7. How does the economic conditions of an individual impact on his/her 
engagement with the UK society and its tax system?   
8. Do you think that social status of an individual is a factor for his/her 
understanding of tax liabilities?   
9. In your opinion, how do your class positions in the UK affect your tax 
compliance attitude? 
10. Do you have a tax advisor?  What’s your experience with the tax advisor 
so far?  
11. How much do you agree or disagree with the recommendations of your 
tax adviser? What happens when you are not satisfied with your tax 
advice?  
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12. Have you ever been in a conflict with your tax adviser? What are some of 
the reasons for conflicts and how do you manage them? 
13. How do you value your relationship with your tax adviser?  
14. Have you ever sought any help / put any queries to HMRC, local tax 
clinic?  What was your experience of this interaction?  
 
 
Broad questions to tax advisers:  
 
1. How long have you been working as a tax adviser?  
2. What professional qualifications do you have?  
3. Do you have a professional license and membership of professional 
bodies? 
 
Specific questions to tax advisers:  
 
1. Would you please describe the income tax compliance behaviour of 
small Bangladeshi owned family businesses?  
2. In your opinion, what are the major difficulties they face in paying income 
tax? 
3. Why do you think that ---- emerges as a major difficulty for them? 
4. What sort of questions do they ask when you present them with the draft 
tax return for their business? Can you give an example? 
5. Do you find it hard to explain the tax return to them?  
6. Do they cooperate you by supplying the documents you ask for from 
them?  
7. How aware are they about the consequences of not paying income tax? 
Do they have any idea about the risks they may face if they don’t pay 
income tax?  
8. Do you think that cultural norms and practices influence tax compliance 
behaviour? 
9. How does the economic conditions of an individual impact on his/her 
engagement with the UK society and its tax system?   
10. Do you think that social status of an individual is a factor for his/her 
understanding of tax liabilities?   
11. In your opinion, how do the class positions of the Bangladeshis in the UK 
affect their tax compliance attitude? 
12. How much do they agree or disagree with the recommendations you 
make to them? What happens when they are not satisfied with your tax 
advice?  
13. Have you ever been in a conflict with a tax client? What are some of the 
reasons for conflicts and how do you manage them?  
14. How do you value your relationship with your tax clients?  
 
 
 
Appendix Table A4.2 List of interview questions with related literature and 
Bourdieusian concepts   
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Constructs/Dimension Related Bourdieusian/other literature Interview Q 
No 
Questions to 
Taxpayers  
 
Perception about tax 
system  
Carnes and Cuccia (1996); Ulph (2014) 
modified  
Broad Q 3 
Tax compliance  Christian and Alm (2014); Chau and 
Leung,2009 
Broad Q 4 
Tax system difficulty  Schenk (2011) Specific Q 1 
Problematic aspects of 
tax compliance   
Yong (2011); Ingraham et al. (2005); 
Carnes and Cuccia (1996) modified 
Specific Q 2  
Tax planning   Russo (2010); Shailer (1993); Yong 
(2011) 
Specific Q 3 
Tax compliance 
knowledge  
Kamleitner et al. (2012) modified  Specific Q 4 
Tax risk and its 
management  
Neto (2017); PwC (2004)  Specific Q 5 
Cultural norms and tax 
compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Yong (2011) Specific Q 6  
Economic conditions 
and compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Bourdieu et al. 
(Becker (1968) 
Specific Q 7 
Social status and tax 
compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Grasmick and Scott 
(1982) 
Specific Q 8 
Class positions and tax 
compliance  
Bourdieu (1999); Bourdieu (1984) Specific Q 9 
Tax adviser-Taxpayer 
relationship  
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003); 
Bourdieu (1990) 
Specific Q 10 
Satisfaction with tax 
advice  
Pabon and Klima (2017) modified  Specific Q 7 
Conflicts in tax advice   Bourdieu et al. (1994) Specific Q 12 
Relationship Dynamics  Bourdieu (1990); Bourdieu et al. (1994)  Specific Q 13 
Perceptions about 
taxpayer service  
Rothengatter (2005); Tsai and Yang 
(2015) modified  
Specific Q 14 
Questions to tax 
advisers  
 
Professional experience  Inland Revenue, New Zealand (2014); 
Carney (2007); Thatcher and 
Halvorsrud, 2016) 
Broad Q 1 
Professional knowledge 
and skills  
Bourdieu (1998); (Ebrahim,2003) Broad Q 2 
Professional authority  Bradley (2004); Allen (1991) modified  Broad Q 3 
Tax compliance attitude  Christian and Alm (2014); Chau and 
Leung,2009 
Specific Q 1 
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Perceptions about Tax 
complexity  
Schenk, 2011; Carnes and Cuccia 
(1996) 
Specific Q 2 
Levels of tax knowledge  Kamleitner et al. (2012) Specific   Q 5  
Cooperation  Togler (2007); Kirchler (2007) Specific Q 6  
Tax risk and its 
management 
Neto (2017); PwC (2004) Specific Q 7 
Cultural norms and tax 
compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Yong (2011) Specific Q 8  
Economic conditions 
and compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Bourdieu et al. 
(Becker (1968) 
Specific Q 9 
Social status and tax 
compliance  
Bourdieu (1986); Grasmick and Scott 
(1982) modified  
Specific Q 10 
Class positions and tax 
compliance 
Bourdieu (1999); Bourdieu (1984) Specific Q 11 
Mutual respect and trust  Fantasia (2010); Grenfell (2008); Sayer 
(2010) 
Specific Q 12 
Pressure and conflict  Bourdieu et al. (1994); Fogatry and 
Jones (2014); Beckert (2010) 
Specific Q 13 
Nature of professional 
relationship  
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003); 
Bourdieu (1990) modified  
Specific Q 14 
Note: Some questions, for example, broad question 1 and 2 to taxpayers, and 
specific questions 3 and 4 to tax professionals were asked for clarifications and 
in-depth exploration of a topic.   
 
 
A5: Survey Questionnaire  
[1] What is the name of your organization/company? 
Please write your answer here: 
[2] Is this business owned by you and/or your family members? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  No 
[3] How many employees are there in your business?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
  10-20   20-30   30-40   40-50 
[4] What is the total capital of your business (in British Pounds)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 below 100,000 
 100,000-200,000 
 200,000-300,000 
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 300,000- 400,000 
 400,000- 500,000 
 above 500,000 but ≤ 1,000,000 
[5] To which business sector do you belong? 
 Catering  
 Groceries  
 Transport   
 Other  
[6] What is the organizational form of your business 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Company 
 Partnership  
 Sole proprietorship  
 Cooperative  
 Other  
[7] Do you have a tax adviser to help with your income tax activities?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Hired tax adviser  
 In-house tax adviser  
 Both 
[8] Who do you consult when you have an income-tax-related problem? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Friends 
 Accountants  
 Community leaders 
 Government offices 
 Family members 
 Others [please specify] 
[9] Do you hold any of the following positions to serve your community?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Member or participant of a cultural organization 
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 Member or participant of a social organization 
 Member or participant of a political organization 
[10] Do you have a friend or relative who is socially important?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes   No 
[11] What academic qualification do you hold?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 UK school certificate 
 UK undergraduate 
 UK master’s 
 Bangladeshi school certificate 
 Bangladeshi undergraduate 
 Bangladeshi master’s 
 Other [please specify] 
[12] Which of the following types of music do you like to listen to most?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Bangladeshi music 
 Hindi music 
 English music 
 Other [please specify] 
[13] Do you attend the cultural events (exhibitions, fairs, Diwali, etc.) of 
other ethnic communities? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  No 
[14] What is the ownership status of the house you live in? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Owned by you or your family 
 Rented 
 Other [please specify] 
[15] Which of these places or events do you like to visit most? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Museum  
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 Art Gallery  
 Concert  
 Cinema  
 Community festivals/fairs 
 None  
[16] Does your business have any brand or logo which is widely known in 
your business community?    
Please choose only one of the following: 
Yes   No  
[17] Do you feel that the income tax laws related to your business are 
ambiguous?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes  No 
[18] How do you feel when you pay income tax?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very good 
 Good 
 Uncertain 
 Not good  
 Not very good  
[19] In your opinion, how complicated is the UK tax system?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very complicated 
 Complicated  
 Uncertain 
 Not complicated  
 Not complicated at all 
[20] How difficult is it for you to deal with the tax system of the UK?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very difficult 
 Difficult 
 Uncertain 
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 Not difficult 
 Not difficult at all 
[21] Which aspect of UK income tax law causes most problems for your 
business?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Determination of taxable income 
 Calculation of tax 
 Book-keeping and accounting 
 Frequent changes in tax law 
  Tax filing procedure 
 Other [please specify]  
[22] For which of the following reasons do you go to a tax adviser?    
Please choose only one of the following: 
 The tax return is confusing 
  Busy with the business 
 You don’t understand tax law 
 Tax language is not easy 
 Tax inspectors/tax officials are not helpful 
 Other [please specify] 
[23] How concerned are you about your income tax filing? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very concerned     
 Concerned  
 Uncertain 
 Not concerned   
 Not concerned at all  
[24] How important do you think it is to pay income tax?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very important 
 Important 
 Uncertain 
 Not important 
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 Not important at all  
[25] Do you have a documented plan to manage tax risks of your 
business?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes   No 
[26] How often does your tax adviser update you about risks in tax 
activities? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very often  
 Often 
 Uncertain   
 Not often  
 Not very often 
[27] Have you ever been agitated with your tax adviser for any of his tax 
decisions?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes   No 
 [28] How easily can you consult with your tax adviser to discuss a tax 
issue?   
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very easily  
 Easily 
 Uncertain   
 Not easily   
 Not very easily 
[29] Do you feel pressurised by your tax adviser to undertake risky tax 
activities?  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item 
 Yes   Uncertain   No  
[30] How trustworthy is your tax adviser regarding your income tax 
management (filing, tax payment etc.)?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very trustworthy  
 Trustworthy  
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 Uncertain  
 Not trustworthy  
 Not trustworthy at all  
[31] To what extent do you agree that you seek tax advise due to 
uncertainty about income tax regulations?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Highly agree 
 Somewhat agree 
 Uncertain 
 Disagree 
 Fully disagree 
[32] How often do you feel impressed at the level of professional 
knowledge your tax adviser has? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Almost always 
 Sometimes 
 Once in a while 
 Rarely 
 Never 
[33] Do you think that it is important for a tax adviser to have a 
professional tax license? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item 
 Yes    No  
 [34] How satisfied are you with your tax adviser?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Uncertain 
 Not satisfied 
 Not satisfied at all 
[35] Do you think that your tax adviser has sufficient knowledge of tax 
practice? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
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 Yes 
 No 
[36] How seriously do you take the recommendations of your tax adviser?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Very seriously  
 Seriously  
 Uncertain  
 Not seriously  
 Not seriously at all   
[37] To what extent does your tax adviser have an influence on your tax 
decisions? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Major influence   
 Some influence   
 Uncertain  
 Little influence   
 No influence  
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